Bland et al v. House of Raeford Farms Inc
Filing
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ORDER granting in part and denying in part 12 Motion for Summary Judgment as set out. Signed by Honorable J Michelle Childs on 9/19/11.(awil)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
GREENVILLE DIVISION
Jackie Bland, Tamortha Bruster, Myrtle Bryson,
Antonio Burch, and Steven Case,
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)
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Plaintiffs,
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v.
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House of Raeford Farms, Inc. d/b/a
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Columbia Farms,
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Defendant.
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_________________________________________ )
C.A. No. 6:10-cv-00928-JMC
OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiffs Jackie Bland (“Bland”), Tamortha Bruster (“Bruster”), Myrtle Bryson (“Bryson”),
Antonio Burts (“Burts”)1, and Steven Case (“Case,” and collectively “Plaintiffs”) brought this action
against Defendant House of Raeford, Inc. d/b/a Columbia Farms (“Columbia Farms”) alleging that
Columbia Farms wrongfully discharged them from employment in retaliation for instituting workers’
compensation claims. Columbia Farms filed a Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 12] as to each
Plaintiffs’ claims. For the reasons stated below, the court grants in part and denies in part Columbia
Farms’s Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 12].
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Columbia Farms operates a chicken processing plant located in Greenville, South Carolina.
The Greenville plant is covered by a collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) that prescribes certain
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The case caption includes named plaintiff Antonio Burch. However, multiple documents
in the record, including depositions, signed statements, medical records and employment records,
indicate that plaintiff’s name is Antonio Burts. See [Docs. 19-8, 19-9, 19-10, and 19-40].
Accordingly, the court refers to plaintiff as Antonio Burts. Plaintiffs’ counsel is instructed to inform
the court of plaintiff’s correct name and file a motion to correct the case caption if appropriate.
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terms and conditions of employment. Under the CBA, Columbia Farms uses a point system for
absences. Pursuant to this system, employees are charged points for absences and tardiness. One
half-point is accessed if an employee arrives late or leaves early; a full point is assessed if an
employee misses a day of work on Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, or Friday; and a point-and-a-half
is assessed if an employee misses an assigned Monday, Saturday, or Sunday. If an employee has a
medical excuse for an absence for illness or injury that is not work-related, one point is assessed for
the entire period of medically excused leave, even if the leave is longer than one day. However, only
a half-point is deducted when an employee works thirty (30) days without receiving any new points.
An employee may be automatically terminated if he or she is absent two consecutive days without
notifying Columbia Farms. The attendance policy provided to the employees does not explain how
Columbia Farms accounts for absences due to work work-related injuries. All plaintiffs were
instructed about Columbia Farms’s attendance point system at orientation, and signed a document
acknowledging that they have been so informed.
An employee who has an accident, or is injured or becomes ill at work, is required to report
the incident to his or her supervisor, or to Teresa Taylor, who is the plant nurse. Taylor assesses the
individual’s condition and determines whether the injury requires the attention of the company
doctor. The company doctor then determines whether an injury qualifies as a work-related injury
necessitating the filing of a workers’ compensation claim. If Taylor determines that the injury only
requires first aid, she does not refer the employee to the company doctor for examination. Columbia
Farms requires its employees to seek medical care for work-related injuries from the company doctor
and provides for the filing of workers’ compensation claims only through its company doctor.
Although Columbia Farms does not expressly advise its employees whether they can or cannot file
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workers’ compensation claims in another manner, it does advise its employees that they may only
seek medical care for a work-related injury with the permission of Columbia Farms.
Jackie Bland
Jackie Bland began his employment with Columbia Farms on September 18, 2009, while
under a work-release program administered by the South Carolina Department of Corrections and
continued his employment after his release. Shortly after beginning work with Columbia Farms,
Bland began to complain of recurring hand pain to the plant nurse. The nurse administered first aid
treatment to Bland’s hands several times by rubbing a topical pain reliever on his hands. The nurse
never referred Bland to the company doctor. Sometime thereafter, Bland alleges that he called to
notify Columbia Farms that his hand pain was so severe that he needed to visit the hospital
emergency room. According to Bland, he was advised that he was required to come to work instead
of seeing a doctor and that if he did not report to work, he would be fired. Bland admits that he
decided to see the doctor instead of going to work on that day, and contends that he did not return
to work because he believed Columbia Farms had fired him for his decision. Columbia Farms
alleges that it terminated Bland’s employment because he was absent from work for two days and
failed to report.
