Reed-Smith v. Spartanburg County School District Seven

Filing 98

ORDER AND OPINION granting in part and denying in part 91 Motion for filed by Carolyn E Reed-Smith as set out. Signed by Honorable J Michelle Childs on 3/7/2014.(mbro, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
SPARTANBURG DIVISION
Carolyn E. Reed-Smith,

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Plaintiff,
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v.
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Spartanburg County School District )
Seven,
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Defendants.
)
_____________________________ )

Civil Action No. 7:11-00970-JMC

ORDER AND OPINION

This matter is before the court by way of a motion filed by Plaintiff Carolyn E. ReedSmith (“Plaintiff”) to partially reconsider an order of the court. (ECF No. 91.) In the order filed
on March 20, 2013 (the “March Order”), the court granted a motion by Defendant Spartanburg
County School District Seven (“Defendant”) for attorney’s fees and tentatively awarded
Defendant $10,080.00 in fees. (ECF No. 88 at 9.) The court further ordered Plaintiff to provide
information regarding her monthly income and employment status from January 2012 through
March 2013 to assess the burden caused by having a $10,080.00 judgment against her and to aid
in the final determination of the amount of attorney’s fees she would owe to Defendant. (Id. at
9-10.)
In her motion, Plaintiff requests that the court “[f]ind that her poor financial situation
precludes an assessment of fees and costs against her; and [][i]ssue a rule to show cause as to
why appropriate fees and costs should not be taxed to her counsel, Theo Mitchell, instead.”
(ECF No. 91 at 4.) In response to Plaintiff’s motion, Defendant opposes any reduction of the
attorney’s fees award below $10,080.00 and further requests that the court increase the award to
$15,942.50. (ECF No. 92.) For the reasons stated below, the court GRANTS IN PART AND
DENIES IN PART Plaintiff’s motion to reconsider.

I.

RELEVANT BACKGROUND TO PENDING MOTION1

On April 25, 2011, Plaintiff filed a pro se complaint alleging claims for race
discrimination and retaliation. (ECF No. 1.) On June 15, 2011, Attorney Theo W. Mitchell
(“Mitchell”) entered his appearance on Plaintiff’s behalf. (ECF No. 20.) With a grant of leave
from the court, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint on July 26, 2011, specifically alleging a
single cause of action for the following:
Violation of U.S. Civil Rights Act of 1866 and 1877, Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 1981 and 1983, 42 USC 2000e-2 and 2000e5(b), 29 U.S.C. 211 and 29 U.S.C. 626, 42 U.S.C. 12117, First and Fourth
Amendments to the United States Constitution, 2 U.S.C. Sec. 1311, 3 USC 411a2,
5 USC 552a – all of which violates protection for teachers in South Carolina as
outlined in South Carolina Code of Laws Title 59 Chapter 25 Sections 59-25-430,
59-25-440, 59-25-450.
(ECF No. 34 at 8.)
On November 28, 2011, Defendant moved for summary judgment.

(ECF No. 40.)

Plaintiff filed opposition to the motion for summary judgment on January 3, 2012, to which
Defendant filed a reply in support of its motion for summary judgment on January 13, 2012.
(ECF Nos. 49, 52.) In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule 73.02
D.S.C., the magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation on April 5, 2012,
recommending that Defendant’s motion for summary judgment be granted. (ECF No. 62.)
Plaintiff filed objections to the report and recommendation on April 22, 2012, to which
Defendant filed a reply in support of the magistrate judge’s recommendation on May 11, 2012.
(ECF Nos. 65, 67.) On May 31, 2012, the court granted Defendant summary judgment on
Plaintiff’s claims in accordance with the magistrate judge’s recommendation. (ECF No. 68.)
On June 14, 2012, Defendant moved for attorney’s fees. (ECF No. 71.) On June 26,

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The March Order contains a thorough recitation of the relevant factual and procedural
background of the matter and is incorporated herein by reference. (ECF No. 88.)
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2012, Plaintiff filed pro se opposition to Defendant’s motion for attorney’s fees. (ECF No. 72.)
She then filed a pro se notice to appeal the court’s May 31, 2012 order to the Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit. (ECF No. 73.) On November 29, 2012, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the
court’s May 31, 2012 order adopting the magistrate judge’s Report and Recommendation. (ECF
No. 79.) The Fourth Circuit found that Plaintiff had waived her right to appellate review because
she failed to file specific written objections to the Report and Recommendation. (Id. at 2-3.)
The Fourth Circuit issued its formal mandate on January 23, 2013 giving effect to its decision to
affirm this court. (ECF No. 81.)
Thereafter, the court issued the March Order on March 20, 2013, which order (1) found
that the frivolous and groundless nature of Plaintiff’s claims became evident during the summary
judgment phase of the litigation, (2) granted Defendant’s motion for attorney’s fees tentatively in
the amount of $10,080.00, and (3) required Plaintiff to provide information within thirty (30)
days regarding her monthly income and employment status from January 2012 through March
2013.

