State Farm Fire & Casualty Insurance Company v. Sproull et al
Filing
78
OPINION and ORDER granting in part and denying in part (53) Motion for Summary Judgment in case 7:16-cv-03998-AMQ and in case 7:17-cv-00234. Signed by Honorable A Marvin Quattlebaum, Jr on 7/17/18.Associated Cases: 7:16-cv-03998-AMQ, 7:17-cv-00234-AMQ(alew, )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
SPARTANBURG DIVISION
State Farm Fire & Casualty Insurance
Company,
)
)
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
vs.
)
)
Horace Miller Sproull, III, Personal
)
Representative of the Estate of Horace
)
Miller Sproull, IV,
)
Johnny R. Lee, Personal
)
Representative of the Estate of Joshua Lee, )
Todd Harlan Vande Berg, Personal
)
Representative of the Estate of Sarah
)
Vande Berg, Felicia Ahlborg,
)
LaDonna Campbell, Robert Henry
)
Campbell
)
and Shawn M. Campbell, Personal
)
Representative of the Estate of James
)
Robert Campbell,
)
)
Defendants.
)
)
Johnny R. Lee, Personal Representative
)
of the Estate of Joshua Lee,
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
vs.
)
)
Robert Henry Campbell, LaDonna
)
Campbell,
)
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance )
Company,
)
Defendants.
)
____________________________________)
Case No. 7:16-cv-03998-AMQ
Case No. 7:17-cv-00234-AMQ
OPINION AND ORDER
This is an action for declaratory relief brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201 concerning
claims for insurance coverage arising out of an accident. Before this Court is the Motion for
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Summary Judgment filed by State Farm Fire and Casualty Insurance Company (hereinafter
“State Farm”)1 brought pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (ECF No.
53.) The Court held a hearing on this motion on May 30, 2018, and has considered the
arguments of the parties, as well as the briefing submitted and the entire record in this case. For
the reasons set forth herein, this Court grants in part and denies in part the Motion as set forth
herein.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff State Farm filed this action on December 27, 2016, seeking a declaration
regarding the rights, status and legal relationship of the parties concerning claims for insurance
coverage arising out of an accident that occurred on October 11, 2015. (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 1.) The
accident involved a vehicle owned by LaDonna Campbell and operated by her grandson, James
Robert Campbell, deceased (“James”). The insurance policy at issue in this case was issued by
State Farm to LaDonna and her husband, Robert Campbell, residents of Greenville County,
South Carolina. (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 1.) Jurisdiction is premised upon 28 U.S.C. § 1332 based on
the diversity of citizenship amongst the parties and the amount in controversy exceeding
$75,000.
As alleged in the complaint, on or about October 11, 2015, James was a student at the
University of South Carolina Upstate and resided in Spartanburg County at the time of the
accident.
(ECF No. 1 at ¶ 9.) James was driving a 2014 Ford Mustang owned by his
grandmother when he was involved in a single car accident. (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 9.) Horace Miller
Sproull, IV, Joshua Lee and Sarah Vande Berg, who were passengers, died in the accident.
1
A related matter, case number 7:17-cv-00234, brought by Johnny R. Lee and removed to
federal court was filed against State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company. For the
purposes of this motion, the Court will refer to both entities as “State Farm.”
2
Felicia Ahlborg, who was also a passenger, was injured in the accident, but survived. James also
died in the accident. (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 9.)
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company had issued an automobile liability
policy to LaDonna Campbell which covered the automobile involved in the accident. (ECF No.
1 at ¶ 10.) LaDonna and Robert Campbell were also insured under a State Farm personal liability
umbrella policy, which is described in the record as PLUP SC Policy #4BVG578-5/Forms:
FP/7950/2 (hereinafter the “PLUP SC Policy”). Settlements have been accepted and approved in
state court as it relates to the automobile liability policy and UIM (underinsured) automobile
policy limits and the claims of the guest passengers. (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 12.) Thus, it is the PLUP
SC Policy that is at issue in this case.
