Sanford v. State of South Carolina

Filing 32

ORDER RULING ON REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 28 . The Court adopts the Magistrate Judges Report and Recommendation 28 . Accordingly, Respondents Motion for Summary Judgment 17 is granted. A certificate of Appealability is denied. Signed by Honorable Donald C Coggins, Jr on 3/6/2019. (kric, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
GREENVILLE DIVISION
Jason Sanford,

)
)
Petitioner,
)
)
v.
)
)
Warden Perry Correctional Institution, )
)
Respondent.
)
________________________________ )

Case No. 6:17-cv-03204-DCC

ORDER

Petitioner, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, is seeking habeas corpus relief
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. ECF No. 1. Respondent filed a Motion for Summary
Judgment and Return and Memorandum on March 9, 2018. ECF Nos. 17, 18. Petitioner
filed a Response in Opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment, and Respondent
filed a Reply. ECF Nos. 25, 27.
In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2), (D.S.C.),
this matter was referred to United States Magistrate Judge Kevin F. McDonald for pretrial proceedings and a Report and Recommendation (“Report”). On October 26, 2018,
the Magistrate Judge issued a Report recommending that the Motion for Summary
Judgment be granted and the Petition be denied. ECF No. 28. Petitioner filed objections
to the Report. ECF No. 30.

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APPLICABLE LAW

Standard of Review
The Magistrate Judge makes only a recommendation to this Court.

The

recommendation has no presumptive weight, and the responsibility to make a final
determination remains with the Court. See Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261 (1976). The
Court is charged with making a de novo determination of any portion of the Report of the
Magistrate Judge to which a specific objection is made. The Court may accept, reject, or
modify, in whole or in part, the recommendation made by the Magistrate Judge or
recommit the matter to the Magistrate Judge with instructions. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b).
The Court will review the Report only for clear error in the absence of an objection. See
Diamond v. Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 315 (4th Cir. 2005) (stating
that “in the absence of timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo
review, but instead must only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the
record in order to accept the recommendation.” (citation omitted)).

Habeas Corpus
Petitioner’s claims are governed by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), which provides that his
petition cannot be granted unless the claims “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary
to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that
was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence
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presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). “[A] federal habeas court
may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment
that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously
or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable.” Williams v. Taylor,
529 U.S. 362, 411 (2000). Importantly, “a determination of a factual issue made by a
State court shall be presumed to be correct,” and Petitioner has “the burden of rebutting
the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.”

28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(e)(1).

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Where allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel are made, the question is
“whether counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial
process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.” Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984). First, a petitioner must show that counsel made
errors so serious that counsel’s performance was below the objective standard of
reasonableness guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. Id. at 687–88. Second, the
petitioner must show that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694.
“The standards created by Strickland and § 2254(d) are both highly deferential . . . and
when the two apply in tandem, review is ‘doubly’ so.” Harrington v. Richter, 562U.S. 86,
105 (2011). In applying § 2254(d), “the question is not whether counsel’s actions were
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reasonable. The question is whether there is any reasonable argument that counsel
satisfied Strickland’s deferential standard.” Id.
In the specific context of a guilty plea, to satisfy the prejudice prong of Strickland,
a prisoner must show that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors,
[the prisoner] would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.”
Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985). The Supreme Court further explained,
In many guilty plea cases, the “prejudice” inquiry will closely
resemble the inquiry engaged in by courts reviewing
ineffective-assistance challenges to convictions obtained
through a trial. For example, where the alleged error of
counsel is a failure to investigate or discover potentially
exculpatory evidence, the determination whether the error
“prejudiced” the defendant by causing him to plead guilty
rather than go to trial will depend on the likelihood that
discovery of the evidence would have led counsel to change
his recommendation as to the plea. This assessment, in turn,
will depend in large part on a prediction whether the evidence
likely would have changed the outcome of a trial . . . . As we
explained in Strickland v. Washington, supra, these
predictions of the outcome at a possible trial, where
necessary, should be made objectively, without regard for the
“idiosyncrasies of the particular decisionmaker.” Id., 466 U.S.,
at 695.
Hill, 474 U.S. at 59–60.
DISCUSSION
Petitioner raised four grounds in his Petition. Petitioner states that he does not
object to the Magistrate Judge's recommendation with respect to Grounds Two, Three,
and Four. ECF No. 30 at 1. The Court has reviewed this portion of the Report for clear
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error and agrees with the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge that these grounds
are procedurally barred from federal habeas review. Petitioner objects to the Magistrate
Judge’s recommendation with respect to Ground One. The Magistrate Judge provided a
thorough recitation of the procedural history and the relevant law, including the summary
judgment standard and the habeas corpus standard of review, which the Court
incorporates into this Order by reference.

