Pronin v. Johnson et al
Filing
151
ORDER granting 108 Motion for Summary Judgment; adopting Report and Recommendations re 141 Report and Recommendation. Signed by Honorable David C Norton on 3/31/15.(akob, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
ORANGEBURG DIVISION
DMITRY PRONIN,
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
vs.
)
)
LT. TROY JOHNSON, OFFICER
)
FLOURNEY, KENNETH ATKINSON,
)
REX BLOCKER, JOHN BRYANT,
)
BRANDON BURKETT, JAKE
)
BURKETT, OFFICER CRAWFORD,
)
DANIEL FALLEN, LOUISA FUERTES- )
RASARIO, EDWARD HAMPTON,
)
WILLIAM JOHNSON, SANDRA K.
)
LATHROP, OFFICER MIDDLEBROOK, )
EDA OLIVERA-NEGRON, HENRI
)
WALL, PATINA WALTON-GRIER,
)
and OFFICER WILSON,
)
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Defendants.
)
)
No. 5:12-c v-03416-DCN
ORDER
This matter is before the court on Magistrate Judge Kaymani D. West’s Report
and Recommendation (“R&R”) that this court grant the motion for summary judgment
filed by all eighteen defendants of record. Plaintiff Dmitry Pronin (“Pronin”), an inmate
who alleges that defendants violated his constitutional rights, filed written objections to
the R&R. For the reasons set forth below, the court adopts the R&R and grants
defendants’ motion for summary judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
Pronin’s complaint and supporting affidavits document a number of incidents that
he alleges occurred while he was incarcerated at the Federal Corrections Institution in
Edgefield, South Carolina (“FCI Edgefield”). Specifically, Pronin alleges that
defendants: (1) denied his right of access to the courts by, among other actions, failing to
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provide him access to the prison law library; (2) retaliated against him by treating him
like an animal and denying him access to courts; (3) violated his constitutional rights by
failing to timely send him certain incident reports and treating him differently than his
Spanish-speaking cellmate; (4) violated the Eighth Amendment by showing deliberate
indifference to his medical needs and creating filthy prison conditions; and (5) violated
his constitutional rights under a theory of supervisory liability. Defendants deny that the
allegations amount to constitutional violations and assert the defense of qualified
immunity.
Pronin filed the present action on December 3, 2012. Pronin filed an amended
complaint on February 13, 2013 and a second amended complaint on April 29, 2013. On
August 21, 2013, defendants filed a motion to dismiss. Pronin filed a response on
September 24, 2013. On January 13, 2014, the magistrate judge issued an R&R, treating
the motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment and recommending that the
court grant the motion because Pronin failed to exhaust his administrative remedies
pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”). This court rejected the
magistrate judge’s recommendation, finding a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether defendants hindered Pronin’s ability to obtain grievance forms. The case was
then remanded back to the magistrate judge for further consideration of defendants’
motion.
Defendants subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment on May 27, 2014.
Pronin filed responses on June 16, 2014, August 4, 2014, and August 18, 2014. The
magistrate judge issued an R&R on September 5, 2014. Pronin filed objections to that
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R&R on September 22, 2014, and filed supplemental objections on September 25, 2014.
The matter has been fully briefed and is now ripe for the court’s review.
II. STANDARDS
A.
Objections to R&R
This court is charged with conducting a de novo review of any portion of the
magistrate judge’s R&R to which specific, written objections are made. 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1). A party’s failure to object is accepted as agreement with the conclusions of
the magistrate judge. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149–50 (1985). In absence of a
timely filed objection to a magistrate judge’s R&R, this court need not conduct a de novo
review, but instead must “only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the
record in order to accept the recommendation.” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins.
Co., 416 F.3d 310, 315 (4th Cir. 2005) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee’s
note). The recommendation of the magistrate judge carries no presumptive weight, and
the responsibility to make a final determination rests with this court. Mathews v. Weber,
423 U.S. 261, 270–71 (1976). This court may accept, reject, or modify the report of the
magistrate judge, in whole or in part, or may recommit the matter to him with instructions
for further consideration. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
B.
Summary Judgment
Summary judgment is proper “if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit
under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.”
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). “[S]ummary judgment will
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not lie if the dispute about a material fact is ‘genuine,’ that is, if the evidence is such that
a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. At the summary
judgment stage, the court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences in his favor. Id. at 255.
C.
Pro Se Plaintiff
Plaintiff is proceeding pro se in this case. Federal district courts are charged with
liberally construing complaints filed by pro se litigants to allow the development of a
potentially meritorious case. See Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9–10 (1980). Pro se
complaints are therefore held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys.
