Watts v. Byars et al

Filing 66

ORDER RULING ON 57 Report and Recommendation; GRANTING 39 Motion for Summary Judgment, filed by Wayne C McCabe, Willie F Smith, Steven J Reck, William R Byars, Marcia Fuller; DENYING 25 Motion for Summary Judgment, filed by Marcus Leeotis Watts. This action is dismissed with prejudice. Signed by Honorable Joseph F Anderson, Jr on 9/3/2013. (mbro)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
Marcus Leeotis Watts,

)
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Plaintiff,
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vs.
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William R. Byars, Agency Director;
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Steven J. Reck, Food Service Administrator;
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Willie F. Smith, Institutional Food Service
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Coordinator; Marcia Fuller, Dietician Head
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Nutritionist; and Wayne C. McCabe, Warden )
of Lee Correctional Institution,
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Defendants.
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______________________________________ )

C/A No.: 6:12-1867-JFA-KFM

ORDER

The pro se plaintiff, Marcus Watts, brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
contending that the defendants violated his constitutional rights under the First
Amendment and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) by
failing to provide a Halal1 menu as a dietary option. He seeks injunctive relief and costs
incurred in pursuing this action. Watts is an inmate at the Lieber Correctional Institution
of the South Carolina Department of Corrections.
The Magistrate Judge assigned to this action2 has prepared a Report and
Recommendation wherein he suggests that this court should grant the defendants’ motion
1

Halal means “to kill an animal in the manner prescribed by Muslim law.” The meat is ritually slaughtered
and prepared according to Islamic specifications. Muslims are instructed to eat meat only if it is Halal. Meat that is not
Halal is referred to as “Haram” and is forbidden.
2

The Magistrate Judge’s review is made in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civil Rule
73.02. The Magistrate Judge makes only a recommendation to this court. The recommendation has no presumptive
weight, and the responsibility to make a final determination remains with the court. Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261
(1976). The court is charged with making a de novo determination of those portions of the Report to which specific
objection is made and the court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the recommendation of the Magistrate
Judge, or recommit the matter to the Magistrate Judge with instructions. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

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for summary judgment.3 The Report sets forth in detail the relevant facts and standards
of law on this matter, and the court incorporates such without a recitation and without a
hearing.
The plaintiff was advised of his right to file objections to the Report and
Recommendation and he filed timely objections thereto. Thus, this matter is ripe for
review.
As an initial matter, Section 3 of the RLUIPA provides, in pertinent part:
No government shall impose a substantial burden on the
religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an
institution . . . unless the government demonstrates that
imposition of the burden . . . (1) is in furtherance of a
compelling government interest; and (2) is the least restrictive
means of furthering that compelling government interest.
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc–1(a).
In Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005), the Supreme Court noted that
“Lawmakers supporting RLUIPA were mindful of the urgency of discipline, order, safety,
and security in penal institutions. They anticipated that courts would apply the Act's
standard with ‘due deference to the experience and expertise of prison and jail
administrators in establishing necessary regulations and procedures to maintain good
order, security and discipline, consistent with consideration of costs and limited
resources.’” Id. at 723.

3

An order was issued pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975) notifying plaintiff of
the summary dismissal procedure and possible consequences if he failed to adequately respond to the motion for
summary judgment. Plaintiff responded to the motion.

2

The burden is on the plaintiff to show whether the policy or practice substantially
burdens his exercise of religion. See 42 U.S.C. Section 2000cc–2(b). The Supreme Court
has also stated “that for RLUIPA purposes, a substantial burden on religious exercise
occurs when a state or local government, through act or omission, ‘put[s] substantial
pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs.’” Lovelace v.
Lee, 472 F.3d 174, 187 (4th Cir. 2006) (quoting Thomas v. Review Bd. Of Ind.
Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981). If this requirement is satisfied, the
government must then prove that the challenged policy is the least restrictive means of
furthering a compelling governmental interest.

