Kyles v. Atkinson et al
Filing
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ORDER RULING ON REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 23 . The court ACCEPTS the Report of the magistrate judge (ECF No.37). It is therefore ordered that Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 23) is GRANTED and this action is DISMISSED with prejudice. Signed by Honorable J Michelle Childs on 8/26/2014. (kric, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
GREENVILLE DIVISION
Basil Jacob Kyles,
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Plaintiff,
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v.
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Kenny Atkinson and Alex A. Chartier,
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Defendants.
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____________________________________)
Civil Action No. 6:13-cv-02235-JMC
ORDER AND OPINION
Plaintiff Basil Jacob Kyles (“Plaintiff”) filed this action pursuant to Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971),1 alleging
violations by Defendants Kenny Atkinson, Warden of the Federal Correctional Institution at
Edgefield, South Carolina, (“FCI Edgefield”) and Alex A. Chartier, the Supervisory Chaplain of
FCI Edgefield, (collectively “Defendants”) of his First Amendment rights and the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”) due to denial of the opportunity to properly worship under
the tenets of his faith. (ECF No. 1.) This matter is before the court on Defendants’ Motion for
Summary Judgment (ECF No. 23).2
In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Rule 73.02, the matter was referred to
United States Magistrate Judge Kevin F. McDonald for pre-trial handling. On May 21, 2014, the
magistrate judge issued a Report of the Magistrate Judge (“Report”), recommending the court
grant Defendants’ motion. (ECF No. 37.) This review considers Plaintiff’s Objections to Report
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The Supreme Court established a cause of action against federal officials for violations of
federal constitutional rights in Bivens. A Bivens claim is analogous to a claim under 42 U.S.C. §
1983. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 504 (1978).
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The magistrate judge evaluated Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, for
Summary Judgment (ECF No. 23) as a motion for summary judgment. (See ECF No. 37 at 4).
The court agrees that Defendants’ motion should be construed as such.
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and Recommendation of Magistrate Judge (“Objections”), filed June 2, 2014. (ECF No. 39.)
For the reasons set forth herein, the court ACCEPTS the magistrate judge’s Report. The court
thereby GRANTS Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment and DISMISSES Plaintiff’s
Complaint. (ECF No. 1.)
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The court concludes upon its own careful review of the record that the factual and
procedural summation in the magistrate judge’s Report is accurate, and the court adopts this
summary as its own. However, a recitation of the relevant facts and procedural history is
warranted.
Plaintiff is incarcerated at FCI Edgefield, serving a 262-month term of imprisonment.
(ECF Nos. 44 at 1, 37 at 2.) Plaintiff alleges Defendants have violated his First Amendment
rights and the RFRA by denying him the opportunity to properly worship as a Hebrew Messianic
Yisraelite. (ECF No. 1-1 at 2-3.) Plaintiff seeks $250,000 in damages from each defendant. (Id.
at 13.)
Due to limited time and resources available at FCI Edgefield, the Religious Services
Department determined worship services and other religious accommodations for Hebrew
Messianic Yisraelites would be provided under the umbrella of Judaism, as the faiths are similar.
(ECF No. 37 at 3.) As such, Plaintiff was offered the opportunity to join those of the Jewish
faith in services welcoming in the Sabbath on Friday evenings. (Id.) Plaintiff declined to join in
these services, and was informed he could perform his religious observance as an individual
practitioner, which would allow him to receive books and other religious items and to practice
religious observances without interference. (Id.)
After Plaintiff made his initial requests for accommodation of his faith, the Hebrew
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Messianic Yisraelite group at FCI Edgefield grew, and the Religious Services Department
reserved a space for the group to conduct services in the chapel area from 2:00 to 3:00 p.m. on
Saturdays. (Id.) Beginning January 2013, FCI Edgefield provided the Yisraelite group space in
the chapel area to conduct a separate Sabbath service on Friday evenings. (Id. at 3-4.)
Plaintiff exhausted his administrative remedies regarding his claims prior to filing his
Complaint on August 19, 2013. (ECF 23 at 3; see also ECF No. 1-2.) Plaintiff disputes that the
Hebrew Messianic Yisraelite and Jewish faiths are similar. (ECF No. 30 at 3.) He contends that
Defendants substantially burdened the exercise of his religion by only allowing him to bring in
the Sabbath in a combined service with the Jewish inmates (ECF No. 30 at 6) and to practice this
service alone would also violate Plaintiff’s First Amendment rights. (ECF No. 39 at 3.) Plaintiff
further argues that providing a separate place for Yisraelite worship on Saturday afternoon,
rather than Friday evening, violated his rights. (ECF No. 1-1 at 9.) Plaintiff also disputes
Defendants’ claim that he was the sole Hebrew Messianic Yisraelite at the time of his initial
requests for accommodation. (Id. at 8.)
On November 19, 2013, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, For
Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 23.) Plaintiff filed a response in opposition to the motion on
January 6, 2014. (ECF No. 30.)
