Robinson v. Mack et al

Filing 68

ORDER RULING ON REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION: The court ACCEPTS the Report of the Magistrate Judge (ECF No. 60 ). The court thereby GRANTS Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 50 ) as to the Eight Amendment claim WITH PREJUDICE and as to the claims of excessive force, Fourteenth Amendment violations, and gross negligence WITHOUT PREJUDICE. IT IS SO ORDERED. Signed by Honorable J Michelle Childs on 6/24/2015. (mcot, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
ORANGEBURG DIVISION
Corey Jawan Robinson #294233,

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Plaintiff,
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v.
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Lt. A. Mack and Sgt. M. Marquardt,
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Defendants.
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_________________________________________ )

Civil Action
No. 5:14-cv-01089-JMC
ORDER AND OPINION

Plaintiff Corey Jawan Robinson (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se, brought this civil rights
action and is seeking relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of his constitutional
rights by Defendants Lt. A. Mack and Sgt. M. Marquardt (collectively “Defendants”), employees
of Lieber Correctional Institution (“LCI”). (ECF No. 1.) This matter is before the court pursuant
to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, or in the alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF
No. 50.)
In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 73.02(B)(2)(a) for the
District of South Carolina, the matter was referred to United States Magistrate Judge Kaymani D.
West for pre-trial handling. On February 27, 2015, the Magistrate Judge issued a Report and
Recommendation (“Report”) recommending that the court grant Defendants’ Motion for
Summary Judgment.1 (ECF No. 60.) This review considers Plaintiff’s Objections to the Report

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The Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation treated Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss or
in the Alternative Motion for Summary Judgment as a motion for summary judgment “[b]ecause
the court considered matters outside the pleadings.” (ECF 60 at 1 n.2.) In consideration of the
documents attached to the pleadings in this matter, the court observes that “documents attached
to the complaint or incorporated by reference therein are not outside of the pleadings.” BHC
Interim Funding II, L.P. v. F.D.I.C., 851 F. Supp. 2d 131, 134 (D.D.C. Mar. 30, 2012). Further,
documents attached to a motion to dismiss may also be considered without conversion if they are
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(“Objections”), filed March 9, 2015 (ECF No. 63), and Defendants’ Response to Plaintiff’s
Objections (“Response”), filed March 26, 2015 (ECF No. 66). For the reasons set forth herein,
the court ACCEPTS the Magistrate Judge’s Report. The court thereby GRANTS Defendants’
Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 50) as to the Eighth Amendment claim WITH
PREJUDICE and as to the claims of excessive force, Fourteenth Amendment violations, and
gross negligence WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
I.

RELEVANT FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A thorough recitation of the relevant factual and procedural background of this matter is
discussed in the Report. (See ECF No. 60.) The court concludes upon its own careful review of
the record that the Magistrate Judge’s Report is accurate and incorporates it by reference. The
court will only reference herein facts pertinent to the analysis of Plaintiff’s Objections and
Defendants’ Response.
Plaintiff was incarcerated at (“LCI”), within the South Carolina Department of
Corrections (“SCDC”). (ECF No. 1 at 3.) Plaintiff alleges that his mattress and the rest of his
belongings were taken on October 31, 2013. (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff writes in his Complaint that he
was “stripped out” of his belongings for an extra five days and that he was without a mattress for
thirty days. (Id. at 4–5.)

Plaintiff asserts that these actions were excessive and cruel and

unusual. (Id.) Plaintiff further alleges that he believes the taking of his mattress and belongings
were in retaliation because of his pending litigation against Defendants. (Id. at 5.)
On December 11, 2014, Defendants filed their Motion to Dismiss, or in the alternative,
Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 50). On February 27, 2015, the Magistrate Judge
‘“integral’” to the claim. See id. Nevertheless, the court reviewed the medicals records, incident
reports, affidavits, and grievance forms (ECF Nos. 1-1, 50-1 to 50-7) attached to the pleadings
and the Motion to Dismiss in the context of Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 as recommended by the Magistrate
Judge.
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issued the Report recommending that the court grant Defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment. (ECF No. 60.) In the Report, the Magistrate Judge found that Plaintiff had only
exhausted his administrative remedies for the “Eighth Amendment violations, including [the]
deprivation of certain property, as well as a claim for medical indifference.” (Id. at 6.) As to the
other allegations of excessive force, Fourteenth Amendment violations, and gross negligence, the
Magistrate Judge recommended Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment be granted because
Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies before filing these claims. (Id.) The
Magistrate Judge further recommended the granting of summary judgment as to the Eighth
Amendment claim because Plaintiff failed to offer evidence that demonstrated Defendants acted
with deliberate indifference to deprive him of a basic human need or other constitutionallyprotected right.

