Monster Daddy LLC v. Monster Cable Products Inc

Filing 428

ORDER and OPINION granting 267 Motion for Attorney Fees as set out. Signed by Honorable Mary G Lewis on 3/19/14.(alew, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
GREENVILLE DIVISION
MONSTER DADDY,
Plaintiff,
v.
MONSTER CABLE PRODUCTS, INC.,
MONSTER, LLC, and WEST COAST
CUSTOMS, INC.,
Defendants.
__________________________________
MONSTER CABLE PRODUCTS, INC.,
Counterclaimant,
v.
MONSTER DADDY,
Counterdefendant.
__________________________________

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Civil Action No.: 6:10-1170-MGL

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Defendant Monster Cable Products, Inc., Monster, LLC
and West Coast Customs, Inc.’s (collectively “Monster Cable”) Motion for Attorney’s Fees (ECF
No. 267) seeking $93,404.50 in attorney’s fees and $8,343.00 in costs. The motion was filed in
response to this Court’s order of April 23, 2013 (ECF No. 262) which sanctioned Plaintiff Monster
Daddy (“Monster Daddy”) for failing to comply with a court order, and required Monster Daddy
to pay Monster Cable the reasonable costs for reconvening the Rule 30(b)(6) deposition of Monster
Daddy and for the reasonable attorney’s fees and costs associated with filing Monster Cable’s
Motion for Contempt of Court and Sanctions Against Monster Daddy. (ECF No. 240.) Monster
Cable submitted declarations and other documentation in support of the request for attorney’s fees.

