Reier v. Commissioner of the Social Security Administration

Filing 23

ORDER RULING ON REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION: The court ADOPTS the Magistrate Judge's Report (ECF No. 17), AFFIRMS the final decision of the Commissioner denying Plaintiff's claim for DIB and SSI under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Signed by Honorable J Michelle Childs on 2/5/2016. (gnan )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
ORANGEBURG DIVISION
Anita Barbee Reier,

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Plaintiff,
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v.
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Commissioner of Social Security,
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Respondent.
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____________________________________)

Civil Action No. 5:15-cv-00117-JMC

ORDER

Plaintiff Anita Barbee Reier (“Plaintiff”) filed this action, seeking judicial review of the
final decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (the “Commissioner”)
under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2012). This matter is before the court for review of the United States
Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation (“Report”), issued in accordance with 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) (2012) and Local Rule 73.02(B)(2)(a) D.S.C. (ECF No. 17.)
The Magistrate Judge recommended affirming the Commissioner’s final decision
denying Plaintiff’s claim for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”). (Id. at 25.) Plaintiff timely
objected to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. (ECF No. 19.) For the reasons set forth
below, the court ADOPTS the Magistrate Judge’s Report (ECF No. 17) and AFFIRMS the final
decision of the Commissioner denying Plaintiff’s claim for DIB under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
I.

LEGAL STANDARD

A. Magistrate Judge’s Report1
The Magistrate Judge makes only a recommendation to this court that has no presumptive
weight—the responsibility to make a final determination remains with this court. See Mathews
The Report sets forth in detail the relevant procedure and facts and of this matter. (ECF No. 17
at 1–5.) The court incorporates those portions of the Magistrate Judge’s Report herein without
recitation.
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v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 270–71 (1976). The court reviews de novo only those portions of a
Magistrate Judge’s Report to which specific objections are filed, and it reviews those portions
not objected to—including those portions to which only “general and conclusory” objections
have been made—for clear error. Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 315
(4th Cir. 2005); Camby v. Davis, 718 F.2d 198, 200 (4th Cir. 1983); Orpiano v. Johnson, 687
F.2d 44, 47 (4th Cir. 1982). The court may accept, reject, or modify—in whole or in part—the
Magistrate Judge’s recommendation or recommit the matter with instructions. See 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1).
B. Federal Review of Administrative Decisions
The Social Security Act establishes an administrative scheme wherein the federal
judiciary’s role is limited.

Section 405(g) of the Act provides, “[T]he findings of the

Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be
conclusive . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). “Substantial evidence has been defined innumerable times
as more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance.” Thomas v. Celebrezze, 331 F.2d 541,
543 (4th Cir. 1964).
This standard precludes a de novo review of the factual circumstances that substitutes the
court’s findings for those of the Commissioner. See Vitek v. Finch, 438 F.2d 1157 (4th Cir.
1971). The court must uphold the Commissioner’s decision as long as it is supported by
substantial evidence. See Blalock v. Richardson, 483 F.2d 773, 775 (4th Cir. 1972). “From this
it does not follow, however, that the findings of the administrative agency are to be mechanically
accepted. The statutorily granted right of review contemplates more than an uncritical rubber
stamping of the administrative agency.” Flack v. Cohen, 413 F.2d 278, 279 (4th Cir. 1969).
“[T]he courts must not abdicate their responsibility to give careful scrutiny to the whole record to

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assure that there is a sound foundation for the [Commissioner’s] findings, and that this
conclusion is rational.” Vitek, 438 F.2d at 1157–58. This court adheres to that responsibility and
considers the record, the Report, and Plaintiff’s objections in this case.
II.