Tamortha Bruster
Tamortha Bruster commenced work at Columbia Farms on December 5, 2008. In January
of 2009, Bruster allegedly injured her finger at work. She notified her supervisors of the injury and
saw the plant nurse. The nurse wrapped Bruster’s finger several times thereafter, but did not refer
Bruster to the company doctor. Bruster contends that her fingernail turned black and she went to the
hospital emergency room for medical attention where she received prescriptions for pain and
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infection. Bruster continued to work and visited the plant nurse several more times regarding
continuous problems with pain and discoloration of her fingernail. Bruster alleges that her fingernail
then turned green and she made a subsequent visit to the hospital emergency room. Bruster admits
that she missed several days of work due to the pain in her finger and doctors’ visits related thereto,
but insists that she presented doctors’ notes excusing her absences to Columbia Farms which were
refused by Columbia Farms. After Bruster’s doctor’s visit in April of 2009, Columbia Farms
contends that she had accumulated too many attendance points and was recorded as a voluntary
termination for failure to return to work.
Myrtle Bryson
Myrtle Bryson began her relevant employment with Columbia Farms on October 15, 2008.
Shortly after commencing employment, Bryson asserts that she visited the plant nurse with a
complaint of wrist pain. The nurse applied a topical pain reliever to the area and returned to work.
Bryson saw the plant nurse again with the same complaint and the nurse informed her that she should
go home and could not return to work without a doctor’s clearance. Bryson obtained medical
attention from a private doctor who provided a note indicating the she could return to work with no
restrictions. Bryson never returned to see a doctor regarding the pain in her wrists and did not visit
the plant nurse. Subsequently, Bryson left her assigned work station during her shift and did not
return to Columbia Farms. Columbia Farms asserts that Bryson voluntarily ceased employment with
the company.
Antonio Burts
Antonio Burts began his relevant employment with Columbia Farms on March 6, 2009.
While cleaning a machine using a pump spray, Burts claims he was exposed to sanitizing chemicals,
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which penetrated his protective clothing and caused reddening of the skin and discomfort on his right
arm, hand and shoulder which he describes as a chemical burn. Burts saw the plant nurse who
administered a cream to the affected area. He received additional applications of the cream in the
following days at work. At some point, Burts contends that he requested the nurse to allow him to
see a doctor, but the nurse declined to do so and informed him that he was not released to leave work
to visit the hospital emergency room. Despite the nurse’s warning of discipline if he left, Burts went
to the emergency room. He contends that he attempted to provide Columbia Farms with a doctor’s
excuse for his missed time at work, but Columbia Farms refused to accept it. Columbia Farms
argues that it terminated Burts because he left his work station without permission and failed to
contact Columbia Farms until several days after his doctor’s visit.
Steven Case
Steven Case began his employment with Columbia Farms on December 5, 2008. Case began
to experience hand pain in January of 2009 and reported to the plant nurse for treatment. The nurse
applied a topical pain reliever and wrapped his hand several times through April of 2009. Case
alleges that during one of his visits to the nurse, she informed him that if he could not do the
assigned job, Columbia Farms did not need his services. He further contends that he requested to
see the doctor and was told to see his own doctor. Case received medical attention from his doctor
who diagnosed him with strained tendinitis and alleges that the doctor advised him not to work for
approximately two weeks. He claims that he informed the plant nurse that the doctor placed him on
medical leave for two weeks and she instructed him to bring a doctor’s excuse upon his return to
work. The day before Case was to return to work, he claims that he called Columbia Farms and a
female employee responding to his call told him he was on the termination list. Therefore, Case
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testified that he did not return to Columbia Farms. Columbia Farms asserts that Case told the plant
nurse that he could not do his job due to a non-work related incident and was terminated for
excessive attendance points for failing to return after the expiration of his medical leave.
None of the Plaintiffs filed formal workers’ compensation claims prior to their termination
of employment with Columbia Farms.
LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that “there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(a). To prevail on a motion for summary judgment, the movant must demonstrate that: (1)
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact; and (2) that he is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.
In determining whether a genuine issue has been raised, the court must construe all inferences
and ambiguities against the movant and in favor of the non-moving party. United States v. Diebold,
Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962). The court need not credit the non-movant with every possible
inference that can be drawn from the evidence, but only those inferences which are in the range of
reasonable probability. See Sylvia Dev. Corp. v. Calvert County, Md., 48 F.3d 810, 817-18 (4th Cir.
1995).
Inferences that rest solely upon speculation and conjecture are not appropriate for
consideration. Id. If a reasonable jury could reach only one conclusion based on the evidence,
judgment as a matter of law must be entered. See Crinkley v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 844 F.2d 156, 160
(4th Cir.1988).
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The party seeking summary judgment shoulders the initial burden of demonstrating to the
district court that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,
323 (1986). Once the movant has made this threshold demonstration, the non-moving party, to
survive the motion for summary judgment, may not rest on the allegations averred in his pleadings.
Rather, the non-moving party must demonstrate that specific, material facts exist which give rise to
a genuine issue. Id. at 324. Under this standard, the existence of a mere scintilla of evidence in
support of the plaintiff’s position is insufficient to withstand the summary judgment motion. See
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986). Likewise, conclusory allegations or
denials, without more, are insufficient to preclude the granting of the summary judgment motion.
