Kennedy v. Techtronic Industries North America Inc et al

Filing 11

ORDER AND OPINION denying 5 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. Signed by Honorable J Michelle Childs on 3/10/2014.(mbro, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
ANDERSON DIVISION
Arthur W. Kennedy,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
v.
)
)
Techtronic Industries North America, Inc.; )
One World Technologies, Inc.; and Ryobi )
Technologies, Inc.,
)
)
Defendants.
)
___________________________________ )

Civil Action No. 8:13-00871-JMC

ORDER AND OPINION

Plaintiff Arthur W. Kennedy (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against Defendants Techtronic
Industries North America, Inc. (“TINA”), One World Technologies, Inc. (“OWT”), and Ryobi
Technologies, Inc. (“Ryobi”), (collectively “Defendants”) alleging claims for strict products
liability, negligence, breach of implied warranty of fitness, breach of warranty of
merchantability, and reckless, willful or malicious conduct. (ECF No. 1 at 6-11.) Specifically,
Plaintiff alleges that he suffered severe and permanent personal injuries to his left hand while
using a Ryobi table saw, Model No. BTS10S, Serial No. XX070298797 (the “Ryobi Saw”). (Id.
at 3 ¶ 7, 6 ¶ 19.)
This matter is before the court on Defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (“Rule 12(b)(6) motion”) for failure to state a claim or, in the alternative,
because it is time-barred by the applicable statute of limitations. (ECF No. 5) Plaintiff opposes
Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion in its entirety. (ECF No. 9.) For the reasons set forth below,
the court DENIES Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion without prejudice.
I.

RELEVANT BACKGROUND TO PENDING MOTION

On June 20, 2009, Plaintiff was injured while allegedly using a Ryobi Saw. (ECF No. 1

at 6 ¶ 19.) On April 1, 2013, Plaintiff filed an action in this court alleging that he “is a citizen of
Ohio,” TINA “is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business located at 1428
Pearman Dairy Road, Anderson, South Carolina 29625,” OWT “is a Delaware corporation with
its principal place of business located at 1428 Pearman Dairy Road, Anderson, South Carolina
29625,” and Ryobi “is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business located at
1428 Pearman Dairy Road, Anderson, South Carolina 29625.” (Id. at 1 ¶¶ 1-2, 2 ¶¶ 3-4.)
Plaintiff further alleged that the court “has personal jurisdiction over Defendants because
Defendants have their principal place of business in Anderson, South Carolina[]” and “[v]enue is
proper in the Court because Defendants have their principal place of business in Anderson, South
Carolina.” (Id. at 2 ¶¶ 5-6.)
On April 25, 2013, Defendants filed their Rule 12(b)(6) motion regarding the complaint.
(ECF No. 5.) In their motion, Defendants assert that Plaintiff’s complaint should be dismissed
because he lacks capacity to assert his claims in South Carolina against Defendants under South
Carolina’s Door Closing Statute (the “Door Closing Statute”), S.C. Code Ann. § 15-5-150
(2005). (Id.) Alternatively, Defendants argue that the court should dismiss the complaint
because “Plaintiff’s personal injury claims are also barred under South Carolina’s three-year
statute of limitations.” Plaintiff filed opposition to Defendant’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion on May
13, 2013, to which Defendants filed a reply in support of dismissal of the complaint on May 23,
2013. (ECF Nos. 9, 10.)
II.
A.

LEGAL STANDARD AND ANALYSIS

Dismissal Pursuant to the Door Closing Statute
Defendants move to dismiss the complaint on the basis that the Door Closing Statute

precludes Plaintiff from maintaining an action in South Carolina. (ECF No. 5.) Defendants

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argue that the Door Closing Statute bars Plaintiff’s action because he is a foreign citizen seeking
to maintain an action that arose outside of South Carolina against Defendants that are
incorporated under the laws of Delaware. (ECF No. 5-1 at 2.)
The Door Closing Statute provides that “[a]n action against a corporation created by or
under the laws of any other state, government or country may be brought . . . (1) By any resident
of this State for any cause of action; or (2) By a plaintiff not a resident of this State when the
cause of action shall have arisen or the subject of the action shall be situated within this State.”
S.C. Code Ann. § 15–5–150 (2005).

