Landrum v. Spartanburg County Sheriff's Department et al

Filing 32

ORDER granting 24 Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Spartanburg County and Sheriff Chuck Wright on the Third, Fourth, Fifth and Sixth causes of action. Signed by Honorable J Michelle Childs on 8/18/11.(awil)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
GREENVILLE DIVISION

Diane Landrum, in her capacity as
Personal Representative of the
Estate of Aaron Clark Gray,

)
)
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
)
Spartanburg County, Chuck Wright,
)
Christopher Raymond, and Glen Stuart,
)
in their individual capacities,
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)
Defendants.
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___________________________________ )

C.A. No. 7:10-cv-00007-JMC
OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the court on Defendants‟ Spartanburg County (the “County”) and
Spartanburg County Sheriff Chuck Wright‟s (“Wright”) Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc.
24] on Plaintiff Diane Landrum‟s (“Landrum”) Amended Complaint [Doc. 6], pursuant to Rule
56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff filed no response to these Defendants‟
Motion for Summary Judgment.
For the reasons set forth below, the court grants Defendants‟ (the County and Wright)
Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff‟s Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth causes of action.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This case arises out of a drug bust organized and conducted by the Spartanburg County
Sheriff‟s Department on February 10, 2005. On February 7, 2005, the Spartanburg County
Sheriff‟s Office Narcotics Unit received information that Aaron Clark Gray (“Gray”) was
distributing crack cocaine in the Spartanburg area, and the Narcotics Unit purchased $400.00

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worth of crack cocaine using an undercover operative. The informant maintained contact with
Gray throughout the week with the intention of making a second purchase from Gray.
On February 10, 2005, the Narcotics Unit arranged to purchase $1,600.00 worth of
cocaine from Gray at a residence located on Overhill Circle in Spartanburg County. After the
purchase was completed by the informant, Defendant Glen Stuart (“Stuart”) and Defendant
Christopher Raymond (“Raymond”) remained in the vicinity to obtain a description of the
residence for the purposes of obtaining a search warrant. As Stuart and Raymond drove by the
residence in an unmarked vehicle, they observed a car leaving which Raymond recognized as
Gray‟s vehicle. Stuart and Raymond followed the car and radioed for a marked unit to initiate a
traffic stop.
Before the second unit arrived, Gray turned into a driveway also located on Overhill
Circle. At that time, Stuart believed that Gray was acting as if he was attempting to evade them
and as if he knew something was wrong. According to the officers, they decided to place Gray
under arrest and Raymond parked his vehicle at the mouth of the driveway. The officers exited
the vehicle and instructed Gray to get out of the car and to get on the ground. Both officers were
wearing marked clothing and allegedly told Gray numerous times to get out of the car and to get
on the ground. According to the officers‟ testimony, as Stuart and Raymond approached Gray‟s
vehicle, Gray placed the car in reverse and backed toward the officers. As the car was backing
up and in fear of being struck by the vehicle, Raymond fired at the vehicle.
According to the officers‟ testimony, Gray began to drive erratically in the yard, turned
the car around, and proceeded forward. Then, he reversed directly toward Stuart. Believing he
was going to be overrun as the car was within three to five feet of him, Stuart fired at the vehicle.
Raymond, also believing that the car was going to strike Stuart, fired at the vehicle. The car

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came toward Raymond, and he fired again. The car then slowed and came to rest. The officers
approached the car, saw Gray slumped over, and immediately called for medical assistance.
Stuart estimated the entire incident, from the initial approach on the vehicle to the call for
emergency medical services, took no more than fifteen seconds.