Id. Liberal construction, however, does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure
in the pleading to allege facts that set forth a cognizable claim. See Weller v. Dep’t of
Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 390–91 (4th Cir. 1990).
III. DISCUSSION
Pronin objects to the R&R on eight grounds. Pronin asserts that the magistrate
judge erred in finding that: (1) there is no independent constitutional right to library
access, legal supplies, or legal assistance; (2) Pronin’s retaliation claim should fail as a
matter of law; (3) Pronin failed to demonstrate a due process claim; (4) finding that
Pronin failed to demonstrate a medical indifference claim; (5) Pronin failed to
demonstrate a cause of action for cruel and unusual punishment; (6) Pronin failed to
demonstrate an equal protection violation; (7) Pronin failed to demonstrate a cause of
action for supervisory liability; and (8) defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.
The court will address each objection in turn.
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A.
Access to Courts
Pronin’s first objects to the magistrate judge’s finding that there is no independent
constitutional right to library access, legal supplies, or legal assistance. Pl.’s Objections
2. Pronin further objects to the magistrate judge’s finding that he failed to allege a cause
of action for denial of access to courts based on the loss of his legal paperwork. Id. at 3.
In Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821 (1977), the Supreme Court explained that
“prisoners have a constitutional right of access to the courts.” However, “Bounds did not
create an abstract, freestanding right to a law library or legal assistance.” Lewis v. Casey,
518 U.S. 343, 351 (1996). A prisoner claiming a Bounds violation must show: (i) that
shortcomings in the prison’s library or legal assistance program hindered his efforts to
attack his sentence, directly or collaterally, or to challenge the conditions of his
confinement; and (ii) that he was actually injured as a result of these shortcomings.
Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351–53, 355. To establish a prima facie case of denial of access to the
courts, the inmate cannot rely on conclusory allegations; he must identify with specificity
an actual injury resulting from official conduct, Cochran v. Morris, 73 F.3d 1310, 1316
(4th Cir. 1996); see also White v. White, 886 F.2d 721, 723–24 (4th Cir. 1989), by
demonstrating “that his nonfrivolous, post-conviction or civil rights legal claim has been
frustrated or impeded.” Jackson v. Wiley, 352 F. Supp. 2d 666, 679–80 (E.D. Va. 2004).
Plaintiff objects to the magistrate judge’s reliance on Cobb v. Ozmint, which
states that a prisoner “has no independent constitutional right to library access, legal
supplies, or legal assistance.” No. 0:08-cv-3978, 2010 WL 2943073, at *4 (D.S.C. July
1, 2010) report and recommendation adopted, 2010 WL 2990013 (D.S.C. July 27, 2010).
However, given that the magistrate judge was referring to Pronin’s allegation that
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envelopes, paper, and other supplies were not made available to him, compl. ¶ 13, the
court finds that the magistrate judge properly relied on Cobb to dispose of this part of
Pronin’s denial of access to courts claim.
As for Pronin’s allegation that defendants Jake Burkett (“Burkett”) and Troy
Johnson (“Johnson”) “successfully got rid of [Pronin’s] legal paperwork,” Pl.’s
Objections 3, this claim relates to an incident in which Burkett allegedly placed certain
legal paperwork in Pronin’s old cell, cell 236, which Pronin’s former cellmate later
destroyed on November 11, 2012 by throwing the paperwork on the floor and flushing
part of it down the toilet. Compl. ¶ 6; Am. Compl. ¶ 10–12. Pronin alleges that Burkett
then “maliciously and deliberately left [his] legal paperwork in cell 236 for another six
hours, so that [his] paperwork was mostly ruined by [his] then-cellmate.” Compl. ¶ 8(a).
Defendants have attached the declaration of Burkett to their motion for summary
judgment. In his declaration, Burkett avers that he did not place the legal paperwork in
cell 236 with the intention that Pronin’s cellmate destroy the paperwork and that when he
was notified of the water in cell 236, he “gathered all of Mr. Pronin’s property that could
be identified as his property from cell 236, and gave Mr. Pronin his property.” Def.’s
Mot. Ex. 23 ¶ 4–5. Burkett further avers that he “did not leave any of Mr. Pronin’s
documents, including any envelopes which could clearly be identified as Mr. Pronin’s
paperwork in cell 236 for any reason.” Id. Ex. 23 ¶ 5.
Thus, in light of Burkett’s uncontested declaration, there is no genuine issue of
material fact as to whether he intentionally destroyed Pronin’s legal paperwork.
