Sanders et al v. McMaster et al

Filing 202

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION recommending 186 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Trey Gowdy and 187 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Mark Kitchens be granted. Objections to R&R due by 4/16/2009. Signed by Magistrate Judge William M Catoe on 3/30/09. (Attachments: # 1 Objection notice)(ladd, )

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES F O R THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA G R E E N V IL L E DIVISION

L a u n e il Sanders and J a n n e th Sanders,

vs. H e n r y McMaster, et al.,

) ) ) Plaintiffs, ) ) ) ) ) ) Defendants. ) )

Civil Action No. 6:07-3510-GRA-W M C REPORT OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE

T h is matter is before the court on the motions for summary judgment of d e f e n d a n ts Trey Gowdy and Mark Kitchens. The plaintiffs, Launeil and Janneth Sanders, w h o are proceeding pro se, brought this action under Title 42, United States Code, Section 1 9 8 3 , complaining that they have attempted to obtain relief in South Carolina state courts but h a ve been denied relief because of a racist court system. The dispute apparently started w h e n they failed to pay a carpenter who worked on their house and a mechanic's lien arose, re s u ltin g in their home being sold at auction. They ask, among other relief, that the decision in the state court action be reversed and remanded back to Circuit Judge Joseph Derham C o le 's court for a jury trial (comp. 15), and that a temporary restraining order ("TRO") be g ra n te d barring opposing parties from acting. On March 26, 2008, the Honorable G. Ross A n d e rs o n , Jr. adopted this court's recommendation and denied the plaintiff's motion for TRO. J u d g e Anderson has also adopted this court's recommendations and granted the motions to dismiss of defendants David Alford, Henry McMaster, and David Ingalls. P u rs u a n t to the provisions of Title 28, United States Code, Section 636(b)(1)(A) a n d Local Civil Rule 73.02)(B)(2)(e) D.S.C., all pretrial m a t te rs in cases involving pro se litig a n ts are referred to a United States Magistrate Judge for consideration. D e f e n d a n ts Gowdy and Kitchen both filed motions for summary judgment on J a n u a ry 30, 2009. By order filed February 2, 2009, pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528

F .2 d 309 (4 th Cir. 1975), the plaintiffs were advised of the summary judgment dismissal p ro c e d u re and the possible consequences if they failed to adequately respond to the m o tio n s . On February 6, 2009, the plaintiffs filed their responses in opposition to the motions f o r summary judgment. T h e chronology of the underlying state case is set forth in the order of G o rd o n G. Cooper, Master-in-Equity for Spartanburg County, dated December 13, 2007, w h ic h was attached to the plaintiffs' previous motions for contempt: T h e Court issued its Order August 10, 2005, foreclosing the m e c h a n ic 's lien of the Plaintiff [the carpenter]. The Defendants [th e plaintiffs in this case] timely filed their appeal and posted a b o n d of . . . $6435.78. The Court withdrew the property from s a le . The Defendants' appeal was denied by the Court of A p p e a ls on December 20, 2006; whereupon the Defendants f ile d for a W rit of Certiorari to the South Carolina Supreme C o u rt. The Supreme Court denied their request by Order dated O c to b e r 18, 2007. A lth o u g h the Defendants have since filed companion civil a c tio n s in the federal system, there is no Order binding on this C o u rt which prohibits or delays the disbursement of the funds h e ld by the Court. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED t h a t the court finds that it has the jurisdiction of the funds and p a r t ie s to the action. Further that the Plaintiff is entitled to his ju d g m e n t amount of . . . $3217.89, plus interest of . . . $889.34 a t . . . 12% since the date of the Order, and additional costs in t h e amount of . . . $160.61 for a total of . . . $4267.84. Judge Cooper ordered that $4,267.84 be paid to the plaintiff's attorney, and the balance be re tu rn e d to Launeil and Janneth Sanders.

AP P L I C AB L E LAW AND ANALYSIS F e d e ra l Rule of Civil Procedure 56 states, as to a party who has m o v e d for s u m m a r y judgment: T h e judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the p le a d in g s , depositions, answers to interrogatories, and

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a d m is s io n s on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that th e re is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the m o v in g party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. A c c o rd in g ly, to prevail on a motion for summary judgment, the movant must d e m o n s tr a te that: (1) there is no genuine issue as to any material fact; and (2) that he is e n t it le d to summary judgment as a matter of law. As to the first of these determinations, a f a c t is deemed "material" if proof of its existence or nonexistence would affect the disposition o f the case under the applicable law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (19 8 6 ). An issue of material fact is "genuine" if the evidence offered is such that a

r e a s o n a b le jury might return a verdict for the non-movant. Id. at 257. In determining whether a genuine issue has been raised, the court must construe all inferences and ambiguities a g a in s t the movant and in favor of the non-moving party. United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U . S . 654, 655 (1962). T h e party seeking summary judgment shoulders the initial burden of d e m o n s t ra t in g to the district court that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Celotex C o r p . v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Once the movant has made this threshold d e m o n s tra tio n , the non-moving party, to survive the motion for summary judgment, may not re s t on the allegations averred in his pleadings; rather, he must demonstrate that specific, m a t e r ia l facts exist which give rise to a genuine issue. Id. at 324. Under this standard, the e x is t e n c e of a mere scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's position is insufficient to w it h s t a n d the summary judgment motion. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. Likewise, conclusory a lle g a t io n s or denials, without more, are insufficient to preclude the granting of the summary ju d g m e n t motion. Ross v. Communications Satellite Corp., 759 F.2d 355, 365 (4 th Cir. 1985), o v e r ru le d on other grounds, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). "Only disputes over facts that might affect t h e outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary ju d g m e n t. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted."

