Brooks et al v. Field et al

Filing 268

ORDER RULING ON REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION adopts Report and Recommendation 157 , and adopts in part the Report and Recommendation 199 . Fields motion to compel arbitration 97 is DENIED, Fields motion to abstain 110 is D ENIED, Fields motion to compel arbitration and stay discovery 156 is DENIED, and Plaintiffs motion to dismiss counterclaims 109 is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Fields cause of action for civil conspiracy is dismissed. However, Fields remaining causes of action set forth in his substitute counterclaim 101 may proceed. Signed by Honorable Bruce Howe Hendricks on 3/25/2016. (gpre, )

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
GREENVILLE DIVISION
Harold Brooks, Clara Louise Brooks,
Benjamin Brooks, William F. Tomz,

)
)

Civil Action No.: 6:14-cv-2267-BHH

Frances W. Tomz, Sharon Finch,
Individually and as Class
Representatives,

)
)
)
)
Plaintiffs,
)
)
vs.
)
)
Arthur M. Field, Frederick Scott Pfeiffer, )
)
Defendants.
)
)
Arthur M. Field,
)
)
Counter-Claimant,
)
)
vs.
)
Harold Brooks, Clara Louise Brooks,
Benjamin Brooks, William F. Tomz,
and Sharon Finch,
Counter-Defendants
Arthur M. Field,
Third-Party Plaintiff,
vs.
Capital Investment Funding,
Third-Party Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

1

On June 11, 2014, Plaintiffs filed this case alleging violations of the civil Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”). On April 30, 2015, Defendant Arthur
M. Field (“Field”) filed a counterclaim against Plaintiffs, alleging thirteen causes of
action.1 In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule 73.02 D.S.C., this
matter was referred to United States Magistrate Jacquelyn D. Austin, for consideration of
pretrial matters. The Magistrate Judge first prepared a thorough Report and
Recommendation (“Report”) on September 24, 2015, which recommends that Field’s
motion to compel arbitration be denied, motion to abstain be denied, and motion to
compel arbitration and stay discovery be denied.2 (ECF No. 157.) Field filed timely
objections to the Report. (ECF No. 170.) The Magistrate Judge then prepared another
thorough Report on November 12, 2015, which recommends that Plaintiffs’ motion to
dismiss counterclaims be denied. (ECF No. 199.) Plaintiffs filed timely objections to the
Report (ECF No. 205) and Field filed a reply (ECF No. 208). For the reasons set forth
herein, the Court adopts the September 24, 2015 Report and adopts in part the
November 12, 2015 Report.
BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The Report sets forth in detail the relevant facts and standards of law, and the
Court incorporates them and summarizes below only in relevant part. Plaintiffs filed this
matter on June 11, 2014, alleging violations of the civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (“RICO”). (ECF No. 1.) Specifically, Plaintiffs allege violations of 18
U.S.C. § 1962(c) and (d). (Id. at 46–49.) They also seek class certification of a class as

1
Field filed a substitute counterclaim on May 1, 2015 to correct scrivener’s errors in the original
counterclaim. (ECF No. 101.)
2
The Magistrate Judge considered Field’s second motion to compel arbitration and to stay discovery “as
merely supportive of his first motion to compel arbitration.” (ECF No. 157 at 3 n.2.)

2

well as actual damages, trebled, plus attorneys’ fees and costs. (Id. at 49.) Field filed a
counterclaim against Plaintiffs on April 30, 2015, alleging thirteen causes of action. (ECF
No. 101.)
Field filed a motion to compel arbitration on April 30, 2015 (ECF No. 97), a motion
to abstain on May 22, 2015 (ECF No. 110), and a second motion to compel arbitration
and to stay discovery on September 17, 2015 (ECF No. 156). After consideration of the
responses filed in opposition to these motions (ECF Nos. 125; 131), Field’s replies (ECF
Nos. 130; 138), and Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint (ECF No. 152), the Magistrate Judge
issued a Report recommending that Field’s motions all be denied. (ECF No. 157.) The
Court has reviewed the objections to the Report, but finds them to be without merit.
Therefore, it will enter judgment accordingly.3
In addition, on May 20, 2015, Plaintiffs filed a motion to dismiss counterclaims
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (ECF No. 109.) After
consideration of Field’s responses filed in opposition to this motion (ECF No. 118; 119),
and Plaintiffs’ reply (ECF No. 134), the Magistrate Judge issued a Report recommending
that Plaintiffs’ motion be denied. The Court has reviewed the objections to the Report,
but finds them largely to be without merit. Therefore, it will enter judgment accordingly.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Magistrate Judge makes only a recommendation to this Court. The
recommendation has no presumptive weight. The responsibility for making a final
determination remains with this Court. Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 270 (1976).