Therefore, Burkett’s actions amount to, at most, negligence, which is not actionable
under § 1983. See Pink v. Lester, 52 F.3d 73, 77 (4th Cir. 1995) (finding that “negligent
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denials of access” are not actionable under § 1983); Wise v. Lexington Cnty. Sheriff’s
Dep’t, No. 4:06-cv-1842, 2008 WL 551618, at *5 (D.S.C. Feb. 26, 2008) aff’d, 283 F.
App’x 155 (4th Cir. 2008) (“Prisoners do not have a cause of action under § 1983 for
negligent interference by prison officials with their right of access to the courts.”) (citing
Pink, 52 F.3d at 77)).
Moreover, even if the court were to assume that there was a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether Burkett intentionally destroyed Pronin’s legal paperwork, this
claim still fails because Pronin has not shown with specificity that he was injured by the
alleged denial of access to his legal property. Cochran, 73 F.3d at 1316.
In alleging actual injury, Pronin lists various documents relating to his epilepsy,
neck tick, and psychological impairments, which he contends were destroyed by Burkett
and Johnson. Pl.’s Objections 4–5. Pronin claims that, “had these documents been
presented to the United States District Court for the District of Delaware (where plaintiff
was convicted), it would greatly influence the length of [his] imposed sentence.” Id. at 5.
It appears Pronin is referring to his pending § 2255 motion for post-conviction, on which
the United States District Court for the District of Delaware has not yet ruled. Defs.’
Resp. Ex. 1.
The Fourth Circuit considered a similar argument in Strickler v. Waters, when
rejecting a prisoner’s denial of access to courts claim. 989 F.2d 1375, 1383 (4th Cir.
1993). In Strickler, the prisoner contended that the prison’s deficiencies delayed his
filing of a habeas corpus petition and thereby delayed the termination of his
imprisonment. Id. The Fourth Circuit held that “[s]uch a vague and conclusory
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allegation does not state the kind of specific injury or prejudice to his litigation sufficient
to survive summary judgment, if it could be said to state an injury at all.” Id.
The court finds Strickler instructive here. Accordingly, because Pronin has failed
to allege an actual injury, summary judgment for the defendants is appropriate on his
access to courts claim claim.
B.
Retaliation
Pronin’s second objection to the R&R is that the magistrate judge erred in finding
that his retaliation claim should fail as a matter of law. Pl.’s Objections 10–11. Pronin
contends that he has provided direct and circumstantial evidence of retaliation. Id.
To state a claim of retaliation under § 1983, a plaintiff must “allege either that the
retaliatory act was taken in response to the exercise of a constitutionally-protected right
or that the act itself violated such a right.” Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 75 (4th Cir. 1994).
An inmate must also present more than conclusory accusations of retaliation, id. at 74,
and must provide facts that show the exercise of his constitutional right was a substantial
factor motivating the retaliation. See, e.g., Cochran, 73 F.3d at 1318; Hughes v. Bledsoe,
48 F.3d 1376, 1387 n.11 (4th Cir. 1995). Finally, a plaintiff must show that he suffered
some adverse impact on the continued exercise of his constitutional rights as a result of
the retaliatory conduct. Am. Civil Liberties Union, Inc. v. Wicomico Cnty., 999 F.2d
780, 785 (4th Cir. 1993) (“Where there is no impairment of the plaintiff’s rights, there is
no need for the protection provided by a cause of action for retaliation.”).
In his complaint, Pronin alleges that he “was treated like an animal” and denied
access to courts for retaliatory reasons. Compl. 2. Pronin details the alleged retaliation in
his amended complaint, stating that: (1) Burkett turned off the water and light in Pronin’s
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cell for more than four hours on October 28, 2012; (2) Burkett “maliciously and
deliberately left [Pronin’s] legal paperwork [in his former cell] for another six hours, so
that [his] paperwork was mostly ruined by [his] then-cellmate; and (3) Burkett, “in
retaliation on behalf of his elder brother Jake Burkett, wrote [Pronin] an incident report
where he claimed that on October 28, 2012, [Pronin] pressed an emergency button
without purpose and thus alternated (sic) a life-safety device.” Am. Compl. ¶¶ 8, 9.
The court agrees with the magistrate judge’s finding that each of Pronin’s
retaliation claims fail as a matter of law. As an initial matter, Pronin presents conflicting
statements as to whether his exercise of a constitutionally protected right was a
substantial factor motivating the alleged retaliatory actions. Cochran, 73 F.3d at 1318. In
his complaint, Pronin acknowledges that Burkett turned off his cell’s water and light on
October 28, 2012 because “somebody from our cell threw a tray at [Burkett].” Compl.
Ex. 2 at 1. However, in his objections to the R&R, Pronin claims for the first time that
this alleged retaliatory act occurred “to prevent [Pronin] from writ-writing.” Pl.’s
Objections 13. He goes on to state that the collective retaliation “completely ruined his
expectations to achieve [a] successful § 2255 motion.” Id. at 14.
