Smith v. Greenwood, City of

Filing 95

ORDER RULING ON REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS granting 69 Motion for Summary Judgment filed by James H Mathis, Mathis Plumbing & Heating Co Inc, granting 70 Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Steven J Brown, Ronnie Powell, Greenwood, City of, Lawrence Ouzts, adopting 88 Report and Recommendations. Signed by Honorable J Michelle Childs on 3/22/12. (awil)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
ANDERSON/GREENWOOD DIVISION
Julia B. Smith,

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Plaintiff,
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v.
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City of Greenwood; Mathis Plumbing &
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Heating Co., Inc.; and James H. Mathis,
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Steven J. Brown, Lawrence Ouzts, and
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Ronnie Powell, in their individual
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capacities,
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Defendants.
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___________________________________ )

Civil Action No. 8:09-cv-02061-JMC
OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is now before the court upon the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation
(“Report”), [Doc. 88], filed on February 10, 2012, recommending that Defendants James H. Mathis
(“Mathis”) and Mathis Plumbing & Heating Co., Inc.’s (collectively the “Mathis Defendants”)
Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 69] and Defendants City of Greenwood (the “City”), Steven
J. Brown (“Brown”), Lawrence Ouzts (“Ouzts”), and Ronnie Powell’s (“Powell”) (collectively the
“Greenwood Defendants”) Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 70] be granted. Plaintiff’s
Amended Complaint sets forth a cause of action for race discrimination and retaliation pursuant to
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (“Title VII”), interference with
contractual relations,1 and civil conspiracy in relation to the termination of her employment with the
City.

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In her response in opposition to the Mathis Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff
stipulated to the dismissal of her intentional interference with contractual relations claim.
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claim for intentional interference with contractual relations is dismissed with
prejudice.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation is made in accordance with 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule 73.02 for the District of South Carolina. The Magistrate Judge
makes only a recommendation to this court. The recommendation has no presumptive weight. The
responsibility to make a final determination remains with this court. See Mathews v. Weber, 423
U.S. 261, 270-71 (1976). The court is charged with making a de novo determination of those
portions of the Report and Recommendation to which specific objections are made, and the court
may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation or
recommit the matter with instructions. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff filed objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report. [Doc. 91]. Objections to the
Report must be specific. Failure to file specific objections constitutes a waiver of a party’s right to
further judicial review, including appellate review, if the recommendation is accepted by the district
judge. See United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91, 94 & n.4 (4th Cir. 1984). In the absence of
specific objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report, this court is not required to give any
explanation for adopting the recommendation. See Camby v. Davis, 718 F.2d 198, 199 (4th Cir.
1983). The facts as viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff are discussed in the Report and
Recommendation. The court concludes, upon its own careful review of the record, that the
Magistrate Judge’s factual summary is accurate. The court adopts this summary as its own, and will
only reference facts pertinent to the analysis of Plaintiff’s objections. Further, the Report and
Recommendation sets forth the relevant legal standards on this matter, and the court incorporates
the Magistrate Judge’s Report herein without a recitation.
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Civil Conspiracy
Plaintiff objects that the Magistrate Judge erred in finding that the record contains no
evidence that Mathis, Brown, Ouzts, and Powell joined together for the purpose of injuring Plaintiff.
Specifically, Plaintiff objects that the Magistrate Judge appears not to have considered the “Firriolo
situation,” an incident which seems to have involved a controversy over permits for work done by
Mathis’s company. Plaintiff alleges that “it is too much of a coincidence that Mr. Mathis just
happened to complain about Plaintiff [to Brown] after [Plaintiff] wrote a statement for Mr. Firriolo.”
[Doc. 91]. Contrary to Plaintiff’s assertion, the Magistrate Judge expressly addressed Plaintiff’s
argument regarding the Firriolo situation in the Report and noted that Plaintiff has stated that she was
just guessing about Mathis’s involvement in her termination and that she was not aware of any
meetings involving Mathis where Plaintiff’s termination was discussed.
Plaintiff further argues that contrary to the Magistrate Judge’s finding in the Report, Mathis
identified Plaintiff in his complaint about Plaintiff’s alleged act of continuing with a personal phone
call while Mathis waited for service. In support of her argument, Plaintiff cites to Mathis’s
deposition testimony in which he states that he identified Plaintiff in making his complaint, but that
he did not mention her name. However, the Magistrate Judge’s Report is consistent with Mathis’s
deposition testimony and merely notes that Mathis stated that he did not identity Plaintiff by name
when he complained about the poor service that Plaintiff allegedly provided.
The court finds that Plaintiff’s objections regarding her claim for civil conspiracy are mere
restatements of the arguments made in her response in opposition to the Mathis Defendants’ Motion
for Summary Judgment. The court finds that the Magistrate Judge appropriately addressed