3
 As always, the Court says only what is necessary to address the parties’ objections against the already
meaningful backdrop of a thorough Report of the Magistrate Judge, exhaustive recitation of law and fact
exists there. 

3

The Court is charged with making a de novo determination of any portions of the Report
and Recommendation to which a specific objection is made. The Court may accept,
reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the recommendation made by the Magistrate Judge
or may recommit the matter to the Magistrate Judge with instructions. See 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1).
DISCUSSION
A.

ECF No. 157, September 25, 2015 Report

The Magistrate Judge first recommended that Field’s motion to compel arbitration
be denied and the Court agrees. After summarizing the applicable federal arbitration law,
the Magistrate Judge discussed the arbitration clause issue. (ECF No. 157 at 7–13.) The
clause is found in the 2006 Prospectus, to which all Plaintiffs were allegedly subject as
noteholders to securities controlled and managed by Defendants Field and Frederick
Scott Pfeiffer (collectively, “Defendants”). The 2006 Prospectus states, in relevant part:
[I]n the event any present or prior holder of a Note issued by the Company
at any time has any dispute with the Company, including the validity hereof,
such dispute shall be resolved by binding arbitration in Greenville County
and the result thereof may be entered and enforced at law in a court of
competent jurisdiction and the holder voluntarily waives the right to a trial
by jury of such issue(s) to avoid the time and expense of litigation. This
Agreement to arbitrate shall include all issues which may arise including
the validity of this article for disputes of $50,000 or less. . . . Claims
exceeding $50,000 in damages shall be litigated and venue shall be in
Greenville County, South Carolina and the costs thereof and the legal fees
of the successful party shall be borne by the party filing the claim.
(ECF No. 131-5 at 31.)
The Magistrate Judge correctly found South Carolina law requires that an
“unambiguous, clear and explicit” contract “be construed according to the terms the

4

parties have used, to be taken and understood in their plain, ordinary, and popular
sense.” (ECF No. 157 at 11 (quoting C.A.N. Enters., Inc. v. S.C. Health and Human
Servs. Fin. Comm’n, 373 S.E.2d 584, 586 (S.C. 1988)).) Looking to the arbitration
clause, she correctly found that the clause “unambiguously refers to disputes and claims
and not individual notes.” (Id. at 13.) Accordingly, she properly found that “the clear
language of the clause does not support” Field’s assertion that “the arbitration clause
intended to require arbitration for notes with a face value of less than $50,000” and that
“each note constitutes a separate instrument for purposes of the arbitration clause.” (Id.
at 11–13.)
The Magistrate Judge then noted Plaintiffs’ allegation that the notes purchased by
them range in “aggregate value to each person from approximately $35,000.00 up
through hundreds of thousands of dollars.” (Id. at 13.) She further noted that Plaintiffs
seek treble damages, which greatly increases the value of the notes at issue. (Id.) From
this, she correctly found that “Plaintiffs’ claims are expressly excluded from the
arbitration requirement” and recommended denying Field’s motion to compel arbitration.
(Id.)
Here, Field’s filing largely rehashes arguments previously considered by the
Magistrate Judge. (ECF No. 170 at 3–9.) He objects to the Magistrate Judge’s
consideration of the aggregate value of the notes and the possibility of treble damages.
(Id. at 3.) However, the Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge’s calculation of the
potential value of the disputes and claims at issue. She properly found that even if the
median note was $30,000, the award of treble damages would bring such claims over

