Miller v. Eagleton

Filing 75

ORDER RULING ON REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION {61]. The Respondents motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 34) is GRANTED and Petitioners petition is DENIED. Additionally, Petitioners Motions for Discovery and an Extension (ECF No. 69, 70, and 74) are DENIED. A certificate of appealability is denied. Signed by Honorable Timothy M Cain on 3/9/2017. (kric, ) Modified on 3/9/2017 to edit text(kric, ).

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
GREENVILLE DIVISION
Clarence Scott Miller,
Petitioner,
v.
Mr. Willie Eagleton,
Respondent.

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Civil Action 6:15-3726-TMC

ORDER

Petitioner Clarence Miller, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a petition for writ of
habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and
Local Civil Rule 73.02, D.S.C., this matter was referred to a magistrate judge for pretrial
handling. Before the court is the magistrate judge’s Report and Recommendation (“Report”),
recommending that Respondent’s motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 34) be granted and
the petition denied (ECF No. 61). The parties were advised of their right to file objections (ECF
No. 61 at 19). On January 23, 2017, Respondent filed objections. (ECF No. 63).
On February 8, 2017, Petitioner filed a motion for an extension of time within which to
file objections. (ECF No. 65). In this motion, Petitioner stated that he did not receive the Report
until January 30, 2017, and he also requested a copy of the memorandum he filed in opposition
to Respondent’s summary judgement motion. Id. Petitioner also stated that he had a pending
motion before the magistrate judge regarding discovery. Id. At that time, there were no pending
motions for discovery on the docket. On February 10, 2017, the court directed the Clerk of
Court to send Petitioner a copy of his memorandum, and granted Petitioner an extension until
February 23, 2017, to file objections to the Report. (ECF No. 67). The court also informed
Petitioner that no further extensions would be granted. Id. On February 16, 2017, Petitioner
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filed a motion for discovery pursuant to Rule 6 of the Rules Governing Section 2254
Proceedings. (ECF No. 69).1 On February 23, 2017, Petitioner filed another motion for an
extension of time to allow him to obtain this discovery. (ECF No. 70).2 Subsequently, Petitioner
filed another motion for discovery. (ECF No. 74).
The Report has no presumptive weight and the responsibility to make a final
determination in this matter remains with this court. See Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 27071 (1976). The court need not conduct a de novo review when a party makes only “general and
conclusory objections that do not direct the court to a specific error in the magistrate’s proposed
findings and recommendations.” Orpiano v. Johnson, 687 F.2d 44, 47 (4th Cir. 1982).3
I. Facts/Background
In his Report, the magistrate judge sets out the facts and procedural history in detail.
Briefly, on March 27, 2008, Petitioner pled guilty to two counts of burglary 1st degree, petit
larceny, two counts of burglary 2nd degree, and grand larceny. On April 28, 2008, Petitioner
was sentenced to 20 years confinement for each burglary 1st degree charge, 15 years for one
burglary 2nd degree, and 10 years for petit larceny, all to run concurrent, along with consecutive

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Rule 6(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Proceedings, provides that “[a] judge
may, for good cause, authorize a party to conduct discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and may limit the extent of discovery.” Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, Rule
6(a), 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254.
2

