Landrum v. Warden FCI Estill
Filing
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OPINION AND ORDER RULING ON REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION: For the reasons stated above and by the Magistrate Judge, the Court overrules Petitioner's Objections and adopts and incorporates by reference the Magistrate Judge 's Report herein. It is therefore ORDERED that Petitioner's § 2241 petition is DISMISSED with prejudice and without requiring the respondent to file a return. IT IS SO ORDERED. Signed by Honorable Bruce Howe Hendricks on 8/8/2018. (prou, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
Christopher Frank Landrum,
) Civil Action No. 5:17-2325-BHH
)
Petitioner, )
)
v.
)
OPINION AND ORDER
Warden, FCI Estill,
)
)
Respondent. )
___________________________________ )
Christopher Frank Landrum, (“Petitioner”), proceeding pro se, filed this
application for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (ECF No. 1.) In
accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Rule 73.02, D.S.C., the action was
referred to United States Magistrate Judge Kaymani D. West for pretrial handling and a
Report and Recommendation (“Report”). Magistrate Judge West recommends that this
action be summarily dismissed with prejudice because the shortcomings evident in the
pleading cannot be corrected by amendment. (See ECF No. 11 at 6.) The Report sets
forth in detail the relevant facts and standards of law on this matter and the Court
incorporates them without recitation.
BACKGROUND
Petitioner filed this action challenging the validity of his sentence for participation
in a drug-related conspiracy, asserting that his prior convictions do not qualify him as a
career offender pursuant to the holdings in Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243
(2016), United States v. Hinkle, 832 F.3d 569 (5th Cir. 2016), and Holt v. United States,
843 F.3d 720 (7th Cir. 2016). Petitioner has filed multiple motions to vacate pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 2255, one of which was partially granted, allowing him to appeal the final
judgment in the underlying criminal case. (See ECF No. 11 at 1-2 (detailing procedural
history).) However, the Fourth Circuit ultimately dismissed the appeal, finding that the
appellate waiver included in Petitioner’s plea agreement was valid and enforceable. See
United States v. Landrum, 293 F. App’x 997, 999 (4th Cir. 2008). More recently, the
Fourth Circuit denied Petitioner’s request to file a successive § 2255 motion on June 23
and August 31, 2016. (See United States v. Landrum, No. 7:06-cr-01148-HMH, ECF
Nos. 119 & 121.) In the instant case, Petitioner filed his § 2241 petition on August 30,
2017. (ECF No. 1.) On September 11, 2017, the Magistrate Judge issued a Report
(ECF No. 11), and on September 22, 2017, Petitioner filed his objections (ECF No. 15).
The Court has reviewed the record, the relevant law, and the objections, but finds the
objections to be without merit. Therefore, it will enter judgment accordingly.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Magistrate Judge makes only a recommendation to the Court. The
recommendation has no presumptive weight. The responsibility to make a final
determination remains with the Court. Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 270-71 (1976).
The Court is charged with making a de novo determination of those portions of the
Report to which specific objection is made, and the Court may accept, reject, or modify,
in whole or in part, the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, or recommit the matter
with instructions. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). However, the Court need not conduct a de
novo review when a party makes only “general and conclusory objections that do not
direct the court to a specific error in the magistrate’s proposed findings and
recommendations.” Orpiano v. Johnson, 687 F.2d 44, 47 (4th Cir. 1982). In the absence
of a timely filed, specific objection, the Magistrate Judge’s conclusions are reviewed
only for clear error. See Diamond v. Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310,
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315 (4th Cir. 2005).
DISCUSSION
The Magistrate Judge found that this action is subject to summary dismissal
because Petitioner has not presented a cognizable claim of actual innocence and has
not shown that a motion filed pursuant to § 2255 is inadequate or ineffective to test the
legality of his detention thereby allowing him to file a § 2241 petition.1 See Rice v.
Rivera, 617 F.3d 802, 807 (4th Cir. 2010). Petitioner filed specific objections to the
Report, which the Court will now address.2
Petitioner argues that, contrary to the Magistrate Judge’s conclusions, he is able
to satisfy the savings clause of § 2255. (ECF No. 15 at 3.) Petitioner accurately cites the
standard, set forth in In re Jones, 226 F.3d 328 (4th Cir. 2000), that he must satisfy in
order to show that § 2255 is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention:
(1) at the time of his conviction, settled law of this circuit or the Supreme
Court established the legality of the conviction; (2) subsequent to the
prisoner’s direct appeal and first § 2255 motion,3 the substantive law
changed such that the conduct of which the prisoner was convicted is
deemed not to be criminal; and (3) the prisoner cannot satisfy the
gatekeeping provisions of § 2255 because the new rule is not one of
constitutional law.
Id. at 333-34. Petitioner further asserts that he satisfies these criteria because: (1) at the
1
As always, the Court says only what is necessary to address Petitioner’s objections against the already
meaningful backdrop of a thorough Report and Recommendation by the Magistrate Judge;
comprehensive recitation of law and fact exists there.
