Turner v. Taylor et al
Filing
69
ORDER granting 52 Motion for Summary Judgment as set out. Signed by Honorable J Michelle Childs on 8/26/11.(awil)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
SPARTANBURG DIVISION
Britney Nicole Turner,
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
)
Sheriff David Taylor, Union
)
County, James Owens and the
)
City of Jonesville,
)
)
Defendants.
)
___________________________________ )
C.A. No. 7:09-cv-02858-JMC
ORDER AND OPINION
This matter is before the court on Defendants Union County (“Union County”) and
Union County Sheriff David Taylor’s (“Taylor”) (collectively “Defendants”) Motion for
Summary Judgment [Doc. 52].1 Based on the record before this court, Defendants’ motion is
granted.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On the evening of May 20, 2009, Officer James Owens (“Owens”), a patrol officer
employed by the Town of Jonesville Police Department, observed Plaintiff Britney Nicole
Turner (“Plaintiff”) driving her car, along with her passenger Frances Louise Zelarno
(“Zelarno”), with one of its front headlights out and initiated a traffic stop.2 [Doc. 48-2, at p. 19,
ll. 14-16]; [Doc. 48-2, at p. 20, ll. 3-11]; [Doc. 48-3, at p. 8, ll. 1-12]. Plaintiff admitted that she
had been stopped on four prior consecutive days for driving without a headlight. [Doc. 48-2, at
1
Although
this case’s caption includes the “City of Jonesville” as a Defendant, in its Motion for
Summary Judgment [Doc. 48] the Defendant refers to itself as the “Town of Jonesville.”
2
Frances Louise Zelarno has filed a companion case to the instant action. See Frances Louise
Zelarno v. Sheriff David Taylor, Union County, James Owens and the City of Jonesville, C.A.
No. 7:09-cv-02860-JMC.
1
p. 15, l. 15 – p. 17, l. 2]; [Doc. 48-4, at p. 20, l. 15 – p. 21, l. 2]; [Doc. 48-5, at p. 31, ll. 17-20].
However, Plaintiff did not fix her headlight, and it remained broken on May 20, 2009, when she
and Zelarno left Plaintiff’s home. [Doc. 48-3, at p. 7, l. 16 – p. 8, l. 12]. Plaintiff admitted that
she knew it was against the law to drive without a headlight and that she had no problem being
stopped yet again. [Doc. 48-3, at p. 8, ll. 13-18]; [Doc. 48-3, at p. 9, ll. 6-8]; [Doc. 48-3, at p. 49,
ll. 18-22]. Just before pulling Plaintiff over, Owens saw Zelarno throw a cigarette out of the car
window. [Doc. 48-4, at p. 23, ll. 6-15].
Plaintiff and Zelarno admit that Owens advised Plaintiff that he smelled alcohol coming
from the car. [Doc. 48-2, at p. 24, ll. 18-21]; [Doc. 48-4, at p. 24, ll. 15-18]. Both Plaintiff and
Zelarno admit that Plaintiff consented to a search of her vehicle upon request by Owens. [Doc.
48-2, at p. 24, ll. 18-21]; [Doc. 48-4, at p. 24, ll. 15-18]. After consent, Owens searched the
vehicle and then used his police dog to sniff the vehicle for drugs. [Doc. 48-2, at p. 25, ll. 1-12];
[Doc. 48-3, at p. 18, ll. 2-24]; [Doc. 48-3, at p. 20, ll. 12-18]; [Doc. 48-4, at p. 26, ll. 1-24]; [Doc.
48-5, at p. 27, ll. 3-20]. Zelarno testified that Owens showed Plaintiff some marijuana stems and
seeds he found in the car. [Doc. 48-4, at p. 29, l. 21 – p. 30, l. 22]; [Doc. 48-5, at p. 25, l. 14 – p.
26, l. 3].3
When Owens called for back-up, a deputy employed by the Union County Sheriff’s
Office responded. [Doc. 48-2, at p. 26, ll. 16-19]; [Doc. 48-3, at p. 23, ll. 10-14]; [Doc. 48-4, at
3
Plaintiff admitted that she smoked marijuana once a month but was not smoking often at the
time of this incident. [Doc. 48-3, at p. 4, ll. 19-23]; [Doc. 48-5, at p. 19, l. 24 – p. 20, l. 12].
