McIlwain v. Commissioner of Social Security

Filing 31

ORDER RULING ON REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION adopting 27 Report and Recommendation as set out. Signed by Honorable Richard M Gergel on 2/4/13. (jsmi, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA

Jamarcus McIlwain,
Plaintiff,
vs.
Michael J. Astrue, Commissioner
of Social Security,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Civil Action No.6: 11-2324-RMG

ORDER

Plaintiff has brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) seeking judicial review of
the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying his claim for Disability
Insurance Benefits ("DIB") and Supplemental Security Income ("SSI"). In accord with 28
U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02 DSC, this matter was referred to a United States
Magistrate Judge for pre-trial handling. The Magistrate Judge issued a Report and
Recommendation ("R & R") on January 14,2013 recommending that the Commissioner's
decision be affirmed. (Dkt. No. 27). Plaintiff filed objections to the Magistrate Judge's R & R.
(Dkt. No. 30). As set forth below, the Court adopts the R & R of the Magistrate Judge as the
order of this Court and affirms the decision of the Commissioner.

Legal Standard
The Magistrate Judge makes only a recommendation to this Court. The recommendation
has no presumptive weight, and the responsibility to make a final determination remains with the
Court. Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261 (1976). The Court is charged with making a de novo
-1­

detennination of those portions of the R & R to which specific objection is made. The Court
may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge.
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
The role of the federal judiciary in the administrative scheme established by the Social
Security Act is a limited one. The Act provides that the "findings of the Commissioner of Social
Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive." 42 U.S.C.
§405 (g). "Substantial evidence has been defined innumerable times as more than a scintilla, but
1essthanpreponderance." Thomasv. Celebrezze, 331 F.2d541,543 (4thCir.1964). This
standard precludes de novo review of the factual circumstances that substitutes the Court's
findings of fact for those of the Commissioner. Vitek v. Finch, 438 F.2d 1157 (4th Cir. 1971).
Although the federal court's review role is a limited one, "it does not follow, however,
that the findings of the administrative agency are to be mechanically accepted. The statutorily
granted right of review contemplates more than an uncritical rubber stamping of the
administrative action." Flackv. Cohen, 413 F.2d 278,279 (4th Cir. 1969). Further, the
Commissioner's findings of fact are not binding if they were based upon the application of an
improper legal standard. Coffman v. Bowen, 829 F.2d 514,519 (4th Cir. 1987).
Discussion
Plaintiff has a long and well-documented history of significant behavior problems, anger
management issues, and social adjustment difficulties that ultimately resulted in his expulsion
from the public schools and which Plaintiff now argues renders him disabled under the Social
Security Act. The record includes reports by four experts, all of whom recognize and document
Plaintiffs impainnents and potential significance in the vocational setting. (Transcript of Record
-2­

("Tr.") at 163-79,247-52,254-56,261-71). The experts differ, however, regarding the degree to
which these impainnents affect Plaintiffs ability to function in the work setting, particularly his
ability to tolerate and accept supervision. For instance, Dr. Lisa Bridgewater, an examining
expert, concluded that Plaintiff had "extreme" limitations in the ability to interact appropriately
with supervisors, co-workers, and the public, noting that Plaintiff has "extreme difficulty
controlling his impulses and acts out violently and aggressively in anger." (Tr. at 267,270). She
also found, however, that Plaintiff was only mildly limited in carrying out simple instructions and
to make simple work-related decisions. (Tr. at 269). On the other hand, Dr. Lisa Klohn, a non­
examining consulting expert, concluded that while Plaintiff had a moderate limitation on social
functioning he would not be significantly limited in his "ability to accept instructions and
respond appropriately to criticism from supervisors." (Tr. at 173, 178).
The ALJ carefully and methodically evaluated the various expert opinions. (Tr. at 17-26).
He ultimately concluded that Plaintiff had severe impainnents in regard to mood disturbance and
borderline intellectual functioning but that Plaintiff, with certain specified restrictions, retained
the residual functional capacity to perfonn work at all exertionallevels. (Tr. at 17,22). In the
course of reaching those conclusions, the ALJ gave little weight to the opinions of Dr.
Bridgewater because he found them "not supported by or consistent with the medical evidence of
record" and because her "statements and conclusions are contradictory." (Tr. at 25). Although
Plaintiff is correct that there exists evidence in the record, if credited by the fact finder, to support
a finding of disability, the weighing and reconciling of that evidence with conflicting evidence is
the responsibility of the Commissioner. So long as there exists substantial evidence to support
the findings and conclusions of the Commissioner, as exists with the record in this matter, the
-3­

Court is obligated to sustain the decision of the Commissioner.
Plaintiff raises three objections to the Magistrate Judge's R & R, all of which were
essentially raised before the Magistrate Judge and addressed in the R & R. First, Plaintiff objects
to the language of the ALl's hypothetical question to the Vocation Expert, contending that it was
inconsistent with the limitations set forth in the Residual Functional Capacity ("RFC")
assessment. (Dkt. No. 30 at 1- 4). The Court has carefully reviewed the hypothetical posed by
the ALJ and it appears to communicate reasonably Plaintiffs limitations set forth in the RFC.
(Tr. at 22,309). The Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge's analysis in the R & R on this
issue. (Dkt. No. 27 at 24-25). Second, Plaintiff objects to the manner in which the ALJ weighed
and considered the opinion evidence of various experts. (Dkt. No. 30 at 6-12). The Magistrate
Judge fully and adequately addressed the expert testimony in the R & R, and the Court agrees
with her that the ALJ appropriately weighed and reconciled the opinions of the various experts.
(Dkt. No. 27 at 6-15, 17-22). Third, Plaintiff argues that the mother's testimony was not
adequately weighed and considered by the ALJ. (Dkt. No. 30 at 12-14). The Court concurs in
the analysis and conclusion of the Magistrate Judge that the ALJ did, in fact, adequately consider
the testimony of Plaintiff's mother. (Dkt. No. 27 at 22-24).

-4­

Conclusion
Based upon the foregoing, the Court adopts the R & R of the Magistrate Judge and
affirms the decision of the Commissioner in this matter.
AND IT IS SO ORDERED.

February~, 2013
Charleston, South Carolina

-5­