Even assuming Pronin properly alleges that the retaliation occurred in response to
his exercise of a constitutionally protected right, he has failed to demonstrate that an
adverse effect occurred as a result. Am. Civil Liberties Union, Inc., 999 F.2d at 785. As
previously noted, Pronin has filed a § 2255 motion that is currently pending before the
United States District Court for the District of Delaware. Defs.’ Resp. Ex. 1. Because
Pronin has not suffered an adverse effect from the alleged retaliation, his retaliation claim
fails as a matter of law.
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C.
Due Process
Pronin’s third objection to the R&R is that the magistrate judge erred in finding
that Pronin failed to demonstrate a due process claim. Pl.’s Objections 16. Pronin
contends that the magistrate judge “completely overlook[ed]” the fact that Pronin was
deprived of his legal property.1 Id. Pronin again details the alleged loss of his legal
paperwork due to the actions of Burkett and Johnson, claiming that as a result of the
defendants’ actions, Pronin lost not only a “substantial part of his property, but also his
fair hope and regar[d] to obtain freedom [and] liberty faster than it would be in current
circumstances.” Id.
The Due Process Clause provides that no State shall deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
However, the Due Process Clause is not implicated by a negligent act of a governmental
official causing unintended loss of or injury to life, liberty, or property. Daniels v.
Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986); Pink v. Lester, 52 F.3d 73, 75 (4th Cir. 1995). Moreover,
“[a]n unauthorized intentional deprivation of property by a [government] employee does
not constitute a violation of the procedural requirements of the Due Process Clause . . . if
a meaningful postdeprivation remedy for the loss is available.” Cyrus v. U.S. Marshals
1
Pronin does not appear to object to the magistrate judge’s finding that no
violation of due process took place when Pronin received copies of incident reports
concerning his suicide attempts more than 24 hours after the incidents happened. R&R
12. Regardless, the court finds that the magistrate judge properly relied on Wolff v,
McDonnell to find that due process does not require that Pronin receive notice of an
incident report within 24 hours of the incident. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539,
563–567 (1974) (finding that an inmate is entitled to the following: 1) written notice of
the charges at least 24 hours in advance of the hearing; 2) written findings as to the
evidence relied upon and reasons for the disciplinary action; and 3) the right to call
witnesses and present evidence in his defense, provided that there is no undue hazard to
institutional safety or correctional goals).
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of Columbia, SC, No. 8:05-cv-1384, 2007 WL 601610, at *5 (D.S.C. Feb. 21, 2007)
(quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984)), report and recommendation
adopted No. 8:05-cv-1384, 2007 WL 809608 (D.S.C. Feb. 27, 2007); see Raditch v.
United States, 929 F.2d 478, 481 (9th Cir. 1991) (“Although Hudson involved § 1983 and
the Fourteenth Amendment, the same due process principles apply to the federal
government through the Fifth Amendment.”).
Here, “[t]here were adequate postdeprivation remedies available to [Pronin] and
therefore, the conduct complained does not violate the procedural requirements of the
Due Process Clause.” Cyrus, 2007 WL 601610, at *5. Accordingly, Pronin’s due
process claim fails as a matter of law.2
D.
Deliberate Indifference
Pronin’s fourth objection to the R&R is that the magistrate judge erred in finding
that Pronin failed to demonstrate a medical indifference claim. Pl.’s Objections 18.
The Fourth Circuit has recognized that “an inmate, with his conviction, forfeits or
has circumscribed many rights and privileges afforded to other persons.” United States v.
Gore, 592 F.3d 489, 493–94 (4th Cir. 2010). This forfeiture is not absolute; prisoners
inherently maintain their Eighth Amendment right to remain free from cruel and unusual
punishment. Id. A prison employee who shows “deliberate indifference to [the] serious
medical needs” of a prisoner violates that prisoner’s constitutional right to remain free
2
Although Pronin alleges that defendant John Bryant, a Correctional Counselor at
FCI Edgefield, lost his administrative remedies, compl. ¶ 10, such allegations have no
effect on Pronin’s due process claim. See Cyrus, 2007 WL 601610, at *5 (finding, in the
context of prisoner’s due process claim that, “even if defendant allegedly failed to
process the prisoner’s grievances, the plaintiff has not stated a constitutional claim”); see
also Montalvo v. Owen, No. 6:10-cv-01626, 2010 WL 4751576, at *3 (D.S.C. Nov. 16,
2010) (“[I]nmates have no constitutionally protected right to a grievance procedure.”).