The magistrate judge issued the Report on May 21, 2014, recommending Defendant’s
Motion for Summary Judgment be granted. (ECF No. 37.) The Report concluded that Plaintiff’s
claims under the First Amendment and the RFRA failed, as Plaintiff had not shown that
Defendants substantially burdened the exercise of his religion. (Id. at 6.) As the magistrate
judge explained, under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, a plaintiff can establish
a claim if he shows (1) that he has a sincerely held religious belief and (2) that the defendant’s
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actions substantially burdened the plaintiff’s religious expression. (Id. at 5-6 (citing Blue v.
Jabe, 996 F. Supp 499, 502 (E.D. Va. 1996)).) Further, the RFRA “prohibits ‘[g]overnment
from ‘substantially burden[ing]’ a person’s exercise of religion even if the burden results from a
rule of general applicability unless the government can demonstrate the burden ‘(1) is in
furtherance of a compelling government interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of
furthering that compelling governmental interest.’ ” (Id. at 6 (quoting City of Boerne v. Flores,
521 U.S. 507, 515-16 (1997).) The magistrate judge found that as Plaintiff was offered multiple
options to practice his religion and could provide no evidence as to how he was burdened other
than his own conclusions, he could not make a showing that Defendants had placed a substantial
burden on the exercise of his religion. (Id. at 6-9.)
Further, the magistrate judge found that even if Plaintiff could make a showing that
Defendants had substantially burdened the exercise of his religion, summary judgment would
still be appropriate under Tuner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987). (ECF No. 37 at 9.) In Turner, the
Supreme Court held that “when a prison regulation impinges on inmates’ constitutional rights,
the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” Turner, 482
U.S. at 89. To determine the reasonableness of a challenged prison regulation, the Turner Court
outlined four factors to consider: (1) there must be a valid, rational connection between the
regulation and the legitimate government interest put forth to justify it, (2) if there are alternative
means of exercising the right that remain open to prisoners, (3) what impact accommodation of
the asserted right will have on guards, other inmates, and on the allocation of prison resources,
and (4) whether there are alternatives available that fully accommodate the prisoner’s rights at de
minimis cost to valid penological interests. Id. at 89-90.
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The Report concluded that Plaintiff’s claim fails under this four factor test. (ECF No. 37
at 9-11.) The Federal Bureau of Prisons Program Statement 5360.09, Religious Beliefs and
Practices, provides inmates of all faiths reasonable and equitable opportunities to practice their
religions within the constraints of budgetary and security concerns. (Id. at 10.) The magistrate
judge found controlling prison costs to be a compelling government interest. (Id.) As FCI
Edgefield has three chaplains to serve approximately 1,800 inmates, the magistrate judge found
it would be impractical to provide time and space for separate religious services when a similar
faith group had time and space already scheduled. (Id.) Further, the magistrate judge found
Plaintiff was afforded multiple alternative options to practice his religion, and that Defendants
made additional accommodations for the Hebrew Messianic Yisraelite as the group grew in size,
indicating the Defendants utilized the least restrictive means to accommodate Plaintiff. (Id. at
10-11.)
The Report further concluded that Defendant Atkinson is entitled to summary judgment
on the basis of supervisory liability, as Plaintiff could not make a showing that “(1) the
supervisor had actual or constructive knowledge that a subordinate was engaged in conduct that
posed a ‘pervasive and unreasonable risk’ of constitutional injury to people like the plaintiff, (2)
the supervisor’s response was so inadequate as to constitute deliberate indifference or tacit
authorization of the subordinate’s conduct; and (3) there is an ‘affirmative causal link’ between
the supervisor’s inaction and the plaintiff’s constitutional injury.” (Id. at 12.) Finally, the Report
concluded Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity, as Plaintiff could not establish the
threshold finding that Defendants deprived Plaintiff of “an actual constitutional right” to defeat
the immunity protecting government officials performing discretionary functions from civil
damage suits as long as their conduct does not “violate clearly established rights of which a
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reasonable person would have known.” (Id. at 12-13 (citing Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609
(1999); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)).)
Plaintiff filed his Objections on June 2, 2014. (ECF No. 39.)
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Magistrate Judge’s Report is made in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and
Local Civil Rule 73.02 for the District of South Carolina. The magistrate judge makes only a
recommendation to this court.
The recommendation has no presumptive weight.
The
responsibility to make a final determination remains with this court. See Matthews v. Weber, 423
U.S. 261, 270-71 (1976). This court is charged with making a de novo determination of those
portions of the Report to which specific objections are made, and the court may accept, reject, or
modify, in whole or in part, the magistrate judge’s recommendation, or recommit the matter with
instructions. See 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1).
Summary judgment should be granted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(a). “Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the
governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are
irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
248 (1986).
“[T]here is no issue for trial unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the
nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party.” Id. at 249.
