Ravenell v. Reynolds

Filing 49

ORDER adopting 43 Report and Recommendation and granting 24 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Honorable Patrick Michael Duffy on 06/28/2016.(adeh, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
GREENVILLE DIVISION
Tyrone A. Ravenell,

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Petitioner,
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v.
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Warden Cecilia Reynolds,
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Respondent.
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____________________________________)

C.A. No.: 6:15-cv-1743-PMD
ORDER

This matter comes before the Court on Petitioner’s objections to United States Magistrate
Judge Kevin F. McDonald’s report and recommendation (“R & R”) (ECF Nos. 46 & 43) that the
Court grant Respondent’s summary judgment motion (ECF No. 24) and dismiss Petitioner’s
motion for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. For the reasons provided herein, the Court overrules
the objections, grants the summary judgment motion, and dismisses the case.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Magistrate Judge makes only a recommendation to this Court. The R & R has no
presumptive weight, and the responsibility for making a final determination remains with the
Court. Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 270–71 (1976). This Court must conduct a de novo
review of any portion of the R & R to which a timely, specific objection is made, and the Court
may accept, reject, or modify the Magistrate Judge’s findings and recommendations in whole or
in part. Id. Additionally, the Court may receive more evidence or recommit the matter to the
Magistrate Judge with instructions. Id. A party’s failure to object is taken as the party’s
agreement with the Magistrate Judge’s conclusions. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985).
Absent a timely, specific objection—or as to those portions of the R & R to which no specific
objection is made—this Court “must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of
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the record in order to accept the recommendation.’” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Accident Ins.
Co., 416 F.3d 310, 315 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee’s note).
DISCUSSION
The Magistrate Judge recommends granting summary judgment on all seven of
Petitioner’s asserted grounds for relief. Petitioner’s objections relate to the first six grounds. 1
I.

First, Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Grounds

Petitioner’s first, fourth, fifth, and sixth grounds relate to trial counsel’s purported failure
to prepare adequately for trial. Addressing those four grounds together, the Magistrate Judge
concluded Petitioner has not shown that the PCR court’s analysis of those grounds involved
either an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, see § 2254(d)(1), or an
unreasonable determination of the facts, see § 2254(d)(2). Among other things, the Magistrate
Judge found ample support for the PCR court’s finding that trial counsel was credible. In his
first objection, Petitioner contends the record proves that trial counsel was not credible. 2
However, this Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that the record supports the PCR court’s
credibility determination and thus the PCR court did not make an unreasonable factual decision.
The Court therefore overrules Petitioner’s objection.
II.

Second and Third Grounds

In his second and third grounds, Petitioner faults trial counsel for not securing a
purported alibi witness for trial. The PCR court denied relief on this theory, finding that
Petitioner had not established prejudice under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 648 (1984),
1. Petitioner does not object to the portion of the R & R addressing the seventh ground for relief. Seeing no clear
error in that analysis or in the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation, the Court adopts them.
2. In his objection, Petitioner cites § 2254(d)(1), which relates to errors of law. However, he then states the PCR
court unreasonably determined the facts—an argument that falls under § 2254(d)(2)—and cites portions of the
record. As such, it appears Petitioner intended to object only to the Magistrate Judge’s § 2254(d)(2) analysis.
Nonetheless, out of an abundance of caution, the Court has also carefully reviewed the Magistrate Judge’s
§ 2254(d)(1) analysis. It finds no error therein.

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because he did not provide evidence of the testimony that the purported alibi witness would have
offered at trial. Addressing the second and third grounds together, the Magistrate Judge found
the PCR court’s determination well-supported in both the law and the record.
Petitioner argues his failure to produce the witness at the PCR hearing should not excuse
trial counsel’s failure to produce the alibi witness at trial. That is a contention about what the
law of ineffective assistance claims should be. The question before this Court, however, is
whether PCR court reasonably applied existing ineffective-assistance law. Like the Magistrate
Judge, this Court answers that question in the affirmative. Accordingly, it overrules Petitioner’s
objection.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court OVERRULES Petitioner’s objections and
ADOPTS the R & R. 3 It is ORDERED that Respondent’s motion for summary judgment is
GRANTED and that Petitioner’s § 2254 application is DISMISSED with prejudice. 4
AND IT IS SO ORDERED.

June 28, 2016
Charleston, South Carolina

3.
The Court makes one substitution: in the Harrington v. Richter citation following the block quotation on
page 15 of the R & R, “104” is replaced with “105.”
4.
The Court declines to issue a certificate of appealability. Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of a
denial of a constitutional right. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2); Miller–El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336–38 (2003) (in
order to satisfy § 2253(c), a petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district court’s
assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 474, 484 (2000) (holding
that when relief is denied on procedural grounds, a petitioner must establish both that the correctness of the
dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the petition states a debatably valid claim of the denial of a
constitutional right).

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