Cooper v. Spartanburg County School District No 7

Filing 225

ORDER denying Plaintiff's 217 Motion to Reconsider and to Alter Judgment. Signed by Honorable J Michelle Childs on 12/29/16.(kmca)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
SPARTANBURG DIVISION
Wendell Cooper,

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)
Plaintiff,
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v.
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)
Spartanburg School District Seven,
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)
Defendant.
)
___________________________________ )

Civil Action No. 7:13-cv-00991-JMC

ORDER AND OPINION

Plaintiff Wendell Cooper (“Plaintiff”) filed this action pro se against his employer,
Defendant Spartanburg School District Seven (“Defendant”), alleging that Defendant retaliated
against him in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. §§
2000e–2000e-17, and the Civil Rights Act of 1866 (“§ 1981”), 42 U.S.C. § 1981; and further
interfered with and retaliated against him for exercising rights under the Family and Medical
Leave Act of 1993 (“FMLA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2654. (ECF No. 15 at 18–21.) Plaintiff also
asserts state law claims for breach of contract and violation of the South Carolina Payment of
Wages Act (“SCPWA”), S.C. Code Ann. §§ 41-10-10 to -110 (Supp. 2011). (Id. at 17–19.)
This matter is before the court on Plaintiff’s Motion to Reconsider and Alter Judgment
(“Motion for Reconsideration”) pursuant to Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
(ECF No. 217.) Specifically, Plaintiff seeks reconsideration of the Order entered on July 6, 2016
(the July Order), in which the court granted Defendant summary judgment as to all of Plaintiff’s
claims.

(ECF No. 209 at 12.)

Defendant opposes Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration

asserting that “he fails to make the required showing of any grounds for the extraordinary relief
afforded by Rule 59(e).”1 (ECF No. 218 at 6.) For the reasons set forth below, the court
DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration.
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The court observes that “rule” refers to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

I.

RELEVANT BACKGROUND TO PENDING MOTION2

Plaintiff filed an action in this court on April 12, 2013, alleging claims for breach of
contract (Count 1), interference with FMLA rights (Count 2), violation of the SCPWA (Count 3),
retaliation in violation of the FMLA (Count 4), and retaliation in violation of Title VII (Count 5).
(ECF No. 1 at 17–20.) On May 6, 2013, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint to add a sixth
cause of action for retaliation in violation of § 1981. (ECF No. 15.) On March 11, 2016,
Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment along with a Memorandum in Support. (ECF
No. 166.) Plaintiff filed a Response to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment on May 4,
2016. (ECF No. 189.) The Magistrate Judge issued her Report and Recommendation on June
15, 2016. (ECF No. 202.) Plaintiff filed Objections to the Report and Recommendation of
Magistrate Judge (“Objections”) on July 1, 2016. (ECF No. 207.) Thereafter, on July 6, 2016,
the court entered the July Order granting Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment and
dismissing Plaintiff’s action. (ECF No. 209.)
II.

LEGAL STANDARD AND ANALYSIS

In the July Order, the court conducted a de novo review of specific objections by Plaintiff
to the Magistrate Judge’s determination that (1) Plaintiff could not establish a prima facie case of
retaliation and interference under the FMLA and (2) the court should decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over his state law claims.3 (ECF No. 209 at 4–5 & 10.) Upon its review,
the court found that the Magistrate Judge properly concluded that Plaintiff could not establish prima
facie cases of either interference or retaliation under the FMLA. (Id. at 6–10.) However, the court

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The July Order contains a thorough recitation of the relevant factual and procedural background
of the matter and is incorporated herein by reference. (See ECF No. 209 at 1–4.)
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Plaintiff failed to file specific objections to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation that
“Plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII or § 1981, and
Defendant’s motion for summary judgment should be granted with respect to these claims.”
(ECF No. 202 at 13; see also ECF No. 209 at 5.)
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disagreed with the Magistrate Judge and adjudicated the merits of Plaintiff’s state law claims finding
that Defendant was entitled to summary judgment as to both the breach of contract claim and the
claim for violation of SCPWA.

(Id. at 10–11.)

In the instant Motion, Plaintiff seeks

reconsideration of the foregoing pursuant to Rule 59.
A.