State Farm’s complaint for declaratory judgment in this case makes reference to certain
“claims” asserted by the Defendants Johnny R. Lee, Todd Harlan Vande Berg, and Horace
Miller Sproull, III (hereinafter “Defendants”) against LaDonna Campbell and Robert Campbell
for insurance coverage under the PLUP SC Policy. (ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 9, 13.) In its complaint,
State Farm alleges that James was not an insured under the PLUP SC Policy. State Farm also
claims that the policy does not provide coverage for any such claims asserted against LaDonna
and Robert Campbell, including any “potential claim under the Family Purpose Doctrine or
under a theory of negligent entrustment in connection with the use of the vehicle by James
Robert Campbell (deceased) in the above-referenced accident.” (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 13.) State Farm
asserts three “causes of action” in this regard: (1) “James Robert Campbell was not covered
under his grandparents’ personal liability umbrella policy (PLUP);” (2) “there is no valid claim
for negligent entrustment with regard to coverage under the personal liability umbrella policy
issued to LaDonna Campbell and Robert Henry Campbell;” and (3) “there is no valid claim
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under the Family Purpose Doctrine for coverage under the personal liability umbrella policy
issued to LaDonna Campbell and Robert Henry Campbell.” (ECF No. 1.) Because State Farm
contends that the facts and circumstances of the automobile accident do not give rise to claims
under these South Carolina legal doctrines, it asserts that it is entitled to a declaration that no
coverage is available under the PLUP SC Policy in connection with any claims. (ECF No. 1 at ¶
23.)
Previously, the Honorable Mary G. Lewis granted State Farm’s Motion to Consolidate
the instant civil action with Johnny R. Lee, Personal Representative of the Estate of Joshua Lee
v. Robert Henry Campbell et al., Civil Action No. 7:17-00234 (D.S.C) (hereinafter the “Related
Action”), and denied motion to remand filed by Johnny R. Lee concerning diversity jurisdiction
filed in that case. (ECF No. 46.) Additional factual background and procedural history is set forth
in that opinion and order and need not be repeated here. For the purposes of this motion, the
Court highlights that the Related Action was a declaratory judgment action initially filed in state
court by Johnny R. Lee concerning potential additional coverage with regard to the PLUP SC
Policy. The Related Action was subsequently removed to this Court by State Farm.
The
Declaratory Judgment Action filed by State Farm (Case No. 7:16-cv-03998) was designated by
the Court as the lead case for filing purposes. (ECF No. 47.)
On December 4, 2017, Plaintiff State Farm filed the instant Motion for Summary
Judgment.2 (ECF No. 53.) Defendants filed a Response in Opposition to Summary Judgment on
February 23, 2018. (ECF No. 64.) State Farm’s Reply to the Response in Opposition to the
Motion for Summary Judgment was filed on March 9, 2018. (ECF No. 67.)
2
Although State Farm did not formally file a Motion for Summary Judgment in the Related
Action, counsel for State Farm has indicated to the Court that it intended to do so, and the parties
filed responses to the Motion in both cases. The Court’s order will be entered in both cases and
the Court’s reasoning applies in both matters to the extent the issues are relevant and dispositive.
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STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Summary Judgment:
A court shall grant summary judgment if the moving party shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(a). In deciding whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, the evidence of the
non-moving party is to be believed and all justifiable inferences must be drawn in his favor. See
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). The moving party has the burden of
proving that summary judgment is appropriate. Once the moving party makes this showing,
however, the opposing party may not rest upon mere allegations or denials, but rather must, by
affidavits or other means permitted by the Rule, set forth specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56; see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317
(1986). A litigant “cannot create a genuine issue of material fact through mere speculation or the
building of one inference upon another.” Beale v. Hardy, 769 F.2d 213, 214 (4th Cir.1985).
Further, at the summary judgment stage, the judge is not to weigh the evidence, but rather
determine if there is a genuine issue of material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 249 (1986). If no material factual disputes remain, then summary judgment should be
granted against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an
element essential to that party’s case, and on which the party bears the burden of proof. Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Thus, at the summary judgment phase, “[t]he
pertinent inquiry is whether there are any genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved
only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party.”
