Lawson v. Union County Clerk of Court et al

Filing 13

ORDER granting 6 Motion for Partial Dismissal. Signed by Honorable Timothy M Cain on 5/13/2013.(gpre, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
SPARTANBURG DIVISION
Melanie Lawson,
Plaintiff,
v.
Union County Clerk of Court William
F. “Freddie” Gault; William F.
“Freddie” Gault, Individually,
Defendants.

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Civil Action No. 7:13-1050

ORDER

This matter is before the court on Union County Clerk of Court William F. “Freddie”
Gault’s (“Gault”) motion to dismiss Melanie Lawson’s (“Lawson”) claim for wrongful discharge
in violation of public policy. (ECF No. 6.) Gault contends that, under South Carolina law,
Lawson cannot maintain her wrongful discharge claim because 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a
statutory remedy for her grievance. (See ECF No. 6-1.) In response, Gault argues that Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 8(d)(2) allows her to plead the two claims in the alternative and that,
because it is unclear at this point in the litigation whether her claim “fits” under § 1983,
dismissal of the wrongful termination claim could mean forfeiture of her remedy. (ECF No. 7.)
For the following reasons, the court agrees with Gault.
I. Background
In her amended complaint, Lawson alleges that Gault, in his official capacity, violated
South Carolina Code § 16-17-560, which makes it unlawful to “discharge a citizen from
employment . . . because of political opinions or the exercise of political rights and privileges,”
when he terminated her employment after she ran against him in an election. (ECF No. 1-1.) In

addition, Lawson brings claims pursuant to §§ 1981, 1983, 1988 and the First Amendment
against Gault in his individual capacity. (Id.)
II. Discussion
Although South Carolina law generally allows employers to discharge at-will employees
for any reason, the South Carolina Supreme Court has carved out an exception. This “public
policy exception” creates a cause of action when “the retaliatory discharge of an at-will
employee constitutes violation of a clear mandate of public policy.” Ludwick v. This Minute of
Carolina, Inc., 287 S.C. 219, 225 (1985). However, the exception does not apply when “the
employee has an existing remedy for a discharge that allegedly violates rights other than the right
to the employment itself.” Epps v. Clarendon County, 304 S.C. 424, 426 (1991).
In this case, Lawson claims that her discharge violated her First Amendment rights to
free speech and association, not just her right to employment. The United States Supreme Court
has recognized § 1983 as a viable method for aggrieved public at-will employees to bring claims
for damages from hiring decisions that violate the First Amendment. See Rutan v. Republican
Party of Illinois, 497 U.S. 62 (1990). And, the South Carolina Supreme Court has found that, in
the context of the public policy exception, § 1983 is an existing remedy that bars use of the
exception by an employee alleging that his discharge violated his First Amendment rights. Epps,
304 S.C. at 426. Thus, Lawson cannot maintain her wrongful termination claim.
Lawson’s arguments to the contrary cannot stand up to legal precedent. First, this court
has already addressed whether Rule 8(a)(2) permits a plaintiff to plead her claims in the
alternative under these circumstances and found that “to accept Plaintiff’s argument that she can
plead her claims in the alternative would essentially nullify decisions such as Bolin which hold
that ‘no common law public policy wrongful termination claim can be stated where the

employee has an existing statutory remedy.’” Frazier v. Target Corp., No. 2:09-cv-1625, 2009
WL 3459221, at *3 (D.S.C. Oct. 27, 2009) (emphasis in original) (quoting Bolin v. Ross Stores,
Inc., No. 08-cv-2759, 2009 WL 363990 (D.S.C. Feb. 11, 2009)).
And, second, her claim against Gault in his individual capacity fits squarely within §
1983 with or without any evidence of custom or policy. See Mikkelsen v. DeWitt, 141 Fed.
Appx. 88, 90-91 (4th Cir. 2005) (“Debating whether a public employer has adopted an
unconstitutional ‘custom’ or ‘policy’ is a question to be asked when examining the basis for
municipal liability under § 1983.

It is not the right question to ask when confronting a

supervisor’s potential liability in his individual capacity.”); Epps, 304 S.C. at 426 (recognizing
an almost identical claim as fitting within § 1983).
III. Conclusion
Accordingly, the court grants Gault’s motion for partial dismissal (ECF No. 6).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/Timothy M. Cain
United States District Court Judge
May 13, 2013
Anderson, South Carolina