Monster Daddy filed a response in opposition on May 17, 2013 (ECF No. 271) and Monster Cable
filed a reply in support of the motion on May 28, 2013. (ECF No. 274.) Monster Daddy filed a
sur-reply on June 7, 2013. (ECF No. 278.) The Court conducted a pre-trial conference and hearing
on June 19, 2013, at which time the Court heard from the parties regarding the motion for attorney’s
fees and costs. (ECF No. 292.)
Having considered these filings and the arguments of counsel, as well as the entire record
in this case, this Court grants Monster Cable’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees (ECF No. 267) but limits
the relief granted as set forth herein.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The background and the Court’s rationale for sanctioning Monster Daddy is set forth fully
in this Court’s order of April 23, 2013 (ECF No. 262), and the Court reiterates and incorporates
herein by reference all of its discussion and findings regarding Monster Daddy’s conduct and the
reasons for levying sanctions pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37. Monster Cable has,
on several occasions, outlined Monster Daddy’s several failures to comply with various court
directives and orders throughout the course of this litigation by way of motions and in hearings
before this Court. The Court need not revisit these shortcomings. Monster Cable has asked this
Court on more than one occasion to levy very serious sanctions against Monster Daddy to deter
dilatory conduct which has thwarted the pursuit of a resolution on the merits in this case.
The purpose of the Court’s April 23, 2013 ruling was to require Monster Daddy to
compensate Monster Cable for the reasonable costs for reconvening the Rule 30(b)(6) deposition
and for the reasonable attorney’s fees and costs associated with filing the discovery motion (ECF
No. 240), which prompted the Court to issue limited sanctions against Monster Daddy. At that
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time, the Court did not find the requested sanction of dismissal of Plaintiff’s case to be appropriate.
Accordingly, the Court found that less drastic sanctions were available in the form of an award of
attorney’s fees and limiting Monster Daddy’s trial testimony in accordance with Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 37(c)(1) due to its failure to file timely pre-trial disclosures. At that time, the Court
directed counsel for Monster Cable to file fee and cost-related documentation as evidence of the
reasonable costs and fees associated with reconvening the Rule 30(b)(6) deposition and for filing
the discovery motion which resulted in the imposition of sanctions.
Monster Cable’s Motion for Contempt of Court and Sanctions Against Monster Daddy (ECF
No. 240) was not Monster Cable’s first motion for sanctions made in this case. On June 7, 2012,
Monster Cable filed a motion to compel the reopening of the Rule 30(b)(6) deposition of Monster
Daddy and the production of documents and for sanctions and appointment of a special master.
After considering the briefs of the parties and arguments made at a hearing on the motion on August
21, 2012, this Court granted Monster Cable’s Motion to Compel and Produce in part but denied
Monster Cable’s request for sanctions and for the appointment of a special master. (ECF No. 239.)
The Court specifically found that Monster Daddy failed to make a good faith effort to adequately
prepare its designated witness as required by the federal rules, allowed for the reconvening of the
Rule 30(b)(6) deposition of Monster Daddy, and ordered the production of any documents identified
by Monster Daddy’s Rule 30(b)(6) deponent during his deposition that had not been produced and
which were responsive to Monster Cable’s discovery requests. (ECF No. 239.)
On September 14, 2012, Monster Cable filed its Motion for Sanctions and Motion for
Contempt for Violation of Court Order ECF No. 239 due to Monster Daddy’s continued failure to
produce certain documents responsive to Monster Cable’s discovery requests (ECF No. 240) as well
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as supplemental briefing regarding same. (ECF No. 242.) Following the reconvened deposition
of Monster Daddy, Monster Cable filed another brief in support of its motion outlining what it
maintained was additional evidence of Monster Daddy’s continued and intentional noncompliance
with the Court’s orders and seeking a full dismissal of Monster Daddy’s complaint. (ECF No. 249.)
On August 26-29, 2013, and September 16, 2013, this Court held a bench trial and heard
closing arguments from the parties. During the trial, Monster Cable brought a motion for default
judgment against Monster Daddy upon the discovery of information previously sought concerning
Monster Daddy’s suppliers. (ECF No. 345.) Monster Cable contended that the Court’s previous
sanctions were insufficient to remedy the prejudice caused to Monster Cable as a result of Monster
Daddy’s conduct. This Court found the Motion for Default Judgment to be moot as a result of the
Court’s order resolving the parties’ claims on the merits.
ANALYSIS
In brief, this Court found that Monster Daddy should pay Monster Cable’s reasonable
attorney’s fees and costs in reconvening the Rule 30(b)(6) deposition and for its reasonable fees and
costs associated with preparing its Motion for Sanctions and Motion for Contempt for Violation of
Court Order ECF No. 239. The Court found that the payment of fees and costs was equitable under
the circumstances and was a less drastic sanction than other alternatives.
Upon finding that an award of attorney’s fees is appropriate, the Court must determine
whether the requested amount is reasonable. Under the “lodestar” formula, the Court should
multiply the number of hours reasonably expended by counsel by a reasonable hourly rate. S ee
Child Evangelism Fellowship of South Carolina v. Anderson School Dist. 5, No. 8:04-1866-HMH,
2007 WL 1302692 (D.S.C.2007). In determining reasonableness, the Court shall analyze the twelve
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factors set forth in Barber v. Kimbrell’s, Inc., 577 F.2d 216 (4th Cir.1978). Those twelve factors
are “(1) the time and labor expended; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions raised; (3) the
skill required to properly perform the legal services rendered; (4) the attorney’s opportunity costs
in pressing the instant litigation; (5) the customary fee for like work; (6) the attorney’s expectations
at the outset of the litigation; (7) the time limitations imposed by the client or circumstances; (8)
the amount in controversy and the results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation and ability of the
attorney; (10) the undesirability of the case within the legal community in which the suit arose; (11)
the nature and length of the professional relationship between attorney and client; and (12)
attorneys’ fees awards in similar cases.” Barber, 577 F.2d at 226. Although the Court must
consider all twelve factors, it is not required to apply them rigidly. In determining whether a
requested rate is reasonable, the Court should consider “‘prevailing market rates in the relevant
community.’” Rum Creek Coal Sales, Inc. v. Caperton, 31 F.3d 169, 175 (4th Cir.1994) (quoting
Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 (1984)).
In the case at bar, on April 24, 2013, Monster Cable submitted declarations from counsel
in support of its request concerning the following:
1. Motion to Compel Reopening of the Rule 30(b)(6) deposition of Monster Daddy and
production of documents (ECF No. 217), including reply in support of the Motion to Compel (ECF
No. 229);
2. Reconvened November 2012 Rule 30(b)(6) Deposition;
3. Motion for Sanctions and Contempt (ECF No. 240), including Supplemental Brief (ECF
No. 242) and Response in Support of Motion for Sanctions (ECF No. 249), and Motion Hearing;
and
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4. Costs, including travel expenses relating to the reconvening of the Rule 30(b)(6)
Deposition and related motions hearings.
At that time, Monster Cable also provided opposing counsel with a fee petition and
supporting declarations of Monster Cable’s counsel. On April 30, 2013, Monster Cable made a
motion on the record to the same effect. (ECF No. 267.) On May 17, 2013, Monster Daddy filed
its memorandum in opposition to Monster Cable’s request for attorney’s fees and costs. (ECF No.
271.) In that response, Monster Daddy did not particularly challenge or dispute Monster Cable’s
entitlement to fees and costs but instead challenged the amount sought as excessive and lacking
sufficient explanation and documentation. In essence, Monster Daddy seeks a reduction of the
amount requested by Monster Cable. Monster Cable subsequently filed a reply in support of the
motion providing actual invoices of the law firms of Nexsen Pruet, LLC (“Nexsen Pruet”) and
LaRivere Grubman and Payne, LLP (“LGP”) submitted for in camera review to further assist the
Court in determining the reasonable amount of attorney’s fees and costs. Between the two
submissions to the Court, Monster Cable has briefed and addressed the Barber factors which
support its request and put forth evidence to demonstrate the reasonableness of the rates.
A.