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from “the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,
103 (1976) (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976)). In order to establish a
“deliberate indifference” to medical needs, plaintiff must demonstrate that defendant’s
treatment was “so grossly incompetent, inadequate, or excessive as to shock the
conscience or to be intolerable to fundamental fairness.” Miltier v. Beorn, 896 F.2d 848,
851 (4th Cir. 1990). Furthermore, “an inadvertent failure to provide adequate medical
care” does not meet the standard required to claim an Eighth Amendment violation, nor
does “mere negligence or malpractice.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105–06.
“Although the Constitution does require that prisoners be provided with a certain
minimum level of medical treatment, it does not guarantee to a prisoner the treatment of
his choice.” Jackson v. Fair, 846 F.2d 811, 817 (1st Cir. 1988). Prison officials
implement the type and amount of medical treatment at their discretion. See e.g., Allah
v. Hayman, 442 F. App'x 632, 635 (3d Cir. 2011) (holding that deliberate indifference
standard “requires much more” than taking issue with the “amount and kind of medical
care” an inmate received); Faison v. Rosado, 129 F. App’x 490, 492 (11th Cir. 2005)
(noting that although a prisoner “might not agree with the method of treatment provided,
matters of medical judgment do not give rise to a § 1983 claim”).
In his complaint, Pronin alleges that he entered the Special Housing Unit (“SHU”)
at FCI Edgefield after a sexual assault occurred for which he did not receive proper
psychological help. Compl. Ex. 1 at 2. In his amended Complaint, Pronin alleges that
defendant Dr. Rex Blocker (“Dr. Blocker”), the Clinical Director at FCI Edgefield,
“failed to see [him] as a chronic care clinic patient for almost a year, falsified [his]
medical record by placing wrong reason for [his] neurological condition (nervous neck
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tick), ignored [his] requests to correct the situation, ignored the situation with [his] eye
infection, and [his] seizure-like activity.” Am. Compl. ¶ 3. In addition, Pronin maintains
that on November 27, 2012, defendant Nurse Patina Walton-Greer (“Walton-Greer”)
refused to “take a sick call from [him] concerning his eye infection [and] to give him a
blank form for a sick call.” Id. ¶ 11. Finally, Pronin alleges that defendant Louisa
Fuertes-Rosario (“Fuertes-Rosario”), the Health Services Administrator at FCI Edgefield,
“failed to correct the false reasoning for [his] neurological condition (nervous neck tick),
[and] ignored [his] requests to her pertaining to the situation.” Id. ¶ 4.
As an initial matter, the court finds that, other than an apparent scrivener’s error
as to the date of Pronin’s initial examination by Dr. Blocker, the magistrate judge
correctly summarized Pronin’s medical treatment from defendants. The record reveals
that Pronin was initially examined by Dr. Blocker on January 18, 2012.3 Defs.’ Mot.
Summ. J. Exs. 12 at 21–23; 13 at 10. Upon examination, Dr. Blocker agreed with a
diagnosis in Pronin’s medical history indicating that he had an unspecified type of
epilepsy. Id. Ex. 12 at 22. Dr. Blocker also addressed Pronin’s psychological issues,
diagnosed Pronin with an unspecified psychosis, and ordered a comprehensive blood
work-up. Id. Ex. 12 at 21–23. During the same examination, Dr. Blocker examined
Pronin’s neck and found that he had full range of motion. Id. Ex. 12 at 22. Results of an
x–ray of Pronin’s neck were negative for any abnormalities, and the medical records
indicate that Pronin has minor chronic neck pain. Id. Exs. 11 at 8; 12 at 21.
3
The R&R states that Pronin’s initial examination by Dr. Blocker took place on
January 18, 2013. R&R 15. In support, the magistrate judge cites Dr. Blocker’s
declaration and the relevant medical records, which both indicate that this examination
occurred on January 18, 2012. Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J. Exs. 11 at 2; 12 at 21–23.
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Thereafter, Pronin saw psychology staff for an intake screening, and the staff
referred him for a telepsychiatry session. Id. Ex. 12 at 24. Pronin agreed to a plan that
would be monitored by psychology staff quarterly. Id. Ex. 11 at 4. On February 7, 2012,
Pronin agreed to take two anti-depressant medications. Id. Ex. 12 at 27–31. Pronin later
stopped taking the medications at his own request. Id. Ex. 12 at 36–37. He continued to
be treated for his mental health conditions and saw Dr. Blocker on February 22, 2013. Id.
