Woods v. Stirling et al

Filing 67

ORDER granting 54 Motion to Stay Signed by Honorable David C Norton on October 22, 2018.(cban, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
Anthony Woods,
Petitioner,
vs.
Bryan P. Stirling, Director, South Carolina
Department of Corrections, and Willie D.
Davis, Warden, Kirkland Reception and
Evaluation Center,
Respondents.

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Case No.: 5:18-cv-00144-DCN-KDW
ORDER

This capital habeas corpus matter is before the court on the petitioner, Anthony
Woods’s (“Woods”), Motion to Stay Proceedings Pending Exhaustion of State Remedies.
(ECF No. 54.) Woods filed this motion along with his Amended Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus (“Petition,” ECF No. 53) on September 19, 2018. In Ground Four of the
Petition, Woods alleges he is intellectually disabled, as defined in Atkins v. Virginia, 536
U.S. 304 (2002), and its progeny, and is therefore ineligible for the death penalty under
the Eighth Amendment and that his trial and post-conviction relief (“PCR”) counsel were
ineffective for not raising this claim in state court. (ECF No. 53 at 18.) On September
17, 2018, through his current federal habeas counsel, Woods filed a second PCR
application in the Clarendon County Court of Common Pleas asserting identical claims to
those raised in Ground Four of the Petition. (See ECF Nos. 54 at 2, 54-1 at 1–2.) Woods
moves the Court to stay these federal habeas proceedings while the state courts consider
his second PCR application. Respondents oppose the motion to stay and have moved to
dismiss the second PCR application. (See ECF Nos. 59, 59-1.)
In December 2006, a jury convicted Woods of murder, burglary, and criminal
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sexual conduct and sentenced him to death. The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed
his convictions and sentence on appeal. State v. Woods, 382 S.C. 153, 676 S.E.2d 128
(2009). Woods subsequently filed a state PCR application, followed by two amended
applications.
Notably, in his May 1, 2012 amended PCR application, Woods alleged ineffective
assistance of trial counsel for failing to adequately investigate and raise the issue of his
intellectual disability. (See App.1 at 4185.) However, PCR counsel abandoned that claim
prior to the evidentiary hearing and, therefore, did not include it in the final amended
PCR application. (See ECF No. 62 at 2 (Woods’s reply to motion to stay confirming
Respondents’ assertion that initial PCR counsel abandoned the claim).) Thus, the state
courts have not yet had the opportunity to fully consider Woods’s Atkins and
corresponding ineffective assistance of counsel claims.
Further, South Carolina state courts have accepted second-in-time or successive
PCR applications raising Atkins claims from at least four other capital federal habeas
petitioners. See Elmore v. State, 2005-CP-24-1205 (circuit court denied State’s motion to
dismiss Elmore’s second PCR application as time-barred, considered Elmore’s Atkins
claim, and granted post-conviction relief); Aleksey v. State, 2015-CP-38-00764 (Aleksey
currently undergoing mental evaluations in support of the Atkins claim in his second PCR
application, which has been pending in the circuit court since 2015); Bryant v. State,
2016-CP-43-00829 (Atkins claim in second PCR application allowed to go forward,
State’s motion for summary judgment denied, and evidentiary hearing scheduled); Stone
v. State, 2018-CP-43-1025 (second PCR application raising Atkins claim currently

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The Appendix is located at ECF No. 20.
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pending in circuit court). In each of these cases, counsel first discovered evidence
supporting the petitioner’s claim of intellectual disability during the petitioner’s federal
habeas proceedings. And, in each of these cases, the federal court stayed the petitioner’s
federal habeas corpus action pending resolution of his state PCR action.2 (See Stone v.
Stirling, 2:17-cv-1221-MGL-MGB (D.S.C. Sept. 4, 2018) (order granting motion to
stay); Bryant v. Stirling, 9:16-cv-01423-DCN-BM (D.S.C. July 26, 2016) (order granting
motion to stay); Aleksey v. Stirling, 5:14-cv-03016-JMC-KDW (D.S.C. Aug. 19, 2015)
(order granting motion to stay); Elmore v. Ozmint, No. 07-14 (4th Cir. March 24, 2008)
(order staying appeal).)
Despite this precedent, Respondents assert that Woods’s second PCR application
is improper under several state procedural rules. (See ECF No. 59 at 2, 18–24.)
However, at least one South Carolina circuit court has specifically dismissed this
argument, finding “holding that an Atkins claim is subject to procedural default would
result in an unnecessary waste of judicial time and resources and, based on a[n]
incorrectly applied technicality, the wrongful execution of a person who is
constitutionally ineligible for the death penalty.” Order Denying State’s Mot. to Dismiss
in Bryant v. State, 2016-CP-43-828, Bryant v. Stirling, 9:16-cv-01423-DCN-BM, (D.S.C.
July 21, 2016), ECF No. 50-1. Respondents argue the circuit court’s finding is based on
an erroneous construction of state law. (ECF No. 59 at 25.) This Court will leave proper
construction of state law to the state courts. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67–68

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Aleksey and Bryant were stayed prior to the South Carolina Supreme Court’s decision in
State v. Robertson, 795 S.E.2d 29 (S.C. 2016), which expressly found Martinez v. Ryan,
566 U.S. 1 (2012), inapplicable to successive state PCR applications, with one very limited
exception. In staying this matter, the Court relies on different reasoning than in the orders
staying those cases, but to the same end.
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(1991) (“[I]t is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state-court
determinations on state-law questions.”).
In addition, Respondents contend that Woods’s case is distinguishable because
Woods’s PCR counsel considered raising the ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim
now asserted in the Petition, but made a strategic decision to abandon that claim based on
evidence that Woods was not intellectually disabled and that trial counsel were not
ineffective. (See ECF No. 59 at 25–28.) That argument goes to the merits and is best
addressed after Woods has had the opportunity to properly exhaust and fully brief his
claims.
Thus, after full consideration of the parties’ submissions and the procedural
posture of this matter, and in the interests of federalism and comity, this matter is hereby
stayed pending (1) final disposition of Woods’s pending PCR action or (2) further order
of this Court. See, e.g., Dietz v. Bouldin, 136 S. Ct. 1885, 1892 (2016) (recognizing “that
district courts have the inherent authority to manage their dockets and courtrooms with a
view toward the efficient and expedient resolution of cases”).
Accordingly, Woods’s motion to stay (ECF No. 54) is GRANTED. The parties
shall submit to the Court joint status reports every sixty (60) days regarding the status of
the PCR action and Woods shall notify the Court within fifteen (15) days of the final
disposition of his pending PCR application. The Court will address any currently
pending funding requests when this matter returns to federal court.

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AND IT IS SO ORDERED.

DAVID C. NORTON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
October 22, 2018
Charleston, South Carolina

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