Zelarno admitted being a “pothead” and smoking six “blunts” a day. [Doc. 48-5, at p. 19, ll. 2-6].
Zelarno also admitted selling marijuana. [Doc. 48-5, at p. 19, ll. 17-23]. Despite this, both denied
smoking marijuana on May 20, 2009, before their evening excursion. [Doc. 48-2, at p. 21, ll. 4-7,
ll. 18-25]; [Doc. 48-2, at p. 22, ll. 1-7, ll. 12-14]; [Doc. 48-4, at p. 21, ll. 19-21]; [Doc. 48-5, at p.
37, ll. 9-12].
2
p. 28, ll. 16-23]. The officer assisted in a search of the vehicle. [Doc. 48-2, at p. 26, ll. 21-24];
[Doc. 48-4, at p. 28, ll. 20-23]. Owens, apparently believing that Plaintiff or Zelarno may have
hidden drugs on their bodies, requested that a female officer come to the scene to conduct a
search of Plaintiff and Zelarno. [Doc. 48-2, at p. 26, l. 25 – p. 27, l. 4]; [Doc. 48-4, at p. 29, ll. 420].
A female detention officer employed by the Union County Sheriff’s office responded.
[Doc. 48-2, at p. 27, l. 25 – p. 28, l. 9]; [Doc. 48-4, at p. 29, ll. 4-20]. She took Plaintiff to the
side of her patrol car away from the road and searched her in between the open passenger’s side
door and rear door. [Doc. 48-2, at p. 27, ll. 21-23]; [Doc. 48-2, at p. 29, ll. 9-23]; [Doc. 48-4, at
p. 31, l. 2 – p. 32, l. 7]. She conducted searches of Plaintiff by asking her to hold out and shake
her bra, unhook her bra, pull down her panties, cough, squat, and bounce. [Doc. 48-2, at p. 27, l.
25 – p. 28, l. 8]; [Doc. 48-2, at p. 29, ll. 9-23]; [Doc. 48-3, at p. 24, l. 24 – p. 25, l. 12]; [Doc. 484, at p. 31, ll. 13-24]; [Doc. 48-4, at p. 34, l. 16 – p. 35, l. 1]. The record neither reveals nor does
Plaintiff point to evidence that the male officers or other individuals could observe this search
conducted behind the patrol car. Zelarno was searched by the female officer in the same manner.
[Doc. 48-2, at p. 36, ll. 17-22 – p. 37, ll. 18-24]; [Doc. 48-3, at p. 29, ll. 6-16]; [Doc. 48-4, at p.
37, l. 11 – p. 38, l. 15]. The officers found no drugs.
Owens gave Plaintiff a warning for the headlight and gave Zelarno a ticket for throwing a
cigarette out of Plaintiff’s car. [Doc. 48-2, at p. 35, l. 22 – p. 36, l. 14]; [Doc. 48-4, at p. 41, ll.
14-18].
When Plaintiff’s car would not start, Owens assisted in jumpstarting her vehicle.
Thereafter, Plaintiff and Zelarno left the scene. [Doc. 48-2, at p. 35, ll. 6-21]; [Doc. 48-4, at p.
41, l. 19 – p. 42, l. 12].
3
After the stop, Plaintiff and Zelarno went to a nearby convenience store. [Doc. 48-2, at p.
38, ll. 15-17]; [Doc. 48-2, at p. 40, ll. 1-18]; [Doc. 48-4, at p. 43, l. 12 – p. 44, l. 6]. Owens came
to the store and approached Plaintiff and Zelarno with a half of a marijuana cigarette indicating
that he had found it under his car after they left. [Doc. 48-2, at p. 40, l. 20 – p. 41, l. 14]; [Doc.
48-4, at p. 44, l. 11 – p. 45, l. 6]. Plaintiff and Zelarno denied that the marijuana was theirs.
[Doc. 48-2, at p. 41, ll. 18-23]; [Doc. 48-5, at p. 2, l. 6].
Plaintiff filed her Complaint on November 2, 2009, naming Union County and Taylor as
Defendants. [Doc. 1]. Defendants filed their Answer [Doc. 34] on February 18, 2010, and the
instant Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 52] on September 8, 2010.
LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that “there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). To prevail on a motion for summary judgment, the movant must
demonstrate that: (1) there is no genuine issue as to any material fact; and (2) that he is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law. In determining whether a genuine issue has been raised, the
court must construe all inferences and ambiguities against the movant and in favor of the nonmoving party. See United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962).
The party seeking summary judgment shoulders the initial burden of demonstrating to the
district court that there is no genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Once the movant has made this threshold demonstration, the non-moving
party, to survive the motion for summary judgment, may not rest on the allegations averred in his
pleadings. Rather, the non-moving party must demonstrate that specific, material facts exist
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which give rise to a genuine issue. See id. at 324. Under this standard, the existence of a mere
scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff’s position is insufficient to withstand the summary
judgment motion. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986). Likewise,
conclusory allegations or denials, without more, are insufficient to preclude the granting of the
summary judgment motion. See Ross v. Commc’ns Satellite Corp., 759 F.2d 355, 365 (4th Cir.
1985). “Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing
law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or
unnecessary will not be counted.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.
I.
Union County’s Liability
Union County asserts that summary judgment is appropriate because Plaintiff’s
allegations against it assume an employer/employee relationship. According to Union County,
no such relationship exists between Union County and its sheriff and deputy sheriffs. Plaintiff
argues that Union County is a proper defendant because Union County employs Taylor and his
deputies. Plaintiff also argues that Union County is a proper defendant because Taylor exercised
administrative control over the Union County Detention Center and as such steps out of his role
as sheriff and instead becomes a warden, which according to Plaintiff is an unelected position
that gives rise to Union County’s liability. The essence of Plaintiff’s argument is that Union
County is liable because of the alleged master/servant relationship that exists between it and
Taylor.
In South Carolina, “[t]he decisive test in determining whether the relationship of master
and servant exists is whether the purported master has the right or power to direct and control the
servant in the performance of his work and the manner in which the work is done.” Jamison v.
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Morris, 385 S.C. 215, 221, 684 S.E.2d 168, 171 (2009); see also McConnell v. Adams, 829 F.2d
1319, 1328 (4th Cir. 1987). Furthermore, according to the South Carolina Supreme Court,
(1) [T]he South Carolina constitution establishes the office of the sheriff and the
term of office. S.C. Const. art. V, § 24; (2) the duties and compensation of
sheriffs and deputies are set forth by the General Assembly; (3) their arrest
powers are related to state offenses; and (4) the Governor of South Carolina has
the authority to remove a sheriff for misconduct and fill the vacancy. Based upon
these factors, the court [in Gulledge] found that the State has the ‘potential power
of control’ over the office of sheriff, qualifying the sheriff as a state official.
Moreover, a deputy, as an agent of the sheriff, is also ‘more closely connected to
the state than to the county,’ hence a state official.
Cone v. Nettles, 308 S.C. 109, 112, 417 S.E.2d 523, 525 (1992) (quoting Gulledge v. Smart, 691
F. Supp. 947 (D.S.C. 1998)), aff’d, 878 F.2d 379 (4th Cir. 1989). Because sheriffs and deputy
sheriffs are state – not county – officials, Union County cannot be liable for Taylor’s alleged
harms to Plaintiff because it lacks the control over Taylor and his deputies necessary to establish
an employee/employer relationship. Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court has clearly
held that a governmental entity may not be held liable for the acts of its employees under a
respondeat superior theory because of the employment relationship. See Monell v. Department of
Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment
is granted with respect to all of Plaintiff’s claims against Union County.
II.
Sheriff Taylor’s Eleventh Amendment Immunity
Taylor contends that summary judgment is appropriate because as a state official he is
entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. Plaintiff has sued Taylor in his official capacity, and
her Amended Complaint alleges that Taylor “control[led] certain deputies under his supervision .
. . .” [Doc. 34, at 1, ¶¶ 3]. Plaintiff has not alleged that Taylor was personally involved in the
instant facts, and Taylor himself states in his Affidavit that “[he] was not personally involved
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with the stop or search of [Plaintiff] or Frances Zelarno” and that “[he] was not aware of this
incident until some time after it was over.” [Doc. 52-2, at 2, ¶ 3].