(Id. at 9–10.)

In addition, the Magistrate Judge stated that the medical

indifference claim “should be dismissed for failure to comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.” (Id. at 11.) As the Magistrate Judge found that Defendants performed their
official duties in an objectively reasonable fashion and that they did not violate any constitutional
rights of Plaintiff, she concluded that Defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. (Id. at 13.)
Plaintiff timely filed his Objections on March 9, 2015. (ECF No. 63.) Defendants filed
their Response on March 26, 2015. (ECF No. 66.)
II.

JURISDICTION

This court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, which confers
jurisdiction in actions authorized by 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against defendants acting under color of
state law.
III.

LEGAL STANDARD

The Magistrate Judge’s Report is made in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and

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Local Civil Rule 73.02 for the District of South Carolina. The Magistrate Judge makes only a
recommendation to this court.

The recommendation has no presumptive weight.

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responsibility to make a final determination remains with this court. See Matthews v. Weber, 423
U.S. 261, 270–71 (1976). This court is charged with making a de novo determination of those
portions of the Report to which specific objections are made, and the court may accept, reject, or
modify, in whole or in part, the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation, or recommit the matter with
instructions. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
As Plaintiff is a pro se litigant, the court is required to liberally construe his arguments.
Gordon v. Leeke, 547 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). The court addresses those arguments that,
under the mandated liberal construction, it has reasonably found to state a claim. Barnett v.
Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128, 1133 (10th Cir. 1999).
IV.
A.

ANALYSIS

Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
Plaintiff first argues that he has, in fact, exhausted his administrative remedies in regard

to his claims against Defendants. (ECF No. 63 at 3.) Plaintiff attached to his Complaint copies
of his Step 1 and Step 2 Grievance forms for Grievance No. LCI-1668-13, which show final
responses from SCDC officials. (ECF No. 1-1 at 1–3.) Plaintiff’s grievance in relation to his
disciplinary charge was ultimately upheld. (EFC No. 50 at 4.) Defendants counter, however,
that Plaintiff’s grievance was only relating to his disciplinary charge.

(Id. at 4 (emphasis

added).) Defendants assert that “[p]ursuant to SCDC inmate grievance policy, only one issue or
one disciplinary conviction may be addressed on each grievance form.” (Id. at 4–5.) By Plaintiff
alleging other issues within one form, Defendants argue Plaintiff failed to comply with agency
procedure and thus failed to exhaust all of his administrative remedies. (Id. at 5.)

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Satisfaction of the exhaustion requirement requires “using all steps that the agency holds
out, and doing so properly.” Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90 (quoting Pozo v. McCaughtry,
286 F.3d 1022, 1024 (7th Cir. 2002)) (emphasis in original)).

Thus, “it is the prison’s

requirements, and not the PLRA, [Prison Litigation Reform Act] that define the boundaries of
proper exhaustion.” Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 218 (2007). Here, SCDC policy requires two
steps in order to properly file a grievance and exhaust administrative remedies. See Wagner v.
United States, 486 F. Supp. 2d 549, 558. The Magistrate Judge found that Plaintiff exhausted his
administrative remedies only in regard to the Eighth Amendment claim.2 (ECF No. 60 at 6.)
This court agrees.
B.

Eighth Amendment Claims
i. Deprivation of Property
Generally, the Eighth Amendment prohibits punishments that “are incompatible with ‘the

evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society’ or which involve the
unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.’” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102–03 (1976).
However, the Eighth Amendment “does not mandate comfortable prisons.” Rhodes v. Chapman,
452 U.S. 337, 349 (1981). In order to state an Eighth Amendment violation, a prisoner must
show: “(1) a serious deprivation of a basic human need; and (2) deliberate indifference to prison
conditions on the part of prison officials.” Williams v. Griffin, 952 F.2d 820, 824 (4th Cir. 1991)
(internal citations omitted). “Because routine discomfort is ‘part of the penalty that criminal
offenders pay for their offenses against society,’” only extreme deprivations will make out a
conditions-of-confinement claim. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992) (quoting Rhodes,

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By this ruling, the court does not address either the merits of Plaintiff’s excessive force,
Fourteenth Amendment, and gross negligence claims or offer an opinion as to the outcome of
any future attempts to exhaust these claims.
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452 U.S. at 347).