Analysis of the Barber Factors
The Fourth Circuit has held that there is no strict manner in which the Barber factors are

to be considered and applied. See E.E.O.C. v. Service News Co., 898 F.2d 958, 965 (4th Cir.1990).
Although the Court is to review all twelve Barber factors, it need only make specific findings as
to the factors it determines are relevant to its determination. Id. From the record, factors (4), (6),
(7), (8), (10), and (11) do not seem to affect the fee concerning the instant motion, however the
Court has carefully reviewed and considered each factor. This case is a significant matter and
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representation of Monster Cable is based on seemingly longstanding relationships between client
and counsel. Circumstances did require Monster Cable’s counsel to spend a significant amount of
time to address a number of discovery issues and the Court acknowledges that this might have
impacted counsel’s ability to pursue other work. Additionally, to some extent the discovery issues
caused by Monster Daddy contributed to the amount of the fees incurred by Monster Cable in this
case. However, dealing with Monster Daddy’s lack of responsiveness to discovery did not
necessarily require expertise beyond that of a typical litigator. Further, the Court does not find it
appropriate to consider the ultimate resolution of the case and outcome in addressing this limited
fee petition.
Several of the remaining factors are more relevant to this Court’s consideration of the
appropriateness of the fee and the hours expended in this case. First, having reviewed the relevant
time entries, the Court finds that most of the time and labor expended by counsel for Monster Cable
for the purposes of preparing for the reconvened deposition and the motion of sanctions was in fact
reasonable under the circumstances presented in this case. The parties have been in litigation for
several years. Counsel for Monster Cable has spent significant time and effort engaging in motion
practice to ensure Monster Daddy’s compliance with court orders and the rules of court. Next, the
Court finds that although the reconvened deposition did involve some potentially difficult and novel
issues related to the area of patent and trademark law, the issues related to the discovery dispute
underlying this motion are not particularly novel or difficult. Similarly, no particularly special skills
were required to brief and present Monster Cable’s motion for sanctions. Still, the complexity of
the underlying litigation justifies Monster Cable’s selection of knowledgeable and competent lead
counsel and equally skilled and competent local counsel to address the matter in this South Carolina
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court.
The Court has carefully considered the customary fees for like work as a factor. Monster
Cable seeks attorney’s fees in the amount of $30,339 at rates of $190-520 per hour for three
timekeepers (firm member, special counsel, and paralegal), and costs in the amount of $4,473.20
on behalf of Nexsen Pruet in connection with preparing an initial motion to compel and for
sanctions (ECF No. 217) and related reply (ECF No. 229), a second motion for sanctions (ECF No.
240), and preparing for and attending the reconvened November 2012 Rule 30(b)(6) deposition of
Monster Daddy. Monster Cable also seeks attorney’s fees in the amount of $63,065.50 at rates of
$375-575 per hour for three timekeepers (three partners), and costs in the amount of $3,869.80 on
behalf of LGP in connection with reconvening the Rule 30(b)(6) deposition, preparing the second
motion for sanctions, and attending the hearing on the motion. Thus, Monster Cable seeks an award
of $101,747.50 which includes $93,404.50 in total attorney’s fees and $8,343.00 in total costs.
The Court must first note that its sanctions order was limited to the attorney’s fees and costs
associated with the second motion for sanctions (ECF No. 240), and not the initial motion to
compel/sanctions (ECF No. 217), so the Court will deduct the fees associated with the initial motion
from Nexsen Pruet’s calculation. After deducting fees and hours associated with the first motion
to compel (ECF No. 217), Nexsen Pruet seeks $19,492.00 for a total of 57.8 hours of work and LGP
seeks $63,065.50 for a total of 144.3 hours of work.
The Court must attempt to compensate attorneys at the prevailing market rate in the relevant
community. Rum Creek Coal Sales v. Caperton, 31 F.3d 169, 175 (4th Cir.1994). Normally, the
relevant community is the judicial community in which the court sits, however, in some
circumstances where it is reasonable to retain attorneys from other communities, the rates in those
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communities may also be considered. Id. Monster Cable provided the Court with declarations
from counsel outlining attorney’s fees and costs associated with the instant dispute. (ECF No. 267.)
In response to Monster Daddy’s memorandum in opposition which challenged the substantiation
for the motion (ECF No. 271), Monster Cable submitted a reply and supplemental declarations
(ECF No. 274) to include the American Intellectual Property Law Association (AIPLA) Report of
the Economic Survey 2011. (ECF No. 274-5.) The report provides some data on the hourly rates
charged by intellectual property attorneys and associated patent agents who participated in the
survey. The report classifies responses based on the location of respondents to include categories
for “Other Southeast: North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida” and “Other West:
Montana, Wyoming, Colorado, New Mexico, Idaho, Utah, Nevada, Arizona, Washington, Oregon,
California, Alaska, Hawaii.”1
The Court reviewed the AIPLA report however, this submission does not establish that the
fees requested are comparable to customary fees for like work in the relevant market of South
Carolina (or Monterrey, California) or the reasonableness of the rates requested. See generally
Grissom v. Mills Corp., 549 F.3d 313, 323 (4th Cir. 2008) (reversing fee award, in part because
“Plaintiff offered no specific evidence that the hourly rates sought for his attorneys coincided with
the then prevailing market rates of attorneys in the [district] of similar skill and for similar work,
which our case law required him to do.”); Plyler v. Evatt, 902 F.2d 273, 277 (4th Cir.1990) (“In
addition to the attorney’s own affidavits, the fee applicant must produce satisfactory specific
evidence of the prevailing market rates in the relevant community for the type of work for which