Gray was transported to

Spartanburg Regional Medical Center where he later died from his wounds.
Some of the above facts as provided by the officers and the County are disputed by
Landrum. In her Amended Complaint, Landrum alleges that Stuart and Raymond did not have
probable cause or reasonable suspicion to seize Gray, nor did they have proper identification or
authority to attempt to seize Gray. Landrum alleges that Stuart and Raymond attempted to seize
Gray by opening his car door and attempting to pull him out of the car. Gray rebuffed their
attempts and tried to flea the area. Landrum alleges that “at no time did Gray attempt to use his
car as a weapon to threaten the lives of Stuart and Raymond.” [Doc. 6 at ¶ 8]. Furthermore,
Landrum alleges that “[w]ithout legal justification or threat to their personal safety, Defendants
Raymond and Stuart began firing multiple, numerous and excessive shots in the residential
neighborhood striking innocent homes, (interior and exterior), striking the vehicle being operated
by Gray and striking the body of Gray.” Id.
Additionally, Landrum alleges that the County was grossly negligent in hiring Raymond
and Stuart when it knew or should have known that they were unqualified and not suitable to be
deputies, in failing to supervise Raymond and Stuart when they knew that one or more had
engaged in similar unlawful and excessive force conduct in the past, and in failing to properly
train the other officers at the scene to intercede when they observed Raymond and Stuart
applying unnecessary and excessive force against Gray. [Doc. 6]

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Landrum has set forth the following causes of action:
a survival action claim under 42 U.S.C. §1983 against Raymond and Stuart for illegal
seizure of Gray in violation of the Fourth Amendment;

1)

a wrongful death action claim under 42 U.S.C. §1983 against Raymond and Stuart for
use of excessive force during the seizure of Gray in violation of the Fourth Amendment;

2)

a claim under 42 U.S.C. §1983 against Wright under a supervisor liability theory for
allowing an unconstitutional custom, policy and practice;

3)

a survival action for common law assault and battery against the County based on the
shooting of Gray.

4)

a wrongful death action for common law assault and battery against the County based
on the shooting and killing of Gray;

5)

a wrongful death action for gross negligence against the County based on the shooting
and killing of Gray.

6)

Even with the court‟s understanding that there are substantial facts which are being
disputed by Landrum, this does not affect the particular findings in favor of summary judgment
for Defendants the County and Wright. Because this order solely entails claims against the
County and Wright, only the third through sixth causes of action will be discussed herein.
LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that “there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). To prevail on a motion for summary judgment, the movant must
demonstrate that: (1) there is no genuine issue as to any material fact; and (2) that he is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law. In determining whether a genuine issue has been raised, the
court must construe all inferences and ambiguities against the movant and in favor of the nonmoving party. See United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962).

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The party seeking summary judgment shoulders the initial burden of demonstrating to the
district court that there is no genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Once the movant has made this threshold demonstration, the non-moving
party, to survive the motion for summary judgment, may not rest on the allegations averred in his
pleadings. Rather, the non-moving party must demonstrate that specific, material facts exist
which give rise to a genuine issue. See id at 324. Under this standard, the existence of a mere
scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff‟s position is insufficient to withstand the summary
judgment motion. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986). Likewise,
conclusory allegations or denials, without more, are insufficient to preclude the granting of the
summary judgment motion. See Ross v. Commc’ns Satellite Corp., 759 F.2d 355, 365 (4th Cir.
1985). “Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing
law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or
unnecessary will not be counted.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.
DISCUSSION
A. Plaintiff’s Third Cause of Action
Plaintiff alleges that “prior to February 10, 2005, Defendant Wright developed and
maintained policies or customs exhibiting deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of
persons of Spartanburg County, which caused the violation of Mr. Gray‟s rights.” [Doc. 6, at ¶
21]. The County filed a Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 24] on behalf of itself and Wright,
contending that Landrum‟s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against the County and Wright should be
dismissed because she failed to allege that Gray‟s constitutional rights were deprived as a result
of an official County custom, policy, pattern, practice, or procedure which was adhered to by the
County Sheriff‟s Office and Wright.
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Here, Landrum claims that it was the policy and/or custom of Wright to “inadequately
and improperly investigate citizen complaints of police misconduct, and Sheriff Wright instead
tolerated the acts of misconduct.” [Doc. 6, at ¶ 22]. She sets forth general allegations of
deliberate indifference but puts forth no evidence in support of these blanket allegations.
Furthermore, Landrum fails to provide any evidence of how any policy or procedure maintained
by the Sheriff‟s Department directly led to the alleged violation of Gray‟s constitutional rights.
Landrum cannot demonstrate that the policies of the County‟s Sheriff‟s Department are
unconstitutional, and the record fails to demonstrate any pattern or practice of unconstitutional
conduct by Sheriff Wright or his deputies.
1. Official Capacity of Wright
The County further argues that Landrum‟s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against Wright in his
official capacity should be dismissed. A suit against an officer in his official capacity is the same
as a suit against the governmental entity. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985).
Therefore, to the extent that the Court construes the Amended Complaint as making allegations
against Wright in his “official” capacity as Sheriff of Spartanburg County, these claims are
dismissed with prejudice.
The South Carolina Supreme Court, United States District Court for the District of South
Carolina, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit have all held that South
Carolina sheriffs and deputy sheriffs are state officials. In Gulledge v. Smart, 691 F. Supp. 947
(D.S.C. 1988), the court conducted an extensive review of South Carolina state law concluding
that sheriffs and deputy sheriffs are state officials and therefore are not “persons” for purposes of
§ 1983 when sued in their official capacity. In reaching this determination, the court relied on

