Stockholm v. South Carolina Department of Public Safety et al
Filing
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ORDER granting 16 Motion for Summary Judgment; granting 18 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Honorable Timothy M Cain on 6/3/2014.(gpre, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
GREENVILLE DIVISION
Gene Stockholm, Special
Administrator of the Estate
of Jose Luis Escoto,
Plaintiff,
v.
T.K. Teaster,
Defendants.
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C/A No. 7:13-680-TMC
ORDER
This matter is before the court on a motion for summary judgment filed by Defendant South
Carolina Department of Public Safety (“SCDPS”) (ECF No. 16) and a motion to dismiss, or
alternatively, for summary judgment filed by Defendant T.K. Teaster (“Teaster”) (ECF No. 18).1
Plaintiff Gene Stockholm (“Stockholm”), Special Administrator of the Estate of Jose Luis Escoto
(“Escoto”) did not file a response to the motions.2 A hearing was set for February 28, 2013, but on
February 26, 2013, Stockholm, with the consent of Defendants, filed a motion requesting that the
court decide the motions on the filings of the parties. (ECF No. 21). The court granted the motion
1
In this case, because the court considers documents outside of the Complaint, the court
will treat Defendant Teaster's motion as one for summary judgment. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(d) (“If
on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) . . . matters outside the pleadings are presented and not
excluded by the court, the motion must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule
56.”).
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It appears that Escoto’s name may actually be spelled Escotto. (ECF No. 18-1 at 2 n.1).
However, the court will continue to use the spelling as set forth on the docket.
and cancelled the hearing. (ECF No. 22).3 For the reasons below, the court grants Defendants’
motions.
I. Background/Procedural History
On October 21, 2010, after receiving a report of a vehicle speeding and being driven
erratically, Trooper Teaster stopped a vehicle on I-26 being driven by Escoto. Escoto did not have
a driver’s license or any other identification and the vehicle was titled in the name of Jessica
McElhaney.4 Teaster smelled alcohol and marijuana, and noticed that Escoto’s eyes were red and
glassy and his speech was slurred. Teaster then walked to the passenger side of the car and began
to talk with the passenger, Jose Sanchez (“Sanchez”), who appeared to be sleeping. Teaser
attempted to wake Sanchez, but Sanchez ignored Teaster’s questions and requests for identification.
Teaster suspected Sanchez was also under the influence of drugs and/or alcohol. Teaster also
observed what he believed to be liquor drinks in plastic bottles between the legs of Escoto and
Sanchez. Teaster called for backup and Laurens County Deputy Christy Johnson (“Johnson”) arrived
to assist him.
When Escoto was first stopped, he had pulled over to the left side of the roadway and the
passenger side of the car was extremely close to traffic. Once Johnson arrived on the scene, Teaster
3
Stockholm’s failure to file a response does not relieve Defendants from the burden
imposed upon the moving party. See Custer v. Pan Am. Life Ins. Co., 12 F.3d 410 (4th Cir.
1993)(holding that while “the failure to respond to a summary judgment motion may leave
uncontroverted those facts established by the motion, the moving party must still show the
uncontroverted facts entitle the party to ‘a judgment as a matter of law.’” (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P.
56(c)).
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On the dash camera video, Teaser stated that he had been told the car was traveling at
105 mph. However, radar results revealed that the vehicle was actually traveling between
seventy-seven and eighty-one miles per hour. In any event, Escoto was speeding, as the posted
speed limit was seventy miles per hour.
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asked Escoto to move the car further from the roadway. Escoto complied and moved the car a few
feet to the left farther from the roadway.
Teaster and Johnson then attempted to remove Sanchez from the car. After Johnson
handcuffed Sanchez and was escorting him to her patrol car, Sanchez pulled away and a struggle
ensued. At the same time, Escoto started the car and began to drive towards the interstate. Teaster
leaned into the car from the passenger side and attempted to turn the car off. A struggle ensued
between Teaster and Escoto and Escoto then began stabbing Teaster in the neck with a fork. Teaster
warned Escoto that he would shoot if Escoto did not stop. Escoto continued stabbing Teaster and
the car continued crossing over several lanes of I-26. Teaster fired three times striking Escoto, and
the car came to a stop in the far right lane of I-26. Johnson stopped traffic and approached the
vehicle with her weapon drawn. She opened the passenger door and pulled Teaster from the vehicle.
