Carroll v. United States et al

Filing 25

ORDER denying 19 Motion for Recusal. Signed by Magistrate Judge Kaymani D West on 8/18/2014.(mcot, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
) C/A No. 5:14-2167-JMC-KDW
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Plaintiffs,
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ORDER
vs.
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United States, Federal Corporation;
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Eric Holder, US Attorney General;
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Charles E. Samuels, Jr., Director of
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Federal Bureau of Prisons, FBOP;
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Andrew Mansukhani, Warden, FCI Estill;
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Nicole C. English, Warden, FCI Marianna;
Christopher Zych, Warden, USP Lee, in their Official)
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Capacities,
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Defendants.
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Cory Conell Carroll, and
Brian Schumaker, et al.,

Brian Schumaker (“Plaintiff”) submitted a Motion for Recusal, asking that the undersigned
United States Magistrate Judge “withdraw from this case, or otherwise recuse herself and direct all
further proceedings in this case to be directed by the Clerk exclusively to Judge J. Michelle Childs
. . . .” ECF No. 19 at 3 (emphasis and citations omitted). Plaintiff alleges that he withdraws any
implied consent to magistrate involvement and contends that the undersigned exhibited bias in
favor of and possible collusion with Defendants in connection with the contents of the initial Order
issued in this case. Id. at 1-3. Plaintiff contends that his explicit consent is required before a
magistrate judge can preside over the preliminary stages of his pro se litigation and that he has now
withdrawn any “implied consent” for magistrate consideration. Id. at 1, 3. He also contends that
rulings on other pending motions have been unreasonably delayed and that the undersigned’s

explanation in the initial Order issued in this case of certain aspects of applicable law regarding
participation by multiple pro se prisoners indicates bias in favor of Defendants. Id. at 2.
A judge should recuse him- or herself if the judge’s “impartiality might reasonably be
questioned.” 28 U.S.C.A. § 455(a). In addition, a judge must disqualify him- or herself “[w]here he
has a personal bias . . . concerning a party. . . .” Id. § 455(b)(1). The Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals has ruled that “a presiding judge is not required to recuse [him- or herself] because of
‘unsupported, irrational or highly tenuous speculation.’” United States v. Cherry, 330 F.3d 658,
665 (4th Cir. 2003) (citing United States v. DeTemple, 162 F.3d 279, 287 (4th Cir. 1998)). The test
to be applied is “whether another with knowledge of all of the circumstances might reasonably
question the judge’s impartiality.” Id.
The undersigned has reviewed Plaintiff’s allegations supporting his Motion for Recusal
and finds them to be meritless. Consent from a litigant is not required for magistrate judges to rule
on non-dispositive pretrial matters or to issue reports and recommendation on dispositive issues. In
re Artis, 955 F.2d 40, * 1 (4th Cir. 1992) (citing to Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261 (1976) and
Orpiano v. Johnson, 687 F.2d 44 (4th Cir. 1982)). Also, Plaintiff’s allegations that rulings on his
other pending motions have not been made as quickly as he desires and that “restrictions” placed
on Plaintiffs’ submissions were “superfluous”—which apparently led to his “perception . . . the
Magistrate appears to demonstrate prejudice . . . ,” ECF No. 19 at 2—show, at most, “unsupported,
irrational, or highly tenuous speculation[.]” DeTemple, 162 F.3d at 287. Recusal is not warranted.
Furthermore, the contents of Plaintiff Schumaker’s “objections” to the initial Order issued in this
case, ECF No. 16, and the allegations in the Motion now under consideration clearly indicate his
disagreement with the undersigned’s statements of applicable law regarding fee payments
expected from pro se prisoners and about the ability of pro se litigants to “represent” other pro se
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litigants. However, “judicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or
partiality motion,” Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994), and the fact that a magistrate
judge issues orders with which the prisoner disagrees is not a valid ground for recusal of the
magistrate judge. See Holloway v. United States, 960 F.2d 1348, 1350-51 (8th Cir. 1992); Sato v.
Plunkett, 154 F.R.D. 189 (N.D. Ill. 1994).
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion for Recusal, ECF No. 19, is denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

August 18, 2014
Florence, South Carolina

Kaymani D. West
United States Magistrate Judge

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