Spissinger v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration
Filing
21
ORDER rejecting 15 Report and Recommendation, reversing Commissioner's decision, and remanding for further administrative proceedings. Signed by Honorable David C Norton on 9/29/2014.(cahe, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
ORANGEBURG DIVISION
WILLIAM SPISSINGER,
Plaintiff,
vs.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting
Commissioner of Social Security,1
Defendant.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
No. 5:12-cv-03454-DCN
ORDER
This matter is before the court on Magistrate Judge Kaymani D. West’s Report
and Recommendation (“R&R”) that this court affirm Acting Commissioner of Social
Security Carolyn Colvin’s decision denying plaintiff’s application for disability insurance
benefits (“DIB”). Plaintiff filed objections to the R&R. For the reasons set forth below,
the court rejects the R&R, reverses the Commissioner’s decision, and remands for further
administrative proceedings.
I. BACKGROUND
Unless otherwise noted, the following background is drawn from the R&R.
A.
Procedural History
Plaintiff William Spissinger (“Spissinger”) filed an application for DIB on
January 19, 2010, alleging disability beginning on November 2, 2009. The Social
Security Agency denied Spissinger’s claim initially and on reconsideration. Spissinger
requested a hearing before an administrative law judge (“ALJ”), and ALJ Ronald S.
1
Carolyn W. Colvin became the Acting Commissioner of Social Security on
February 14, 2013. Pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
Carolyn W. Colvin should be substituted for Michael J. Astrue as the defendant in this
lawsuit.
1
Robins held a hearing on May 19, 2011. The ALJ issued a decision on June 27, 2011,
finding Spissinger not disabled under the Social Security Act. Spissinger requested
Appeals Council review of the ALJ’s decision. The Appeals Council declined to review
the decision, rendering the ALJ’s decision the final action of the Commissioner.
On December 6, 2012, Spissinger filed this action seeking review of the ALJ’s
decision. The magistrate judge issued an R&R on July 9, 2014, recommending that this
court affirm the ALJ’s decision. Spissinger filed objections to the R&R on July 16, 2014,
and the Commissioner responded to Spissinger’s objections on July 28, 2014. The matter
is now ripe for the court’s review.
B.
Medical History
Because Spissinger’s medical history is not relevant to the disposition of this case,
the court dispenses with a lengthy recitation thereof and instead only notes a few relevant
facts. Spissinger was born on June 20, 1959 and was 49 years old on the alleged onset
date. He has a high school education and past relevant work experience as a corrections
officer captain and a security guard.
C.
ALJ’s Decision
The ALJ employed the statutorily-required five-step sequential evaluation process
to determine whether Spissinger was disabled from November 2, 2009 through June 27,
2011. The ALJ first determined that Spissinger had not engaged in substantial gainful
activity during the relevant time period. Tr. 24. At the second step, the ALJ found that
Spissinger suffered from the following severe impairments: degenerative disc disease,
lumbar and cervical; chronic back pain; and pain disorder. Id. At step three, the ALJ
determined that Spissinger’s impairment or combination of impairments did not meet or
2
equal one of the listed impairments in the Agency’s Listing of Impairments. Tr. 28; see
20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpt. P, App’x 1. Before reaching the fourth step, the ALJ
determined that Spissinger had the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform light
work, as defined by 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b), with several limitations. Id. Specifically,
the ALJ determined that Spissinger had unlimited pushing and pulling capabilities; could
occasionally climb, balance, crouch, crawl, kneel, and stoop; must avoid concentrated
exposure to vibrations and hazards such as moving machinery and unprotected heights;
and may not stand or walk for more than two hours total in an eight-hour workday or sit
for more than six hours in an eight-hour workday. Tr. 28-29. The ALJ found, at step
four, that Spissinger was unable to perform any past relevant work. Tr. 31. Finally, at
the fifth step, the ALJ found that considering Spissinger’s age, education, work
experience, and RFC, he could perform jobs existing in significant numbers in the
national economy, and therefore concluded that he was not disabled during the period at
issue. Tr. 31-32.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
This court is charged with conducting a de novo review of any portion of the
magistrate judge’s R&R to which specific, written objections are made. 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1). A party’s failure to object is accepted as agreement with the conclusions of
the magistrate judge. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149-50 (1985). The
recommendation of the magistrate judge carries no presumptive weight, and the
responsibility to make a final determination rests with this court. Mathews v. Weber, 423
U.S. 261, 270-71 (1976).