2
At the outset, the Court would note that it is a rare occurrence indeed for the Court to encounter such
clear, well-written objections from a pro se petitioner. Though clear writing alone cannot sustain the legal
merit of Petitioner Landrum’s § 2241 petition, the Court commends him on his attention to detail and
admirable efforts to engage with the applicable law, which includes a fairly complex interaction between
substantive and procedural elements.
3
For purposes of the In re Jones test, Petitioner’s second § 2255 motion in sequence (ECF Nos. 105 &
108) is effectively his “first § 2255 motion” subsequent to direct appeal. This is because Petitioner’s first §
2255 motion in sequence (ECF No. 70) was partially granted due to his counsel’s failure to file a direct
appeal as requested (see ECF No. 71), thereby allowing Petitioner to pursue his appeal (see ECF Nos.
74 & 75).
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time of Petitioner’s conviction and sentence, relief pursuant to Mathis v. United States,
136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016) was unavailable; (2) subsequent to Petitioner’s direct appeal
and first § 2255 motion, the substantive law changed such that the conduct of which he
was convicted is not deemed to be criminal; and (3) Petitioner cannot satisfy the
gatekeeping provisions of § 2255 because the new rule he cites is one of statutory
interpretation and not constitutional law. (ECF No. 15 at 3-4.) Petitioner repeatedly
asserts that the Magistrate Judge was wrong to conclude that Mathis has not been
deemed to be retroactively applicable in the Fourth Circuit. However, even if this
assertion was correct—which it is not—it would have no relevance to the merit of
Petitioner’s pleading.
In Mathis, the Supreme Court held that because the elements of Iowa’s burglary
law are broader than those of generic burglary, Mathis’s convictions under that law
could not qualify as predicate offenses for an enhanced sentence under the Armed
Career Criminal Act (ACCA). Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2257. Specifically, the court found
that Iowa’s burglary statute is not “divisible”—i.e., it does not list multiple elements
disjunctively, but rather enumerates various factual means of committing a single
element—and has a broader locational element than generic burglary because it
enumerates means of satisfying the locational element that are not included in the
corresponding element of the generic offense. Id. at 2249-50. Moreover, because the
Iowa burglary statute is not “divisible,” the court held that the Eighth Circuit erred in
applying the modified categorical approach to determine the means by which Mathis
committee his prior crimes, thereby deciding whether they were appropriately counted
as predicate offenses for an ACCA enhancement. See id. at 2251-54 (setting forth
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reasoning for adhering to an elements-only inquiry).
With respect, the Court notes that the Mathis holding has no impact whatsoever
on the legality of Petitioner’s conviction in the instant case (see ECF No. 11 at 6 (“Nor,
as previously indicated, do any of these cases affect the validity of Plaintiff’s
conviction.”)), which was for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and
distribution of five kilograms or more of cocaine and fifty grams or more of crack cocaine
in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A), and 846. Even if Mathis did apply
retroactively, which it does not (see, e.g., Rahim v. Joyner, No. CV 9:17-961-JMC-BM,
2017 WL 4179851, at *4 n.4 (D.S.C. July 19, 2017), report and recommendation
adopted, No. CV 9:17-00961-JMC, 2017 WL 4168571 (D.S.C. Sept. 20, 2017)
(collecting cases holding that Mathis did not announce a new rule of constitutional law
made retroactive by the Supreme Court)), it would not assist Petitioner’s collateral
challenge to his conviction. Accordingly, Petitioner has not satisfied the second prong of
the In re Jones test to show that § 2255 is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of
his detention. This deficiency in Petitioner’s pleading cannot be corrected by
amendment.
Furthermore, the Magistrate Judge rightly concluded that neither Hinkle, nor Holt
have any effect upon the validity of Petitioner’s conviction. In Hinkle, the Fifth Circuit
held that the defendant’s prior Texas conviction for delivery of heroin did not qualify as a
“controlled substance offense” under the career offender enhancement guideline. 832
F.3d at 576-77. That holding, and the related analysis, was specific to the wording of the
Texas criminal statute at issue and has no bearing upon or precedential value in the
instant case. In Holt, the Seventh Circuit held that the defendant was not entitled to
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pursue a second collateral attack on his sentence for being a felon in possession of a
firearm, and specifically noted that Mathis has not been declared retroactive by the
Supreme Court. 843 F.3d at 722. Simply put, neither of these cases assist Petitioner in
his attempt to satisfy the savings clause of § 2255(e).
Because the Court agrees with the cogent analysis by the Magistrate Judge, and
because that analysis evinces no error, the Court need not discuss the same issues for
a second time here. Therefore, the Court overrules Petitioner’s Objections.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above and by the Magistrate Judge, the Court overrules
Petitioner’s Objections and adopts and incorporates by reference the Magistrate
Judge’s Report herein. It is therefore ORDERED that Petitioner’s § 2241 petition is
DISMISSED with prejudice and without requiring the respondent to file a return.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/Bruce Howe Hendricks
United States District Judge
August 8, 2018
Greenville, South Carolina
*****
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL
The parties are hereby notified that any right to appeal this Order is governed by
Rules 3 and 4 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.
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