Teaster surrendered his service pistol to the State Law Enforcement Division (“SLED”)
investigators and was transported to the hospital, where he was treated for injuries to his neck and
knee. Investigators secured the dash camera video from Teaster’s patrol car and secured a metal
fork from the driver’s seat of the Pontiac.
Escoto was air-lifted to an area hospital and later died. In a voluntary statement to SLED,
Sanchez admitted that he and Escoto had been drinking and postmortem toxicology testing revealed
that Escoto’s blood alcohol percentage was .105.
On October 17, 2012, Stockholm filed this action in state court alleging claims for assault
and battery, violations of 42 U.S.C. §1983, and wrongful death seeking actual and punitive damages.
On March 13, 2013, SCDPS, with Defendant Teaster’s consent, removed the action to this court.
Teaster has not been served. However, Defendant Teaster filed an answer denying the allegations
and raising, inter alia, as a defense the insufficient service of process.
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II. Standard of Review
Summary judgment is appropriate only “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute
as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P.
56(a). In deciding whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, the evidence of the non-moving
party is to be believed and all justifiable inferences must be drawn in his favor. Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). However, “[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the
outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.
Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” Id. at 248. A litigant
“cannot create a genuine issue of material fact through mere speculation or the building of one
inference upon another.” Beale v. Hardy, 769 F.2d 213, 214 (4th Cir. 1985). “Where the record
taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, disposition
by summary judgment is appropriate.” Monahan v. County of Chesterfield, 95 F.3d 1263, 1265 (4th
Cir. 1996).
III. Discussion
A. SCDPS’s Summary Judgment Motion
SCDPS contends it is entitled to summary judgment on three grounds. The court agrees and
addresses each ground separately below.
1. Liability under § 1983
A state agency is not a person subject to suit under § 1983. Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State
Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66-67, 71 (1989). Under South Carolina law, SCDPS is a part of the executive
branch of the South Carolina state government. S.C. Code Ann. § 1-30-10(A). Because SCDPS is
an arm of the State of South Carolina, it is not capable of being sued for money damages under §
1983. SCDPS is, therefore, entitled to a dismissal of Stockholm’s claims for money damages
against it under § 1983 as a matter of law.
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2. Supervisory liability
To the extent that Stockholm is asserting claims against supervisors or officials within the
SCDPS, it is well established that the doctrine of respondeat superior generally is inapplicable to
§1983 suits, absent an official policy or custom which results in illegal action. Monell v. Dept. of
Soc. Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978); see also Fisher v. Washington Metro. Area Transit
Authority, 690 F.2d 1133, 1142-43 (4th Cir. 1982). Higher officials may be held liable for the acts
of their subordinates, however, if the official is aware of a pervasive, unreasonable risk of harm from
a specified source and fails to take corrective actions as a result of deliberate indifference or tacit
authorization. Slakan v. Porter, 737 F.2d 368 (4th Cir. 1984). Stockholm has not alleged a
pervasive or unreasonable risk of harm, nor a claim for inadequate training. Doe v. Broderick, 225
F.3d 440, 456 (4th Cir. 2000). Accordingly, SCDPS is entitled to summary judgment for any
claims against based on supervisory liability.
3. Immunity under the South Carolina Tort Claims Act (“SCTCA”)
The SCTCA provides a limited waiver of immunity for tort actions against the state.
However, the state has not waived its immunity for intentional torts. See S.C. Code § 15-78-60 (17).
Therefore, SCDPS is entitled to summary judgment on Stockholm’s state law claims for the
intentional torts of assault and battery.
B. Teaster’s Summary Judgment Motion
In the Complaint, Stockholm asserts claims under § 1983, and state law claims for wrongful
death and assault and battery. Stockholm’s claims are based upon his allegations that Defendant
Teaster had no probable cause to believe Escoto had committed any crime or legal violation and had
no reasonable basis for believing Teaster’s conduct was lawful, valid, or justifiable. (Compl. ¶¶ 7,
13, 14, 18, and 23). In his summary judgment motion, Teaster contends that he is entitled to
summary judgment on several grounds, including that there is no genuine issue of material fact that
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Teaster’s use of force was warranted. The court agrees. There simply is no evidence establishing
that Teaster violated Escoto's constitutional rights.