ANALYSIS

One of Plaintiff’s main objections is to the Magistrate Judge’s finding that there was
substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s determinations that Plaintiff’s mental impairments are
not severe. (ECF No. 19 at 1.) Plaintiff specifically challenges the ALJ’s “reli[ance] solely on
inconsistencies in the Plaintiff’s hearing testimony and what the Plaintiff reported to her treating
physician” as a basis for this determination. (Id. at 2.) Citing Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 595
(4th Cir. 1996), Plaintiff contends that the ALJ was wrong to do so because medical evidence
should not have been required to substantiate Plaintiff’s testimony. (Id.)
Indeed, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Craig was clear that “because pain
is subjective and cannot always be confirmed by objective indicia, claims of disabling pain may
not be rejected ‘solely because the available objective evidence does not substantiate [the
claimant’s] statements’ as to the severity and persistence of her pain.” Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d
585, 595 (4th Cir. 1996) (quoting 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.929(c)(2) (2012) & 404.1529(c)(2) (2012)).
But it further clarified: “That is, once a medically determinable impairment which could
reasonably be expected to produce the pain alleged by the claimant is shown by objective
evidence, the claimant’s allegations as to the severity and persistence of her pain may not be
dismissed merely because objective evidence of the pain itself (as opposed to the existence of an
impairment that could produce the pain alleged), such as inflamed tissues or spasming muscles,
are not present to corroborate the existence of pain.” Id.

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This court does not find that the ALJ in this case rejected Plaintiff’s testimony of her
mental impairments solely because of the unavailability of the type of objective evidence that
Craig references. As the Magistrate Judge found, (ECF No. 17 at 21)—and as even Plaintiff
notes, (see ECF No. 19 at 2) —what the ALJ partly relied on in reaching his determination were
the inconsistencies between Plaintiff’s hearing testimony and what she, herself, had expressed to
medical authorities before that time. (ECF No. 9-2 at 21.) Among these inconsistencies, the
ALJ noted, for example, that while Plaintiff reported in the hearing testimony several medication
side effects and problems with concentration, she denied on “the most contemporaneous visit to
the date last insured” having any medication side effects and reported her ability to perform basic
daily activities. (Id. at 19–22.) Moreover, this court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that the
ALJ complied with all of the steps 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a (2012) requires in evaluating
Plaintiff’s mental impairments, including these noted inconsistencies, and also adequately
supported his application of the steps with documentation. See generally Jackson v. Astrue,
8:08-2855-JFA, 2010 WL 500449, at *10 (D.S.C. Feb. 5, 2010) (“[A]n ALJ is not required to
provide a written evaluation of every piece of evidence, but need only minimally articulate his
reasoning so as to make a bridge between the evidence and its conclusions.”) (internal quotation
and citations omitted).
The second of Plaintiff’s main objection is to the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that the
ALJ did not need to give controlling weight to Plaintiff’s treating physician’s opinion. Plaintiff
argues: “The ALJ must give controlling weight to the opinion of a treating physician when, as it
is here, the physician’s opinion ‘is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and
laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence.’”
(ECF No. 19 at 2 (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2) (2012)).)

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This court, however, agrees with the Magistrate Judge’s explanation for why the ALJ’s
weighing of that opinion in this case did not violate applicable regulations and case law. (See
ECF No. 17 at 18–19.) As the Magistrate Judge concluded: “As required, the ALJ provided
reasons why he gave [the treating physician]’s opinion little weight. Citing to both [the treating
physician]’s report and to [the treating physician]’s treatment notes, the ALJ explained why he
thought [the treating physician]’s report was inconsistent with the medical records.” (Id. at 18–
19 (citing ECF No. 9-2 at 22).)
To conclude, this court restates its responsibility to uphold the Commissioner’s decision
as long as it is supported by substantial evidence. See Blalock v. Richardson, 483 F.2d 773, 775
(4th Cir. 1972). Upon review of the record, the court finds that the Commissioner’s decision is
supported by substantial evidence here.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, the court ADOPTS the Magistrate Judge’s Report (ECF No. 17),
AFFIRMS the final decision of the Commissioner denying Plaintiff’s claim for DIB and SSI
under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
IT IS SO ORDERED.

United States District Judge
February 5, 2016
Columbia, South Carolina

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