Fields v. Expedited Logistics Solutions LLC et al
Filing
29
ORDER AND OPINION granting 13 Motion to Remand to State Court. Clerk's Notice: Attorneys are responsible for supplementing the State Record with all documents filed in Federal Court. Signed by Honorable J Michelle Childs on 7/16/2015.(asni, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
ORANGEBURG DIVISION
Paul Matthew Fields,
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
)
Expedited Logistics Solutions LLC, Frank )
Joseph Loftis, South Carolina Department )
of Transportation,
)
)
Defendants.
)
____________________________________)
Civil Action No. 5:15-cv-01866-JMC
ORDER AND OPINION
This matter is before the court pursuant to Plaintiff Paul Matthew Fields’ (“Plaintiff”)
Motion to Remand the case to the Court of Common Pleas for Orangeburg County, South
Carolina. (ECF No. 13.) Defendants Expedited Logistics Solutions LLC, Frank Joseph Loftis,
and South Carolina Department of Transportation (“SCDOT”) (collectively “Defendants”)
oppose Plaintiff’s Motion and ask the court to retain jurisdiction. (ECF Nos. 25, 26.) For the
reasons set forth herein, the court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand (ECF No. 13).
I. RELEVANT FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, a citizen of South Carolina, alleges that Defendant Loftis, a citizen of
Tennessee, while operating a tractor trailer for Defendant Expedited Logistics Solutions, a North
Carolina company, failed to yield the right of way and attempted to make a left turn from a
private drive onto South Carolina Secondary 49, blocking four lanes of traffic and causing
Plaintiff to strike the trailer. (ECF No. 1-1 at 3-4; see also ECF No. 1 at 2.) Plaintiff further
alleges that SCDOT failed to properly maintain safe road conditions and that rutting in the
roadway caused standing water which contributed to Plaintiff’s inability to stop before colliding
with the trailer. (ECF No. 1-1 at 4.)
1
On May 1, 2015, Defendants Loftis and Expedited Logistics Solutions filed a Notice of
Removal, asserting the court has jurisdiction over the matter under diversity jurisdiction pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. (ECF No. 1 at 2.)
Defendants assert that Defendant SCDOT is a
fraudulently joined defendant “because there is no possibility, based on the pleadings, that
plaintiff can state a cause of action against Defendant [SC]DOT in state court.” (Id. at 3.)
Plaintiff moved to remand the case back to state court on May 29, 2015. (ECF No. 13.)
II. LEGAL STANDARD AND ANALYSIS
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. A defendant is permitted to remove a
case to federal court if the court would have had original jurisdiction over the matter. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1441(a). A federal district court has “original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter
in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is
between - (1) citizens of different States; . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). In cases in which the
district court’s jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship, the party invoking federal
jurisdiction has the burden of proving the jurisdictional requirements for diversity jurisdiction.
See Strawn v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 530 F.3d 293, 298 (4th Cir. 2008) (holding that in removing
case based on diversity jurisdiction, party invoking federal jurisdiction must allege same in
notice of removal and, when challenged, demonstrate basis for jurisdiction). Because federal
courts are forums of limited jurisdiction, any doubt as to whether a case belongs in federal or
state court should be resolved in favor of state court. See Auto Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Interstate
Agency, Inc., 525 F. Supp. 1104, 1106 (D.S.C. 1981) (citations omitted).
Section 1332 requires complete diversity between all parties. Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7
U.S. 267, 267 (1806). Complete diversity requires that “no party shares common citizenship
with any party on the other side.” Mayes v. Rapoport, 198 F.3d 457, 461 (4th Cir. 1999).
2
“A civil action otherwise removable solely on the basis of the jurisdiction… may not be
removed if any of the parties in interest properly joined and served as defendants is a citizen of
the State in which such action is brought.” 28 U.S.C. 1441(b)(2).
The amount in controversy is not in dispute. Where the parties disagree is whether
complete diversity exists in this case.
Fraudulent joinder doctrine “effectively permits a district court to disregard, for
jurisdictional purposes, the citizenship of certain nondiverse defendants, assume jurisdiction over
a case, dismiss the nondiverse defendants, and thereby retain jurisdiction.” Mayes, 198 F.3d at
461 (citing Cobb v. Delta Exp. Inc., 186 F.3d 675, 677-78 (5th Cir 1999)). To use this exception,
“the removing party must demonstrate either ‘outright fraud in the plaintiff’s pleading of
jurisdictional facts’ or that ‘there is no possibility that the plaintiff would be able to establish a
cause of action against the in-state defendant in state court.’” Hartley v. CSX Transp., Inc., 187
F.3d 422, 424 (4th Cir. 1999) (citing Marshall v. Manville Sales Corp., 6 F.3d 229, 232 (4th
Cir.1993)) (emphasis in original). Defendants allege the latter. (ECF No. 1 at 3.)
Defendants argue that Plaintiff could not establish a cause of action of negligence against
Defendant SCDOT because “no one who investigated the accident, including the investigating
officer, the South Carolina Highway Patrol, or the MAIT [South Carolina Highway Patrol MultiDisciplinary Accident Investigation Team] team found… that there was any defect or condition
in the roadway that was a contributing factor to this accident.” (ECF No. 1 at 3.) However, in
his Response to Defendants’ Memorandum in Opposition of Motion to Remand, Plaintiff cites to
the deposition of Trooper Michael Laird in which Laird stated that road defects would not be
listed on accident reports and further that the road did have a defect causing standing water.
(ECF No. 27-1 at 3.) Therefore, Plaintiff can demonstrate at least a possibility he may succeed
3
on a negligence cause of action against Defendant SCDOT and Defendants cannot meet the high
burden of establishing that “there is no possibility” Plaintiff could establish a cause of action
against the in-state Defendant. As such, removal was not proper, and this case should be
remanded to state court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1441(b)(2).
III. CONCLUSION
Based on the aforementioned reasons, the court hereby GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to
Remand (ECF No. 13) and REMANDS this action to the Court of Common Pleas for
Orangeburg County, South Carolina, for further proceedings.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
United States District Judge
July 16, 2015
Columbia, South Carolina
4
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?