The motion for extension was postmarked February 23, 2017. (ECF No. 70-1).
Therefore, pursuant to the mailbox rule, the court considers it to have been filed February 23,
2017. See Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266 (1988) (holding that date of filing is date petitioner
gave petition to prison officials for mailing); and Douglas v. Noelle, 567 F.3d 1103, 1109 (9th
Cir. 2009) (considering postmark as evidence of date of mailing in applying prison mailbox
rule).
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“While the level of scrutiny entailed by the court's review of the Report depends on
whether or not objections have been filed, in either case the Court is free, after review, to accept,
reject, or modify any of the magistrate judge's findings or recommendations.” Wallace v. Hous.
Auth. of City of Columbia, 791 F. Supp. 137, 138 (D.S.C. 1992) (citations omitted).
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15 year terms for the other burglary 2nd degree and 10 years for the grand larceny, which were
both suspended to time served and intensive probation for five years to follow Petitioner’s prison
sentence.
On July 29, 2006, Petitioner broke into the home of Richard Shook and stole guns. His
fingerprints were found inside Shook’s home. On August 2, 2006, Petitioner kicked in the back
door of the home of Valerie and Jason Johnson while they were inside. The victims tackled
Petitioner and held him until police arrived. On the night of December 31, 2005, Petitioner broke
into a building belonging to Ellis Bowden. On January 30, 2006, Petitioner broke into a business
and stole automobile racing suits and was seen attempting to sell those racing suits. Petitioner
was also seen wearing clothing similar to the clothing worn by one of the burglars on
surveillance video from the crime scene. At his guilty plea hearing, Petitioner admitted
committing these crimes and, at his sentencing, Petitioner apologized to the victims.
Petitioner filed a direct appeal, raising the following issue: Did the Circuit Court Judge
err in accepting appellant’s guilty plea where the plea was not knowing and voluntary as the
result of appellant’s inability to understand the guilty plea proceeding, his inability to understand
the constitutional rights he was waiving, and his inability to assist trial counsel in his defense?
On October 28, 2010, the South Carolina Court of Appeals denied and dismissed the direct
appeal in an unpublished opinion. State v. Miller, Op. No. 2010-UP-467 (S.C. Ct. App. 2010).
On April 4, 2011, Petitioner filed an application for post-conviction relief (“PCR”).
Petitioner alleged he was being held in custody unlawfully based on the following grounds: (a)
Failure to investigate; (b) Failure to request a competency hearing knowing applicant had a
history of mental illness; (c) Failure to request a suppression hearing to suppress applicant
statement due to physical [illegible] and mental [illegible] during interrogation.

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An evidentiary hearing was held on June 13, 2012. On July 31, 2012, the PCR court
construed Petitioner’s claims as ineffective assistance of counsel allegations and found Petitioner
had not established any constitutional violations or deprivations and denied and dismissed the
PCR application with prejudice. On March 26, 2013, Appellate Defender LaNelle C. DuRant
filed a Johnson petition for a writ of certiorari, raising the following issue: Did PCR court err in
failing to find plea counsel ineffective for not insuring that petitioner’s guilty plea was entered
freely, voluntarily and knowingly? Petitioner also filed a pro se brief arguing that plea counsel
was ineffective for failing to ensure that Petitioner entered the guilty plea freely, voluntarily, and
knowingly. He sated that the medications he was taking at the time of the plea made it
impossible for him to understand the plea and that his medications had changed between the time
he was evaluated for competency and the plea. He also argued plea counsel was ineffective for
failing to request a competency hearing. On January 27, 2015, the South Carolina Court of
Appeals denied the petition for writ of certiorari. On October 14, 2015, Petitioner timely filed
this § 2254 petition.
II. Discussion
In his habeas petition, Petitioner raises the following grounds for relief, quoted verbatim:
Ground One: Counsel failed to investigate
Supporting Facts: Counsel failure to adequately investigate, research or evaluate
possible defense and evidence in mitigation. If counsel would have done so he
would known Miller was not on the same medication. He was evaluated on with
John H. Dewitt, MD and Frank Quinn, Ph.D. During his plea, the doctor change
Miller medications from the medication he was evaluated on.
Ground Two: Counsel failed to request a competency hearing knowing that the
applicant had a history of mental illness
Supporting Facts: Miller trial counsel was deficient for failing to request a Blair
hearing or competence hearing. Applicant counsel was deficient because he
admitted it was strange and not normal for someone to hear echo sounds. When
court had information concerning Miller or petitioner irrational behavior,
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including suicide attempt and hallucination. Psychiatric evaluations, a learning
disability. Miller inability also affected him in assisting trial counsel in his
defense. With Miller ingested drugs prior to entering his guilty plea, and Miller
comment he’s hearing echo sounds suffering form delusion hallucination and
hearing echoes imaginary voices. Miller had been diagnosed consistently with
having depression disorder and personality disorder. With all these mental
disorders, Miller should have been giving a competency hearing.
Ground Three: Counsel failed to request a suppression hearing to suppress the
applicant’s statement. Due to physical and mental issues during interrogation.
(ECF No. 1-6 at 5, 7-8, 9).
In his summary judgment motion, Respondent argues that Grounds One and Three are
procedurally defaulted. The magistrate judge determined that only Ground Three was
procedurally defaulted and, addressing Grounds One and Two on the merits, found them to be
without merit. In his objections, Respondent asserts that the magistrate judge erred by finding
that Ground One is not procedurally barred.
Here, while the issue raised in Ground One was perhaps not arguably raised to, or ruled
upon by, the PCR court and thus is procedurally barred, the court believes the better course in
this action is to address the merits of Ground One. See Gray v. Ozmint, C/A No. 8:08-cv-03773HFF-BHH, 2010 WL 1068979, *7 n.3 (D.S.C. Mar. 18, 2010).4 As the PCR court noted, the