In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a court must view the evidence in the light
most favorable to the non-moving party. Perini Corp. v. Perini Constr., Inc., 915 F.2d 121, 124
(4th Cir. 1990). The non-moving party may not oppose a motion for summary judgment with
mere allegations or denials of the movant’s pleading, but instead must set forth specific facts
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demonstrating a genuine issue for trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317, 324 (1986); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252; Shealy v. Winston, 929 F.2d 1009, 1012 (4th
Cir. 1991). All that is required is that “sufficient evidence supporting the claimed factual dispute
be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties’ differing versions of the truth at trial.”
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249 (quoting First Nat. Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Service Co., 391 U.S. 253,
288-89 (1968)). “Mere unsupported speculation . . . is not enough to defeat a summary judgment
motion.” Ennis v. Nat’l Ass’n of Bus. & Educ. Radio, Inc., 53 F.3d 55, 62 (4th Cir. 1995).
Conclusory allegations or denials, without more, are insufficient to preclude the granting of the
summary judgment motion. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.
As Petitioner is a pro se litigant, the court is required to liberally construe his arguments.
Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). The court addresses those arguments
that, under the mandated liberal construction, it has reasonably found to state a claim. Barnett v.
Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128, 1133 (10th Cir. 1999).
ANALYSIS
Plaintiff objects to the Report, in part, on the grounds that the magistrate judge based his
recommendation solely on Defendant’s version of the facts, which “fail to support law or facts
for the motion for [summary] judgment to be granted.” (ECF No. 39 ¶ 2.) Plaintiff’s numerous
objections revolve largely on the characterization and practices of his faith. (Id. ¶ ¶ 3-5, 10, 1214.) These objections, however, are either bare statements of a burden imposed by Defendants
or are not material to Plaintiff’s claim.
Plaintiff repeatedly offers arguments differentiating his faith from the Jewish faith and
reiterates that these differences demonstrate a burden imposed by Defendants on his exercise of
religion due to the offer to worship alongside the Jewish congregation at FCI Edgefield.
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However, Plaintiff fails to specify precisely how these differences in faith burden his exercise of
religion. “Mere unsupported speculation . . . is not enough to defeat a summary judgment
motion.” Ennis, 53 F.3d at 62.
The material facts in this case pertain to Plaintiff’s alleged burden under the Free
Exercise Clause and to the Turner factors. In his Response in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss
or in the Alternative, Summary Judgment, Plaintiff stipulates to Defendants’ Statement of Facts
in the Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 30 at 2.) These facts address the limited
resources of the Religious Services Department at FCI Edgefield and the impracticality of
providing separate services for a group as small as Plaintiff’s at the time of his initial request due
to those limited resources. (Id. at 3-5.) The Statement of Facts also lists the accommodations
Defendants made to Plaintiff’s exercise of his religion, as well as alternatives offered to Plaintiff.
(ECF No. 23 at 4-5.)
The facts further note that the accommodations to Plaintiff’s faith
increased as the size of the Hebrew Messianic Yisraelite congregation grew. (Id. at 4.) Under
these facts, as the magistrate judge discussed, Defendants can make the required showings under
the Turner analysis. (See ECF No. 37 at 10-11.)
As Plaintiff can provide no support other than his own conclusions that Defendants’
actions burdened the exercise of his religion, and as Plaintiff has stipulated to the material facts
under the Turner analysis, Plaintiff cannot show a genuine dispute of material facts, and
therefore Defendants are entitled to summary judgment.
Qualified Immunity
Plaintiff correctly states in his Objections that “[t]here is no immunity protection for
government officials who violate clear constitutional rights[.]” (ECF No. 39 at 4.) However, as
discussed, the facts do not support Plaintiff’s claim of a constitutional violation, and thus do not
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meet the threshold question in qualified immunity analysis. See Wilson, 526 U.S. at 609.
Therefore, the court concurs with the magistrate judge that Defendants are entitled to the
protection of qualified immunity.
Supervisory Liability
Plaintiff offers no objection to the portion of the Report recommending summary
judgment be granted to Defendant Atkinson on the basis of supervisory liability. In the absence
of objections to the magistrate judge’s Report, this court is not required to provide an explanation
for adopting the recommendation. See Camby v. Davis, 718 F.2d 198, 199 (4th Cir. 1983).
Rather, “in the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo
review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in
order to accept the recommendation.’” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310,
315 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee’s note). Furthermore, failure
to file specific written objections to the Report results in a party’s waiver of the right to appeal
from the judgment of the District Court based upon such recommendation.
28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985);
United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984). Therefore, after a thorough and careful
review of the Report and the record regarding this issue, the court finds the Report provides an
accurate summary of the facts and law and adopts the magistrate judge’s recommendation.
CONCLUSION
Based on the aforementioned reasons and a thorough review of the Report of the
magistrate judge and the record in this case, the court ACCEPTS the Report of the magistrate
judge (ECF No.37). It is therefore ordered that Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment
(ECF No. 23) is GRANTED and this action is DISMISSED with prejudice.
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IT IS SO ORDERED.
United States District Judge
August 26, 2014
Columbia, South Carolina
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