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Variety Stores, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 17-1503, 2018 WL 1916320, at *3 (4th Cir.
Apr. 24, 2018)(internal citation and quotation marks omitted). “[W]here the record taken as a
whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, disposition by
summary judgment is appropriate.” Teamsters Joint Council No. 83 v. Centra, Inc., 947 F.2d
115, 119 (4th Cir.1996).
Declaratory Judgment:
The Federal Declaratory Judgment Act provides this Court with significant discretionary
power to “declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such
declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be sought.” Centennial Life Ins. Co. v.
Poston, 88 F.3d 255, 256 (4th Cir. 1996)(citing 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a)). Federal courts frequently
use federal declaratory judgment actions to resolve “disputes over liability insurance coverage,
even in advance of judgment against the insured on the underlying claim for which coverage is
sought.” Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Madison at Park W. Prop. Owners Ass’n, Inc., 834 F. Supp. 2d
437, 442–43 (D.S.C. 2011)(internal citations and quotations omitted).
The Fourth Circuit has explained that a declaratory judgment action is appropriate: (1)
“when the judgment will serve a useful purpose in clarifying and settling the legal relations in
issue,” and (2) “when it will terminate and afford relief from the uncertainty, insecurity, and
controversy giving rise to the proceeding.” Centennial Life Ins. Co. v. Poston, 88 F.3d 255, 256
(4th Cir. 1996)(internal citations and quotations omitted). The Court must also consider whether
the declaratory judgment controversy can be better settled in the pending state court action, as
well as the general principles of federalism, efficiency and comity when making its discretionary
decision whether to entertain the declaratory judgment action. Id. at 256-267.
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After carefully
considering the factors above, the Court finds it appropriate to issue a declaratory judgment
relative to a narrow coverage issue presented by State Farm’s Motion as further addressed below.
ANALYSIS
State Farm’s Motion for Summary Judgment raises three arguments, each of which the
Court will consider in turn.
A. Whether LaDonna and Robert Henry Campbell’s grandson, James Robert
Campbell was an “insured” under the PLUP SC Policy.
State Farm moves for summary judgment on the grounds that James was not an insured
under the PLUP SC Policy. (ECF No. 53-1 at 4.) The PLUP SC Policy contains the following
relevant provisions:
COVERAGE L – PERSONAL LIABILITY
If a claim is made or suit is brought against an insured for damages because of a
loss for which the insured is legally liable and to which this policy applies, we
will pay on behalf of the insured, the damages that exceed the retained limit. The
most we will pay for such loss is the Coverage L Limit of Liability, as shown on
the declarations page, regardless of the number of insureds who may be liable,
claims made, or persons injured.
DEFINITIONS
6. “insured” means:
a. you and your relatives whose primary residence is your household;
b. any other human being under the age of 21 whose primary residence is your
household and who is in the care of a person described in 6.a.
c. any other person or organization to the extent they are liable for the use of an
automobile, recreational motor vehicle or watercraft by a person included in
6.a. or 6.b.
As noted above, the relevant policy language defines “insured” to include “you and your
relatives whose primary residence is your household.” (ECF No. 53-2 at 8.) “Relative” is
defined in the policy as “any person who is related to you by blood, adoption or marriage.” (ECF
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No. 53-2 at 9.)
The narrow question presented here is one of coverage under the PLUP SC
Policy. If LaDonna and Robert Campbell are the named insured on the PLUP SC policy, the
Court must determine whether James, who caused the underlying accident was a primary
resident of their household, thereby qualifying as an “insured” under the PLUP SC Policy.
Under South Carolina law, insurance policies are subject to the general rules of contract
construction. B.L.G. Enters., Inc. v. First Fin. Ins. Co., 334 S.C. 529, 535, 514 S.E.2d 327, 330
(1999). The Court must give the policy language its plain, ordinary, and popular meaning. Id.