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The court agrees with Respondent that an issue cannot be raised for the first time in a
Johnson petition for writ of certiorari with the South Carolina Supreme Court. In Johnson v.
State, 364 S.E.2d 201 (S.C. 1988), the South Carolina Supreme Court adopted an appellate
procedure for when appellate counsel concludes that the PCR applicant has no meritorious
grounds to present: counsel shall file a Johnson petition raising any issue which is arguably
appealable and applicant is notified that he has a specific period of time to file a pro se petition
raising additional issues. Foster v. State, 379 S.E.2d 907 (S.C. 1989). In ruling on a Johnson
petition for writ of certiorari, the South Carolina Supreme Court will only consider those issues
raised to and ruled on by the PCR court. The South Carolina Supreme Court applies a
procedural bar to issues which do not meet this criteria. See Pruitt v. State, 423 S.E.2d 127, 128
n. 2 (S.C. 1992) (holding that “the general rule [is] that issues must be raised to, and ruled on by,
the post conviction judge to be preserved for appellate review.”). See also Padgett v. State, 484
S.E.2d 101 (S.C. 1997) (holding that issues not ruled on by the PCR court are not preserved for
appeal).
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issues in this case are interrelated and although Petitioner did not specifically raise an issue about
whether plea counsel should have investigated whether he was taking a different medication, he
did raise the issue of whether plea counsel should have investigated Petitioner’s competency on
the day of the plea, and this issue was raised to and ruled on by the PCR court.5 Moreover,
Respondent identifies no error in the magistrate judge's ultimate conclusion that Petitioner's
claims lack merit.
Petitioner pled guilty on March 27, 2008, and his sentencing was delayed to give the
victims notice and an opportunity to appear before the court. On April 28, 2008, Petitioner
returned to court for sentencing and he did not express any concerns over his mental state the
day he pled guilty. Prior to Petitioner’s guilty pleas, his attorney had him evaluated separately
by the South Carolina Department of Mental Health (“SCDMH”) and a private psychologist for
criminal responsibility and competency to stand trial. Petitioner was found criminally
responsible and competent to stand trial by both the SCDMH and private psychologists.
The issue raised in Ground One rests on whether Petitioner’s trial counsel was ineffective
for failing to investigate and request another competency hearing before the guilty plea.
Petitioner contends that his guilty plea was involuntary because he was under the influence of a
newly prescribed medication that affected his ability to comprehend everything and thus
rendered him incompetent.
Before a court accepts a guilty plea, the court must determine that the defendant is
competent to enter the plea and that the plea is knowing and voluntary. Godinez v. Moran, 509
U.S. 389 (1997). To establish such a claim, a defendant must show “his mental faculties were so
impaired by drugs when he pleaded that he was incapable of full understanding and appreciation

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The court notes that the magistrate judge specifically noted that the issue of Petitioner’s
change in medication was also addressed in regard to Ground Two. (Report at 14 n.9).
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of the charges against him, of comprehending his constitutional rights and of realizing the
consequences of his plea.” United States v. Truglio, 493 F.2d 574, 579 (4th Cir. 1974).
“Absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, a defendant is bound by the
representations he makes under oath during a plea colloquy.” Fields v. Attorney Gen. of
Maryland, 956 F.2d 1290, 1299 (4th Cir. 1992). A defendant's statements at the plea hearing are
“strong evidence” of the voluntariness of the plea agreement. United States v. DeFusco, 949
F.2d 114, 119 (4th Cir.1991).
In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the Supreme Court established a
two-part test for determining whether a convicted person is entitled to relief on the ground that
his counsel rendered ineffective assistance. The first prong of the test requires the petitioner
demonstrate that counsel's performance was deficient and “fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. The second prong requires the petitioner to show
that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Id. at 687. In order to satisfy the prejudice
requirement of the two-prong test set forth in Strickland, defendant must show that “counsel's
errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.”
Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364 (1993). Indulging a strong presumption that counsel's
conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance, a court must then
determine whether, in light of all the circumstances, as viewed as of the time of counsel's
conduct and not through hindsight, the defendant has carried his burden of showing that his
counsel's acts or omissions fell outside the range of reasonably competent assistance. Strickland,
466 U.S. at 690.
In addition, “a defendant who alleges ineffective assistance of counsel following the
entry of a guilty plea has an even higher burden to meet.” Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 53-59
(1985). In the case of a guilty plea, the defendant must show that “there is a reasonable
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probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have
insisted on going to trial.”