(ECF No. 88.)

On March 29, 2013, Plaintiff filed the pending motion for partial

reconsideration of the March Order arguing that (1) a judgment against Plaintiff for $10,080.00
in attorney’s fees and for costs of $875.60 “would pose an extreme financial burden on [her]”;
and (2) the court should make Mitchell respond to an inquiry as to why he should not be partially
liable under Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 for Defendant’s attorney’s fee award.2 (ECF No. 91 at 2-3.) On
April 15, 2013, Defendant filed a response to Plaintiff’s motion for partial reconsideration
opposing any reduction of the attorney’s fees award below $10,080.00 and requesting that the
court increase the award to $15,942,50. (ECF No. 92 at 5.) In a reply to Defendant’s response
filed on April 24, 2013, Plaintiff reiterated that “any award of fees and costs against [][her]
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Plaintiff retained Attorney Howard W. Anderson, III, to prepare a response to the March Order.
(ECF No. 91 at 1-2.)
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would be excessive because she lacks the ability to pay” and Mitchell should bear some part of
the attorney’s fee judgment because of his actions. (ECF No. 93 at 2.)
II.
A.

LEGAL STANDARD AND ANALYSIS

Rule 59(e) Motions and the Parties’ Arguments
Fed. R. Civ. P. 59 allows a party to seek an alteration or amendment of a previous order

of the court. Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). Under Rule 59(e), a court may “alter or amend the judgment
if the movant shows either (1) an intervening change in the controlling law, (2) new evidence
that was not available at trial, or (3) that there has been a clear error of law or a manifest
injustice.” Robinson v. Wix Filtration Corp., 599 F.3d 403, 407 (4th Cir. 2010); see also
Collison v. Int’l Chem. Workers Union, 34 F.3d 233, 235 (4th Cir. 1994). It is the moving
party’s burden to establish one of these three grounds in order to obtain relief under Rule 59(e).
Loren Data Corp. v. GXS, Inc., 501 Fed. Appx. 275, 285 (4th Cir. 2012). The decision whether
to reconsider an order pursuant to Rule 59(e) is within the sound discretion of the district court.
Hughes v. Bedsole, 48 F.3d 1376, 1382 (4th Cir. 1995).
Plaintiff moves the court for partial reconsideration of the March Order that finds her
solely responsible for Defendant’s attorney’s fees.3 Specifically, Plaintiff asks that the court
hold Mitchell partially liable for Defendant’s attorney’s fees pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 11. In
support of her request, Plaintiff identified several instances where Mitchell’s allegedly deficient
representation caused the court to find her claims frivolous and groundless. These instances
include Mitchell (1) filing an amended complaint without allowing Plaintiff to review and/or
approve it and which included a claim for sex discrimination that Plaintiff did not have proper
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Plaintiff acknowledges that Defendant is entitled to some amount of attorney’s fees. (ECF No.
91 at 2 (“Ms. Reed-Smith recognizes the potential injustice associated with requiring the
Defendants to bear the complete expense of litigation after the Court found it had become
frivolous.”).)
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authorization from the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to bring, (2)
misrepresenting to the court that he had failed to receive Defendant’s requests for admissions, (3)
failing to respond to Defendant’s requests for admissions when Plaintiff had provided responses
to them, (4) failing to advise Plaintiff regarding the motion for summary judgment or the
response in opposition to it, (5) presenting frivolous and groundless arguments in response to
Defendant’s motion for summary judgment, (6) failing to advise Plaintiff that an adverse report
and recommendation had been issued by the magistrate judge, (7) filing frivolous objections to
the report and recommendation without consulting with Plaintiff beforehand, and (8) charging
her $5,000.00 for his services. (See, e.g., ECF No. 91-1.)
In response to Plaintiff’s motion, Defendant argued that “this Court should not further
reduce its award of attorneys’ fees below Ten Thousand Eighty Dollars ($10,080), that the Court
should increase the award and that the determination of whether Plaintiff or her previous attorney
is responsible for reimbursing the School District should be left to the discretion of the Court.”
(ECF No. 92 at 1-2.)
B.