Ross v. Commc’ns Satellite Corp., 759 F.2d 355, 365 (4th Cir. 1985). “Only disputes over facts that
might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of
summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.”
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiffs bring claims against Columbia Farms alleging that Columbia Farms committed
unlawful and retaliatory acts against them after Plaintiffs experienced work-related injuries.
Columbia Farms requests the court enter summary judgment in its favor on these claims because
Plaintiffs either did not file workers’ compensation claims prior to termination or were properly
terminated for violating company policy.
South Carolina law provides that “[n]o employer may discharge or demote any employee
because the employee has instituted or caused to be instituted, in good faith, any proceeding under
the South Carolina Workers’ Compensation Law.” S.C. Code Ann. § 41-1-80 (Supp. 2003). In order
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to prove a claim under § 41-1-80, a plaintiff must establish three elements: (1) the institution of
workers’ compensation proceedings, (2) discharge or demotion, and (3) a causal connection between
the first two elements. See Hinton v. Designer Ensembles, Inc., 343 S.C. 236, 242, 540 S.E.2d 94,
97 (2000). To establish causation under § 41-1-80, the employee must show that he would not have
been discharged “but for” the filing of the workers’ compensation claim. Id.
It is not necessary for a plaintiff to have filed a formal workers’ compensation claim to
demonstrate that he or she has instituted sufficient workers’ compensation proceedings to proceed
on an action for retaliation. South Carolina courts have recognized other conduct as sufficient to
have instituted a proceeding including the employer's agreement to pay or payment of medical care
or the employer's receipt of written notice from an independent health care provider in the form of
a bill for medical services rendered to an injured employee. Johnson v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 308 S.C.
116, 119, 417 S.E.2d 527, 529 (1992)
The purpose of Section 41-1-80 cannot be avoided by firing an injured employee before he
or she files a claim. Id. However, an employer may terminate an employee for inability to meet
established employer work standards or may terminate an employee for the violation of specific
written company policy. Such terminations may constitute an affirmative defense under section 411-80. See Hinton, 343 S.C. at 242, 540 S.E.2d at 97. While the employer has the burden of proving
its affirmative defenses, the employer does not have the burden of establishing the affirmative
defenses are causally related to the discharge. See Horn v. Davis Elec. Constructors, Inc., 307 S.C.
559, 416 S.E.2d 634 (1992). If the employer articulates a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for the
termination, the proximity in time between the work-related injury and the termination is not
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sufficient evidence to carry the employee's burden of proving a causal connection. See Hinton, 343
S.C. at 243, 540 S.E.2d at 97.
Columbia Farms contends that the retaliation claims asserted by Plaintiffs are due to be
dismissed because none of the Plaintiffs instituted workers’ compensation proceedings – either
formally by filing a workers’ compensation charge or constructively, as by securing the employer’s
agreement to pay for medical care or the employer’s receipt of written notice from an independent
health care provider in the form of a bill for medical services rendered to an injured employee.
Columbia Farms also argues that the evidence establishes that Plaintiffs were discharged for
legitimate, non-pretextual, non-discriminatory reasons – chiefly violation of the company’s written
absentee policy, memorialized in the CBA. Columbia Farms and Plaintiffs Bland, Bruster, Burts,
and Case provide competing explanations of the circumstances surrounding the alleged work-related
injuries, the reporting of those injuries to Columbia Farms, and the termination of each of these
Plaintiffs. Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, the court finds that there are
genuine disputes of material fact which prevent a judgment as a matter of law on these Plaintiffs’
claims. Therefore, the court denies Columbia Farms’s request for summary judgment as to the
retaliation claims of Plaintiffs Bland, Bruster, Burts, and Case.
As to Plaintiff Bryson’s claim, the court finds that there is no genuine dispute of material fact.
The record indicates that Bryson saw the plant nurse twice for wrist pain and was thereafter cleared
for work by a physician. Although Bryson alleges that she continued to experience wrist pain, there
is no dispute that Bryson did not seek further attention from the plant nurse or a doctor. Instead, the
record reflects that Bryson voluntarily left her work assignment and never returned to Columbia
Farms. While there may be some dispute over whether Bryson actually suffered a work-related
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injury, there is no dispute that Bryson left Columbia Farms employ of her own will and was not
terminated in connection with injury-related complaints or absences. Therefore, the court grants
Columbia Farms’s motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff Bryson’s claim.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant House of Raeford, Inc. d/b/a Columbia Farms’s Motion
for Summary Judgment [Doc. 12] is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. The court denies
summary judgment on the retaliation claims of Plaintiffs Bland, Bruster, Burts, and Case and grants
summary judgment on Plaintiff Bryson’s claims.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
United States District Judge
September 19, 2011
Greenville, South Carolina
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