Ray v. Commissioner of the Social Security Administration

Filing 30

ORDER adopting 22 Report and Recommendation and affirming the Commissioner's decision. Signed by Honorable David C. Norton on 03-17-2014. (gcle, 3/17/14)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
ORANGEBURG DIVISION
MELLICA ANN RAY,
Claimant,
vs.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting
Commissioner of Social Security,
Respondent.

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No. 5:12-cv-03307-DCN

ORDER

This matter is before the court on United States Magistrate Judge Kaymani D.
West’s report and recommendation (“R&R”) that the court affirm the Acting
Commissioner of Social Security’s decision to deny claimant Mellica Ann Ray’s (“Ray”)
application for disability insurance benefits (“DIB”). Ray has filed objections to the
R&R. For the reasons set forth below, the court adopts the R&R and affirms the
Commissioner’s decision.
I. BACKGROUND
Unless otherwise noted, the following background is drawn from the R&R.
A. Procedural History
Ray filed applications for DIB and for supplemental security income (“SSI”) on
November 8, 2005, alleging that she had been disabled since August 26, 2005. Ray’s SSI
claim was denied on November 9, 2005 because she did not meet the eligibility
requirements. That decision has not been appealed. The Social Security Administration
(“the Agency”) denied Ray’s application for DIB both initially and on reconsideration.
Ray requested a hearing before an administrative law judge (“ALJ”) and ALJ Karen H.

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Baker presided over a hearing held on October 1, 2008. In a decision issued on January
30, 2009, the ALJ determined that Ray was not disabled. In light of newly submitted
evidence, the Appeals Council remanded the case to the ALJ. Since ALJ Baker had
retired, the case was reassigned to ALJ Ivar E. Avots, who held another hearing on
January 14, 2011. In an opinion issued on April 11, 2011, the ALJ again denied Ray’s
claims for benefits. The Appeals Council subsequently denied review, making the ALJ’s
decision the final decision of the Commissioner.
Ray filed this action for judicial review on November 19, 2012. On May 15,
2013, she filed a brief requesting that the Commissioner’s decision be reversed and the
case remanded to the Agency for further administrative proceedings. On June 26, 2013,
the Commissioner filed a brief contending that her decision should be upheld. On
January 22, 2014, the magistrate judge issued the instant R&R, recommending that the
Commissioner’s decision be affirmed. Ray objected to portions of the R&R on February
14, 2014, and the Commissioner filed a brief response to those objections on February
27, 2014. This matter has been fully briefed and is now ripe for the court’s review.
B. Ray’s Medical History
Because the parties are familiar with Ray’s medical history, the court dispenses
with a lengthy recitation thereof and instead notes a few relevant facts. Ray was born on
February 19, 1955, and was forty-nine years old on her alleged disability onset date. Tr.
119. She has a high school education and past relevant work experience as a
communications data entry person and telephone solicitor. Tr. 48, 119.

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C. ALJ’s Findings
The Social Security Act defines “disability” as the “inability to engage in any
substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental
impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be
expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 423(d)(1)(A); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1505. The Social Security regulations establish a fivestep sequential evaluation process to determine whether a claimant is disabled. See 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. Under this process, the ALJ must determine whether the
claimant: (1) is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) has a severe
impairment; (3) has an impairment which equals an illness contained in 20 C.F.R. § 404,
Subpt. P, App’x 1, which warrants a finding of disability without considering vocational
factors; (4) if not, whether the claimant has an impairment which prevents her from
performing past relevant work; and (5) if so, whether the claimant is able to perform
other work considering both her remaining physical and mental capacities (defined by her
residual functional capacity) and her vocational capabilities (age, education, and past
work experience) to adjust to a new job. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520; Hall v. Harris, 658
F.2d 260, 264-65 (4th Cir. 1981). The claimant bears the burden of proof during the first
four steps of the inquiry, while the burden shifts to the Commissioner for the final step.
Pass v. Chater, 65 F.3d 1200, 1203 (4th Cir. 1995) (citing Hunter v. Sullivan, 993 F.2d
31, 35 (4th Cir. 1992)).
To determine whether Ray was disabled from August 26, 2005 through the date
her date last insured of December 31, 2010, the ALJ employed the statutorily-required
five-step sequential evaluation process. At step one, the ALJ found that Ray did not