The Court’s Review
In her motion to reconsider, Plaintiff relies on assertions about Mitchell’s representation

as her counsel that cannot be labeled as an intervening change in controlling law or a reference to
new evidence previously unavailable. In this regard, the court construes Plaintiff’s motion as
seeking reconsideration on the basis that it would be a manifest injustice if she alone was held
monetarily responsible for the entire amount of Defendant’s attorney’s fees. Moreover, Plaintiff
contends that Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 allows the court to avoid the imposition of the aforesaid
manifest injustice.
Rule 11 makes the following provision for imposition of sanctions against an attorney:

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(a) SIGNATURE. Every pleading, written motion, and other paper must be
signed by at least one attorney of record in the attorney’s name . . . (b)
REPRESENTATIONS TO THE COURT. By presenting to the court a pleading,
written motion, or other paper—whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later
advocating it—an attorney or unrepresented party certifies that to the best of the
person’s knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable
under the circumstances: (1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose,
such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of
litigation; (2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by
existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing
existing law or for establishing new law; (3) the factual contentions have
evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, will likely have evidentiary
support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery; and
(4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or, if
specifically so identified, are reasonably based on belief or a lack of information .
. . (c) SANCTIONS. (1) In General. If, after notice and a reasonable opportunity
to respond, the court determines that Rule 11(b) has been violated, the court may
impose an appropriate sanction on any attorney, law firm, or party that violated
the rule or is responsible for the violation . . . (3) On the Court’s Initiative. On its
own, the court may order an attorney, law firm, or party to show cause why
conduct specifically described in the order has not violated Rule 11(b).
Fed. R. Civ. P. 11.
In the March Order, the court observed that the frivolous and groundless nature of
Plaintiff’s claims became evident during the summary judgment phase and continued in her
objections to the Report and Recommendation. (See ECF No. 88 at 5-6 (“First, much of ReedSmith’s motion mirrors the School District’s summary judgment motion; it uses strikingly
similar language but merely reverses the affirmative and negative assertions made by the School
District so that the proposition stated would support her position.”); see also ECF No. 88 at 7
(“[T]his court determined that Reed-Smith’s objections merely restated arguments made in her
Motion in Opposition to Summary Judgment and only set forth negative, conclusory assertions to
the School District’s arguments.”).) These documents that directly attributed to the awarding of
attorney’s fees against Plaintiff were signed by Mitchell and Plaintiff has moved the court to
assign some measure of blame to Mitchell pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 11. Compare with
Blackwell v. Bd. of Offender Rehab., State of Ga., 609 F. Supp. 772, 776 (S.D. Ga. 1985) (“The
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Court is of the opinion that [Plaintiff’s Attorney] Roberson violated Rule 11 when he affixed his
signature to the motion for attorney fees and to the subsequent briefs . . . The arguments made in
the subsequent briefs had no basis in existing law, nor in any reasonable view of the direction
which the law should take.”); Taylor v. Belger Cartage Serv., Inc., 102 F.R.D. 172, 182-83
(W.D. Mo. 1984) (“However, in order to assess part of the damage against [Plaintiff] Taylor in
this case, he must have done something more than just hire his attorney; he must have acted in
bad faith in bringing or pursuing this case . . . In short, there is no basis for concluding that
plaintiff did anything other than rely in good faith on his attorney to furnish sound legal advice.
Therefore, no part of the attorney’s fee award will be apportioned to the plaintiff personally.”).
Therefore, upon consideration of Plaintiff’s motion, the court is persuaded that Mitchell
should show cause as to why his conduct in this litigation does not create liability to him for
Defendant’s attorney’s fees pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 11.
III.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART the
motion for partial reconsideration of Plaintiff Carolyn E. Reed-Smith. (ECF No. 91.) Attorney
Theo Mitchell is directed to inform the court within fourteen (14) days of the date of filing of this
order why he should not be liable for part or all of Defendant’s attorney’s fees based on
Plaintiff’s assertions regarding his representation of her. Attorney Theo Mitchell is further
advised that failure to comply with this order may result in the imposition against him of some
portion of Defendant’s attorney’s fees.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

United States District Judge
March 7, 2014
Greenville, South Carolina

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