1

The report includes a category for Los Angeles Consolidated Metropolitan Statistical Area but it
does not appear that Monterrey, California, the location of LGP, would be included in the calculations
associated with the Los Angeles metropolitan area.

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he seeks an award.”). The AIPLA report data is simply not specific enough to highlight the rates
in the relevant markets and Monster Cable did not file any affidavits from other attorneys to support
its claims regarding the prevailing market rates of attorneys in the community for similar cases. See
Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 n. 11 (1984)(Fee applicants bear the burden of establishing that
the rates requested are “in line with those prevailing in the community for similar services by
lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience, and reputation.”).
Without specific support for the requested rates, the Court cannot appropriately conduct the
required analysis of the reasonableness of hourly rates requested. See Robinson v. Equifax
Information Services, LLC, 560 F.3d 235, 246 (4th Cir. 2009)(holding district court abused its
discretion in awarding fee where court relied solely on affidavit of plaintiff’s attorney in
determining prevailing market rate). Of course, the Court may draw upon its own knowledge of
litigation rates often charged in this district. See Joe Hand Promotions, Inc. v. The Precint
Bar–Daxlam, Ltd., No. 3:10–199–CMC, 2010 WL 3420189, *4 (D.S.C. Aug. 23, 2010) (finding
requested fees to be reasonable based on court’s “own knowledge of rates charged in litigation in
this court” for “similar work in this geographic area.”).
Additionally, the Court has considered the experience, reputation, and ability of the
attorneys involved. Although the motion is not supported by any outside affidavits or other
information about the abilities or reputation of counsel, the Court takes note of the affidavits of
counsel which provide some insight about counsel’s overall experience and years of practice. These
submissions on behalf of highly experienced and very capable litigators and intellectual property
attorneys support the requested attorney’s fees. Even though the type of motion at issue does not
necessarily require any specialized skills, some special abilities were likely required to prepare for
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and conduct the reconvened Rule 30(b)(6) deposition of Monster Daddy.
Finally, the Court considers attorney’s fees awards in similar cases as a relevant factor. The
Court has reviewed several cases in this district including similar cases involving complicated and
technical intellectual property claims and other complex issues. See,.e.g. Super Duper, Inc. v.
Mattel, Inc., No. 6:05–cv–1700–HFF–WMC, 2009 WL 866463 (D.S.C. Mar. 31, 2009) (finding
a request for fees in the amount of $2,643,844.15 appropriate in a complex trademark and patent
infringement case litigated for several years and involving experienced in-state and out-of-state
counsel); Uhlig v. Shirley, 895 F. Supp. 2d 707 (D.S.C. Sept. 25, 2012)(finding attorney’s fees
sought to be excessive in comparison to similar actions involving misappropriation of trade secrets).
The Court has also found the opinion of Grayson Consulting, Inc. v. Cathcart, to be instructive.
Grayson Consulting, Inc. v. Cathcart, No. 2:07–02992–DCN, 2013 WL 436217 (Feb. 5, 2013)
(awarding a petition for attorney’s fees and costs related to a successful motion for sanctions for
discovery abuses). These cases have provided additional insight on hourly rates and fees found to
be reasonable by other courts in this district for similarly sophisticated legal work and under similar
circumstances.
B.

