Creamer v. Williamston, Town of

Filing 29

ORDER granting in part and denying in part Defendant's 17 Second Partial Motion to Dismiss. Signed by Honorable G Ross Anderson, Jr on 7/16/12.(kmca)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
ANDERSON DIVISION
Ashley E. Creamer,

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Plaintiff,
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v.
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Town of Williamston,
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Defendant.
)
________________________________________)

C/A No.: 8:12-CV-00501-GRA-JDA
ORDER
(Written Opinion)

This matter is before the Court on Defendants’ Second Partial Motion to
Dismiss, filed on March 23, 2012. ECF No. 17. Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s
breach of contract claim is subject to dismissal on the pleadings under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. Defendant also contends that
punitive damages are not recoverable against the Defendant as a matter of law.
Plaintiff responded in opposition. For the reasons stated below, Defendant’s Motion
is DENIED in part and GRANTED in part.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) provides that a pleading must contain a
“short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”
It has been noted that “[a] motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted is a challenge to the legal sufficiency of a
complaint, as governed by Rule 8.” Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Innovative Mktg., Inc.,
654 F. Supp. 2d 378, 384 (D. Md. 2009). When presented with a Rule 12(b)(6)
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motion to dismiss, the court must restrict its inquiry to the sufficiency of the
complaint rather than “resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim,
or the applicability of defenses.” Republican Party of North Carolina v. Martin, 980
F.2d 943, 952 (4th Cir. 1992). To withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, “a complaint
must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that
is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
The United States Supreme Court noted, in Iqbal, that “[a] claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged,” id.
(citing Twombly 550 U.S. at 556), and stated that “[d]etermining whether a
complaint states a plausible claim for relief will . . . be a context-specific task,
requiring the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense,”
id. at 663–64 (citing Twombly 550 U.S. at 556). The Court added that “the tenet
that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in the complaint is
inapplicable to legal conclusions,” and that, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a
cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. at
678. The Court further noted that “[w]hen there are well-pleaded factual allegations,
a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give
rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id. at 679.
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This Court, after a careful review of the pleadings, holds that the Plaintiff has
met her burden under Iqbal, and concludes that the complaint pleads sufficient facts
for which this Court can infer a plausible claim for relief. Therefore, the Court denies
this part of Defendant’s Motion.

Additionally, Plaintiff conceded that punitive

damages are not available in her case.

Thus, the Court grants this part of

Defendant’s Motion.
Furthermore, Plaintiff alleges, in her response to Defendant’s Motion, that her
complaint states facts sufficient to assert a claim of breach of an implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing. The implied covenant claim is not mentioned in Plaintiff’s
Amended Complaint. As such, the Court declines to address this issue at this time.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is DENIED in
part and GRANTED in part.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

July 16, 2012
Anderson, South Carolina

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NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL
Plaintiff has the right to appeal this Order within thirty (30) days from the date
of the entry of this Order, pursuant to Rules 3 and 4 of the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure. Failure to meet this deadline, as modified by Rule 4 of the Federal Rules
of Appellate Procedure, will waive the right to appeal.

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