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many of the same factors cited by the Supreme Court in McMillian v. Monroe County, 520 U.S.
781 (1997), which ultimately held that this particular inquiry is on a state-by-state basis.
In Gulledge, the district court found that the “state constitution establishes the elective
office of county sheriff and his term of office” and that the state General Assembly “prescribes
his duties and compensation.” Gulledge, 691 F. Supp. at 954 (citing S.C. Const. art. V § 24).
The South Carolina Code of Laws also sets forth sheriffs‟ “arrest powers,” which in turn “relate
primarily to state offenses.” Id. Furthermore, although “the sheriff as an elected official is not
subject to hiring and firing by the state, the legislature has nevertheless prescribed that the
Governor is the public official empowered to remove the sheriff from office for misconduct and
to fill a vacancy in that office.” Id. (citing S.C. Code Ann. §§ 1-3-240, 23-11-40). Therefore,
when sued pursuant to 42 U.S.C §1983 in their official capacities, sheriffs are not “persons”
amenable to suit.
2. Individual Capacity of Wright
Landrum‟s Amended Complaint states that Wright is being sued in his individual or
personal capacity, rather than his official capacity. [Doc. 6 at ¶ 2) “Personal-capacity suits ....
seek to impose individual liability upon a government officer for actions taken under color of
state law. Thus, „on the merits, to establish personal liability in a § 1983 action, it is enough to
show that the official, acting under color of state law, caused the deprivation of a federal right.‟”
Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991) (quoting Ky. v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985).
However, Landrum has not alleged or provided any evidence that Wright had any personal
involvement with the incident in question.
It is well settled that “in order for an individual to be liable under § 1983, it must be
affirmatively shown that the official charged acted personally in the deprivation of the plaintiff‟s

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rights.” Davis v. DSS, 941 F.2d 1206 (4th Cir. 1991) (quoting Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841
(4th Cir. 1985)).

Landrum‟s Amended Complaint contains no allegations of personal

involvement of Wright in the incident where Gray was fatally wounded. The allegations against
Wright are merely that he was the Sheriff of Spartanburg County at the time of the incident, and
that as Sheriff, he “developed and maintained policies or customs exhibiting deliberate
indifference” to constitutional rights. [Doc. 6 at ¶ 21)].
Additionally, a plaintiff may not allege a constitutional cause of action against
Defendants to recover damages for the unconstitutional acts of other employees. The United
States Supreme Court has clearly held that a governmental entity may not be held liable for the
acts of its employees under a respondeat superior theory because of the employment
relationship. See Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). To the extent
that Landrum seeks to impose vicarious liability on Defendant Wright for alleged conduct of
Raymond and Stuart, these allegations must be dismissed pursuant to Monell.
There is no evidence that Wright caused the deprivation of a federal right belonging to
Gray. Accordingly, Landrum has failed to carry the burden of proof against Wright, and the
court finds in favor of Defendant Wright.
B.