Computing the Lodestar Figure
With the Barber factors in mind, in determining the proper fee award, the Court multiples

the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation by a reasonable hourly rate. See Hensley
v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). Absent circumstances warranting adjustment, the lodestar
figure represents the proper fee award. See Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 888 (1984). Based on
these considerations, the Court makes the following determinations:

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1.

Reasonable Hourly Rate

The balance of the relevant Barber factors weigh in favor of reducing the actual hourly rate.
The Court concludes that the appropriate hourly rate for the attorneys in this case is $330 per hour.
This is the hourly rate of the special counsel who worked on the case and is consistent with the
Court’s knowledge of hourly rates for other high level attorneys in the community. This rate also
takes into account counsel’s expertise and experience in the field of intellectual property and
litigation.2 Although some of the attorneys involved have significant legal experience which may
command a higher hourly rate, the Court believes the hourly rate of $330 to be appropriate for the
type of legal work performed and for which an award is being made. Further, some of the work at
issue—particularly the work relating to the motion for sanctions—does not require an inordinate
amount of special skill in the intellectual property law area in the opinion of the Court.
The Court also finds it appropriate to cut the requested paralegal rate from $190 to $150.
A paralegal rate of $150 was recently approved in another case in this district and the Court finds
this rate to be more in line with the going rates for work done by paralegals in this district. See
Uhlig, LLC v. Shirley, 895 F. Supp. 2d 707, 717 (D.S.C. Sept. 25, 2012) (approving rate of $150
per hour for work done by paralegals at a law firm of similar size and national presence).
2.

Hours Reasonably Expended

In addition to establishing a reasonable hourly rate, the Court is required to calculate the
number of hours reasonably expended by the prevailing party seeking attorney’s fees. In making
2

Other courts in this district have found that slightly lower hourly rates are more
appropriate for work done by senior attorneys and partners. Atkinson v. House of Raeford Farms,
Inc., Docket Nos. 09–cv–1901, 09–cv3137, 2012 WL 2923246, at *3 (D.S.C. July 18, 2012)
(awarding attorney’s fees at a rate of $300/hour for law partners); CT & T EV Sales, Inc. v. 2AM
Group, LLC, No. 7:11–1532–TMC, 2012 WL 3010911, at *4 (Jul. 13, 2012)(same).
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this determination, “the court should not simply accept as reasonable the number of hours reported
by counsel.” Child Evangelism Fellowship of S.C. v. Anderson Sch. Dist. 5, No. 8:04-1866-HMH,
2007 WL 1302692, *2 (D.S.C. May 2, 2007)(internal citation omitted). The number of hours
should not include hours that are “excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary” in order to arrive
at the number of hours that would properly be billed to the client. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434.
At issue here is approximately 183.1 hours of attorney time and 19 hours of paralegal time.
The Court finds this request excessive and applies a twenty percent (20%) reduction in order to
arrive at a reasonable fee award.3 The Court has considered and analyzed the hours submitted in
the context of the relevant Barber factors and in light of Monster Daddy’s claims about overbilling,
duplicative time entries, and excessive hours on the part of Monster Cable’s counsel. Specifically,
the Court reviewed the detailed invoices from the law firms of Nexsen Pruet and LGP which were
submitted to the Court in-camera to aid in the determination of the reasonable amount of attorney’s
fees and costs in this case. Included in the in-camera submission are summary charts of the time
entries associated with the requested amounts. Based on these submissions, the Court was able to
conduct a close review of the hourly time entries.
This is a significant case and has undoubtedly required a great deal of work on the part of
3

