Williams v. Roechling Automotive Duncan LLP

Filing 76

ORDER RULING ON REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION granting 52 Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Rochling Automotive USA LLP, adopting 69 Report and Recommendation and dismissing this action. Signed by Honorable Mary G Lewis on 9/16/13. (alew, )

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
SPARTANBURG DIVISION
Eric Williams,
Plaintiff,
vs.
Rochling Automotive USA, LLP,
Defendant.
______________________________

) Civil Action No.: 7:11-3497-MGL
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ORDER AND OPINION
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Plaintiff Eric Williams (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against Rochling Automotive USA,
LLP, (“Defendant”) alleging claims against his former employer for violation of the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101, 12112(b) and
interference with rights under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
(“ERISA”).
On September 14, 2012, Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment pursuant
to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (ECF No. 52.) Plaintiff filed a response
in opposition on November 19, 2012 (ECF No. 66), and Defendant filed a reply on
November 29, 2012. (ECF No. 68.) In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local
Civil Rule 73.02 D.S.C., this employment discrimination case was referred to United States
Magistrate Judge Kevin F. McDonald for consideration of pretrial matters. The Magistrate
Judge has prepared a thorough Report and Recommendation which recommends that
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment be granted. (ECF No. 69.) Plaintiff filed timely
objections to the Report and Recommendation. (ECF No. 70.) For the reasons set forth
herein, this court adopts the Report and Recommendation and Defendant’s Motion for
Summary Judgment is GRANTED.

BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The Report and Recommendation sets forth in detail the relevant facts and
standards of law on this matter, and the court incorporates them and summarizes below
in relevant part. Plaintiff filed an amended complaint on February 20, 2012, making claims
against his former employer for violation of the ADA and interference with rights under
Section 510 of ERISA based on Plaintiff’s allegations that he was terminated from his
employment because of the healthcare costs associated with two of his children who have
cystic fibrosis. (ECF No. 15.) On September 14, 2012, Defendant moved for summary
judgment arguing that Plaintiff’s claims for discriminatory discharge and ERISA retaliation
should be dismissed because he cannot establish a prima facie case. (ECF No. 52-1.)
After consideration of the response filed in opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment
and Defendant’s reply, the Magistrate Judge issued a Report and Recommendation
recommending that Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment be granted. (ECF No. 69.)
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Magistrate Judge makes only a recommendation to this court.
recommendation has no presumptive weight.

The

The responsibility for making a final

determination remains with this court. Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 270 (1976).
Parties are allowed to make a written objection to a Magistrate Judge’s report within
fourteen days after being served a copy of the Report. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The court
is charged with making a de novo determination of any portions of the Report and
Recommendation to which a specific objection is made. The court may accept, reject, or

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modify, in whole or in part, the recommendation made by the Magistrate Judge or may
recommit the matter to the Magistrate Judge with instructions. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
DISCUSSION
The Magistrate Judge first addressed Plaintiff’s ADA claim of association
discrimination. Title I of the ADA prohibits an employer from “excluding or otherwise
denying equal jobs or benefits to a qualified individual because of the known disability of
an individual with whom the qualified individual is known to have a relationship or
association.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(4). Applying the burden-shifting framework established
in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973), the Magistrate Judge set
forth and considered the elements of a prima facie case of discriminatory discharge under
the ADA. (ECF No. 69 at 10-11.) The Magistrate Judge concluded that Plaintiff cannot
establish the third element of a prima facie case, requiring him to show that at the time of
discharge he was performing his job at a level that met his employer’s legitimate
expectations. (ECF No. 69 at 12.) The Magistrate Judge also found that Plaintiff cannot
establish the fourth element of a prima facie case, that his discharge occurred under
circumstances that raise a reasonable inference of unlawful discrimination. (ECF No. 69
at 13.) The Magistrate Judge recommended summary judgment be granted in favor of
Defendant on the ADA claim finding that there is abundant and uncontroverted evidence
in the record that no discrimination occurred. (ECF No. 69 at 17.) The Magistrate Judge
also considered Plaintiff’s ERISA claim in light of the appropriate standards and concluded
that Plaintiff failed to produce sufficient evidence to support a reasonable inference of
pretext, rendering summary judgment appropriate on Plaintiff’s ERISA claim as well. (ECF

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No. 69 at 18.)
Plaintiff filed objections to the Report and Recommendation on August 12, 2013.
(ECF No. 70.)

