Workman v. Vandermosten et al
ORDER RULING ON REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 18 . Defendants Greenville County Council and Greenville County Food and Mail Services are dismissed without prejudice and without issuance and service of process. Signed by Honorable R Bryan Harwell on 10/23/2017. (kric, )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
Olandio Ray Workman,
John Vandermosten, et al.,
Civil Action No.: 6:17-cv-00766-RBH-KFM
Plaintiff Olandio Ray Workman, a pretrial detainee proceeding pro se, has filed this action
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against eighteen defendants. See ECF Nos. 1 & 57. The matter is before
the Court for consideration of Plaintiff’s objections to the Report and Recommendation (“R & R”) of
United States Magistrate Judge Kevin F. McDonald, who recommends summarily dismissing
Defendants Greenville County Council and Greenville County Food and Mail Services.1 See ECF Nos.
18 & 22.
Standard of Review
The Magistrate Judge makes only a recommendation to the Court. The Magistrate Judge’s
recommendation has no presumptive weight, and the responsibility to make a final determination
remains with the Court. Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 270-71 (1976). The Court must conduct a
de novo review of those portions of the R & R to which specific objections are made, and it may accept,
reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge or recommit the
matter with instructions. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
The Magistrate Judge issued the R & R in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule
73.02(B)(2)(d) (D.S.C.). The Magistrate Judge authorized partial service of process on the other defendants. See
ECF No. 17.
The Court must engage in a de novo review of every portion of the Magistrate Judge’s report
to which objections have been filed. Id. However, the Court need not conduct a de novo review when
a party makes only “general and conclusory objections that do not direct the [C]ourt to a specific error
in the [M]agistrate [Judge]’s proposed findings and recommendations.” Orpiano v. Johnson, 687 F.2d
44, 47 (4th Cir. 1982). In the absence of specific objections to the R & R, the Court reviews only for
clear error, Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 315 (4th Cir. 2005), and the Court
need not give any explanation for adopting the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. Camby v. Davis,
718 F.2d 198, 199–200 (4th Cir. 1983).
Plaintiff is a pretrial detainee housed at the Greenville County Detention Center. He alleges
various claims relating to his conditions of confinement at that jail. The Magistrate Judge recommends
summarily dismissing Defendants Greenville County Council and Greenville County Food and Mail
Services because they are not “persons” within the meaning of § 1983.3 R & R at p. 4. Plaintiff objects
to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See ECF No. 22.
Greenville County Council
Initially, the Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that Greenville County Council is not a
proper defendant for purposes of § 1983. The Greenville County Council is the governing body for
Greenville County, consisting of individual council members who comprise the membership of the
Council, none of whom have been individually named as party defendants in this case. See Crouchman
The R & R summarizes the factual and procedural background of this case, as well as the applicable legal
Under § 1983, “the party charged with the deprivation m ust be a person who may fairly be said to be a state
actor.” Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982) (emphasis added).
v. Pickens Cty. Council, No. CV 9:16-0804-CMC-BM, 2017 WL 767185, at *9 (D.S.C. Feb. 3, 2017),
adopted by, 2017 WL 749393 (D.S.C. Feb. 27, 2017) (finding the Pickens County Council was not a
proper § 1983 defendant and explaining a “group of people or use of such collective terms to name a
§ 1983 defendant has been found improper and inadequate” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Hodges
v. Mayor & City Council of Annapolis, 2016 WL 4140954, at *3 (D. Md. Aug. 3, 2016) (recognizing
“a county council is not sui juris”). See also Dunbar v. Metts, No. CA 2:10-1775-HMH-BHH, 2011
WL 1480279, at *5 (D.S.C. Mar. 31, 2011), adopted by, 2011 WL 1480096 (D.S.C. Apr. 19, 2011)
(“Lexington City Council is not a ‘person’ and is not responsible for the alleged violations of Plaintiff’s
rights.”); Smith-Berch, Inc. v. Baltimore Cty., 68 F. Supp. 2d 602, 626–27 & n.1 (D. Md. 1999) (finding
the Baltimore County Council was not a “person” within the meaning of § 1983).
In his objections, Plaintiff indicates he is attempting to assert a municipal liability claim, as he
cites Monell v. Department of Social Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), and related
cases. See ECF No. 22 at pp. 1–2. Under Monell, “municipalities and other local government units”
(such as cities and counties) can be liable under § 1983 if an official policy or custom causes a
deprivation of constitutional rights. See 436 U.S. at 690–91. However, to the extent Plaintiff has
attempted to sue Greenville County, such a claim is foreclosed by the fact “that, under South Carolina
law, it is the Sheriff of the County who is responsible for the operation of county detention centers, not
the County.” Crouchman, 2017 WL 767185, at *9 (citing S.C. Code Ann. § 24–5–10). As such, the
sheriff of Greenville County—not Greenville County or its individual county council members—is
responsible for operating the Greenville County Detention Center.4 Plaintiff has made no allegations
Even if the Greenville County Sheriff had been appropriately named as a defendant, that office would be
protected under Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity from being sued in federal court. See generally Cromer
v. Brown, 88 F.3d 1315, 1332 (4th Cir. 1996).
calling into question the existence and applicability of this state law to his claims. See Cobb v. South
Carolina, No. 2:13-CV-02370-RMG, 2014 WL 4220423, at *2, 7 (D.S.C. Aug. 25, 2014) (summarizing
Fourth Circuit and South Carolina law holding that because the county has no control over the
operations or policy of the jail, it cannot be held liable for events that take place there). Accordingly,
the Court will dismiss Greenville County Council.
Greenville County Food and Mail Services
Like Greenville County Council, Greenville County Food and Mail Services is not a person
within the meaning of § 1983. See, e.g., Harden v. Green, 27 F. App’x 173, 178 (4th Cir. 2001) (“The
medical department of a prison may not be sued, because it is not a person within the meaning of
§ 1983.”); Nelson v. Lexington Cty. Det. Ctr., No. 8:10-CV-02988-JMC, 2011 WL 2066551, at *1
(D.S.C. May 26, 2011) (“Plaintiff has failed to establish that Food Service Supervisors, as a group of
people and not individuals, are amenable to suit under § 1983.”). Accordingly, the Court will dismiss
Greenville County Food and Mail Services.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court overrules Petitioner’s objections, adopts and incorporates
by reference the R & R [ECF No. 18], and DISMISSES Defendants Greenville County Council and
Greenville County Food and Mail Services without prejudice and without issuance and service of
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Florence, South Carolina
October 23, 2017
s/ R. Bryan Harwell
R. Bryan Harwell
United States District Judge
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