5

the $50,000 threshold. (ECF No. 157 at 13.) Thus, the dispute and claims at issue
exceed $50,000, and the arbitration clause therefore does not apply. This objection is
overruled.
The Magistrate Judge next recommended that Field’s motion to abstain be denied
and the Court agrees. She first correctly found that abstention was not proper under
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) because this case does not involve any federal
constitutional issues. (ECF No. 157 at 14); See Traverso v. Penn, 874 F.2d 209, 212 (4th
Cir. 1989) (Younger demands abstention “where granting the requested relief would
require adjudication of federal constitutional issues involved in the pending state
action”).4 The Magistrate Judge next correctly found that abstention was not proper
under the Colorado River5 abstention doctrine because Field failed “to establish that this
action is parallel to a pending state action.” (ECF No 157 at 14); See Hayes v. JP
Morgan Chase Bank, No. 3:13-cv-1884, 2014 WL 4198897, at *3 (D.S.C. Aug. 20, 2014)
(“Under the Colorado River abstention doctrine, a district court may abstain from
exercising jurisdiction ‘in the exceptional circumstances where a federal case duplicates
contemporaneous state proceedings, and wise judicial administration, giving regard to
conservation of judicial resources, and comprehensive disposition of litigation clearly
favors abstention.’”) (quoting Vulcan Chem. Techs., Inc. v. Barker, 297 F.3d 332, 340–41
(2002)). She recognized Field’s assertion that this action and the appeal pending in the
Superior Court, Appellate Division, State of New Jersey are parallel and properly noted

4
Field briefly objects to this finding, claiming that there are “significant state related matters warranting
abstention under Younger.” (ECF No. 170 at 9.) However, he provides no argument that this case involves
any federal constitutional issues. See Traverso, 874 F.2d at 212. Accordingly, his objection is without
merit.
5
Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. U.S., 424 U.S. 800, 813 (1976).

6

that Field failed to provide any evidentiary support for this argument; specifically, a copy
of the complaint in the state action. (ECF No. 157 at 14.)
Field has now attached a copy of the complaint in the New Jersey state case,
Capital Inv. Funding LLC v. Calvary Asset Mgmt., LLC, No. BER-L-3790-12 (Dkt. No. 1,
filed May 16, 2012), to his filing and asks the Court to “consider the allegations.” (ECF
No. 170 at 6.) Suits are considered parallel “if substantially the same parties litigate
substantially the same issues in different forums.” Gannett Co., Inc. v. Clark Constr.
Grp., 286 F.3d 737, 742 (4th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). If actions involve different
issues, remedies, or proof requirements, they are not parallel for the purposes of
Colorado River abstention. Id. at 742–43. Even if two proceedings have “certain facts
and arguments in common,” they are not parallel unless the legal issues are
“substantially the same.” Al–Abood v. El–Shamari, 217 F.3d 225, 233 (4th Cir. 2000);
see also McLaughlin v. United Va. Bank, 955 F.2d 930, 935 (4th Cir. 1992) (“In addition
to party differences, it would appear that a breach of contract claim pending in the
federal case is not pending, nor has it ever been pending, in any state court proceeding.
It cannot be said therefore that parallel duplicative proceedings exist in state court so as
to present a Colorado River issue.”); Red Bone Alley Foods, LLC v. Nat’l Food &
Beverage, Inc., No. 4:13–cv–3590, 2014 WL 1093052, at *8 (D.S.C. Mar. 14, 2014)
(holding that proceedings were not parallel, despite the common identity of the parties
and the common issues of fact, because the claims alleged and remedies sought were
not the same).

7

In this action, Plaintiffs have asserted federal claims for RICO violations against
Defendants and seek class certification of a class as well as actual damages, trebled,
plus attorneys’ fees and costs. In contrast, Capital Investment Funding, Inc. (“CIF”) does
not assert these claims in the New Jersey state action and does not seek class
certification or treble damages. Indeed, the claims in the state action do not arise under
any state or federal securities law. Although there are clearly common factual questions
between the two actions and some overlap of parties,6 Plaintiffs suit in this Court
involves entirely different claims. Accordingly, the two actions are not parallel and
Colorado River abstention therefore does not apply. See McLaughlin, 955 F.2d at 935.
Field’s objection is therefore overruled.
B.