Plaintiff claims that there is at least a genuine issue of material fact

regarding whether Plaintiff was meeting his employer’s legitimate expectations at the time
of his termination.

(ECF No. 70 at 6.)

Plaintiff contends that there is sufficient

circumstantial evidence of a reasonable inference of unlawful discrimination based on
purported changes in his performance reviews after Defendant learned about the costs of
Plaintiff’s children’s healthcare, and the reasons given for his termination. (ECF No. 70 at
6-10.) Plaintiff also contends that the Magistrate Judge incorrectly relied on the case Ennis
v. National Association of Business and Education Radio, Inc., 53 F.3d 55, 58 (4th Cir.
1995) in recommending summary judgment be granted in favor of Defendant. (ECF No.
70 at 10.) Plaintiff contends this case is more like Dewitt v. Proctor Hospital, a Seventh
Circuit case in which the defendant’s motion for summary judgment was denied, based in
part on the timing of Plaintiff’s termination.1 Plaintiff also contends that summary judgment
should be denied on Plaintiff’s ERISA retaliation claim based on his submission of

1

Plaintiff does not provide a citation to the Dewitt case, but from the context, the
court assumes that Plaintiff is referring to the Seventh Circuit’s decision on February 27,
2008 wherein that court reversed the grant of summary judgment on the ADA
association discrimination claim and remanded the matter to the district court for further
proceedings. Dewitt v. Proctor Hosp., 517 F.3d 944, 950 (7th Cir. 2008). When the
district court granted the plaintiff’s post-remand motion for summary judgment on
Plaintiff’s ERISA claim and ADA association discrimination claim, the plaintiff appealed
again. Dewitt v. Proctor Hosp., 381 Fed. Appx. 585 (7th Cir. 2010). The Seventh
Circuit ultimately affirmed the judgment of the district court which found that the
defendant had a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for terminating the plaintiff’s
employment. Id. at 587. Consequently, Dewitt does not aid Plaintiff’s case because
the Seventh Circuit ultimately found that the plaintiff there could not show that the
defendant employer’s stated reason for its action was a pretext.
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evidence that his direct supervisor prepared documentation regarding cost savings from
reductions in healthcare benefits on the same day as his termination. (ECF No. 70 at 13.)
Plaintiff contends that this evidence is sufficient to establish that Defendant intentionally
interfered with Plaintiff’s benefits.
The Magistrate Judge correctly set forth the applicable standards of law for
establishing a prima facie case of discriminatory discharge under the ADA. To reiterate,
the plaintiff must prove: (1) the plaintiff was in the protected class; (2) he was discharged;
(3) at the time of discharge, he was performing his job at a level that met his employer's
legitimate expectations; and (4) his discharge occurred under circumstances that raise a
reasonable inference of unlawful discrimination. Ennis v. National Ass’n of Business and
Educ. Radio, Inc., 53 F.3d 55, 58 (4th Cir. 1995). Plaintiff’s objections concern the third and
fourth prima facie factors and he also refers to the evidence of pretext presented in his
case.
As it relates to the issue of whether Plaintiff was performing his job at a level that
met his employer's legitimate expectations, Plaintiff claims that the Magistrate Judge erred
in disregarding a favorable letter of recommendation from Rochling manager Sherry Lance
(Plaintiff claims Ms. Lance was seeking to recruit him) and instead relied entirely on an
affidavit of Ms. Lance, submitted as an exhibit to Defendant’s reply brief in support of its
motion for summary judgment, wherein Ms. Lance attested that she did not write the letter
nor did she recall signing the letter. (ECF No. 70 at 5.) Plaintiff maintains that the Lance
letter and the dispute surrounding the validity of the letter creates a genuine issue of
material fact. The court disagrees.
The Magistrate Judge expressly took note of the Lance letter, dated September 28,
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2009; this court has reviewed the letter in light of Plaintiff’s objections. Importantly, even
assuming the validity of the Lance letter, the letter does not create a genuine issue of
material fact any more than the two letters from March and April 2008 from Plaintiff’s
supervisors thanking him for his hard work, support, and positive attitude.2 As noted by the
Magistrate Judge, the record contains overwhelming evidence of Plaintiff’s performance
issues. Plaintiff failed to address these shortcomings in the case as it stood before the
Magistrate Judge nor did Plaintiff address this finding of the Magistrate Judge in his
objections. The court finds no error in the Magistrate Judge’s analysis or finding.
Next, Plaintiff claims that the Magistrate Judge incorrectly concluded there were no
genuine issues of material fact concerning Plaintiff’s claim that the discharge occurred
under circumstances that raise a reasonable inference of unlawful discrimination. (ECF No.
70 at 6.) In arguing that he should have an opportunity to present evidence to the jury
regarding Defendant’s alleged inconsistent defenses as sufficient evidence of pretext,
Plaintiff puts forth much of the same evidence and arguments he presented in his
opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment and before the Magistrate Judge.
(ECF No. 70 at 9.) Plaintiff’s objection does not take issue with any specific finding in the
Report and Recommendation. Of course, the court need not conduct a de novo review
when a party makes only “general and conclusory objections that do not direct the court
to a specific error in the magistrate’s proposed findings and recommendations.” Orpiano
v. Johnson, 687 F.2d 44, 47 (4th Cir.1982); see also Weber v. Aiken–Partain, No.
8:11–cv–02423, 2012 WL 489148, at *2 (D.S.C. Feb.15, 2012) (noting that objections that
2