Id. at 59 (footnote omitted).

“A reasonable probability is a

probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.
During the guilty plea, the following colloquy took place:
The Court: All, right, Mr. Miller, within the last twenty-four (24) hours, have you
consumed any type of substance that’s adversely affecting your ability to
understand what we’re doing today?
The Defendant: No, sir.
The Court: Have you been treated for any type of drug or alcohol abuse?
The Defendant: Well, I take - - I take drugs. I take psychotic medication - The Court: Okay. All right. Are you on that medication now?
The Defendant: Yes.
The Court: All right. Now, is the fact that you’re on that medication, is that - - is
that interfering or preventing you from understanding what we’re doing?
The Defendant: I understand what you’re saying, but it echoes. It sounds like
you’re echoing to me.
The Court: All right. But you can hear me?
The Defendant: I can hear you, yes.
The Court: All right. You know, if ever during this process you don’t think you
can hear me, or you don’t think you can understand me, you let me know, okay?
The Defendant: Yes, sir.
(ECF No. 35-1 at 10-11).
At the PCR hearing, Petitioner testified that at the guilty plea, he “wasn’t feeling very
well” because the medication he was on had him “dazed out.” (ECF No. 35-1 at 107). He stated
he was hearing “echo sounds”and bells ringing, and everything was unbalanced. Id. He stated
he was not focused and wanted to withdraw his plea. (ECF No. 35-1 at 107-08, 109). He also

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testified that he was hearing voices. (ECF No. 35-1 at 110). Petitioner stated he was being
compliant when the PCR judge pointed out that Petitioner did not indicate during the plea that he
was hearing anything other than echoes. (ECF No. 35-1 at 110-11). On cross-examination,
Petitioner also testified that he was hallucinating the day of the plea hearing. (ECF No. 35-1 at
117). Petitioner additionally testified that he was on the same medication the day of the guilty
pleas as he was when he had been evaluated and found competent a few weeks earlier. (ECF
Nos. 35-1 at 132).
At the PCR hearing, plea counsel testified that because he knew Petitioner had some
mental issues, he went over the elements of the crime and the discovery very slowly with
Petitioner. (ECF No. 35-1 at 134). Plea counsel testified that, other than what was on the record,
Petitioner did not indicate to him that he did not understand the proceeding. Id. Plea counsel
testified if Petitioner had told him he did not understand the proceedings he would have stopped
the hearing. Id. Plea counsel stated he continued with the hearing after Petitioner stated he was
hearing echoing because he was not a mental health expert, and he did not believe Petitioner’s
competency would have changed since the evaluation he had undergone a few weeks before the
guilty plea. (ECF No. 35-1 at 139).
Whether counsel's performance was deficient may be answered only by viewing
counsel's actions or decisions in the light of all surrounding circumstances at the time the
decision was made, and not in the artificial light of hindsight. Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S.
364, 371-72 (1993)); United States v. Lopez, 343 F. App'x 950, 951 (4th Cir.2009) (“A
reviewing court cannot engage in hindsight; rather, the reasonableness of counsel's performance
is evaluated within the context of the circumstances at the time of the alleged error.”). Here, at
the time of the guilty plea, there were no red flags that would necessarily have placed any
reasonable plea counsel on notice of the need to investigate the medication Petitioner was on and
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whether Petitioner was competent at the time of the guilty plea.