A n d e r s o n , 477 U.S. at 248. Accordingly, when Rule 56(e) has shifted the burden of proof

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to the non-movant, he must provide existence of every element essential to his action which h e bears the burden of adducing at a trial on the merits.

T r e y Gowdy's Motion for Summary Judgment D e f e n d a n t Gowdy is the Solicitor for the Seventh Judicial Circuit of South C a r o l in a . The complaint contains a reference to defendant Gowdy, as "a triple corrupt 7th S o lic ito r" and a request in the prayer for relief that the court delegate some punishment for th e failure of defendant Gowdy to perform his oath via the South Carolina Constitution and th e United States Constitution (comp. 2, 17-18). However, the complaint does not contain a n y factual allegations to support the reference that defendant Gowdy was corrupt or that he f a ile d to perform his oath. D e f e n d a n t Gowdy argues that he should be dismissed from this action as it is w e ll established that a prosecutor or solicitor is absolutely immune from actions taken in the p r o s e c u t o r ia l decision-making process in initiating or continuing a criminal prosecution. See Im b le r v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431 (1976); see also Springmen v. Williams, 122 F.3d 2 1 1 , 213 (4 th Cir. 1997). "In Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 96 S.Ct. 984 (1976), the S u p re m e Court held that a prosecutor enjoys absolute immunity from suit for conduct `in in it ia t in g and in presenting the State's case.'" Springmen, 122 F.3d at 213 (quoting Imbler, 4 2 4 U.S. at 431). In their response to the motion for summary judgment, the plaintiffs contend th a t Gowdy failed "to investigate misconduct by Officers of the Spartanburg Court" (pl. resp. m . to dismiss at 7). It is clear that the only allegations the plaintiffs present against

d e f e n d a n t Gowdy are founded in this defendant's alleged actions, or in this case alleged in a c tio n , in the prosecutorial decision-making process. Based upon the foregoing, defendant G o w d y is entitled to prosecutorial immunity, and his motion for summary judgment should b e granted.

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M a r c Kitchens' Motion for Summary Judgment D e f e n d a n t Kitchens is the Clerk of Court for Spartanburg County. In their c o m p la in t, the plaintiffs allege that defendant Kitchens executed an Order of Reference on S e p t e m b e r 29, 2004, referring the state court action to the Master-In-Equity for Spartanburg C o u n ty (comp. 7). This is the only factual allegation made against defendant Kitchens in the c o m p la in t. The plaintiffs allege that such action by defendant Kitchens constituted criminal ra c k e te e rin g and criminal forgery and that he was "triple corrupt" (comp. 3). It appears from th e plaintiffs' prayer for relief that they seek only money damages from this defendant (comp. 1 9 ). A c c o r d in g to Kitchens' affidavit, the case of Brian Lancaster, d/b/a Lancaster C o n s tru c tio n s vs. Launeil Sanders, Janneth E. Sanders and Founders Federal Credit Union w a s filed in the Spartanburg County Clerk of Court's Office. As the action was one brought t o foreclose a mechanic's lien concerning real property located in Spartanburg County, South C a ro lin a , Kitchens testified that he was authorized pursuant to South Carolina Rule of Civil P r o c e d u r e 53 to sign an order referring the case to the Master-in-Equity for Spartanburg C o u n t y, which he did on September 29, 2004 (Kitchens aff.). D e f e n d a n t Kitchens argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity as his c o n d u c t did not violate any clearly-established constitutional or statutory rights of which a r e a s o n a b le person should have known. This court agrees. Qualified immunity protects g o ve rn m e n t officials performing discretionary functions from civil damage suits as long as th e conduct in question does not "violate clearly established rights of which a reasonable p e r s o n would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). This qualified im m u n ity is lost if an official violates a constitutional or statutory right of the plaintiff that was c le a rly established at the time of the alleged violation so that an objectively reasonable o f f ic ia l in the defendant's position would have known of it. Id.

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In addressing qualified immunity, the United States Supreme Court has held th a t "a court must first determine whether the plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of an actual c o n s titu tio n a l right at all and, if so, proceed to determine whether that right was clearly e s t a b lis h e d at the time of the alleged violation." Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999); s e e also Suarez Corp. Indus. v. McGraw, 202 F.3d 676, 685 (4 th Cir. 2000). Further, the S u p re m e Court held that "[d]eciding the constitutional question before addressing the q u a lif i e d immunity question also promotes clarity in the legal standards for official conduct, t o the benefit of both the officers and the general public." Wilson, 526 U.S. at 609. If the c o u r t first determines that no right has been violated, the inquiry ends there "because g o v e r n m e n t officials cannot have known of a right that does not exist." Porterfield v. Lott, 1 5 6 F.3d 563, 567 (4 th Cir. 1998). The plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that this

d e f e n d a n t violated any of their constitutional rights. The only action defendant Kitchens a lle g e d ly performed was to sign an order of reference to the Master-in-Equity, an action s p e c if ic a lly authorized by South Carolina Rule of Civil Procedure 53(b). Therefore, the d e f e n d a n t is entitled to qualified immunity. Based upon the foregoing, defendant Kitchens' m o tio n for summary judgment should be granted.

C O N C L U S IO N AND RECOMMENDATION W h e re f o re , based upon the foregoing, this court recommends that the motions f o r summary judgment filed by defendant Gowdy (doc. 186) and defendant Kitchens (doc. 1 8 7 ) be granted. IT IS SO ORDERED.

M a rc h 30, 2009 G re e n v ille , South Carolina

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