Ex. 12 at 82–84
Pronin was seen and treated twice for his eye problem on December 4, 2012, and
December 30, 2012. Id. Ex. 12 at 68, 72, 73. Dr. Blocker avers that after these incidents,
Pronin did not complain about problems with his eyes again. Id. Ex. 11 at 6. The record
further reveals that Pronin was treated for seizure-like symptoms on February 16, 2013,
February 22, 2013, and March 26, 2013. Id. Ex. 12 at 79–89, 112–17. Overall, medical
records indicate that Pronin was seen 44 times in 16 months for various medical reasons.
Id. Exs. 11 ¶ 27; 12; 13.
In his objections, Pronin relies on the R&R to argue that Dr. Blocker waited more
than a month after Pronin’s initial examination on January 18, 2013 to prescribe him
medication on February 22, 2013. Pl.’s Objections 19. Regardless of the correct date of
the initial examination, an allegation of a delayed prescription of medication does not
constitute a constitutional deprivation. See Allah, 442 F. App’x at 635; Brown v.
Thompson, 868 F. Supp. 326 (S.D. Ga. 1994) (finding that although the provision of
medical care by prison officials is not discretionary, the type and amount of medical care
is discretionary).
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Regarding Pronin’s claim against Nurse Walton-Geer, the medical records
indicate that Pronin only complained of and was seen for eye infections on two
occasions—never by Walton-Geer. Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J. Ex. 12 at 68–69,
72–73. The medical records also show that on November 27, 2012, the day Pronin
alleges Walton-Geer refused him a sick call, he was counseled and received a care plan
from health services. Id. Ex. 13 at 8. Thus, the magistrate judge correctly found that
Pronin failed to state a claim of deliberate indifference to medical needs against WaltonGeer.
As for Fuertes-Rosario, Pronin states in his objections that he complained to her
about Dr. Blocker and Walton-Geer, and she therefore had actual knowledge of the
“deficiencies in the medical care system.” Pl.’s Objections 21. However, even assuming
that Pronin’s allegations are true, Fuertes-Rosario did not provide him with direct
medical care and her testimony reveals that she had “no authority or duty to overrule the
professional and informed decisions made by physicians.” Id. Ex. 15 at 1. Furthermore,
Pronin fails to demonstrate that, as a result of Fuertes-Rosario’s alleged inaction, his
treatment was “so grossly incompetent, inadequate, or excessive as to shock the
conscience or to be intolerable to fundamental fairness.” Miltier, 896 F.2d at 851.
Therefore, any inaction on her part could not constitute deliberate indifference to medical
needs. See Miltier, 896 F.2d at 851.
To the extent Pronin seeks to hold Fuertes-Rosario liable under a theory of
supervisory liability, his claim must also fail. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 693
(2009) (“Lest there be any mistake, . . . the majority is not narrowing the scope of
supervisory liability; it is eliminating Bivens supervisory liability entirely.”). As
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explained above, Pronin has failed to demonstrate an “‘affirmative causal link’ between
[Fuertes-Rosario’s] inaction and the particular constitutional injury suffered by the
[Pronin].” Fox v. Drew, No. 8:12-cv-421, 2013 WL 4776706, at *11 (D.S.C. Sept. 4,
2013) (holding that a defendant is liable in his individual capacity only for his personal
wrongdoing or supervisory actions that violated constitutional norms and requiring a
plaintiff to establish, among other things, “that there was an ‘affirmative causal link’
between the supervisor’s inaction and the particular constitutional injury suffered by the
plaintiff” to prevail under Bivens or § 1983 on a theory of supervisory liability).
Accordingly, Pronin has failed to establish a claim of deliberate indifference to
medical needs.
E.
Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Pronin’s fifth objection to the R&R is that the magistrate judge erred in finding
that Pronin failed to demonstrate a cause of action for cruel and unusual punishment.
Pl.’s Objections 23.
The Eighth Amendment prohibits punishments which “involve the unnecessary
and wanton infliction of pain.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103 (quoting Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173).
However, the Eighth Amendment “does not mandate comfortable prisons,” and, “[t]o the
extent that such conditions are restrictive and even harsh, they are part of the penalty that
criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S.
337, 347–49 (1981); see also Lopez v. Robinson, 914 F.2d 486, 490 (4th Cir. 1990). “In
order to establish the imposition of cruel and unusual punishment, a prisoner must prove
two elements—that ‘the deprivation of [a] basic human need was objectively sufficiently
serious,’ and that ‘subjectively the officials act[ed] with a sufficiently culpable state of
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mind.’” Shakka v. Smith, 71 F.3d 162, 166 (4th Cir. 1995) (quoting Strickler, 989 F.2d
at 1379). “Only extreme deprivations are adequate to satisfy the objective component of
an Eighth Amendment claim regarding conditions of confinement.” De’Lonta v.
