Lytle v. Samuels et al

Filing 79

ORDER RULING ON REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION: The court adopts the Magistrate Judge's Report (ECF No. 74 ) and incorporates it herein. Therefore, Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 68 ) is GRANTED. The court declines to issue a certificate of appealability. Signed by Honorable Timothy M Cain on 08/31/2018. (dsto, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
ORANGEBURG DIVISION

Curtis Jerome Lytle,
Petitioner,
v.
Warden FCI-Bennettsville,
Respondent.

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C/A No. 5:16-2277-TMC

ORDER

Petitioner Curtis Jerome Lytle (“Lytle”), a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, filed this
action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, challenging two disciplinary convictions. (ECF No. 1-3).1
On March 30, 2018, Magistrate Judge Kaymani D. West issued a Report and Recommendation
(“Report”) recommending that Respondent’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 68) be
granted. (ECF No. 74).2 Petitioner timely filed objections to the Report. (ECF No. 76).
The Report has no presumptive weight and the responsibility to make a final
determination in this matter remains with this court. See Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 27071 (1976). In the absence of objections, this court is not required to provide an explanation for
adopting the Report. See Camby v. Davis, 718 F.2d 198, 199 (4th Cir. 1983). Rather, “in the
1

At the time Lytle filed this action, he was an inmate at the Federal Correctional Institution in
Bennettsville, South Carolina. (ECF No. 1 at 2). He has since been transferred out of South
Carolina. However, the court retains jurisdiction as jurisdiction in a § 2241 habeas action is
determined at the time of the filing of the action. See United States v. Edwards, 27 F.3d 564,
564 (4th Cir. 1994) (per curiam) (unpublished) (holding in a § 2241 petition that “[j]urisdiction
is determined at the time an action is filed; subsequent transfers of prisoners outside the
jurisdiction in which they filed actions do not defeat personal jurisdiction.”).
2

In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Rule 73.02(B)(2), D.S.C., all pre-trial
proceedings were referred to a magistrate judge.

absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but
instead must only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to
accept the recommendation.” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 315 (4th
Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee’s note). Furthermore, failure to file
specific written objections to the Report results in a party’s waiver of the right to appeal the
district court’s judgment based upon that recommendation. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v.
Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v.
Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).
I. Background/Procedural History
The magistrate judge sets forth in detail the background and procedural history of this
case. (Report at 2-16). Briefly, while a federal inmate housed in Lee, Virginia, Lytle was
convicted of two disciplinary violations for incidents, which occurred on December 28, 2011: (1)
phone abuse based upon Lytle using the personal identification number (“PIN”) of another
inmate, a violation of Inmate Disciplinary Code 297 (“Code 297"); and (2) possession of a
hazardous tool, a cell phone, a violation of Inmate Disciplinary Code 108 (“Code 108"). (ECF
No. 1 at 3). Lytle contends that he was not provided due process in regard to these disciplinary
convictions. Id. Specifically, he contends that: (1) he was denied Unit Discipline Committee
(“UDC”) hearings; (2) he was not timely given a copy of the incident report for the Code 297
violation; (3) the Warden untimely granted an extension of time within which to conduct the
UDC hearing; (4) he did not sign the notice for the Disciplinary Hearing; (5) the Disciplinary
Hearing Officer (“DHO”) was not neutral; and (6) he was not allowed to call witnesses or
present evidence at the hearing before the DHO. Id. In his objections, Lytle seeks damages, the

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expungement of the convictions, restoration of the loss of eighty-two days of good conduct time,
immediate release, and an investigation. (ECF No. 76 at 2).3
II. Applicable Law
Summary judgment is appropriate only “if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In deciding whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, the evidence
of the non-moving party is to be believed and all justifiable inferences must be drawn in his
favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). However, “[o]nly disputes
over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly
preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will
not be counted.” Id. at 248. A litigant “cannot create a genuine issue of material fact through
mere speculation or the building of one inference upon another.” Beale v. Hardy, 769 F.2d 213,
214 (4th Cir. 1985). “Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to
find for the non-moving party, disposition by summary judgment is appropriate.” Monahan v.
County of Chesterfield, 95 F.3d 1263, 1265 (4th Cir. 1996).
III. Discussion
Prisoners are entitled to certain procedural protections in disciplinary proceedings. See
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 564-65 (1974). When a federal prisoner is subject to a
disciplinary proceeding that may result in the loss of good conduct credit, the prisoner must
receive: (1) advance written notice of the disciplinary charges; (2) an opportunity, when
consistent with institutional safety and correctional goals, to call witnesses and present