When a contract is unambiguous, clear, and explicit, it must be construed according to the terms
the parties have used. Id. Further, “[w]here the terms of a contract are clear and unambiguous as
a matter of law, its construction is for the court.” Black v. Freeman, 274 S.C. 272, 273, 262
S.E.2d 879, 880 (1980). The Court’s only role here is to interpret the insurance policy provisions
according to its plain meaning and South Carolina law.
The relevant test for determining whether James was a resident of the LaDonna and
Robert Campbell household under South Carolina law is set forth in State Farm Fire & Casualty
Company v. Breazell, 324 S.C. 228, 478 S.E.2d 831 (1996). In that declaratory judgment action
to determine coverage under a homeowner’s insurance policy for the death of a foster child
living with the insureds, the South Carolina Supreme Court held that the determination of
residence should be based on three factors: “1) living under the same roof; 2) in a close, intimate
and informal relationship, and 3) where the intended duration of the relationship is likely to be
substantial, where it is consistent with the informality of the relationship, and from which it is
reasonable to conclude that the parties would consider the relationship in contracting about such
matters as insurance or in their conduct in reliance thereon.” State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v.
Breazell, 324 S.C. 228, 231, 478 S.E.2d 831, 832 (1996).
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Based on the record and the applicable law, the Court finds that James’s primary
residence was not his grandparent’s household. It is undisputed that James Campbell was a
student a University of South Carolina Upstate. (ECF No. 64 at 1.) Testimony from LaDonna
Campbell indicates that James Campbell did not go to his grandparents’ house to spend the night
and was living in an apartment in Spartanburg at the relevant time. (ECF No. 53-4 at 13, 15.)
She testified that James did not come over to their house to do any type of work nor did he pay
bills there. (ECF No. 53-4 at 14.) James’s father, Robert Campbell, testified that James was subleasing an apartment in Spartanburg while he was in college and at the time of the incident. (ECF
No. 53-6 at 13.) Otherwise, his father testified that he lived at home with his parents. (ECF No.
53-6 at 13-14.) Robert Campbell also testified that James never went to his grandparents’ house
to spend the night. (ECF No. 53-6 at 15.) Defendants do not dispute this testimony. In fact, at
the hearing in this matter, Defendants conceded that State Farm had the better argument on this
point. Therefore, the Court finds, as a matter of law, that James Robert Campbell, was not an
“insured” under the PLUP SC Policy issued to LaDonna and Robert Campbell because he was
not a relative “whose primary residence” was in their household.
B. Whether LaDonna and Robert Campbell are potentially liable under the Family
Purpose Doctrine in South Carolina in connection with the accident.
State Farm also moves for summary judgment on the ground that “LaDonna Campbell
and Robert Campbell are not potentially liable under the Family Purpose Doctrine in South
Carolina in connection with this accident.” (ECF No. 53-1 at 4.) State Farm contends that the
evidence in the record, including the deposition testimony of several family members, does not
support a claim that LaDonna and Robert Campbell are liable under the Family Purpose Doctrine
as James was only a permissive user of the vehicle and was not a member of the household with
general authority to use the vehicle for general family use. (ECF No. 53-1 at 17.) The doctrine is
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a species of agency liability “based on the theory that one ‘who has made it his business to
furnish a car for the use of his family is liable as principal or master when such business is being
carried out by a family member using the vehicle for its intended purpose[.]’” Campbell v.
Paschal, 290 S.C. 1, 8, 347 S.E.2d 892, 897 (Ct. App. 1986). Where the doctrine applies, the
vehicle’s owner is liable for the negligence of the family member having general authority to
operate the vehicle for family general use. Id. The moving Defendants oppose the motion,
arguing that LaDonna and Robert Campbell “could also potentially be held liable for this
accident under the family purpose doctrine.” (ECF No. 64 at 10.) Defendants argue that Robert
and LaDonna’s liability under the doctrine should be one for the jury in that evidence in the
record indicates that the vehicle was made available for use by the family and extended family.