Applicable Standard under Rule 59(e)
Rule 59 allows a party to seek an alteration or amendment of a previous order of the

court. Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). Under Rule 59(e), a court may “alter or amend the judgment if the
movant shows either (1) an intervening change in the controlling law, (2) new evidence that was
not available at trial, or (3) that there has been a clear error of law or a manifest injustice.”
Robinson v. Wix Filtration Corp., 599 F.3d 403, 407 (4th Cir. 2010); see also Collison v. Int’l
Chem. Workers Union, 34 F.3d 233, 235 (4th Cir. 1994). It is the moving party’s burden to
establish one of these three grounds in order to obtain relief under Rule 59(e). Loren Data Corp.
v. GXS, Inc., 501 F. App’x 275, 285 (4th Cir. 2012). The decision whether to reconsider an
order pursuant to Rule 59(e) is within the sound discretion of the district court. Hughes v.
Bedsole, 48 F.3d 1376, 1382 (4th Cir. 1995). A motion to reconsider should not be used as a
“vehicle for rearguing the law, raising new arguments, or petitioning a court to change its mind.”
Lyles v. Reynolds, C/A No. 4:14-1063-TMC, 2016 WL 1427324, at *1 (D.S.C. Apr. 12, 2016)
(citing Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 485 n.5 (2008)).
B.

The Parties’ Arguments
In his Motion for Reconsideration, Plaintiff asserts that the court committed “manifest

error” of law in concluding that he “did not establish a claim for retaliation and interference”
under the FMLA. (ECF No. 217 at 1.) In support of this assertion, Plaintiff cites the court to
opinions in Adams v. Wallenstein, 814 F. Supp. 2d 516, 524 (D. Md. 2011), Fordcye v. Prince
George’s Cty. Md., 43 F. Supp. 3d 537, 548 (D. Md. 2014), and Wagstaff v. City of Durham,
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233 F. Supp. 2d 739, 744 (M.D.N.C. 2002). (ECF No. 217 at 4.) Additionally, Plaintiff argues
that it was “manifestly erroneous” for the court to grant Defendant summary judgment when
there were disputed issues of fact regarding whether Defendant impeded Plaintiff’s attempts to
return to work after his leave expired (id. at 3), the appropriateness of the method used by
Defendant to reduce Plaintiff’s salary when he was out on FMLA leave (id. at 2), and the lack of
advance notice regarding this reduction. (Id. at 4.)
Defendant opposes Plaintiff’s Motion asserting that he has neither cited to “any
controlling or significant change in the law” or “new evidence which has become available”
since the court entered the July Order. (ECF No. 218 at 4.) Defendant further asserts that
“Plaintiff’s motion merely expresses his disagreement with the Court’s decision, which does not
constitute clear error or manifest injustice.” (Id. at 4–5.)
C.

The Court’s Review
Upon review, the court observes that Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration makes

general claims of manifest error in its four pages of content, but adds very little new substantive
argument to what he has already presented in support of his claims. (See, e.g., ECF Nos. 189,
197 & 207.) A Rule 59(e) motion should not be used as an opportunity to rehash issues already
ruled upon because a litigant is displeased with the result. See Hutchinson v. Staton, 994 F.2d
1076, 1082 (4th Cir. 1993) (stating that “mere disagreement does not support a Rule 59(e)
motion”); see also Consulting Eng’rs, Inc. v. Geometric Software Solutions & Structure Works
LLC, 2007 WL 2021901, at *2 (D.S.C. July 6, 2007) (“A party’s mere disagreement with the
court’s ruling does not warrant a Rule 59(e) motion, and such motion should not be used to
rehash arguments previously presented or to submit evidence which should have been previously
submitted.”). In this regard, the court is not persuaded that reconsideration is appropriate based

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on arguments that it has already considered and rejected summarily. Therefore, because Plaintiff
has presented relatively little new substantive argument on the aforementioned issues, the court’s
conclusion remains unchanged.

Accordingly, the court must deny Plaintiff’s Motion for

Reconsideration.
III.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the court hereby DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion to
Reconsider and to Alter Judgment. (ECF No. 217.)
IT IS SO ORDERED.

United States District Judge
December 29, 2016
Columbia, South Carolina

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