“When a district court finds the number of hours claimed is unreasonably high, the court
has two choices: it may conduct an hour-by-hour analysis or it may reduce the requested hours
with an across-the-board-cut.” Bivins v. Wrap It Up, Inc., 548 F.3d 1348, 1350 (11th Cir. 2008)
(per curiam); see also Uhlig, LLC v. Shirley, 895 F. Supp. 2d 707, 717 (D.S.C. Sept. 25, 2012)
(applying a sixty-percent reduction in attorney and paralegal time to arrive at a reasonable
award); Alexander S. By and Through Bowers v. Boyd, 929 F.Supp. 925, 943 (D.S.C. Nov. 22,
1995)(applying a ten-percent reduction in the overall fee submission in addition to other
deductions); South Carolinians for Responsible Government v. Krawcheck, No.
3:06–1640–MBS, 2012 WL 2830274 (D.S.C. July 9, 2012) (applying a thirty-five-percent
reduction for partial success and further reducing the award by an additional five-percent to
eliminate unnecessary duplication of effort).
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the parties. Although Monster Daddy has engaged in conduct which caused an increase in hourly
time commitments from Monster Cable, the Court does not believe that Monster Daddy should be
saddled with a larger fee than deserved. Monster Cable has made some choices based on litigation
strategy which are not fairly taxed to Monster Daddy, i.e., utilizing several professionals to address
the matters at issue, developing presentations for the hearing, and making strategic decisions on
how to address certain topics and issues during the reconvened deposition. On the whole, several
professionals for Monster Cable spent significant amounts of time drafting and editing the motion,
preparing for the reconvened deposition, and collaborating and developing strategy which has
resulted in high fees. The Court finds the twenty-percent overall reduction necessary to account for
these choices, unnecessary duplication of efforts, and overstaffing.4 See generally Sun Pub. Co. v.
Mecklenburg News, Inc., 823 F.2d 818 (4th Cir.1987).
After making these findings, the reasonable attorney’s fees to be awarded are as follows:
$48,338.40 for attorney time for 146.48 hours of work at a rate of $330 per hour and $2,280.00 for
paralegal time for 15.2 hours of work at a rate of $150 per hour. In reaching this conclusion, this
Court has considered the Barber factors as well as the unique facts and circumstances of this matter.
The Court has considered, but declines to make either an upward or downward adjustment to the
lodestar figures above. See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434. Any possible basis for such an adjustment
has been reflected in the lodestar; thus, no further adjustment is necessary.
C.

Expenses/Costs
Monster Cable seeks costs in the amount of $8,343.00. This Court’s April 23, 2013 order
4

As noted above, the Court has already deducted Nexsen Pruet’s hours associated with the
first motion (ECF No. 217) which this Court previously indicated that it would not consider as
part of this fee award.
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directed Monster Daddy to pay Monster Cable the reasonable costs for reconvening the Rule
30(b)(6) deposition and the costs associated with filing the instant discovery motion. (ECF No.
262.) Counsel for Monster Cable seek to recover: 1) $4,158.20 for court reporter/videographer
expenses; 2) $315.00 for the expense of hiring a security guard to attend the deposition; 3)$1,788.78
for travel related expenses incurred by national out-of-state counsel in connection with the
reconvened deposition; and 4) $2,081.02 for travel related expenses incurred by national out-ofstate counsel in connection with a motion hearing on the instant discovery dispute. The Court
received copies of the receipts and invoices for these expenditures in connection with the
declarations of counsel. Upon review of the documentation in support of these claimed expenses,
the Court finds that most are reasonable and necessary. The Court agrees with Monster Daddy’s
assertion that the expense of $315.00 associated with a security guard’s attendance at the deposition
was unnecessary. Monster Daddy should not have to bear that expense and therefore the Court
deducts $315.00 from the requested costs. The Court also declines to tax Monster Daddy with
$2,081.02 associated with counsel’s travel to attend the motion hearing. See, e.g., Grayson
Consulting, Inc., 2013 WL 436217 at *2 (finding it inappropriate to award travel costs associated
with trips to court as part of the fee petition). Therefore, the Court awards Monster Cable costs in
the amount of $5,946.98.
CONCLUSION
After review of the pertinent factors outlined above and the arguments and submissions by
the parties, the Court concludes that an appropriate and reasonable amount to award to Monster
Cable for reasonable attorney’s fees is $50,618.40 plus costs in the amount of $5,946.98. The Court
believes this award is fair after considering all the relevant facts and circumstances involved in the
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instant petition. For the reasons stated above, Monster Cable’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees (ECF
No. 267) is granted as modified herein. Monster Daddy is hereby ordered to pay Monster Cable its
fees and costs reasonably incurred as outlined above.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/Mary G. Lewis
United States District Judge
March 19, 2014
Spartanburg, South Carolina

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