(ECF No. 64 at 12.)
Inasmuch as James Robert Campbell is not an “insured” under the policy, pursuant to
“Coverage L – Personal Liability” of the PLUP SC Policy, insurance coverage is only available
for “a loss for which the insured [either LaDonna Campbell or Robert Henry Campbell] is
legally liable.” Thus, either LaDonna or Robert Campbell would have to be found personally
liable in order for there to be insurance coverage under the PLUP SC Policy. (ECF No. 53-2 at
12.) Although State Farm asks the Court to enter summary judgment in its favor and issue an
order declaring that the PLUP SC Policy does not provide insurance coverage for the claims
under the Family Purpose Doctrine brought by Defendants, its Motion necessarily asks the Court
to make a preemptive ruling on that issue of liability as it pertains to state law tort theories.
More specifically, State Farm’s Motion asks this Court to determine whether La Donna and
Robert Campbell are liable under the Family Purpose Doctrine. The negligence action, however,
was not brought before this Court. Those claims were brought in a later filed underlying state
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court action, Johnny Lee, individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Joshua
Lee vs. Robert Henry Campbell, LaDonna Campbell and Estate of James Campbell, in the South
Carolina Court of Common Pleas, County of Spartanburg, Case No. 2018-CP-42-00646. This
Court takes judicial notice of same. Fed. R.Evid. 201(b)(2).
In ruling in a declaratory judgment action, the Court should not decide issues extending
beyond coverage, or determine disputed factual issues that are key to an insured’s liability in an
underlying suit. See Dann Marine Towing, LC v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins., Co., No.
CIV.A.2:01-2766-18, 2002 WL 34455167, at *2–3 (D.S.C. Apr. 23, 2002)(internal citations and
quotations omitted)(“It is inappropriate to use the declaratory judgment statute in what would
otherwise be a run-of-the-mill negligence action.”); Johnson v. McCuskey, 72 F. App’x 475, 478
(7th Cir. 2003)(“Declaratory judgments are not meant simply to proclaim that one party is liable
to another.”). Further, the declaratory judgment statute should not be used to “try a controversy
by piecemeal, or try particular issues without settling the entire controversy, or to interfere with
an action which has already been instituted.” Allied-Gen. Nuclear Servs. v. Commonwealth
Edison Co., 675 F.2d 610, 611 (4th Cir. 1982)(internal citations and quotations omitted). It
should not be used to resolve factual disputes or adjudicate LaDonna and James Campbell’s
potential liability in an underlying suit or for underlying claims. Those matters are the subject of
a lawsuit in state court, in which Defendants directly allege a cause of action for liability under
the Family Purpose Doctrine. That lawsuit remains pending. Indeed, “declaratory judgments to
resolve issues in pending tort cases should be rare.” Nautilus Ins. Co. v. BSA Ltd. P’ship, 602 F.
Supp. 2d 641, 649 (D. Md. 2009); see also Wood v. Walton, No. CIV. WDQ-09-3398, 2011 WL
3439308, at *5 (D. Md. Aug. 4, 2011)(staying declaratory action pending the resolution of a tort
case in order to prevent inconsistencies and noting that both actions required resolution of the
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same legal issues which could be decided differently between the federal court judge and a jury
in the underlying tort case).
State Farm may be correct in its argument about the Family Purpose Doctrine. This
Order should not be construed as suggesting otherwise. However, that is a matter for the state
court, not this Court. For these reasons, the Court declines to grant summary judgment as it
pertains to State Farm’s argument on LaDonna and Robert Campbell’s potential liability under
the Family Purpose Doctrine or make any factual findings that may be made, and may be
material, in the pending state court action at this stage of this proceeding.3
C. Whether LaDonna and Robert Campbell are potentially liable under South
Carolina law under a theory of negligent entrustment.
