Pifer v. Commissioner of the Social Security Administration

Filing 29

ORDER granting 26 Motion for Attorney Fees per 27 Stipulation inthe amount of $5,115.00 and expenses of $16.26 Signed by Honorable Timothy M Cain on 10/4/2019.(gnan )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
ORANGEBURG DIVISION

Sierra Frances Pifer,
Plaintiff,
vs.
Andrew M. Saul, Commissioner
of Social Security,
Defendant.

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Case No. 5:18-cv-1083-TMC
ORDER

On September 20, 2019, Plaintiff Sierra Frances Pifer filed a motion for attorney’s fees
pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412, on the basis that she was
the prevailing party and that the position taken by the Commissioner1 in this action was not
substantially justified. (ECF No. 26). On October 3, 2019, the parties filed a joint stipulation for
an award of attorney’s fees pursuant to the EAJA. (ECF No. 27).
Under the EAJA, a court shall award attorney’s fees to a prevailing party in certain civil
actions against the United States, unless it finds that the government's position was substantially
justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A).2 The
district courts have discretion to determine a reasonable fee award and whether that award should

1

On June 17, 2019, Andrew M. Saul became the Commissioner of Social Security. Pursuant to
Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d), he is automatically substituted for Defendant Nancy A. Berryhill who was
the Acting Commissioner of Social Security when this action was filed.

2

A party who wins a remand pursuant to sentence four of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §
405(g), is a prevailing party for EAJA purposes. See Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 300-302
(1993). The remand in this case was made pursuant to sentence four. (ECF Nos. 26, 27).

be made in excess of the statutory cap. Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552 (1988); May v.
Sullivan, 936 F.2d 176, 177 (4th Cir. 1991).
District courts also have broad discretion to set the attorney fee amount. In determining
the fee award, “[e]xorbitant, unfounded, or procedurally defective fee applications . . . are matters
that the district court can recognize and discount.” Hyatt v. North Carolina Dep’t of Human Res.,
315 F.3d 239, 254 (4th Cir. 2002) (citing Comm’r v. Jean, 496 U.S. 154, 163 (1990)).
Additionally, the court should not only consider the “position taken by the United States in the
civil action,” but also the “action or failure to act by the agency upon which the civil action is
based.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(D), as amended by P.L. 99-80, § 2(c)(2)(B).
The parties have entered into a stipulation allowing for the payment of attorneys’ fees in
the amount of $5,115.00 and expenses of $16.26. (ECF No. 27 at 1). Despite this stipulation, the
court is obligated under the EAJA to determine if the fee is proper. See Design & Prod., Inc. v.
United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 145, 152 (1990) (holding that under the EAJA, “it is the court’s
responsibility to independently assess the appropriateness and measure of attorney’s fees to be
awarded in a particular case, whether or not an amount is offered as representing the agreement of
the parties in the form of a proposed stipulation”). Applying the above standard to the facts of this
case, the court concludes that the Commissioner’s position was not substantially justified.
Furthermore, after a thorough review of the record, the court finds the stipulated fee request is
appropriate.
Accordingly, the court GRANTS the Motion for Attorney’s Fees (ECF No. 26) and orders
that Plaintiff be awarded attorneys’ fees in the amount of $5,115.00 and expenses of $16.26.3

3

The court notes that the fees must be paid to Plaintiff. See Astrue v. Ratliff, 560 U.S. 586 (2010)
(holding that the plain text of the EAJA requires that attorney’s fees be awarded to the litigant,
2

IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/Timothy M. Cain
United States District Judge
October 4, 2019
Anderson, South Carolina

thus subjecting EAJA fees to offset of any pre-existing federal debts); see also Stephens v. Astrue,
565 F.3d 131, 139 (4th Cir. 2009) (same).
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