ECF No. 199, November 12, 2015 Report7
The Magistrate Judge recommended that the motion to dismiss counterclaims be

denied based on the limited and conclusory arguments raised in the motion. She first
considered Plaintiffs’ cursory argument that Field’s counterclaims warrant dismissal
because they are based on the alleged actions of CIF and not Plaintiffs, finding this
argument to be meritless. (ECF No. 199 at 10–11.) The Magistrate recognized that
“Field’s substitute counterclaim is somewhat confusing and inartfully pled.” (Id. at 11.)
However, she correctly found that “the Court cannot rely on one paragraph of the
substitute counterclaim to support the proposition that the entire counterclaim is based

6
CIF and Arthur Field are both involved in this action and the New Jersey state action. At this time, the
Court makes no determination as to whether Plaintiffs and CIF are in privity for purposes of Colorado River
abstention.
7
The Court recognizes Field’s argument that Plaintiffs’ objections to this Report were untimely filed and
should therefore not be considered. (ECF No. 208 at 1.) Specifically, Plaintiffs’ objections were due
December 3, 2015 and Plaintiffs filed their objections on December 4, 2015. Nevertheless, the Court will
give Plaintiffs the benefit of the doubt and consider the merits of their objections. 

8

upon the actions of CIF when numerous allegations in the substitute counterclaim refer
to the actions of the individually named Plaintiffs.” (Id.)
Plaintiff’s argument on this finding is identical to that raised in their motion to
dismiss. (ECF Nos. 205 at 4–5; 109 at 2–3.) Indeed, Plaintiffs fail to raise any arguments
here that would invoke de novo review. Accordingly, the Court is tasked only with review
of the Magistrate Judge’s conclusions on this issue for clear error. The Court agrees with
the Magistrate Judge’s finding that at least some allegations in the substitute
counterclaim are raised against the individually named Plaintiffs. Accordingly, the Court
cannot agree with Plaintiffs that Field’s apparent allegations against CIF provide
“sufficient reason to dismiss Field’s counterclaims in toto.” (ECF No. 205 at 5.) The
Magistrate Judge did not err in her recommendation that the motion to dismiss be denied
on this basis.
The Magistrate Judge next found that Plaintiffs failed to establish that the RICO
cause of action alleged in the substitute counterclaim is barred. She noted that Plaintiffs’
brief argument on this issue—that Field’s RICO claims are governed by the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act—failed to provide any legal authority or analysis for the
Court to determine whether Field’s RICO claims include conduct actionable as securities
fraud. (ECF No. 199 at 12.)
Plaintiffs do not address this aspect of the Magistrate Judge’s finding. Rather,
they argue that Field’s RICO allegations do not fall under “racketeering activity as
defined by 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1). (ECF No. 205 at 5–6.) 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) defines
“racketeering activity” to include “any act or threat involving . . . extortion . . . [or] any act

9

which is indictable under any of the following provisions of Title 18, United States Code: .
. . section 1956 (relating to the laundering of monetary instruments), section 1951
(relating to . . . extortion). . . .” Field alleges that Plaintiffs formed a collective “XYZ
enterprise” that engaged in mail fraud, wire fraud, extortion, money laundering, and
transportation of funds across state lines. (Id. at 18.) He further alleges that “Plaintiffs,
individually or acting through their agents, have extorted monies from one or more
people in violation of law.” (Id.) Thus, the substitute counterclaim clearly alleges at least
two acts committed by Plaintiffs that may be in violation of the extortion and money
laundering statutes. Field has therefore met his pleading burden with respect to
allegations of “racketeering activity.” Plaintiffs’ objection is therefore overruled as to
Field’s RICO claims.
Finally, the Magistrate Judge found that Plaintiffs’ remaining arguments lacked
any authoritative support and, therefore, she could not dismiss the substitute
counterclaim based on the arguments put forth in the motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 199 at
12.) In their filing, Plaintiffs offer more comprehensive arguments on some of Field’s
remaining counterclaims. The Court will address these arguments in turn.
1.

