Sallis v. Edwards et al

Filing 24

ORDER RULING ON REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION accepting and adopting 19 Report and Recommendation. Signed by Honorable G Ross Anderson, Jr on 6/9/14. (alew, ) (Main Document 24 replaced on 6/9/2014) (alew, ). Modified on 6/9/2014 to replace with corrected document per chambers(alew, ).

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
SPARTANBURG DIVISION
Derrick Sallis,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
)
Judge Tommy Edwards;
)
Judge Gerald C. Smoak, Jr.
)
)
Defendants. )
________________________________ )

C/A No.: 7:14-cv-01232-GRA

ORDER
(Written Opinion)

This matter comes before the Court for review of United States Magistrate
Judge Jacquelyn D. Austin’s Report and Recommendation made in accordance with
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d) DSC, and filed on April 30,
2014.

ECF No. 19.

For the reasons discussed herein, this Court adopts the

magistrate judge’s recommendation in its entirety.
Background
Plaintiff Derrick Sallis, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this
action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.1 ECF Nos. 1, 2, & 13. Under established
procedure in this judicial district, Magistrate Judge Austin made a careful review of
the pro se complaint and now recommends that this Court dismiss Plaintiff’s case
against Defendants without prejudice and without issuance and service of process.
ECF No. 19. Plaintiff timely filed objections to the magistrate judge’s Report and
Recommendation on May 16, 2014. ECF No. 22.

1

Plaintiff’s complaint does not specifically invoke a civil rights claim; however, Plaintiff’s argument
seems to contend that Defendants violated his due process rights. See ECF No. 1.

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Standard of Review
Plaintiff brings this claim pro se. This Court is required to construe pro se
pleadings liberally. Such pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than those
drafted by attorneys. Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). This
Court is charged with liberally construing a pleading filed by a pro se litigant to allow
for the development of a potentially meritorious claim. Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S.
364, 365 (1982). However, a court may not construct the plaintiff's legal arguments
for him, Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411 (7th Cir.1993), nor is a district court required
to recognize “obscure or extravagant claims defying the most concerted efforts to
unravel them.” Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1277 (4th Cir.1985), cert.
denied, 475 U.S. 1088 (1986).
Plaintiff brings this claim in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which
permits an indigent litigant to commence an action in federal court without prepaying
the administrative costs of proceeding with the lawsuit. To protect against possible
abuses of this privilege, the statute requires a district court to dismiss the case upon a
finding that the action “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” “is
frivolous or malicious,” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune
from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
The magistrate judge makes only a recommendation to this Court.

The

recommendation has no presumptive weight, and the responsibility to make a final
determination remains with this Court. Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 270–71
(1976). This Court is charged with making a de novo determination of those portions
of the Report and Recommendation to which specific objection is made, and this

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Court may "accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or
recommendations made by the magistrate." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). This Court may
also "receive further evidence or recommit the matter to the magistrate with
instructions." Id.
In order for objections to be considered by a United States District Judge, the
objections must be timely filed and specifically identify the portions of the Report and
Recommendation to which the party objects and the basis for the objections. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 72(b); see United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91, 94 n.4 (4th Cir. 1984);
Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 845–47 nn.1–3 (4th Cir. 1985). “Courts have . . .
held de novo review to be unnecessary in . . . situations when a party makes general
and conclusory objections that do not direct the court to a specific error in the
magistrate’s proposed findings and recommendation.” Orpiano v. Johnson, 687 F.2d
44, 47 (4th Cir. 1982). Furthermore, in the absence of specific objections to the
Report and Recommendation, this Court is not required to give any explanation for
adopting the recommendation. Camby v. Davis, 718 F.2d 198 (4th Cir. 1983). In this
case, May 19, 2014 was the deadline for filing objections.

Plaintiff filed timely

objections to the Report and Recommendation on May 16, 2014. ECF No. 22.
Discussion
Having reviewed Plaintiff’s objections, this Court finds that many of the
objections are unrelated to the dispositive portions of the magistrate judge’s Report
and Recommendation, and merely restate his claims.

