Simmons v. Commissioner of the Social Security Administration

Filing 41

ORDER granting 37 Motion for Attorney Fees: After a thorough review of the record, the court finds that the stipulated fee request is appropriate. Accordingly, the court GRANTS the Motion for Attorneys Fees (ECF No. 37) as modified by the stipulation of the parties (ECF No. 39) and orders that the Plaintiff be awarded the $6,500 in attorney's fees. Signed by Honorable Timothy M Cain on 1/16/2018.(gnan, )

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
ORANGEBURG DIVISION
LAQUITA T. SIMMONS,
Plaintiff,
v.
02893
NANCY A. BERRYHILL,
Acting Commissioner
Of Social Security,
Defendant.

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C/A No. 5:16-cv-02893
ORDER

On January 1, 2018, Plaintiff Laquita T. Simmons filed a Motion for Attorney’s Fees
pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412, on the bases that she
was the prevailing party and that the Commissioner’s decision was not supported by substantial
evidence. (ECF No. 37). On January 11, 2018, the parties filed a joint stipulation for an award of
attorney’s fees pursuant to the EAJA. (ECF No. 39).
Under the EAJA, a court shall award attorney’s fees to a prevailing party 1 in certain civil
actions against the United States unless it finds that the government’s position was substantially
justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). The
district courts have discretion to determine a reasonable fee award and whether that award should
be made in excess of the statutory cap. Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552 (1988); May v.
Sullivan, 936 F.2d 176, 177 (4th Cir. 1991). The district courts also have broad discretion to set
the attorney fee amount. In determining the fee award, “[e]xorbitant, unfounded, or procedurally
defective fee applications . . . are matters that the district court can recognize and discount.”

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A party who wins a remand pursuant to sentence four of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §
405(g), is a prevailing party for EAJA purposes. See Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 300–302
(1993). The remand in this case was made pursuant to sentence four.
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Hyatt v. North Carolina Dep’t of Human Res., 315 F.3d 239, 254 (4th Cir. 2002) (citing Comm’r
v. Jean, 496 U.S. 154, 163 (1990)). Additionally, the court should not only consider the “position
taken by the United States in the civil action,” but also the “action or failure to act by the agency
upon which the civil action is based.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(D), as amended by P.L. 99-80, §
2(c)(2)(B).
The Plaintiff has asked for the payment of attorney’s fees in the amount of $7,314.15.
(ECF No. 37). On January 11, 2018, the parties stipulated to the payment of $6,500 in attorney
fees. (ECF No. 39). Despite this stipulation, the court is obligated under the EAJA to determine
if the fee is proper. See Design & Prod., Inc. v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 145, 152 (1990)
(holding that under the EAJA, “it is the court’s responsibility to independently assess the
appropriateness and measure of attorney’s fees to be awarded in a particular case, whether or not
an amount is offered as representing the agreement of the parties in the form of a proposed
stipulation.”). Applying the above standard to the facts of this case, the court concludes that the
Commissioner’s position was not substantially justified. Furthermore, after a thorough review of
the record, the court finds that the stipulated fee request is appropriate. Accordingly, the court
GRANTS the Motion for Attorney’s Fees (ECF No. 37) as modified by the stipulation of the
parties (ECF No. 39) and orders that the Plaintiff be awarded the $6,500 in attorney’s fees.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/ Timothy M. Cain
United States District Judge
January 16, 2018
Anderson, South Carolina

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