Plaintiff’s Fourth and Fifth Causes of Action
Landrum‟s Fourth and Fifth causes of action in the Amended Complaint allege that the

County is liable to Landrum based upon the common law intentional torts of assault and battery
inflicted upon Gray.

South Carolina defines an assault as the placement of a person “in

reasonable fear of bodily harm by the conduct of the defendant.” Jones by Robinson v. WinnDixie Greenville, Inc., 318 S.C. 171, 175, 456 S.E.2d 429, 432 (Ct. App. 1995). Battery is “the
actual infliction of any unlawful, unauthorized violence on the person of another, irrespective of

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its degree.” Id. at 432. Both of these torts outline intentional conduct rather than negligent
conduct.
South Carolina Code § 15-78-60 (17) states that a “governmental entity is not liable for a
loss resulting from .... (17) employee conduct .... which constitutes actual fraud, actual malice,
intent to harm, or a crime involving moral turpitude.” The South Carolina Tort Claims Act
provides a limited waiver of immunity for tort actions against the state, but the state has not
waived its immunity for intentional torts. See S.C. Code § 15-78-60 (17). The County has
immunity for the claims made against it for the intentional torts of assault and battery; therefore,
the County is entitled to summary judgment on these claims.
C. Plaintiff’s Sixth Cause of Action
Plaintiff alleges that the County was grossly negligent in the hiring and supervision of
Raymond and Stuart. South Carolina courts have defined gross negligence as “the intentional
conscious failure to do something which it is incumbent upon one to do or the doing of a thing
intentionally that one ought not to do.” Etheredge v. Richland Sch. Dist. One, 341 S.C. 307, 310,
534 S.E.2d 275, 277 (2000); Clyburn v. Sumter County District Seventeen, 317 S.C. 50, 451
S.E.2d 885 (1994); Richardson v. Hambright, 296 S.C. 504, 374 S.E.2d 296 (1988). “It is the
failure to exercise slight care.” Clyburn, 317 S.C. at 53, 451 S.E.2d at 887. Gross negligence
ordinarily is a mixed question of law and fact, but when the evidence supports but one
reasonable inference, the question becomes a matter of law for the court and summary judgment
may be appropriate. See Id., 317 S.C. at 53, 451 S.E.2d at 887-88.
However, in Sims v. Greenville County, 211 F.3d 1265 (Table), at *4 (4th Cir. S.C. Apr.
14, 2000), the court held that while the plaintiff “failed to present any evidence that Greenville
County intentionally and consciously provided an allegedly inadequate training program to its

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officers that was bound to result in the use of excessive force during multiple-officer
takedowns,” the County had the burden of proof to demonstrate they were entitled to one of the
exceptions listed under S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-60. Id. The Sims court found support from
Etheredge which held that “[t]he burden of establishing a limitation upon liability or an
exception to the waiver of immunity is upon the governmental entity asserting it as an
affirmative defense." Etheredge v. Richland Sch. Dist. I, 330 S.C. 447, 499 S.E.2d 238, 242 (Ct.
App. 1998).
Here, Landrum has not provided any evidence to demonstrate that the County was
grossly negligent in the hiring and supervision of Raymond and Stuart or in the training of other
officers on the scene in question. Therefore, these Defendants are entitled to summary judgment
on this claim.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the court

GRANTS

Defendants‟ (Spartanburg County and

Sheriff Chuck Wright) Motion for Summary Judgment on the Third, Fourth, Fifth and Sixth
causes of action. [Doc. 24].
IT IS SO ORDERED.

s/ J. Michelle Childs
United States District Judge
August 18, 2011
Greenville, South Carolina

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