However, this Court will

address the objections that it finds to be specific and pertinent to the Report and
Recommendation. Liberally construed, Plaintiff’s objections appear to be as follows:

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(1) that the magistrate judge’s Report and Recommendation failed to apply certain
aspects of international law in determining whether Defendants properly exercised
subject matter jurisdiction over his mother’s family court custody hearing; (2) that the
magistrate judge’s Report and Recommendation failed to apply portions of the
Uniform Commercial Code in determining whether Defendants properly exercised
subject matter jurisdiction over his mother’s family court custody hearing; (3) that the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine only applies to this case if the South Carolina family court
received prior permission from this Court, the United States Department of State, and
the United States Congress before exercising subject matter jurisdiction over
Plaintiff’s mother’s case; (4) that this case presents a narrow exception to the
Younger abstention doctrine; and (5) that Judge Gerald G. Smoak, Jr. waived
immunity from suit when he exercised subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s
mother’s case. Id.
I.

Application of International Law
In his objections, Plaintiff asserts that various statutes pertaining to

international law govern whether Defendants properly exercised subject matter
jurisdiction over his mother’s case. Id. Most notably, Plaintiff appears to argue that
Congress has replaced all domestic statutory law with international law provisions;
thus, he suggests that before a South Carolina court can exercise subject matter
jurisdiction over a case, it must first satisfy jurisdictional requirements under
international code. See id. at 2. In support of his argument, Plaintiff quotes from a
multilateral international treaty outlining the rights and duties between various
countries in North and South America. Id.; see also Convention between the United

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States of America and other American Republics on Rights and Duties of States,
Dec. 26, 1933, 49 Stat. 3097 (hereinafter “American Convention”).

Presumably,

Plaintiff argues that, because South Carolina courts exercised jurisdiction over his
mother’s case without establishing subject matter jurisdiction under international law,
this Court is free to intervene in the state court’s proceedings.
This Court finds that Plaintiff’s argument is without merit. First, the language
that Plaintiff quotes is not found in the treaty.

Compare ECF No. 22 at 2 with

American Convention, Dec. 26, 1933, 49 Stat. 3097.

Second, the terms of the

American Convention do not address subject matter jurisdiction in domestic relations
cases. See id. As such, the terms of the American Convention have no bearing on
the Plaintiff’s instant jurisdictional argument.

Accordingly, this Court overrules

Plaintiff’s objection that international law supersedes domestic law when determining
subject matter jurisdiction in domestic relations cases.
II.

Application of the Uniform Commercial Code
Plaintiff objects to the magistrate judge’s failure to consider several provisions

of the Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”) in her Report and Recommendation. ECF
No. 22. Plaintiff states that he entered into a contract with Judge Edwards during an
early family court hearing, and that this contract placed the subject matter of his
mother’s case outside of the family court’s jurisdictional authority. See id. at 2. In
support, Plaintiff cites section 3-312 of the Uniform Commercial Code.2 Id.
Here again, Plaintiff’s argument is not legally sustainable. As its title implies,
the UCC governs commercial transactions.

See U.C.C. § 1-103 (describing the

2

It is worth noting that section 3-312 of the UCC relates to lost negotiable instruments, not offer and
acceptance of a contract as Plaintiff seems to imply. U.C.C. § 3-312 (2002); see ECF No. 22.

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purposes of the UCC); see also S.C. Code Ann. § 36-1-103 (state codification of UCC
purposes and principles). The UCC is not a source of substantive rights in matters of
due process, nor does it address state subject matter jurisdiction in domestic
relations. Therefore, the UCC does not apply to Plaintiff’s arguments.
III.

The Rooker-Feldman and Younger Abstention Doctrines
Plaintiff also objects to the magistrate judge’s interpretation of the Rooker-

Feldman and Younger abstention doctrines. ECF No. 22. In his argument as to the
former, Plaintiff contends that Rule 402 of the Federal Rules of Evidence makes the
doctrine inapplicable unless Defendants received prior permission from this Court, the
Department of State, and the United States Congress before exercising subject
matter jurisdiction over his mother’s case. See id. at 3. As to the latter, Plaintiff
argues that this case falls under the doctrine’s “most narrow and of extraordinary
circumstances” exception. Id. at 3–4. Both of these arguments are misplaced.
First, in his arguments regarding the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, Plaintiff quotes
language that is not found in the cited source material. Compare ECF No. 22 at 3
(stating that a United States district court must grant permission for suits to proceed
against a corporate citizen) with 28 U.S.C. § 1330 (discussing federal court
jurisdiction in actions against foreign states). Ultimately, however, it appears that
Plaintiff has misinterpreted the role of the lower federal courts in examining state
court decisions.

Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, “lower federal courts are

precluded from exercising appellate jurisdiction over final state-court judgments.”
Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 463 (2006). Although there are some limitations to
this doctrine, its application is not tied to prior jurisdictional approval from a federal

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district court, the Department of State, or Congress. See generally Davani v. Va.
Dep’t of Transp., 434 F.3d 712, 718-19 (4th Cir. 2006) (discussing general application
of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and how the doctrine was limited by Exxon Mobile
Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280 (2005)).
Second, as to Plaintiff’s Younger doctrine objection, this Court finds Plaintiff’s
argument to be equally unavailing. The Younger doctrine, “which counsels federalcourt abstention when there is a pending state proceeding, reflects a strong policy
against federal intervention in state judicial processes in the absence of great and
immediate irreparable injury to the federal plaintiff.” Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415,
423 (1979) (citation omitted).

As such, federal courts should not interfere with

ongoing state criminal proceedings “except in the most narrow and extraordinary of
circumstance.”

Gilliam v. Foster, 75 F.3d 881, 903 (4th Cir. 1996).

These

circumstances generally arise when a federal district court finds that a state judicial
proceeding is “motivated by a desire to harass or is conducted in bad faith.” Huffman
v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 611 (1975). Here it seems Plaintiff’s only argument in
favor of this exception is that the state family court lacked subject matter jurisdiction
over his mother’s hearing. There is no indication that the South Carolina court acted
in bad faith or with an intent to harass Plaintiff. Accordingly, this Court finds the
magistrate’s Report and Recommendation accurately summarized and applied the
Rooker-Feldman and Younger doctrines, and Plaintiff’s objections are overruled.
IV.

Judicial Immunity
Finally, Plaintiff raises objections related to the magistrate judge’s findings

regarding Defendants’ immunity from suit. ECF No. 22. In his objections, Plaintiff

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asserts that Judge Smoak waived his right to immunity by presiding over a hearing
without subject matter jurisdiction. See id. at 2–3. Plaintiff’s argument relies heavily
on international law and the UCC. See id.
As the magistrate judge’s Report and Recommendation correctly points out,
judges enjoy absolute immunity from suits arising out of their judicial actions unless
they act in the complete absence of all jurisdiction. ECF No. 19 at 3–4; see, e.g.,
Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9 (1991). To that point, it has long been recognized that
matters involving domestic relations are predominately of state court concern.
Akenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 694–95 (1992). Indeed, the United States
Supreme Court recognizes a special limit on federal subject matter jurisdiction in this
area of law. Id. Thus, having addressed Plaintiff’s arguments regarding the state
court’s jurisdictional limitations above, this Court finds no basis for Plaintiff’s claim
that Judge Edwards and Judge Smoak presided over his mother’s hearing in the
complete absence of all jurisdiction. Additionally, because the alleged misconduct
occurred during judicial proceedings in family court and Plaintiff’s complaints relate to
alleged errors in Defendants’ family court rulings, this Court finds that the magistrate
judge correctly concluded that Defendants are judicially immune.

Therefore,

Plaintiff’s immunity objections are overruled.
Conclusion
After a thorough review of the record, this Court finds that the magistrate
judge’s Report and Recommendation accurately summarizes the case and the
applicable law.

Accordingly, the Report and Recommendation is accepted and

adopted in its entirety.

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IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the claims against Judges Tommy
Edwards and Gerald C. Smoak, Jr. are dismissed without prejudice and without
issuance and service of process.
IT IS SO ORDERED.  

June 9 , 2014
Anderson, South Carolina

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL
Pursuant to Rules 3 and 4 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure,
Plaintiff has the right to appeal this Order within thirty (30) days from the date of its
entry. Failure to meet this deadline, as modified by Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of
Appellate Procedure, will waive the right to appeal.

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