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Plaintiff’s arguments in the Report and that Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on
Plaintiff’s civil conspiracy claim.
Race Discrimination
Plaintiff objects that the Magistrate Judge erred in finding that Plaintiff failed to establish that
the City’s proffered reason for Plaintiff’s termination was merely pretext. Specifically, Plaintiff
argues that the City’s assertion that it terminated Plaintiff’s employment because she made personal
telephone calls at work is merely pretext because a white employee also made personal telephone
calls at work, but was not terminated.
Plaintiff further argues that her position as officer manager was not appropriately
acknowledged by her supervisors in that they would channel information through another employee
rather than telling Plaintiff. Plaintiff argues that she complained to Powell that she felt as if a lower
ranking employee was her supervisor despite Plaintiff’s title as office manager, but Powell “would
just deny the matter.” [Doc. 91]. Plaintiff argues that a lower ranking employee did not properly
inform Plaintiff when the employee left early for the day and that her complaints about these actions
were not appropriately addressed. Plaintiff argues that she was not able to accumulate “comp time”
although another employee was able to do so. Plaintiff further argues that she was ostracized and
ignored, verbally attacked, criticized for her hair styles, treated in a mean way, and given a less
favorable parking spot than an employee with less seniority. Plaintiff argues that Ouzts was rude
to Plaintiff’s sister. Plaintiff also argues that Powell once stated to Plaintiff, “I am good to you
people.” Plaintiff asserts that she felt Powell’s comment referred to her race. Finally Plaintiff asserts
that when she approached Brown about a raise, Brown compared Plaintiff’s pay to the pay of two
black females who did not work in Plaintiff’s department.
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Although Plaintiff has presented the court with numerous examples of alleged inappropriate
treatment related to her employment, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate to the court that the City’s
articulated reason for the termination of Plaintiff’s employment was false and that discrimination
was the actual motivation for the termination. As the Magistrate Judge noted, Plaintiff has admitted
to making personal phone calls from work. Plaintiff argues that other employees made personal calls
at work and were not terminated. However, Plaintiff has failed to provide the court with any
evidence that her use of the work phone to make personal phone calls was of the same nature and
frequency as that which she alleges of other employees or that her supervisors were aware that other
employees were making such calls. Accordingly, the court finds that Plaintiff’s race discrimination
claim fails.
Retaliation
Plaintiff objects that the Magistrate Judge erred in finding that Plaintiff failed to establish a
prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII. Plaintiff further reasserts her objection that the
Magistrate Judge erred in finding that Plaintiff failed to establish that the City’s proffered reason for
terminating her employment was merely pretext. The court finds that Plaintiff’s objections regarding
her retaliation are a reiteration of the arguments made in her response in opposition to the
Greenwood Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. Further, as discussed above, Plaintiff has
failed to demonstrate that the City’s articulated reason for the termination of Plaintiff’s employment
was merely pretext. The court finds that the Magistrate Judge appropriately addressed Plaintiff’s
arguments in the Report and that Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s
retaliation claim.

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CONCLUSION
It is therefore ORDERED that Defendants James H. Mathis and Mathis Plumbing & Heating
Co., Inc.’s Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 69] and Defendants City of Greenwood, Steven J.
Brown, Lawrence Ouzts, and Ronnie Powell’s Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 70] be
GRANTED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

United States District Judge
March 22, 2012
Greenville, South Carolina

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