42 U.S.C. § 2000cc–1(a); Smith v.

Ozmint, 578 F.3d 246, 250 (4th Cir. 2009). Then, the government must proffer evidence
such that rational fact finder could only find for the government. Id. at 250.
The Fourth Circuit has required that the government, consistent with the RLUIPA
statutory scheme, acknowledge and give some consideration to less restrictive alternatives
to show the least restrictive means of furthering the identified compelling government
interest. Couch v. Jabe, 679 F.3d 197, 203 (4th Cir. 2012).
The defendants first contend that the plaintiff has failed to plead and prove that the
RLUIPA applies to this action. However, because the SCDC receives federal financial
assistance, the Magistrate Judge finds that the RLUIPA applies to this action. See Cutter
v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 716 n.4 (2006).
Here, the Magistrate Judge opines that the plaintiff has failed to show that the
defendants substantially burdened his right to the free exercise of his religion by
providing him with a vegetarian menu rather than a Halal menu. The defendants have
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provided the affidavit of SCDC Chaplain Mutakabbir who attests that a Muslim may
accommodate his faith without Halal products and that according to the Quran, it is
proper for a Muslim to eat vegetarian cuisine or non-pork meat prepared by Christians or
Jews. Chaplain Mutakabbir states in his affidavit that the master menu and vegetarian
diet at SCDC are both consistent with Islamic beliefs.
The Magistrate Judge finds that the plaintiff has failed to show that the SCDC
substantially burdened the plaintiff’s exercise of religion by giving him a vegetarian menu
rather than a Halal menu. The Magistrate Judge also opines that the defendants have
shown that the SCDC policy in question is the least restrictive means of furthering a
compelling government interest. The SCDC maintains that it is unable to afford a diet for
any religious group that requires ritually slaughtered animals due to the costs and
practical limitations on prison storage, cooking, and serving capacities. If the SCDC were
to accommodate the special menu requests for religious groups, the defendants argue that
this would create the perception of favoritism among inmates and future penological cost
concerns. Notably, the SCDC asserts that it would be required to offer Halal meals to all
Muslim inmates statewide and undergo expensive facility improvements to separately
handle, store, and prepare the Halal meals.

Thus, the Magistrate Judge opines that the

defendants are entitled to summary judgment because they have demonstrated that the
least restrictive means of furthering their compelling interests is to offer the meals based
nutritional guidance rather than religious preference.
With regard to the plaintiff’s First Amendment claims, the Magistrate Judge notes
the Supreme Court’s holding that when a prison regulation impinges on an inmate’s
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constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate
penological interests. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
The Magistrate Judge also cites the Fourth Circuit’s explanation that the “RLUIPA
adopts a ‘more searching standard’ of review than that used for parallel First Amendment
claims, strict scrutiny instead of reasonableness.” See Lovelace, 472 F.3d at 198 n.8
(citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc–2). As the Magistrate Judge has found that the defendants are
entitled to summary judgment on the plaintiff’s RLUIPA claim under the “more
searching” strict scrutiny standard, the Magistrate Judge recommends plaintiff’s First
Amendment claim be dismissed for the same reasons.
In his objections to the Report, the plaintiff contends that the defendants are only
considering the nutritional, not the spiritual, aspects of the plaintiff’s dietary needs. He
then argues that the SCDC has a long-standing practice of providing dietary
accommodations to Jewish and Christian inmates.
The defendants have replied to the plaintiff’s objections arguing that the SCDC
does not offer menus to accommodate Jewish and Catholic inmates, nor can the plaintiff
set forth any evidence to the contrary. Defendants also maintain that the SCDC menus
are consistent with Islamic beliefs and that the plaintiff may participate in the essential
practices of his religion by other means, that is, a vegetarian menu.
After a careful review of the record, the applicable law, the Report and
Recommendation, and the objections thereto, the court finds the Magistrate Judge’s
recommendation to be proper and incorporates the Report herein by reference. The court

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has conducted the required de novo review and finds the plaintiff’s objections are
conclusory and duplicative of the claims in his complaint. As such, they are overruled.
Accordingly, the defendants’ motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 39) is
hereby granted and this action is dismissed with prejudice. The plaintiff’s motion for
summary judgment (ECF No. 25) is denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

September 3, 2013
Columbia, South Carolina

Joseph F. Anderson, Jr.
United States District Judge

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