Under the Eleventh Amendment, states are immune from suit in federal court unless they
have, “by the most express language or by such overwhelming implications from the text as will
leave no room for any other reasonable construction[,]” waived its sovereign immunity.
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662-63, 673 (1999); see also Gulledge v. Smart, 691 F. Supp.
947, 954 (D.S.C. 1988). “In addition, an action against a public official in his official capacity is
beyond the jurisdiction of a federal court if that official is deemed to be an agent of the state.”
Gulledge, 691 F. Supp. at 954 (citing McConnell v. Adams, 829 F.2d 1319 (4th Cir. 1987)). This
court has held that under South Carolina law sheriffs and deputy sheriffs are agents of the state
and not of the counties: “[i]t is well-established in this state that a sheriff’s office is an agency
of, and a sheriff ‘dominated by,’ the state, such that a suit against the sheriff in his official
capacity is a suit against the State.” Carroll v. Greenville Cty. Sheriff’s Dept., 871 F. Supp. 844,
846 (D.S.C. 1994) (quoting Gulledge, 691 F. Supp. at 955). Similarly, “South Carolina’s county
governing bodies ‘have no measurable control over the appointment, discharge, . . ., duties, or
policies of the [sheriff and his deputies].” Id. at 955 (quoting McConnell, 829 F.2d at 1327); see
also McCall v. Williams, 52 F. Supp. 2d 611, 615 (D.S.C. May 19, 1999) (“As an arm of the
State, a deputy sheriff is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity from civil damages suits in
federal court, unless the state expressly waived this immunity.”)
South Carolina has not
expressly waived immunity nor has it consented to suit in federal court. Instead, South Carolina
has expressly preserved Eleventh Amendment immunity in the South Carolina Tort Claims Act.
See S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-20(e) (“Nothing in this chapter is construed as a waiver of the state's
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or political subdivision's immunity from suit in federal court under the Eleventh Amendment to
the Constitution of the United States . . . .”).
Similar to the argument that Plaintiff made with respect to Union County’s alleged
liability, see supra section I.¸ Plaintiff argues that Taylor is not entitled to Eleventh Amendment
immunity because in addition to serving as Union County Sheriff he also serves as the Warden
for the Union County Detention Center and also because the female officer who was at the scene
of the stop and who actually conducted the strip search was his employee. 4 The court is not
persuaded by Plaintiff’s arguments.
First, as Taylor attests in his affidavit, he is “as Sheriff . . . in charge of the jail.” [Doc.
52-2, at p. 2, ¶ 2] (emphasis added). As for his employee, Taylor states that “[t]he female
officer, who was sent to the scene at the request of the Jonesville Police Department, was a
correctional officer employee of the Sheriff’s Department.” [Doc. 52-2, at p. 2, ¶ 2]. Plaintiff
has pointed to no South Carolina law that holds that a sheriff who also administers a jail is not
necessarily serving in his official position as sheriff. Moreover, the court notes that in her
Amended Complaint, Plaintiff has sued Taylor as the “duly elected Sheriff of the County of
Union, State of South Carolina and was so at all times hereinafter mentioned and did control
certain deputies under his supervision as mentioned herein.” [Doc. 34, at p. 1, ¶2]. Thus,
Plaintiff’s allegation reveals that Plaintiff sued Taylor in his capacity as a sheriff and not in his
capacity as a warden or administrator of the county jail. And the instant facts reveal that at no
point during the traffic stop was Plaintiff placed under arrest or even incarcerated in a Union
County facility.
For these reasons, Plaintiff’s attempt to overcome Taylor’s Eleventh
Amendment immunity by asserting that Taylor is not an officer of the state when serving in his
4
The female officer who conducted the strip search at the scene of the traffic stop is not named
as a party to this suit.
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capacity as administrator of the Union County jail is unpersuasive. Taylor is therefore entitled to
Eleventh Amendment immunity, and the court need not address the merits of Plaintiff’s
remaining claims against him. Accordingly, Taylor’s Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 52]
is granted.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.
[Doc. 52].
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/J. Michelle Childs
United States District Judge
August 26, 2011
Greenville, South Carolina
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