While sleeping on steel without a mattress for thirty days seems

uncomfortable, courts have held it is not so extreme to the point where it violates evolving
standards of decency. See Alfred v. Bryant, 378 F. App’x 977, 980 (11th Cir. 2010) (“Objectively
speaking, sleeping on a steel bed without a mattress for eighteen days, though uncomfortable, is
not so extreme as to violate contemporary standards of decency.”) (Citation omitted). As
Plaintiff mentions, courts “give deference to prison officials’ decision about disciplinary
punishment.” (ECF No. 1 at 4.) Plaintiff offers no evidence for deliberate indifference in the
actions of prison officials in taking Plaintiff’s personal property. Plaintiff has failed to state a
claim for cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
ii. Medical Indifference
While on the surface the medical indifference claim seems to be exhausted, upon further
review the Magistrate Judge finds that it is not. (ECF No. 60 at 6, 11.) Plaintiff must show that
the named defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical need. Farmer v.
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). Plaintiff alleges that while being “stripped out” of his
belongings, he got sick due to the cold air and made multiple complaints. (ECF No. 63 at 2–3.)
However, in both his grievance and medical forms, Plaintiff does not name either Defendant or
mention any details as to when he asked for medical care or what medical issues went untreated.
(ECF No. 1-1 at 1, 4–5.) Plaintiff did not properly complete any steps to remedy his medical
grievance. As the Magistrate Judge stated, Plaintiff not only has failed to plead the medical
indifference claim pursuant to Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, but he has also,
again, failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. This court again reminds Plaintiff that all
grievances must first attempt to be resolved by SCDC before seeking relief from the court.

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C.

Qualified Immunity
Plaintiff’s claim alleging Eighth Amendment violations, even if meritorious, fails because

Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. The Magistrate Judge found that Defendants
“performed the discretionary functions of their respective official duties in an objectively
reasonable fashion” and “did not transgress any statutory or constitutional rights of Plaintiff.”
(ECF No. 60 at 13.)
When evaluating a claim for qualified immunity, the court must first determine whether
Plaintiff has alleged a deprivation of an actual constitutional right. Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S.
603, 609 (1999) (citing Conn v. Gabbert, 526 U.S. 286, 290 (1999)). To prove a claim of
excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment, a plaintiff must satisfy the two-part test
outlined by the Fourth Circuit in Iko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d 225 (4th Cir. 2008). Under this
standard, a plaintiff must show “whether the prison official acted with a sufficiently culpable
state of mind (subjective component) and whether the deprivation suffered or injury inflicted on
the inmate was sufficiently serious (objective component).” Id. at 238 (quoting Williams v.
Benjamin, 77 F.3d 756, 761 (4th Cir. 1996)). “All that is necessary is proof of more than de
minimis pain or injury.” Williams, 77 F.3d at 761.
Plaintiff fails first on the objective component. To show he suffered injury as a result of
the alleged actions of Defendants, Plaintiff’s Objections, in addition to simply reiterating the
claims made in his Complaint, refer the court to the medical records Plaintiff attached to his
Complaint. (ECF No. 63 at 3.) The records, however, do not show that he suffered any injury as
a result of Defendants’ actions. On the contrary, the records indicate that additional scarring in
the lungs and throat was from his medical condition and not from being “stripped out.” (ECF
No. 1-1 at 4.) Because Plaintiff has not alleged a sufficiently serious injury, Plaintiff cannot

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show a deprivation of a constitutionally protected right and his claim of excessive force fails.
Since Plaintiff was not deprived of a constitutionally protected right and Plaintiff offers no
additional evidence in his Objections regarding Defendants’ defense, Defendants are entitled to
qualified immunity.
V.

CONCLUSION

Based on the aforementioned reasons and a thorough review of the Report of the
Magistrate Judge and the record in this case, the court ACCEPTS the Report of the Magistrate
Judge (ECF No. 60). The court thereby GRANTS Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment
(ECF No. 50) as to the Eighth Amendment claim WITH PREJUDICE and as to the claims of
excessive force, Fourteenth Amendment violations, and gross negligence WITHOUT
PREJUDICE.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

United States District Judge
June 24, 2015
Columbia, South Carolina

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