Fink v. FCI Williamsburg

Filing 78

ORDER DISMISSING this action for lack of jurisdiction to address the merits of the 26 30 43 57 58 66 motions filed by the parties. Signed by Honorable Richard M Gergel on 7/24/13. (kmca)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA

ANDERSON DIVISION

)

Randy Fink,

)
)

Plaintiff,

No. 8: 12-cv-02221-RMG

)
)

v.

ORDER

)
)

Warden FCI Williamsburg, Chief
Executive Officer, CEO, Federal
Correctional Institute, Williamsburg, SC,

)
)
)
)

Defendant.

)

This matter comes before the Court with several issues pending: Defendant's motion for
dismissal or, in the alternative, for summary judgment, (Dkt. No. 26), as well as five motions by
Plaintiff, (Dkt. Nos. 30, 43, 57, 58, and 66).

For the reasons set forth below, the Court

DISMISSES this action because Plaintiffs requests for injunctive and declaratory relief have
been rendered moot by events occurring since his initial filing.

Background
Plaintiff Randy Fink alleges several violations of his constitutional rights and asserts that
he is entitled to relief pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). (Dkt. No.1). Plaintiff is a prisoner in the custody of the
Federal Correctional Institute, ("FCI"), in Tallahassee, Florida, and proceeds pro se. (Dkt. Nos.
1, 73). He alleges that he has been prescribed a single-cell placement due to his paruresis, a
medical condition colloquially called "shy-bladder syndrome." (Dkt. No. 1 at 3). Plaintiff
further alleges that he suffers from mental illness and was under a court-ordered commitment
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4245. (Id. at 4).

The events underlying Plaintiffs Bivens claim began when Plaintiff was transferred to a
medium-security institution, FCr Williamsburg, on June 29,2012. (Jd. at 9-10). Plaintiff claims
that he advised officials there of his prescription to be housed in a single cell, but FCr
Williamsburg officials nonetheless placed him in a shared cell with another inmate. (ld. at 10).
Plaintiff alleges he received a series of "unjust" incident reports at his previous incarceration
facility as well as at FCI Williamsburg due to his inability to share a cell with another inmate.
(ld. at 9, 12). Plaintiff alleges that, as a result of these incident reports, he was wrongly placed in

a segregation cell. (ld. at 12).
Plaintiff now seeks declaratory judgment and injunctive relief. (Dkt. Nos. 1 at 2, 11).
Specifically, he seeks six declarations relating to his medical needs and psychiatric commitment.
(Dkt. No. 11). Plaintiff also seeks injunctive relief compelling FCI Williamsburg to comply with
his single-cell prescription, or to comply with his section 4245 psychiatric commitment order.
(ld.).

Further, Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief requiring FCI Williamsburg to allow him to

respond to the allegedly wrongful incident reports, as well as an order preventing Fcr
Williamsburg from transferring him to another general population prison. (ld.).
Since the commencement of this action on August 8, 2012, Plaintiff has been transferred
twice more.

He was initially returned to his previous place of confinement, Coleman

Correctional Complex-Low, in March 2013. (Dkt. No. 52). At some point prior to June 24,
2013, Plaintiff was transferred again. (Dkt. No. 73). He remains at this latest location, FCI
Tallahassee, an administrative security level prison. (ld).
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) DSC, this matter was
referred to a United States Magistrate Judge for all pretrial proceedings. On August 8, 2012,
Plaintiff filed a complaint against the Chief Executive Officer, CEO, of FCI Williamsburg. (Dkt.

2

No.1). Defendant filed a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for swnmary judgment, on
December 18, 2012. (Dkt. No. 26). Plaintiff then filed several motions: a motion for "exigent
ruling on declaratory jUdgments one and two," on January 1,2013, (Dkt. No. 30); a motion for a
preliminary injunction and swnmary judgment, on February 21,2013, (Dkt. No. 43); a motion to
"expedite ruling on motion for swnmary judgment on i~unctive relief five" or, in the alternative,
a motion "to supplement emergency motion for preliminary injunction" on April 15,2013, (Dkt.
No. 57); a motion for "authenticity validation check," on April 15, 2013, (Dkt. No. 58); and a
motion to supplement the motion for preliminary i~unction, on May 23, 2013, (Dkt. No. 66).
The Magistrate Judge issued a Report and Recommendation, ("R&R,"), on June 19,2013. (Dkt.
No. 70). I Plaintiff failed to file any objections to the Magistrate Judge's R&R.
Legal Standard

The Magistrate Judge makes only a recommendation to this Court. This recommendation
has no presumptive weight, and the responsibility for making a final determination remains with
this Court. Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261,270-71 (1976). This Court is charged with making
a de novo determination of those portions of the R&R to which specific objection is made, and
this Court may "accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations
made by the magistrate judge." 28 U.S.c. § 636(b)(l).
Federal jurisdictional depends on the existence of a case or controversy. See U.S. Const.
art. III; see also Daimler Chrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 352 (2006).

An actual

controversy must exist at all stages of review. Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520
U.S. 43, 67 (1997). Where events subsequent to the filing of a case resolve the dispute, the

I The Magistrate Judge's R&R recommended that this Court grant Defendant's motion for summary judgment due
to Plaintiff's failure to exhaust his available administrative remedies. Though this Court reaches the same result as
that recommended in the R&R, this Court does not reach the merits of the parties' motions, and instead dismisses
Plaintiff's claims for injunctive and declaratory relief on the basis ofmootness.

3

doctrine of mootness calls for dismissing an action. "Simply stated, a case is moot when the
issues presented are no longer 'live' or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the
outcome." Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 496 (1969).
In reviewing these pleadings, the Court is mindful of Plaintiff s pro se status. This Court
is charged with liberally construing the pleadings of a pro se litigant. See, e.g., De'Lonta v.
Angelone, 330 F.3d 630, 633 (4th Cir.2003). The requirement of a liberal construction does not

mean, however, that the Court can ignore a plaintiff's clear failure to allege facts that set forth a
cognizable claim, or that a court must assume the existence of a genuine issue of material fact
where none exists. See United States v. Wilson, 699 F.3d 789, 797 (4th Cir. 2012).
Discussion

The Fourth Circuit has long held that a prisoner transfer moots requests for declaratory
and injunctive relief. See, e.g., Williams v. Griffin, 952 F.2d 820, 823 (4th Cir. 1991); Taylor v.
Rogers, 781 F.2d 1047, 1048 n.1 (4th Cir. 1986); Magee v. Waters, 810 F.2d 451,452 (4th Cir.

1987).

When Plaintiff was transferred from FCI Williamsburg to Coleman Correctional

Complex-Low and subsequently to FC! Tallahassee, his claims for injunctive and declaratory
relief against this Defendant were rendered moot. Accordingly, this Court lacks jurisdiction to
address the merits of the motions filed by the parties and dismissal is necessary.
Conclusion

(!:oo

:::::~s:::;:ve,the Court DISMISSES

Richard Mark Gergel
United States District Judge
July '2J/,2013
Charleston, South Carolina

4