The third issue raised in connection with State Farm’s Motion for Summary Judgment is
whether LaDonna and Robert Campbell are potentially liable under the South Carolina tort law
theory of negligent entrustment. (ECF No. 53-1 at 17). State Farm maintains that the record in
this case demonstrates as a matter of law that the elements of negligent entrustment are not
present in this case. (ECF No. 53-1 at 19.) Relying primarily on the case Gadson v. ECO
Services of South Carolina, Inc., 374 S.C. 171, 648 S.E.2d 585 (2007), State Farm takes the
position that knowledge of or knowledge imputable to the owner that the driver was either
addicted to intoxicants or had a habit of drinking is a required element of negligent entrustment.
(ECF No. 53-1 at 17.) State Farm argues that the record evidence does not show that LaDonna
and Robert had such knowledge concerning James. (ECF No. 53-1 at 19.) State Farm further
3
Based on the briefs, this Court was under the initial impression that the parties were in
agreement in seeking a ruling from this Court, based on the record presented from informal
discovery, on coverage and liability issues as it pertains to the PLUP Policy. It does not appear,
however, that the parties are in agreement on what they deem it appropriate for this Court to
address. Given this procedural setting, the Court cannot address the potential liability issues
relative to the PLUP Policy.
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asserts that “there is no evidence that he was intoxicated or was likely to drive while
intoxicated.” (ECF No. 53-1 at 19; ECF No. 67 at 7.) Thus, it claims it is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law. (ECF No. 53-1 at 19.) On the other hand, the moving Defendants argue that the
doctrine of negligent entrustment is not so limited and that the doctrine has been described in
several South Carolina cases in broader terms which could allow for a negligent entrustment
case, for example, for knowledge of poor driving habits or the like. (ECF No. 64 at 6.)
The Court has reviewed the cases cited by the parties and has independently reviewed the
case law on the subject matter to discern the state of the law on this issue. To sum the point, as
the Honorable Henry M. Herlong has noted, it appears that the “South Carolina Supreme Court
has never determined whether the negligent entrustment factors set forth in Gadson limit the
claim in South Carolina to situations only involving an intoxicated driver.” Becker v. Estes Exp.
Lines, Inc., No. CIV.A. 8:07-715-HMH, 2008 WL 701388, at *2–3 (D.S.C. Mar. 13, 2008)
(considering Gadson and status of South Carolina law on negligent entrustment). Instead, in
Gadson, the South Carolina Supreme Court only stated that it declined to adopt a broader
definition of negligent entrustment as set forth in the Restatement based on the set of facts before
the Court. Gadson, 374 S.C. at 177, 648 S.E.2d at 588; see also Speer v. Ardovini, No. CV 4:0818-TLW-TER, 2010 WL 11531445, at *5 (D.S.C. Aug. 9, 2010) (“This Court finds that these
cases are sufficient to establish that South Carolina case law permits a claim for negligent
entrustment where intoxicants are not involved.”)
Likewise, this Court declines to find that South Carolina courts have so limited negligent
entrustment claims to situations involving an owner’s entrustment of a vehicle to an intoxicated
driver.
Further, the Court declines to assess LaDonna and Robert Campbell’s knowledge,
whether alcohol or recklessness caused the accident, or decide LaDonna and Robert Campbell’s
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potential liability for negligent entrustment. Those factual matters are directly at issue in the state
tort action referenced above. For the reasons set forth above concerning State Farm’s claim for
liability on the issue of the Family Purpose Doctrine, and for the reasons set forth more
specifically herein concerning the state of the law on negligent entrustment, the motion for
summary judgment on the negligent entrustment issue is denied.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, State Farm’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 53)
is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. For the reason stated above, the Court declares that,
under the terms of the PLUP SC Policy and South Carolina law, James Campbell is not an
“insured” under LaDonna and Robert Campbell’s PLUP SC Policy, and grants the motion in that
regard. All other relief sought in the Motion for Summary Judgment is expressly denied and the
Court declines to make any further declarations at this time.
IT IS SO DECLARED AND ORDERED.
/s/ A. Marvin Quattlebaum, Jr.
United States District Judge
July 17, 2018
Greenville, South Carolina
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