Misrepresentation, failure to supervise, breach of promise,
invasion of privacy, extortion, and/or fraud

Field’s second cause of action includes claims for misrepresentation, failure to
supervise, breach of promise, invasion of privacy, extortion, and/or fraud. (ECF No. 101
at 24.) Plaintiffs first argue that South Carolina does not recognize a civil claim for
extortion. (ECF No. 205 at 7.) However, S.C. Code Ann. § 16-17-640 appears to
combine a cause of action for both blackmail and extortion. The statute states:

10

Any person who verbally or by printing or writing or by electronic
communications:
(1) accuses another of a crime or offense;
(2) exposes or publishes any of another's personal or business acts,
infirmities, or failings; or
(3) compels any person to do any act, or to refrain from doing any
lawful act, against his will;
with intent to extort money or any other thing of value from any person, or
attempts or threatens to do any of such acts, with the intent to extort money
or any other thing of value, shall be guilty of blackmail and, upon
conviction, shall be fined not more than five thousand dollars or imprisoned
for not more than ten years, or both, in the discretion of the court.
S. C. Code Ann. § 16-17-640. Thus, the Court cannot dismiss Field’s extortion claim on
the basis that such a claim is not recognized under South Carolina law.
Plaintiffs next briefly argue that Field does not properly plead the elements of a
fraud claim under South Carolina law and does not meet the heightened pleading
standard under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b). (ECF No. 205 at 7.) However, they
offer no supporting argument. To properly plead fraud, Field must allege the following
elements: (1) a representation; (2) its falsity; (3) its materiality; (4) either knowledge of its
falsity or a reckless disregard of its truth or falsity; (5) intent that the representation be
acted upon; (6) the hearer’s ignorance of its falsity; (7) the hearer’s reliance on its truth;
(8) the hearer’s right to rely thereon; and (9) the hearer’s consequent and proximate
injury. Regions Bank v. Schmauch, 582 S.E.2d 432, 444–45 (S.C. Ct. App. 2003). In
addition, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) provides that, “[i]n alleging fraud or
mistake, a party must state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or
mistake. Malice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions of a person’s mind may be
alleged generally.”

11

The Court finds that Field’s has sufficiently pled fraud under South Carolina law.
He alleges, inter alia, that: (1) Plaintiffs “made numerous false representations to . . .
Field . . . intending for Field to rely thereupon to his detriment”; (2) “Said persons knew or
reasonably should have known such statements were false at the time of utterance and
that Field would reasonably, foreseeably suffer damage as a result”; and (3) “Field did
rely thereon and suffered significant economic damage, injury, and emotional trauma.”
(ECF No. 101 at 7–10.) He further alleges with particularity that certain circumstances
constituted fraud, including that “Representations were made to . . . Field . . . and were
intended to be relied upon to induce . . . Field . . . to issue Notes to Plaintiffs and/or do
business with such Plaintiffs between 1999 and 2008, pay them interest and principal.”
(Id. at 7.) Based on the allegations set forth in the counterclaim and Plaintiffs’ brief
conclusory arguments, the Court cannot find a basis to dismiss Field’s fraud claim.
Plaintiffs

next

appear

to

assert

that

Field’s

breach

of

promise

and

misrepresentation claims are based entirely on allegations that Plaintiffs misrepresented
to Field that he would be dismissed with prejudice from further litigation under the Global
Mediated Settlement Agreement (“GMSA”). (ECF No. 205 at 8.) They argue that
because the GMSA explicitly provided that Field was being dismissed without prejudice,
these claims fail as a matter of law. (Id.) However, Field appears to base these claims
beyond any alleged representations made in the GMSA. For example, he alleges that
Plaintiffs “made numerous false representations to CIF and/or Field and/or his agents,
servants and employees intending for Field to rely thereupon to his detriment.” (ECF No.
101 at 7.) Specifically, Plaintiffs “represented . . . on numerous and diverse times they

12

had received and thoroughly reviewed CIF Prospectus and Audits distributed at least
annually.” (Id.) Thus, Plaintiffs have failed to establish that these causes of action should
be dismissed.
Finally, Plaintiffs briefly argue that Field has failed to establish invasion of privacy.
However, they provide no legal authority for this argument. The Court will not dismiss
this claim on such a conclusory basis.
2. Civil Conspiracy
Field’s fourth cause of action alleges civil conspiracy. Civil conspiracy consists of
three elements: (1) a combination of two or more persons, (2) for the purpose of injuring
the plaintiff, (3) which causes him special damage. Lee v. Chesterfield Gen. Hosp. Inc.,
344 S.E.2d 379 (S.C. Ct. App. 1986). The difference between civil and criminal
conspiracy is that in criminal conspiracy the agreement is the gravamen of the offense,
whereas in civil actions, the gravamen of the tort is the damage resulting to plaintiff from
an overt act done pursuant to a common design. Todd v. S.C. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins.
Co., 278 S.E.2d 607, 611 (S.C. 1981). The Supreme Court of South Carolina has held
that a civil conspiracy claim fails under South Carolina law where the cause of action
“does no more than incorporate the prior allegations and then allege[s] the existence of a
civil conspiracy.” Todd, 278 S.E.2d at 611.
Here, Plaintiffs argue that Field “fails to allege [a] different act that was not already
part of his other claims and fails to allege[] any special damage resulting from any
alleged conspiracy.” (ECF No. 205 at 10.) The Court agrees. Field’s civil conspiracy
claim merely rehashes Plaintiffs’ alleged conduct as stated in Field’s other causes of