3
Judicial review of the Commissioner’s final decision regarding disability benefits
“is limited to determining whether the findings of the [Commissioner] are supported by
substantial evidence and whether the correct law was applied.” Hays v. Sullivan, 907
F.2d 1453, 1456 (4th Cir. 1990). Substantial evidence is “more than a mere scintilla of
evidence but may be somewhat less than a preponderance.” Id. (internal citations
omitted). “[I]t is not within the province of a reviewing court to determine the weight of
the evidence, nor is it the court’s function to substitute its judgment for that of the
[Commissioner] if his decision is supported by substantial evidence.” Id. Where
conflicting evidence “allows reasonable minds to differ as to whether a claimant is
disabled, the responsibility for that decision falls on the [ALJ],” not on the reviewing
court. Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 1996) (internal citation omitted).
III. DISCUSSION
Spissinger objects to the R&R on five grounds, arguing the magistrate judge erred
in: (1) finding that the ALJ properly gave little weight to his treating physician; (2)
finding that the ALJ properly determined that his mental impairments were non-severe;
(3) finding that the ALJ properly evaluated his credibility; (4) determining that remand is
not required to give further consideration to his obesity; and (5) finding that the ALJ
properly relied on vocational expert testimony. Because the court finds that Spissinger’s
objection regarding credibility is grounds for remand, it does not consider the remaining
objections.
Determining whether an individual is disabled by pain or other symptoms is a
two-step process. First, an ALJ must determine whether a claimant has an underlying
impairment that has been established by objective medical evidence that would
4
reasonably be expected to cause subjective complaints of the severity and persistence
alleged. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(b), 416.929(b); SSR 96–7p; Craig, 76 F.3d 585, 59196 (4th Cir. 1996) (discussing the regulation-based two-part test for evaluating pain).
The first part of the test “does not . . . entail a determination of the intensity, persistence,
or functionally limiting effect of the claimant’s asserted pain.” Craig, 76 F.3d at 594
(internal quotation omitted).
Second, and only after claimant has satisfied the threshold inquiry, the ALJ is to
evaluate “the intensity and persistence of the claimant’s pain, and the extent to which it
affects her ability to work.” Id. at 595. This second step requires the ALJ to consider the
record as a whole, including both objective and subjective evidence, and a claimant’s
“statements about the intensity and persistence of pain or other symptoms or about the
effect the symptoms have on his or her ability to work may not be disregarded solely
because they are not substantiated by objective medical evidence.” SSR 96-7p.
“Assessment of the credibility of an individual’s statements about pain or other
symptoms and about the effect the symptoms have on his or her ability to function must
be based on a consideration of all of the evidence in the case record,” including a
claimant’s “prior work record.” Id. (emphasis added); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529
(“[The SSA] will consider all of the evidence presented, including information about
your prior work record,” in evaluating the intensity and persistence of claimant’s
symptoms.).
In this case, the ALJ found that Spissinger’s “statements concerning the intensity,
persistence and limiting effects of [his] symptoms are not credible to the extent they are
inconsistent with the above [RFC] assessment.” Tr. 30. However, in assessing
5
Spissinger’s credibility, the ALJ failed to mention his prior work record. See Tr. 138
(earnings records showing steady income for 22 years leading up to disability claim).
Because SSR 96-7p and 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 require the ALJ to at least consider a good
work record in her credibility determination, the case must be remanded to the
Commissioner for further administrative proceedings. See Gregorie v. Colvin, No. 6:12cv-3275, 2014 WL 3909175 (D.S.C. Aug. 11, 2014) (remanding case because ALJ failed
to mention plaintiff’s work history when evaluating her credibility); Osgood v. Astrue,
No. 2:08-cv-3386, 2010 WL 737839 (D.S.C. Mar. 2, 2010) (same).
When reviewing the case on remand, the ALJ should consider Spissinger’s other
allegations of error.
IV. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the court REJECTS the magistrate judge’s R&R,
REVERSES the Commissioner’s decision, and REMANDS the case for further
administrative proceedings.
AND IT IS SO ORDERED.
DAVID C. NORTON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
September 29, 2014
Charleston, South Carolina
6
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?