Reed v. Commissioner of the Social Security Administration

Filing 35

ORDER RULING ON REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION: The Court hereby ADOPTS the Report and Recommendation as the order of the Court, REVERSES the decision of the Commissioner, and REMANDS the matter to the agency for further action. Signed by Honorable Richard M Gergel on 2/3/2014. (gnan )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA

Donna Ann Reed.
Plaintiff.
vs.
Carolyn W. Colvin, Acting Commissioner
of Social Security.
Defendant.

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Civil Action No. 5: 12-3356-RMG

ORDER

Plaintiff has brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) seeking judicial review of
the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying her claim for Disability
Insurance Benefits (HDIB") and Supplemental Security Income ("SSI"). In accord with 28
U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02 DSC, this matter was referred to a United States
Magistrate Judge for pre-trial handling. The Magistrate Judge issued a Report and
Recommendation ("R & R") on January 15,2014, recommending that the decision of the
Commissioner be reversed and remanded. (Dkt. No. 32). The Commissioner has advised the
Court she does not intend to file objections to the R & R. (Dkt. No. 34).

Legal Standard
The Magistrate Judge makes only a recommendation to this Court. The recommendation
has no presumptive weight, and the responsibility to make a final determination remains with the
Court. Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261 (1976). The Court is charged with making a de novo
determination of those portions of the Report and Recommendation to which specific objection is
made. The Court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the recommendation of the

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Magistrate Judge. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
The role of the federal judiciary in the administrative scheme established by the Social
Security Act is a limited one. The Act provides that the "findings of the Commissioner of Social
Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive." 42 U.S.C.

§ 405(g). "Substantial evidence has been defined innumerable times as more than a scintilla, but
less than preponderance." Thomas v. Celebrezze, 331 F.2d 541,543 (4th Cir. 1964). This
standard precludes de novo review of the factual circumstances that substitutes the Court's
findings of fact for those of the Commissioner. Vitek v. Finch, 438 F.2d 1157 (4th Cir. 1971).
Although the federal court's review role is a limited one, "it does not follow, however,
that the findings of the administrative agency are to be mechanically accepted. The statutorily
granted right of review contemplates more than an uncritical rubber stamping of the
administrative action." Flack v. Cohen, 413 F .2d 278, 279 (4th Cir. 1969). Further, the
Commissioner's findings of fact are not binding if they were based upon the application of an
improper legal standard. Coffman v. Bowen, 829 F.2d 514,519 (4th Cir. 1987).
Discussion

Plaintiff has sought disability benefits under the Social Security Act since 2005, asserting
that she has been disabled since December 2000. A previous Administrative Law Judge decision
of July 17,2007, denied her application for disability benefits. Her present application for
disability benefits was filed in September 2009, and she now asserts an onset date of disability of
September 3, 2009. (Dkt. No. 32 at 1 n.2). In a decision issued on May 5, 2011, the ALJ
detennined that Plaintiff had numerous severe physical and mental health impainnents, including
degenerative disc disease, osteoarthritis, bipolar disorder, depressive disorder, and personality
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disorder. Tr. 12. Nonetheless, the ALJ detennined that none of Plaintiffs impainnents satisfied
any Listing at Step Three and she retained the Residual Functional Capacity for sedentary work.
Tr. 15. The ALJ found, based upon the testimony of a Vocational Expert, that there are sufficient
jobs in the national economy for persons with Plaintiffs limitations and she was, thus, not
disabled under the Social Security Act. Tr. 24.
In reviewing the decision of the AU, the Magistrate Judge addressed the ALJ's findings
relating to Plaintiff's mental health impainnents, particularly the statement that "Plaintiffs
mental health impainnents are effectively treated with psychotropic medications resulting in
mental stability." (Dkt. No. 32 at 33). The Magistrate Judge concluded that this statement is not
supported by substantial evidence. Id. at 33-34. The Magistrate Judge also found improper the
ALl's failure to consider opinions of Plaintiff's licensed counselor, Ms. Jennifer Brown,
regarding the impact of Plaintiff's mental impainnents on her work environment. Id. at 34.
The Court has carefully reviewed Plaintiff's mental health records from on and after the
amended onset date of September 3, 2009, and notes that multiple treating or examining
providers have diagnosed Plaintiff with a major depressive disorder or severe depression. These
include Plaintiff's primary mental health provider at the Pee Dee Mental Health Center, Ms.
Jennifer Brown; a board certified psychiatrist, Dr. Janet Woolery; a board certified neurologist,
Dr. James Evans; and a board certified family physician, Dr. Patrick Ryan. Tr. 413, 454, 459-60,
536. Two of these treating physicians, Dr. Evans and Dr. Woolery, have actively considered the
use of electroconvulsive therapy ("ECT") to deal what has been described as "treatment resistant
bipolar and depression." Tr. 394,413,459-60. These mental health records of treating and
examining physicians demonstrate the correctness of the Magistrate Judge's conclusion that the
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ALJ's finding that Plaintiffs impairments have been "effectively treated" is not supported by
substantial evidence.
The Court also agrees with the finding by the Magistrate Judge that the ALJ improperly
declined to consider opinions of the treating counselor, Ms. Brown, regarding the likely impact
of Plaintiff s mental impairments on her ability to function in the workplace. Ms. Brown stated
in a report dated April 18, 2011, that "the stresses of a normal workday would negatively impact
Donna's symptoms" and Plaintiffs "unpredictable moods" and difficulty handling stress would
likely create "instability" and "marked disturbances"in the workplace. Tr.537. The ALJ gave
"little weight" to Ms. Brown's opinions on Plaintiffs ability to maintain employment because
this was allegedly not a psychological issue and was a matter reserved to the Commissioner. Tr.
20.
The Commissioner has pledged, under the Treating Physician Rule, to consider "every"
expert opinion, including an expert's "judgments about the nature and severity of a claimant's
impairments" and "prognosis," and to provide greater weight to those expert opinions provided
by treating and examining providers. 20 c.P.R. § 404.1 527(a)(2),(c)(2). Certain matters are
reserved to the Commissioner, such as the issue of whether a claimant satisfies the statutory
definition of disability. Id § 404.1527(d)(1). The opinions of Ms. Brown, relating to Plaintiffs
likely ability to perform in the workplace because of her psychological impairments relating to
stress and a mood disorder, draw upon her special insights and expertise as a treating provider
and is the type of expert opinion that should be carefully considered and given a high degree of
deference under the Treating Physician Rule. Consequently, the ALJ erred in providing "little
weight" to Ms. Brown's opinions on this matter.
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After a careful review of the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation, the
Commissioner's objections, the administrative record, and controlling legal standards, the Court
finds that the Report and Recommendation ably analyzes the factual and legal issues in this
matter and correctly concludes that the decision of the Commissioner should be reversed and
remanded to the agency. Therefore, the Court adopts the Report and Recommendation as the
order of the Court.

Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, the Court hereby ADOPTS the Report and Recommendation as
the order of the Court, REVERSES the decision of the Commissioner, and REMANDS the
matter to the agency for further action consistent with this order, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
AND IT IS SO ORDERED.

L,

February
2014
Charleston, South Carolina

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