13

action. Moreover, the damages sought in this cause of action are the same as those
sought in his other causes of action—injunctive relief. Accordingly, the Court finds that
Field has failed to properly plead a civil conspiracy claim under South Carolina law and
dismisses this cause of action. Plaintiffs’ objection is therefore granted.
3.

Outrage and/or Infliction of Distress

Field’s fifth cause of action is for intentional infliction of emotional distress. In
South Carolina, in order to recover for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional
distress or outrage, a plaintiff must establish the following:
(1) the defendant intentionally or recklessly inflicted severe emotional
distress or was certain or substantially certain that such distress would
result from his conduct;
(2) the conduct was so extreme and outrageous as to exceed all possible
bounds of decency and must be regarded as atrocious, and utterly
intolerable in a civilized community;
(3) the actions of the defendant caused the plaintiff’s emotional distress;
and
(4) the emotional distress suffered by the plaintiff was severe so that no
reasonable man could be expected to endure it.
Ford v. Hutson, 276 S.E.2d 776, 778 (S.C. 1981) (citations and quotation marks
omitted).
Here, Plaintiffs argue that “the bulk of [this] cause of action . . . is based upon
litigation that CIF has pursued in various forums seeking to obtain recovery against all of
the parties engaged with CIF during the time Field controlled it.” (ECF No. 205 at 11.)
They assert that this litigation “is not directed at Field.” (Id.) However, the Court finds that
this cause of action is not solely based on litigation pursued by CIF. Rather, it also
concerns litigation brought by Plaintiffs in South Carolina state court, in which Fields was
a defendant. (ECF Nos. 101 at 32; 1-8 at 2.) Field also alleges here that Plaintiffs made

14

comments at court hearings that “include[ed] foul language and telling a spouse or child
to “‘go F*k herself’” and/or to “‘shut the F*k up.’” (ECF No. 101 at 34.) Accordingly,
Plaintiffs have failed to establish that this cause of action should be dismissed.
4.

Remaining Causes of Action

For Field’s remaining causes of action, Plaintiffs offer only brief, conclusory
arguments and fail to provide any legal authority in support of their objections. The
Magistrate Judge has already cautioned Plaintiffs that “it is not the job of this Court to
provide the legal research necessary to support the parties’ arguments if the parties are
unwilling to do so themselves.” (ECF No. 199 at 13 (quoting Bell v. Fairmont Raffles
Hotel Int’l, 2013 WL 1291005, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 27, 2013)).) Plaintiffs have again
failed to brief Field’s remaining causes of action effectively—the Court cannot dismiss
Field’s remaining causes of actions based on Plaintiffs’ current arguments.
CONCLUSION
After careful consideration of the relevant motions, responses, and objections, the
Court adopts the September 24, 2015 Report (ECF No. 157), and adopts in part the
November 12, 2015 Report (ECF No. 199). It is, therefore, ORDERED that Field’s
motion to compel arbitration (ECF No. 97) is DENIED, Field’s motion to abstain (ECF No.
110) is DENIED, Field’s motion to compel arbitration and stay discovery (ECF No. 156)
is DENIED, and Plaintiffs’ motion to dismiss counterclaims (ECF No. 109) is GRANTED
IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Field’s cause of action for civil conspiracy is therefore
dismissed. However, Field’s remaining causes of action set forth in his substitute
counterclaim (ECF No. 101) may proceed.

15

IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/Bruce Howe Hendricks
United States District Judge
Greenville, South Carolina
March 25, 2016

16