There was no evidence that

Petitioner or his counsel knew that Petitioner’s medication had been changed. At the time of the
guilty plea, Petitioner stated he was on the same medication and only that he was hearing echoes.
“Not every manifestation of mental illness demonstrates incompetence to stand trial; rather, the
evidence must indicate a present inability to assist counsel or understand the charges.” Walton v.
Angelone, 321 F.3d 442 (4th Cir. 2003) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
Petitioner did not indicate an inability to assist counsel or understand the proceedings. In fact,
Petitioner informed the court he understood what was being said, and the court told Petitioner to
let him know if he did not understand anything, which Petitioner did not do. Moreover, plea
counsel testified that Petitioner did not inform him that he did not understand the proceedings.
The record supports a finding that plea counsel was not deficient.
Moreover, even if plea counsel was deficient, Petitioner cannot meet his burden of
showing prejudice. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 (“a court need not determine whether
counsel's performance was deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as
a result of the alleged deficiencies,” and “[i]f it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on
the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, . . . that course should be followed”). In particular, he
did not introduce any evidence as to what psychiatric problem he may have been experiencing or
how that problem may have impacted upon his competency to enter a plea. See Godinez v.
Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 397-400 (1993) (The defendant must have “sufficient present ability to
consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding” and has “a rational
as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him”).
Petitioner contends he was on a different medication that apparently had side effects, one
of which was causing him to hear echoes. At the PCR hearing, he elaborated further and testified
that he was hearing voices. However, he did not state this at the guilty plea nor did he tell plea
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counsel this. Moreover, Petitioner has not shown there is a reasonable probability he would not
have been found competent had plea counsel investigated which medication Petitioner was on or
requested another competency hearing. Petitioner has failed to submit any evidence that even
remotely suggests he was incompetent at the time of the plea hearing. Even if the court were to
find some conduct or behavior that was strange or odd at the time of the plea hearing, Petitioner
cannot demonstrate prejudice without some evidence that indicates Petitioner's mental state was
altered so that he was unable to understand the proceedings or assist his attorney in his defense.
And this he has not done. Accordingly, the court finds that Petitioner cannot demonstrate that
the PCR court unreasonably misapplied clearly established federal law as decided by the
Supreme Court in rejecting this claim or that the PCR court made objectively unreasonable
factual findings. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S.362, 410 (2000); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), (e)(1).
Petitioner has also filed two motions for discovery pursuant to Rule 6 of the Rules
Governing Section 2254 Proceedings. (ECF Nos. 69, 74). Unlike other civil litigants, a § 2254
habeas petitioner ‘is not entitled to discovery as a matter of ordinary course.’ ” Stephens v.
Branker, 570 F.3d 198, 213 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 904
(1997)). To conduct discovery in a 2254 habeas proceeding, a petitioner “must provide reasons
for the request,” Rule 6(b), Rules Governing Sect. 2254 Proceedings, that establish “good
cause,” Rule 6(a), Rules Governing Sect. 2254 Proceedings. “A showing of good cause must
include specific allegations suggesting that the petitioner will be able to demonstrate that he is
entitled to habeas corpus relief.” Stephens, 570 F.3d at 204. Here, Petitioner has failed to set
forth good cause as to why discovery in any form is warranted. In these motions, Petitioner
seeks his mental health records “to show evidence as to what plea counsel would have
discovered had he investigated the medication the Petitioner was taking at the time of the plea.”

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(ECF No. 69 at 1).6 Although he has identified specific information he seeks to obtain, he has
not demonstrated that such discovery would result in him being entitled to habeas relief on his
claims. See Stephens, 570 F.3d at 213. Petitioner fails to demonstrate any meaningful likelihood
that if he were permitted to conduct the desired discovery and establish that he was simply on a
different medication, he could demonstrate entitlement to relief because the court is obligated to
review plea counsel’s performance as of the time of the plea. Accordingly, Petitioner’s motions
for discovery and for an extension so that he can conduct discovery regarding the medication he
was on at the time of the guilty plea are denied.
The court has thoroughly reviewed the Report, as well as the objections filed by the
parties, and finds no reason to deviate from the Report’s recommended disposition.
Accordingly, the court adopts the Report (ECF No. 61); and Respondent’s motion for summary
judgment (ECF No. 34) is GRANTED and Petitioner’s petition is DENIED. Additionally,
Petitioner’s Motions for Discovery and an Extension (ECF No. 69, 70, and 74) are DENIED.
Additionally, a certificate of appealability will not issue to a prisoner seeking habeas
relief absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.”

28 U.S.C. §

2253(c)(2). A prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find
both that his constitutional claims are debatable and that any dispositive procedural rulings by
the district court are also debatable or wrong. See Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336
(2003); Rose v. Lee, 252 F.3d 676, 683 (4th Cir. 2001). In this case, the court finds that the

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In his first motion for discovery, Petitioner also seeks copies of his memorandum in
opposition to Respondent’s Summary Judgment Motion. (ECF No. 69 at 1). Petitioner made this
request in a prior motion (ECF No. 65), and the court granted this request on February 10, 2017.
(ECF No. 67). Petitioner most likely had not received it before filing the instant motion.
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petitioner has failed to make a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.
Accordingly, the court declines to issue a certificate of appealability.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/Timothy M. Cain
United States District Judge
March 9, 2017
Anderson, South Carolina

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