Ground One
In Ground One, Petitioner asserts that plea counsel was ineffective for failing to
adequately advise him on the murder conviction. ECF No. 1 at 5. Specifically, he argues
that plea counsel was ineffective for failing to advise Petitioner that any sentence for
murder had to be served day-for-day. The Magistrate Judge addressed the merits of this
claim and determined that Petitioner failed to establish that the post-conviction relief
(“PCR”) court’s denial of his ineffective assistance of counsel claim was either contrary to
or an unreasonable application of applicable Supreme Court precedent.
Petitioner contends that his parole eligibility was not a collateral matter;
accordingly, plea counsel was obligated to inform him of this critical aspect of the plea.
ECF No. 30 at 2. He asserts that PCR court’s order is contrary to the Supreme Court’s
decision in Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010). The Court disagrees.
The Padilla Court determined that counsel has an affirmative duty to advise a
criminal defendant about possible ramifications of a guilty plea could have on his
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immigration status.

The Supreme Court recognized that the threat of deportation is

unique and explicitly limited their holding to that circumstance. Moreover, as referenced
by the Magistrate Judge, the Supreme Court of South Carolina has found that parole
eligibility is “[n]ormally . . . a collateral consequence of sentencing of which a defendant
need not be specifically advised before entering a guilty plea.”1 Griffin v. Martin, 300
S.E.2d 482, 482–83. (S.C. 1983).
Here, plea counsel testified that it was not his practice to advise clients regarding
parole eligibility, and Petitioner has not provided any evidence to the contrary.2 App. 92.
Thus, Petitioner fails to identify any applicable Supreme Court precedent that would
entitle him to federal habeas relief. Moreover, after a de novo review of the record,
applicable law, and the Report, the Court finds that the Magistrate Judge accurately
applied the relevant law to Petitioner’s claim.
Petitioner further argues that he was prejudiced by counsel’s ineffective
representation because he would not have not have pled guilty if he had known that he

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The Court notes that the Fourth Circuit, among other circuit courts, has found that
affirmative misadvice concerning nonimmigration consequences of a conviction can
constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. See, e.g., Strader v. Garrison, 611 F.2d 61,
65 (4th Cir. 1979), overruled on other grounds by O'Dell v. Netherland, 95 F.3d 1214,
1222–23 (4th Cir. 1996) (“[T]hough parole eligibility dates are collateral consequences of
the entry of a guilty plea of which a defendant need not be informed if he does not inquire,
when he is grossly misinformed about it by his lawyer, and relies upon that misinformation,
he is deprived of his constitutional right to counsel”).
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At his PCR hearing, Petitioner testified that he did not ask his plea counsel about
parole eligibility. App. 71.
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would be ineligible for parole. ECF No. 30 at 5. The PCR court found Petitioner’s
testimony that he would not have pled guilty if he had been advised of parole eligibility to
be “dubious and unavailing.” App. 106. The Magistrate Judge also notes that the PCR
court found Petitioner’s testimony to be lacking in credibility and found plea counsel
provided credible and convincing testimony. Id. This finding is entitled to deference which
Petitioner has not overcome. See Cagle v. Branker, 520 F.3d 320, 324 (4th Cir. 2008)
(“[F]or a federal habeas court to overturn a state court's credibility judgments, the state
court's error must be stark and clear.” (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1))); see also Marshall
v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 434 (“28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) gives federal habeas courts no
license to redetermine credibility of witnesses whose demeanor has been observed by
the state trial court, but not by them”).
The PCR court’s denial of the Petitioner’s ineffective assistance claim was neither
contrary to nor an unreasonable application of applicable Supreme Court precedent.
First, the PCR court applied the Strickland standard, which is the applicable Supreme
Court precedent. See App. 100. Second, the record fails to demonstrate the PCR court
confronted a set of facts that were materially indistinguishable from those considered in
a decision of the Supreme Court but arrived at a result different from the Supreme Court
precedent. Accordingly, Petitioner’s objections are overruled.

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CONCLUSION
The Court adopts and incorporates the Magistrate Judge’s Report and
Recommendation [28]. Accordingly, Respondent’s Motion for Summary Judgment [17] is
GRANTED.
CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
The governing law provides that:
(c) (2) A certificate of appealability may issue . . . only if the
applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a
constitutional right.
(c) (3) The certificate of appealability . . . shall indicate which
specific issue or issues satisfy the showing required by
paragraph (2).
28 U.S.C. § 2253(c). A prisoner satisfies the standard by demonstrating that reasonable
jurists would find this Court’s assessment of his constitutional claims debatable or wrong
and that any dispositive procedural ruling by the district court is likewise debatable. See
Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484
(2000); Rose v. Lee, 252 F.3d 676, 683 (4th Cir. 2001). In this case, the legal standard
for the issuance of a certificate of appealability has not been met. Therefore, a certificate
of appealability is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/ Donald C. Coggins, Jr.
United States District Judge
March 6, 2019
Spartanburg, South Carolina
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NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL
The parties are hereby notified of the right to appeal this order pursuant to Rules 3 and 4
of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.

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