Vaughn v. State, The et al

Filing 104

ORDER adopting 100 Report and Recommendation of Magistrate Judge Bruce Howe Hendricks; denying 37 Motion to Amend/Correct; denying 52 Motion for Summary Judgment; denying 69 Motion in Limine; granting 82 Motion f or Summary Judgment; denying 13 Motion for Preliminary Injunction. Plaintiff's claims made pursuant 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are dismissed with prejudice. Furthermore, the Court declines to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over any remaining state causes of action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) and such claims are dismissed without prejudice. Signed by Honorable Richard M Gergel on 9/10/2013.(ssam, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA

CHARLESTON DIVISION

Eamest Vaughn, Sr.
Plaintiff,

v.
Deputy C.S. Whitfield; and
Deputy M. W. Hunnicutt,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

No. 8: 12-cv-2405-RMG

ORDER

PlaintiffEamest E. Vaughn, Sr., a pre-trial detainee of Anderson County, South Carolina,
brings this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action pro se alleging that Defendants violated his constitutional
rights under the Fourth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments by engaging in improper searches
and seizures when detaining and arresting him on April 1, 2011, and again on June 7, 2011.
Plaintiff also alleges deliberate indifference, misconduct in office, and gross negligence.
This matter is before the Court on the Report and Recommendation (R & R) of the
Magistrate Judge recommending this Court grant Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment
as to illegal search and seizure claims, false arrest and/or malicious prosecution claims, and
claims for damages against Defendants in their official capacity. (Dkt. No. 100.) The
Magistrate Judge further recommends that Plaintiff's state law claims be dismissed and
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Motion in
Limine, and Motion to Amend Motion for Preliminary Injunction be denied. (Jd.)

Background

Plaintiffs original Complaint names as Defendants: the State of South Carolina, the
Anderson County Solicitor's Office, Assistant Solicitor Lauren Hogan, the Anderson County
Sheriffs Department, Deputy C.S. Whitfield, Deputy M.W. Hunnicutt, and Narcotics Detective
Brad McGuire. (Dkt. No. 1.) On September 25,2012, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint
eliminating Brad McGuire as a named Defendant (Dkt. No. 10), and a Motion for Preliminary
Injunction. (Dkt. No. 13.) By Order dated February 5, 2013, (Dkt. No. 79), this Court dismissed
Plaintiffs claims against the State of South Carolina, the Anderson County Sheriffs
Department, the Anderson County Solicitor's Office, and Assistant Solicitor Lauren Hogan.
Plaintiff filed his Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 52) on January 3, 2013.
Defendants filed their Response in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment on
March 5, 2013. (Dkt. No. 83). Defendants filed their Motion for Summary Judgment on March
5,2013. (Dkt. No. 82.) Plaintiff filed seven Responses in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment. (Dkt. Nos. 86, 87, 89, 92, 93, 94, 95.)
Pursuant to 28 U.S.c. § 636(b)(1) and Local Rule 73.02(B)(2)(e) DSC, this matter was
referred to a Magistrate Judge for pretrial matters. On July 30,2013, the Magistrate Judge
issued an R & R. Neither party filed objections.
Legal Standard

The Magistrate Judge makes only a recommendation to this Court. The recommendation
has no presumptive weight, and the responsibility to make a final determination remains with the
Court. Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261,270-71 (1976). The Court may "accept, reject, or
modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate," 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1), and need not give any explanation for adopting the R & R in the absence of specific

2

objections by the parties. See Camby v. Davis, 718 F.2d 198,200 (4th Cir. 1983)("Absent
objection, we do not believe that any explanation need be given for adopting the report.").
Summary judgment is appropriate if a party "shows that there is no genuine dispute as to
any material fact" and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw. Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a). In other words, summary judgment should be granted "only when it is clear that there is
no dispute concerning either the facts of the controversy of the inferences to be drawn from
those facts." Pulliam Inv. Co. v. Cameo Props., 810 F.2d 1282, 1286 (4th Cir. 1987)(citations
omitted). "When determining whether the movant has met its burden, the court must assess the
documentary materials submitted by the parties in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party." Id. The party seeking summary judgment shoulders the initial burden of demonstrating
to the court that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Caltrett, 477 U.S.
317,323 (1986),
Once the moving party has made this threshold demonstration, the non-moving party, to
survive the motion for summary judgment, must "set forth specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986). Under this
standard, "[c]onclusory or speculative allegations do not suffice, nor does a 'mere scintilla of
evidence' in support of the nonmoving party's case." Thompson v. Potomac Elec. Power Co.,
312 F.3d 645, 649 (4th Cir. 2002)(citation omitted).
Plaintiff also seeks a preliminary injunction. Preliminary injunctions are "extraordinary
remedies involving the exercise of very far-reaching power to be granted only sparingly and in
limited circumstances." MicroStrategy, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 245 F.3d 335, 339 (4th Cir.
2001 )(quotations omitted). In evaluating a plaintiff's request for a preliminary injunction, the
Court applies the standard set forth under Winter v. Natural Resources Defence Council, 555

3

U.S. 7 (2008). Under Winter, a plaintiff "must establish that he is likely to succeed on the
merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the
balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest." 555 U.S. at
20 (citations omitted). A movant must meet all four of Winter's requirements in order to secure
a preliminary injunction. Pashby v. Delia, 709 F.3d 307, 320-21 (4th Cir. 2013).