The Magistrate Judge found that the March and April 2008 letters were
insufficient to create an issue of material fact. (ECF No. 69 at 13.)
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merely rehash arguments raised before, and addressed by, the Magistrate Judge are
insufficient to direct the court to a specific error in the Magistrate Judge’s Report and
Recommendation); Monahan v. Burtt, No. CIVA 205–2201–RBH, 2006 WL 2796390, at
*9 (D.S.C. Sept.27, 2006) (“Just as a complaint stating only ‘I complain’ states no claim,
an objection stating only “I object” preserves no issue for review.” (quoting Lockert v.
Faulkner, 843 F.2d 1015, 1019 (7th Cir.1988))). In the absence of a specific objection to
the Report and Recommendation, this court is not required to give any explanation for
adopting the recommendation. See Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310,
315 (4th Cir. 2005); Camby v. Davis, 718 F.2d 198 (4th Cir.1983).
Plaintiff here fails to state any basis for his objection or make additional arguments
beyond what is found in Plaintiff’s pleadings. Even under a de novo review, the issues
concerning the circumstances of Plaintiff’s discharge were correctly addressed by the
Magistrate Judge in finding that Plaintiff’s allegations are insufficient to establish the fourth
element of a prima facie case.

Plaintiff’s “subjective beliefs . . .without more, [are]

insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact as to any conduct on [Defendant’s]
part.” Bryant v. Bell Atlantic Maryland, Inc., 288 F.3d 124, 135 (4th Cir. 2002). The court
further finds no merit in Plaintiff’s objection to the Magistrate Judge’s reliance on the Ennis
case which is binding and applicable Fourth Circuit law as it relates to association
discrimination claims. The Ennis case both sets forth the applicable considerations in this
district and is also very factually similar as correctly noted by the Magistrate Judge.
Finally, Plaintiff contends that Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment should
be denied on Plaintiff’s ERISA retaliation claim and argues that this case is substantially

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distinct from a case cited in the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation, Goode
v. American Veterans, Inc., 874 F.Supp. 2d 430 (D. Md. 2012). (ECF No. 70 at 13.) The
Magistrate Judge did not rely upon the Goode case in making his decision; the Magistrate
Judge noted that Plaintiff failed to produce sufficient evidence to support a reasonable
inference of pretext. (ECF No. 69 at 18.) Here again, Plaintiff failed to point to any specific
objection that would call the Magistrate Judge's analysis into question. The court agrees
that Plaintiff failed to establish his ERISA claim and that Defendant intentionally interfered
with his benefits.
CONCLUSION
The Court has carefully reviewed the objections made by Plaintiff and has
conducted the required de novo review. After considering the motion, the record, the
Report and Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, this court finds that the Magistrate
Judge’s recommended disposition is correct and the Report and Recommendation is
adopted and incorporated herein by reference.

Therefore, it is ORDERED that

Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 52) is GRANTED and this action
hereby DISMISSED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/Mary G. Lewis
United States District Judge

Spartanburg, South Carolina
September 16, 2013

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