Elliott v. Commissioner of the Social Security Administration

Filing 31

ORDER granting 28 Motion for Attorney Fees: The court orders that Plaintiff be awarded $5,000.00 in attorney fees. Signed by Honorable Timothy M Cain on 11/9/2015.(gnan )

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
ORANGEBURG DIVISION
Gregory S. Elliott,
Plaintiff,
v.
Carolyn W. Colvin,
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.

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Civil Action No. 5:14-3542
ORDER

On October 20, 2015, Plaintiff Gregory S. Elliott filed a motion for attorney's fees
pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act ("EAJA"), 28 U.S.C. § 2412, on the basis that he was
the prevailing party and the position taken by the Commissioner in this action was not
substantially justified. (ECF No. 28). On November 3, 2015, the parties filed notice that the
petition was withdrawn and that a stipulation for an award of attorney’s fees pursuant to the
EAJA had been entered. (ECF No. 29).
Under the EAJA, a court shall award attorney's fees to a prevailing party1 in certain civil
actions against the United States, unless it finds that the government's position was substantially
justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). The
district courts have discretion to determine a reasonable fee award and whether that award should
be made in excess of the statutory cap. Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552 (1988); May v.
Sullivan, 936 F.2d 176, 177 (4th Cir. 1991).
The district courts also have broad discretion to set the attorney fee amount. In
determining the fee award, “[e]xorbitant, unfounded, or procedurally defective fee applications .
1

A party who wins a remand pursuant to sentence four of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), is a
prevailing party for EAJA purposes. See Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 300–302 (1993). The remand in this
case was made pursuant to sentence four.

. . are matters that the district court can recognize and discount.” Hyatt v. N. C. Dep’t of Human
Res., 315 F.3d 239, 254 (4th Cir. 2002) (citing Comm’r v. Jean, 496 U.S. 154, 163 (1990)).
Additionally, the court should not only consider the “position taken by the United States in the
civil action,” but also the “action or failure to act by the agency upon which the civil action is
based.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(D), as amended by P.L. 99-80, § 2(c)(2)(B).
The parties have entered into a stipulation allowing for the payment of attorney’s fees in
the amount of $5,000.00. (ECF No. 29 at 1). Despite the fact that the parties have executed a
stipulation allowing for the payment of attorney's fees, the court is obligated under the EAJA to
determine if the fee is proper. See Design & Prod., Inc. v. United States, 21 Cl.Ct. 145, 152
(1990) (holding that under the EAJA, “it is the court's responsibility to independently assess the
appropriateness and measure of attorney's fees to be awarded in a particular case, whether or not
an amount is offered as representing the agreement of the parties in the form of a proposed
stipulation”). Applying the above standard to the facts of this case, the court concludes that the
Commissioner’s position was not substantially justified. Furthermore, after a thorough review of
the record, the court finds the stipulated fee request is appropriate. Accordingly, the court orders
that Plaintiff be awarded $5,000.00 in attorney fees.2
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/Timothy M. Cain
United States District Judge
November 9, 2015
Anderson, South Carolina

2

The court notes that the fees must be paid to Plaintiff. See Astrue v. Ratliff, 560 U.S. 586 (2010) (June 14, 2010)
(holding that the plain text of the EAJA requires that attorney’s fees be awarded to the litigant, thus subjecting
EAJA fees to offset of any pre-existing federal debts); see also Stephens v. Astrue, 565 F.3d 131, 139 (4th Cir. 2009)
(same).