In reviewing these pleadings, the Court is mindful of Plaintiff s pro se status. This Court
is charged with liberally construing the pleadings of a pro se litigant. De 'Lonta v. Angelone, 330
F.3d 630, 633 (4th Cir. 2003). The requirement of a liberal construction does not mean,
however, that the Court can ignore a plaintiffs clear failure to allege facts that set forth a
cognizable claim, or that a court must assume the existence of a genuine issue of material fact
where no exists. See United States v. Wilson, 699 F.3d 789, 797 (4th Cir. 2012)("Although
courts must liberally construe the claims ofpro se litigants ... [this] does not transform the court
into an advocate").
Discussion

a. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment as to Search and Seizure
This Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that Plaintiff has failed to raise a genuine
issue of material fact on his illegal search and seizure claims. Plaintiff has not put forward any
evidence supporting his assertion that probable cause for the April 1,2011 and June 7, 2011
traffic stops was lacking. Specifically, Plaintiffs unsupported legal conclusion that no traffic
violation occurred on April 1, 2011, is insufficient. As the Magistrate correctly explained, the
issue is not whether the alleged traffic violation actually occurred, but whether Defendant
Whitfield reasonably believed that the violation occurred. United States v. Muriel, 418 F .3d 720,
724 (7th Cir. 2005). Plaintiffs claim that no one in the vehicle actually committed a traffic

4

offense fails to address the officer's belief at the time of the stop and whether that belief was
reasonable.
Plaintiffs assertion that Defendant Hunnicutt was predisposed to stopping Plaintiffs
vehicle on the June 7, 2011 stop also fails to negate probable cause. The Magistrate accurately
notes that, "[a]ny ulterior motive a police officer may have for making the traffic stop is
irrelevant." United States v. Digiovanni, 650 F.3d 498, 506 (4th Cir. 1992) (citing Whren v.

United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996)). Under the Fourth Circuit's objective test, when a
police officer observes unlawful conduct, the officer's subsequent traffic stop is reasonable for
purposes of Fourth Amendment analysis regardless of any subjective motives the officer may
have. United States v. Hassan El, 5 F.3d 726, 730-31 (4th Cir. 1993).

b. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment as to False Arrest and/or Malicious
Prosecution
This Court agrees with the Magistrate that an arresting officer is not liable for false arrest
where the arrest is supported by probable cause and is based upon the violation of a
presumptively valid statutory provision. Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 36 (1979). The
Magistrate Judge correctly relies on Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 557 (1967), stating, "the
defense of good faith and probable cause ... available to the officers in the common-law action for
false arrest and imprisonment, is also available to them in the action under § 1983." Plaintiff has
put forward no evidence showing that the officers lacked probable cause for his arrests.
It is not clear whether a malicious prosecution claim is cognizable under Section 1983.

See Snider v. Seung Lee, 584 F.3d 193, 199 (4th Cir. 2009). However, even if such a claim
exists, Plaintiff must first show an unreasonable seizure and then a favorable termination of the
criminal proceeding flowing from the seizure. Jd.; Lambert v. Williams, 223 F.3d 257,261-62

5

(4th Cir. 2000). As stated above, Plaintiffhas failed to put forward evidence that his seizure was
unreasonable. Additionally, the charges against Plaintiff were ended by nolle prosequi, leaving
both elements unsatisfied.

c. Defendant's Motionfor Summary Judgment on Damages Claims against Defendants in
their Official Capacity
As the Magistrate Judge correctly held, Defendants are entitled to Eleventh Amendment
immunity for Plaintiffs claims for monetary damages against them in their official capacity, and
these claims are DISMISSED.

d Plaintiff's Motionfor Preliminary Injunction and Motion to Amend Preliminary
Injunction
As the Magistrate accurately noted, Plaintiff's criminal charges have been dismissed and
Plaintiff has been released from custody so the relief sought by Plaintiff is no longer available.
Thus, Plaintiffs Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Motion to Amend Preliminary Injunction
are both DENIED as moot.

e. Plaintiff's Motion in Limine
Plaintiff s request to suppress all evidence claimed to have been seized from the Plaintiff
by Defendants C.S. Whitfield and M. W. Honeycutt argues that the evidence is "fruit of the
poisonous tree." (Dkt. No. 69.) This Court agrees with the Magistrate that Plaintiffs reliance
on criminal rules of evidence in this action is misplaced. Thus, his motion in limine is DENIED.
Conclusion

For the reasons given above, the Court adopts the Magistrate Judge's Report and
Recommendation in full. Accordingly, Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED,
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED, and Plaintiff's claims made pursuant

6

42 U.S.C. § 1983 are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Plaintiffs Motion for Preliminary
Injunction, Motion to Amend Motion for Preliminary Injunction, and Motion in Limine are
DENIED. Furthermore, the Court declines to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over any
remaining state causes of action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) and such claims are
DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

September ~, 2013
Charleston, South Carolina

7