The use of deadly force by a policeman is not excessive when the officer has a reasonable
apprehension that the suspect poses a threat to the officer or to others. Tennessee v. Garner, 471
U.S. 1, 11 (1985). In judging whether a particular use of force satisfies the reasonableness standard,
a court must view the situation facing the officer from his viewpoint. Elliott v. Leavitt, 99 F.3d 640,
642 (4th Cir.1996). In Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989), the United States Supreme Court
held in determining whether an excessive force claim under §1983 has been established, the court
must focus on the objective reasonableness of the officer from “the perspective of a reasonable
officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight. . . The calculus of reasonableness
must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split second
judgments - in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving - about the amount of
force that is necessary in a particular situation.” Id. at 396-397.
In Graham, the Court held that an analysis of excessive force “requires careful attention to
the facts and circumstances of each particular case, including the severity of the crime at issue,
whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether
[the suspect] is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Id. at 396. The
pivotal question is whether a reasonable officer in the same circumstances would have concluded
that a threat existed justifying the particular use of force. Elliott v. Leavitt, 99 F.3d 640, 642 (4th
Cir. 1996). The Fourth Amendment does not “require police officers to wait until a suspect shoots
[or uses other deadly means] to confirm that a serious threat of harm exists.” Id. at 643. An
officer’s liability is to be determined exclusively upon an examination and weighing of the
information possessed immediately prior to and at the very moment he fired the fatal shot.
Greenidge v. Ruffin, 927 F.2d 789 (4th Cir. 1991).
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Here, considering the facts as set forth in the record, and after reviewing the video of the
incident, and resolving all rational inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, the court finds
unequivocally that Defendant Teaster’s use of force was objectively reasonable. Defendant Teaster
stopped Escoto for speeding and driving erratically. During the traffic stop, Teaster smelled alcohol
and marijuana and observed that Escoto’s eyes were glassy and red and that his speech was slurred.
Further, he suspected that the passenger, Sanchez, was also under the influence. During the course
of the traffic stop, as Sanchez was being taken from the car, Escoto started the car and attempted to
flee into traffic. Teaster tried to stop Escoto by attempting to turn off the car as Escoto was driving
back onto the interstate. While the men were struggling, Escoto stabbed Teaster in the neck with
a fork. Teaster ordered Escoto to stop and warned that if Escoto did not stop, he would shoot.
Escoto refused to stop and had driven the car back onto the interstate when Teaster shot him.
Teaster clearly had probable cause to believe that Escoto’s actions posed an immediate threat
of serious physical harm to himself and motorists on the interstate. Therefore, Teaster’s use of force
did not violate Escoto’s constitutional rights and Teaster is entitled to summary judgment as a matter
of law on the § 1983 claims.
Additionally, Teaster is also entitled to summary judgment on the state law claims of assault
and battery and wrongful death. A law enforcement officer who uses reasonable force in effecting
a lawful arrest is not liable for assault or battery. See Roberts v. City of Forest Acres, 902 F.Supp.
662, 671 (D.S.C.1995); Moody v. Ferguson, 732 F.Supp. 627, 632 (D.S.C. 1989). However, if the
officer uses excessive force, or “force greater than is reasonably necessary under the circumstances,”
the officer may be liable for assault or battery. Moody, 732 F.Supp. at 632. As discussed above,
Defendant Teaster’s actions were objectively reasonable, in light of the circumstances, and do not
constitute assault and battery.
Finally, the state law wrongful death claim also fails because there is no predicate “wrongful
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act, neglect or default of another.” S.C. Code Ann. § 15-51-10 (“Whenever the death of a person
shall be caused by the wrongful act, neglect or default of another and the act, neglect or default is
such as would, if death had not ensued, have entitled the party injured to maintain an action and
recover damages in respect thereof, the person who would have been liable, if death had not ensued,
shall be liable to an action for damages, notwithstanding the death of the person injured, although
the death shall have been caused under such circumstances as make the killing in law a felony. In
the event of the death of the wrongdoer, such cause of action shall survive against his personal
representative.”). Therefore, Teaster is also entitled to summary judgment on the state law claims
of assault and battery and wrongful death.5
IV. Conclusion
Accordingly, based on the foregoing, Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment (ECF
Nos . 16 and 18) are GRANTED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/Timothy M. Cain
United States District Judge
Anderson, South Carolina
June 3, 2014
5
Teaster also moves for dismissal based on qualified immunity. In Harlow v. Fitzgerald,
457 U.S. 800 (1982), the United States Supreme Court held that government officials are not
liable in civil actions if their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory rights of
which a reasonable person would have known. As discussed above, Teaster did not violate
Escoto’s Constitutional rights in any way, and therefore, alternatively he is entitled to qualified
immunity.
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