Angelone, 330 F.3d 630, 634 (4th Cir. 2003). “If a prisoner has not suffered serious or
significant physical or mental injury as a result of the challenged condition, he simply has
not been subjected to cruel and unusual punishment within the meaning of the
Amendment.” Strickler, 989 F.2d at 1381.
In his complaint, Pronin alleges that defendants did not remove a bathroom
container from his cell prior to handing out lunch trays and later did not remove the
container after lunch was over, thereby forcing him to “eat in filthy conditions.” Compl.
¶ 19. In an affidavit, Pronin further alleges that defendants turned off the lights and water
in the cell range where he was housed so that he was deprived of light and water for more
than four hours. Compl. Ex. 1 at 1.
Pronin now alleges for the first time in an affidavit attached to his objections that
these conditions lasted for a period of three and a half days. Pl.’s Objections Ex. 1 at
1–2. Specifically, Pronin avers that, while housed in the SHU for three and a half days,
he ate his meals “in filthy conditions” and was “denied pure drinking water” on multiple
occasions. Id. Pronin further claims that the “lack of drinking water caused [him] great
physical and emotional anguish.” Id. at 2.
The most serious claim Pronin makes is that he was not provided with “pure
drinking water” on multiple occasions over a period of three and a half days. Id. “Given
the inevitable health problems that would be occasioned by such an event, it strains
credulity to accept this statement at face value.” Gibert v. Anderson Cnty. Sheriff’s
17
Office, No. 0:06-cv-1853, 2007 WL 328840, at *9 (D.S.C. Feb. 5, 2007) (discussing
plaintiff’s allegations regarding deprivation of water).
Nevertheless, even when Pronin’s complaint and affidavits are construed in the
light most favorable to him as the non-moving party, his allegations of “great physical
and emotional anguish” as a result of the alleged deprivation of water are inadequate to
survive a motion for summary judgment. Strickler, 989 F.2d at 1381 (“The mere
incantation of ‘physical and mental injury,’ of course, is inadequate to survive a motion
for summary judgment.”). Accordingly, Pronin’s claim of cruel and unusual punishment
fails as a matter of law.
F.
Equal Protection Violation
Pronin’s sixth objection to the R&R is that the magistrate judge erred in finding
that Pronin failed to demonstrate an equal protection violation. Pl.’s Objections 32.
“[W]hile a prisoner does not forfeit his constitutional right to equal protection by
the fact he has been convicted of a crime and imprisoned, prisoner claims under the equal
protection clause . . . must still be analyzed in light of the special security and
management concerns in the prison system.” Morrison v. Garraghty, 239 F.3d 648, 655
(4th Cir. 2001). “To succeed on an equal protection claim, a prisoner must first show that
he was treated differently from others who were similarly situated and that the unequal
treatment resulted from intentional or purposeful discrimination.” Daye v. Rubenstein,
417 F. App’x 317, 318 (4th Cir. 2011). After the prisoner makes such a showing, the
prisoner “must allege facts that, if ‘true, would demonstrate that disparate treatment lacks
justification under the requisite level of scrutiny.’” Id. at 318–19 (quoting Veney v.
Wyche, 293 F.3d 726, 731 (4th Cir. 2002)).
18
In his complaint, Pronin alleges that defendant Lieutenant Eda Olivera-Negron
(“Olivera-Negron”) discriminated against him when she covered up for “a Spanishspeaking person (my cellmate from 236)” regarding the circumstances of his loss of legal
paperwork on November 11, 2012. Compl. ¶ 6; Am. Compl. ¶ 10. Pronin alleges that his
cellmate lied about the incident, and implies that Olivera-Negron sided with his
cellmate’s version of events because they were both Hispanic. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 13–14.
Pronin further alleges that Olivera-Negron’s decision to move him, but not his cellmate,
to a different cell resulted in the loss of certain legal paperwork, including the appeal of a
Disciplinary Hearing Officer’s decision in which he was found guilty of fighting with
another Hispanic inmate. Id. ¶ 15.
In response, Olivera-Negron has submitted a declaration in which she recounts a
different version of this incident. Olivera-Negron avers that on November 11, 2012, she
was not working in the SHU, but rather was assigned to a different post. Defs.’ Mot.
Summ. J. Ex. 21 at 2. Therefore, she alleges, she was not responsible for cell changes,
property in the SHU, or supervising SHU staff. Id. Ex. 21 at 2. Olivera-Negron
maintains that she was called to the SHU on that date because she was told Pronin was
being disruptive. Id. Ex. 21 at 2. She claims that when she arrived, Pronin had already
been moved. Id. Ex. 21 at 2. She acknowledges speaking with Pronin’s Hispanic
cellmate, but avers that she did not cover up for this inmate and did not discriminate
against Pronin. Id. Ex. 21 at 2.