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engage in substantial gainful activity during the period at issue. Tr. 19. At step two, the
ALJ found that Ray suffered from the following severe impairments: degenerative disc
disease; multilevel spondylosis and moderate hypertrophic facet arthropathy at L4-5 and
L5-S1; erosive gastritis; morbid obesity; sleep apnea; and chronic obstructive pulmonary
disease (“COPD”). Tr. 20. At step three, the ALJ found that Ray’s impairments or
combination thereof did not meet or medically equal one of the impairments listed in the
Agency’s Listing of Impairments. Tr. 24. Before reaching the fourth step, the ALJ
determined that Ray retained the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform a wide
range of light work. Tr. 34. Specifically, the ALJ found:
She is able to lift no more than 20 pounds at a time, with frequent lifting
or carrying of objects weighing up to 10 pounds. She can walk or stand up
to six hours out of a normal eight-hour workday, and can sit for up to six
hours. She can never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds, but can
occasionally climb ramps and stairs, stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl. She
can frequently balance. She is able to perform some pushing and pulling
of arm or leg controls, and can use her arms and hands to grasp, to hold,
and to turn objects. Because of her COPD, she must avoid concentrated
exposure to fumes, odors, dusts, gases, poor ventilation, and cigarette
smoke. Because of her obesity and chronic pain, she has decreased agility
and must avoid even moderate exposure to hazards, including machinery
and heights. She has no visual or auditory impairments, and her mental
impairments have caused no functional limitations.
Id. At step four, the ALJ found that Ray was able to perform past relevant work as a
communications data entry person and as a telephone solicitor. Tr. 48. As a result, the
ALJ found that Ray was not disabled.1 Tr. 49.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
This court is charged with conducting a de novo review of any portion of the
magistrate judge’s R&R to which specific, written objections are made. 28 U.S.C. §

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Because the ALJ determined at step four that Ray was not disabled, he did not proceed to step
five of the sequential evaluation.

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636(b)(1). This court is not required to review the factual findings and legal conclusions
of the magistrate judge to which the parties have not objected. See id. The
recommendation of the magistrate judge carries no presumptive weight, and the
responsibility to make a final determination remains with this court. Mathews v. Weber,
423 U.S. 261, 270-71 (1976).
Judicial review of the Commissioner’s final decision regarding disability benefits
“is limited to determining whether the findings of the [Commissioner] are supported by
substantial evidence and whether the correct law was applied.” Hays v. Sullivan, 907
F.2d 1453, 1456 (4th Cir. 1990). Substantial evidence is “more than a mere scintilla of
evidence but may be somewhat less than a preponderance.” Id. (internal citations
omitted). “[I]t is not within the province of a reviewing court to determine the weight of
the evidence, nor is it the court’s function to substitute its judgment for that of the
[Commissioner] if his decision is supported by substantial evidence.” Id.
III. DISCUSSION
Ray’s objections to the R&R echo two of the allegations of error she assigned to
the ALJ in her opening brief. Specifically, Ray objects that: (i) the ALJ erred at step
three by failing to consider Ray’s mental impairments in combination with her other
impairments; and (ii) the ALJ erred by improperly determining Ray’s ability to perform
past relevant work. The court considers these objections in turn.
A. Combination of Impairments
Ray first contends that the ALJ failed at step three by improperly considering
Rays mental impairments in combination with her other impairments.
Federal law states that:

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In determining whether an individual’s physical or mental impairment or
impairments are of a sufficient medical severity that such impairment or
impairments could be the basis of eligibility under this section, the
Commissioner of Social Security shall consider the combined effect of all
of the individual’s impairments without regard to whether any such
impairment, if considered separately, would be of such severity.
42 U.S.C. § 423(B) (2012); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1523 (2013) (“[W]e will consider
the combined effect of all of your impairments without regard to whether any such
impairment, if considered separately, would be of sufficient severity.”). As the Fourth
Circuit has explained, “a failure to establish disability under the listings by reference to a
single, separate impairment does not prevent a disability award.” Walker v. Bowen, 889
F.2d 47, 49 (4th Cir. 1989). “As a corollary, the ALJ must adequately explain his or her
evaluation of the combined effects of the impairments.” Id. at 50.
Agency regulations provide a two-step “special technique” that must be employed
when a claimant alleges that she has a mental impairment. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a. First,
the ALJ must evaluate a claimant’s pertinent symptoms, signs, and laboratory findings to
determine whether she has a medically determinable mental impairment. 20 C.F.R. §
404.1520a(b)(1). Second, the ALJ “must then rate the degree of functional limitation
resulting from the impairment(s) . . . and record [his or her] findings . . . .” 20 C.F.R. §
404.1520a(b)(2). Specifically, the ALJ must consider whether the claimant has any
functional limitations in four broad areas: activities of daily living; social functioning;
concentration, persistence, or pace; and episodes of decompensation. 20 C.F.R. §
404.1520a(c).
The ALJ in this case properly employed the required special technique when
assessing Ray’s mental impairments. First, he discussed at length the evidence of Ray’s
mental impairments. Tr. 21-24. Next, he determined – through a detailed discussion –
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that Ray had no functional limitations in the four broad areas enumerated by the statute.
Id. Ray disagrees with the ALJ’s analysis and points to other evidence that supports her
position that her mental impairments are severe. However, it is not the function of this
court to reweigh the evidence. Moreover, as the magistrate judge pointed out, the ALJ
need not provide a written evaluation of every piece of evidence in the record. Jackson v.
Astrue, No. 08-cv-02855, 2010 WL 500449, at *10 (D.S.C. Feb. 5, 2010). The ALJ’s
decision that Ray’s mental impairments have not caused any functional limitations is
undoubtedly supported by substantial evidence. Ray’s first objection fails.
B. Past Relevant Work
Ray next contends that the ALJ improperly determined that she was capable of
doing her past relevant work as a communications data entry person and as a telephone
solicitor. Ray appears to argue that the ALJ’s determination was faulty and that the
“Magistrate Judge fails to recognize that Ray’s mental impairments were partially the
result of her physical impairments.” Ray’s Objections 6.
Agency regulations explain that:
Determination of the claimant’s ability to do [past relevant work] requires
a careful appraisal of (1) the individual’s statements as to which past work
requirements can no longer be met and the reason(s) for his or her inability
to meet those requirements; (2) medical evidence establishing how the
impairment limits ability to meet the physical and mental requirements of
the work; and (3) in some cases, supplementary or corroborative
information from other sources such as employers, the Dictionary of
Occupational Titles, etc., on the requirements of the work as generally
performed in the economy.
SSR 82-62, 1975-1982 Soc. Sec. Rep. Serv. 809 (Jan. 1, 1982).
Regardless of the source of Ray’s mental impairments, the ALJ determined – by
analyzing Ray’s testimony and the record evidence – that those impairments were nonsevere and that they caused no functional limitations. The court has explained above, and
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the magistrate judge discussed at length, that these determinations were supported by
substantial evidence. As a result, the court cannot find that the ALJ improperly
calculated Ray’s ability to perform her past relevant work. Ray’s second objection fails.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the court ADOPTS the magistrate judge’s report
& recommendation, ECF No. 22, and AFFIRMS the Commissioner’s decision.
AND IT IS SO ORDERED.

DAVID C. NORTON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

March 17, 2014
Charleston, South Carolina

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