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In his petition, Lytle also seeks to be given twenty-four months credit for having been placed in
a higher level of security. (ECF No. 1-3 at 8).
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documentary evidence in his defense; (3) a written statement by the factfinder of the evidence
relied on and the reasons for the disciplinary action; and (4) assistance in preparing a defense in
some circumstances. Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454 (1985) (citing Wolff, 418 U.S. at
563-67). Additionally, the findings of a prison disciplinary board must be supported by some
evidence in the record, Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454-55 (1985), and be made by an
impartial adjudicator, Wolff, 418 U.S. at 570-71.
In her Report, the magistrate judge determined that the record shows that Lytle was given
UDC initial reviews, timely and sufficient notice of both of the charges, and a DHO hearing,
where he waived his right to present witness testimony or other evidence at the hearing.
Moreover, the magistrate determined that even if the UDC reviews were not held or were
untimely, such violations do not rise to the level of constitutional violations. (Report at 26). In
his objections (ECF No. 76), instead of raising specific objections to the Report, Lytle rehashes
the arguments he made in response to Defendant’s summary judgment motion (ECF No. 71).
See Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see also Orpiano v. Johnson, 687 F.2d 44, 47 (4th Cir. 1982) (stating
that de novo review of objections is unnecessary when a party makes general and conclusory
objections that do not direct the court to a specific error in the magistrate's report) (citations
omitted); Weber v. Aiken–Partain, No. 8:11–cv–02423, 2012 WL 489148, at *2 (D.S.C. Feb.15,
2012) (noting that objections that merely rehash arguments raised before, and addressed by, the
magistrate are insufficient to direct the court to a specific error in the magistrate's proposed
findings and recommendations). Nonetheless, out of an abundance of caution, the court will
briefly address the arguments raised by Lytle.
Lytle contends that he was never charged for Incident #2250061 (using another inmate’s
PIN) and he did not receive a UDC hearing for either incident. (ECF No. 76 at 2). He also
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contends that the Warden’s extension of time for the UDC hearing was not legitimate and did
not conform to disciplinary policy. Id. He argues that he did not sign the notice of the
Disciplinary Hearing. Id. at 9. Further, Lytle contends that he was not allowed to call witnesses,
or provided a staff representative at the DHO hearing. Id. at 11. Finally, he contends that the
DHO was not a neutral hearing body and he did not sign the incident reports. Id. at 2, 11-12.
While Lytle claims that he was not provided notice or a staff representative and was not
given an opportunity to be heard, present witnesses, or evidence, as the magistrate judge found,
the record indicates otherwise. (ECF Nos. 53-3; 53-4; 53-5; 53-6). As to Lytle’s contention that
certain time requirements were not complied with, “the only time requirement under Wolff is that
the inmate receive written notice of the charge within 24 hours of a disciplinary hearing. There
are no other time requirements necessary to comport with federal due process.” Kokoski v. Small,
No. 5:07-0145, 2008 WL 3200811 at *19 (S.D. W. Va. 2004). Moreover, the magistrate judge
sufficiently addressed Lytle’s argument regarding his signature, or lack thereof, on the
Disciplinary Hearing notice. (Report at 28-29).
Additionally, to the extent that Lytle complains that Respondent did not follow the
prison’s internal policies, such allegations fail to state a plausible claim for a constitutional
deprivation of due process. Alleged prison policy violations do not rise to the level of a
constitutional violation. See Joyner v. Patterson, No.0:13-2675-DCN-PJG, 2014 WL 897121, at
*4 (D.S.C. Mar. 6, 2014) (“Violations of prison policies alone do not rise to the level of a
constitutional deprivation.”); see also Smith v. Cross, No. 2:10-cv-35, 2010 WL 5525178, * 5
(N.D.W. Va. June 11, 2010) (“[T]he fact that the petitioner did not receive the incident report
until seven days after the incident occurred, and did not have his UDC hearing within five
working days does not present a denial of the petitioner's due process guarantees.”). A review of
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the record reveals that Lytle received all of the minimum due process safeguards set forth in
Wolff. Moreover, Lytle’s accusation that the disciplinary proceeding was based on fabricated
testimony is not supported by the record. The evidence supports the DHO’s decision.4
After a thorough review of the Report and the record in this case, the court adopts the
Magistrate Judge’s Report (ECF No. 74) and incorporates it herein. Therefore, Respondent’s
Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 68) is GRANTED.
In addition, a certificate of appealability will not issue to a prisoner seeking habeas relief
absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). A
prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find both that his
constitutional claims are debatable and that any dispositive procedural rulings by the district
court are also debatable or wrong. See Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003); Rose v.
Lee, 252 F.3d 676, 683 (4th Cir. 2001). In this case, the court finds that the petitioner has failed
to make a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. Accordingly, the court
declines to issue a certificate of appealability.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

s/Timothy M. Cain
United States District Judge
Anderson, South Carolina
August 31, 2018

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While Lytle states in his objections that he has repeatedly denied the charge regarding the cell
phone and that there is no evidence connecting him to the cell phone (ECF No. 76 at 12), the
court notes that Lytle also acknowledges several times that he possessed the cell phone. (ECF
Nos. 53-7 at 2; 57 at 2, 3-4; 71 at 2, 4; 76 at 2, 4).
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