Olivera-Negron’s declaration refutes Pronin’s unsubstantiated allegations that she
was responsible for moving him to a different cell on November 11, 2012. Given that
Pronin has not submitted any evidence to dispute Olivera-Negron’s testimony that she
19
was not responsible for his removal from cell 236, his equal protection claim must fail as
a matter of law.
G.
Supervisory Liability
Pronin’s sixth objection to the R&R is that the magistrate judge erred in finding
that Pronin failed to demonstrate a cause of action for supervisory liability against
defendants Kenneth Atkinson (“Atkinson”) and Daniel Fallen (“Fallen”), who were FCI
administrators at all times relevant in Pronin’s complaint. Pl.’s Objections 36.
“Supervisory liability based upon constitutional violations inflicted by
subordinates is based, not upon notions of respondeat superior, but upon a recognition
that supervisory indifference or tacit authorization of subordinate misconduct may be a
direct cause of constitutional injury.” Miltier, 896 F.2d at 854. A plaintiff must establish
three elements to prevail on a theory of supervisory liability under § 1983:
(1) that the supervisor had actual or constructive knowledge that his
subordinate was engaged in conduct that posed “a pervasive and
unreasonable risk” of constitutional injury to citizens like the plaintiff; (2)
that the supervisor’s response to that knowledge was so inadequate as to
show “deliberate indifference to or tacit authorization of the alleged
offensive practices”; and (3) that there was an “affirmative causal link”
between the supervisor’s inaction and the particular constitutional injury
suffered by the plaintiff.
Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 799 (4th Cir. 1994).
In his complaint, Pronin alleges that Atkinson allowed violations of his
constitutional rights under the First, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments by
“[f]ail[ing] to take a decisive action upon receiving written requests concerning B Unit
Staff Members coming to SHU without any remedy forms” and “[f]ail[ing] to supervise
and direct staff members.” Compl. ¶ 1. Pronin alleges that Fallen “failed to react upon
receiving the information from [Pronin] concerning C.O. Brandon Burkett gravely
20
violating 8th Amendment rights . . . by cutting off water [and] light in cell 136 on
October 28, 2012.” Id. ¶ 2. Pronin claims that, in allowing Burkett to go unpunished,
Fallen violated the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Id.
For the reasons stated above, the court finds that Pronin has failed to demonstrate
a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether any defendant deprived him of a
constitutionally protected right. Therefore, Pronin cannot establish that he suffered any
constitutional injuries, much less “an affirmative causal link” between Atkinson’s and
Fallen’s inactions and those alleged injuries. Shaw, 13 F.3d at 799. Accordingly, Pronin
has failed to present evidence sufficient to prevail on a theory of supervisory liability
against Atkinson and Fallen.
G.
Qualified Immunity
Pronin’s seventh objection to the R&R is that the magistrate judge erred in
finding that defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. Pl.’s Objections 39.
Specifically, Pronin asserts that there is a disputed question of material fact as to whether
defendants violated his constitutional rights, and therefore defendants are not entitled to
qualified immunity. Pl.’s Objections 41.
The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials from liability
where the official’s conduct does not violate a “clearly established” constitutional right.
Evans v. Chalmers, 703 F.3d 636, 646 (4th Cir. 2012) (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457
U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). Qualified immunity can shield Bureau of Prison employees from
suit. See Williams v. Ozmint, No. 11–6940, 2013 WL 1987231, at *3 (4th Cir. May 15,
2013) (holding qualified immunity protects prison wardens); McCaster v. Clausen, 684
F.3d 740 (8th Cir. 2012) (finding jailhouse nurse did not act with deliberate indifference
21
and was entitled to qualified immunity); LeMarbe v. Wisneski, 266 F.3d 429 (6th Cir.
2001) (holding that a prison doctor is entitled to qualified immunity); Williams v. Mehra,
186 F.3d 685 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding prison psychiatrists were shielded by qualified
immunity).
To resolve a qualified immunity defense, a court must “decide whether the facts
that a plaintiff has alleged . . . or shown . . . make out a violation of a constitutional
right.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009). The court must then determine
“whether the right at issue was ‘clearly established’ at the time of defendant’s alleged
misconduct.” Id. Courts may address the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis
in whichever order is appropriate in light of the circumstances of the particular case at
hand. Id. at 236.
Because Pronin has failed to show that defendants’ conduct violated any clearly
established rights, the court finds that defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.
IV. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the court ADOPTS the magistrate judge’s R&R and
GRANTS defendants’ motion for summary judgment.
AND IT IS SO ORDERED.
DAVID C. NORTON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
March 31, 2015
Charleston, South Carolina
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