State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Medgyesy et al

Filing 47

ORDER denying 44 Motion to Amend/Correct 42 Order. Signed by Honorable Mary G Lewis on 5/12/14.(alew, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
GREENVILLE DIVISION
State Farm Mutual Automobile )
Insurance Company,
)
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
vs.
)
)
Matthew Medgyesy and
)
Kimberly Medgyesy,
)
)
Defendants. )
____________________________

OPINION AND ORDER
Civil Action No.: 6:12-CV-00044-MGL

Defendants Matthew and Kimberly Medgyesy’s (“Defendants”) move pursuant to
Rule 52(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Fed.R.Civ.P.”) for an order
amending this court’s order dated and entered January 8, 2014, granting Plaintiff State
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (“Plaintiff”) summary judgment and
denying Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. (ECF No. 44.) Plaintiff timely
responded to Defendants’ motion on February 20, 2014.

(ECF No. 45.)

For the

reasons set forth below, the court denies Defendants’ motion.
Rule 52(b) provides, “On a party's motion filed no later than 28 days after the
entry of judgment, the court may amend its findings—or make additional findings—and
may amend the judgment accordingly. The motion may accompany a motion for a new
trial under Rule 59.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(b).

“The findings referred to in Rule 52(b),

however, are only those judicial findings made ‘[i]n an action tried on the facts without a
jury or with an advisory jury.’“

Hurst v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No.

7:05CV00776, 2008 WL 4974786, at *2 (W.D.Va. Nov. 21, 2008) (alteration in original)
(quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a)(1)). “Rule 52(b) is a trial rule that is not applicable in a
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summary judgment proceeding” or on a motion to dismiss in a habeas proceeding.
Orem v. Rephann, 523 F.3d 442, 451 n. 2 (4th Cir.2008) (Shedd, J., concurring).
Nevertheless, “a motion erroneously filed under Rule 52(b) may be treated as a Rule
59(e) motion to alter or amend.” Id. (citing St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Fair Grounds
Corp., 123 F.3d 336, 339 (5th Cir.1997)).
“[R]econsideration of a judgment after its entry is an extraordinary remedy which
should be used sparingly.” Pac. Ins. Co. v. Am. Nat'l Fire Ins. Co., 148 F.3d 396, 403
(4th Cir.1998) (internal quotation marks omitted). The decision whether to reconsider
an order pursuant to Rule 59(e) is within the sound discretion of the district court.
Hughes v. Bedsole, 48 F.3d 1376, 1382 (4th Cir.1995). Under Rule 59(e), a court may
“alter or amend the judgment if the movant shows either (1) an intervening change in
the controlling law, (2) new evidence that was not available at trial, or (3) that there has
been a clear error of law or a manifest injustice.” Robinson v. Wix Filtration Corp., 599
F.3d 403, 407 (4th Cir. 2010).
Here, in their Rule 59(e) motion, Defendants do not rely on an intervening
change in controlling law, refer to new evidence previously unavailable, or assert that
the court committed a manifest injustice and/or clear error of law. Instead, as Plaintiff
points out, Defendants restate arguments previously made and addressed by the court
in its January 8, 2014 order. Rule 59 motions “may not be used to make arguments that
could have been made before the judgment was entered.” Hill v. Braxton, 277 F.3d
701, 708 (4th Cir.2002). Nor are they opportunities to rehash issues already ruled upon
because a litigant is displeased with the result. See Hutchinson v. Staton, 994 F.2d
1076, 1082 (4th Cir.1993) (stating that “mere disagreement does not support a Rule
59(e) motion”).
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Upon review, the court is not convinced that it should reconsider or amend its
January 8, 2014 order based on Defendants’ arguments that have already been
considered and rejected. Because Defendants have failed to satisfy any one of the
three recognized grounds for relief under Rule 59(e), Defendants’ motion is DENIED.
(ECF No. 44.)
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/Mary G. Lewis
United States District Judge
Spartanburg, South Carolina
May 12, 2014

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