“Pursuant to the Door Closing Statute, a non-South

Carolina resident cannot bring an action in South Carolina when the cause of action did not arise
within South Carolina.” Snell v. Golden Rule Ins. Co., C/A No. 6:08–3555–MHM, 2009 WL
185723, at *2 (D.S.C. Jan. 23, 2009). Moreover, “federal courts sitting in diversity must apply
section 15–5–150 unless countervailing federal interests preclude its application.” Tuttle Dozer
Works, Inc. v. Gyro–Trac, Inc., 463 F. Supp. 2d 544, 549 (D.S.C. 2006).
Upon review, the court observes that there is not any dispute that Defendants are foreign
corporations created by or under the laws of Delaware. However, the complaint does not support
Defendants’ assertion that “the subject accident occurred in Ohio.” (ECF No. 5-1 at 1-2.) In this
regard, the allegations in the complaint do not support even an inference that Plaintiff’s claim
arose outside of South Carolina. As a result, the court is not persuaded that it should preclude
Plaintiff’s action by granting Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion pursuant to the Door Closing
Statute. See Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 192 (4th Cir. 2009) (A motion to dismiss
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted
“challenges the legal sufficiency of a complaint.”) (citations omitted); see also Republican Party
of N.C. v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 952 (4th Cir.1992) (“A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) .

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. . does not resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability of
defenses.”). Accordingly, Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion based on the Door Closing Statute
must be denied.
B.

Dismissal Pursuant to the Statute of Limitations
Defendants move to dismiss the complaint arguing that Plaintiff’s claims are time-barred

because the applicable statute of limitations is three (3) years and Plaintiff filed this lawsuit
three (3) years, nine (9) months, and thirteen (13) days after his injury. (ECF No. 5-1 at 6.)
A defendant can raise a statute of limitations affirmative defense in a motion under Fed.
R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). See El Hadidi v. Intracoastal Land Sales, Inc., Civil Action No. 4:12–cv–
00535–RBH, 2013 WL 625575, at *2 (D.S.C. Feb. 20, 2013). A statute of limitations defense
must “clearly appear[] on the face of the complaint.” Richmond, Fredricksburg & Potomac R.
Co. v. Forst, 4 F.3d 244, 250 (4th Cir. 1993). In other words, the complaint must clearly “allege
all facts necessary to the affirmative defense.” Goodman v. Praxair, Inc., 494 F.3d 458, 464
(4th Cir. 2007) (citing Forst, 4 F.3d at 250). When considering a motion to dismiss, the court
should accept as true all well-pleaded allegations and should view the complaint in a light most
favorable to the plaintiff. Ostrzenski v. Seigel, 177 F.3d 245, 251 (4th Cir. 1999); Mylan Labs.,
Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1993).
The statute of limitations relevant to Plaintiff’s claims is established in S.C. Code Ann. §
15-3- 530(5), which provides that the three (3) years statute of limitations is applicable to “an
action for assault, battery, or any injury to the person or rights of another, not arising on contract
and not enumerated by law, and those provided for in Section 15-3-545 (medical malpractice); . .
. .” S.C. Code Ann. § 15-3-530(5) (1988). However, the statute of limitations in South Carolina
as to products liability claims may be extended by the discovery rule, which provides that an

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action “must be commenced within three (3) years after the person knew or by the exercise of
reasonable diligence should have known that he had a cause of action.” S.C. Code Ann. § 15-3535 (1988). Therefore, the court must determine when Plaintiff knew or reasonably should have
learned of facts that would have given him an indication that his injuries had been caused by an
allegedly defective product.
In the complaint, Plaintiff alleges the following:
[I]t has been less than three years since Plaintiff knew or by the exercise of
reasonable diligence should have known that he had a cause of action. More
specifically, Plaintiff did not know, nor should he have known through the
exercise of reasonable diligence, of the defects in the Ryobi Saw until he viewed a
television advertisement advising him of such sometime in 2012. Prior to that
time, he was not aware, nor should he have been aware through the exercise of
reasonable diligence, that the Ryobi Saw was defective due to a lack of flesh
detection technology and/or a riving knife. Prior to that time, he was not aware of
the existence of a safer alternative design to the Ryobi Saw. Despite the exercise
of reasonable diligence, it was not until sometime in 2012 that Plaintiff knew or
reasonably should have known of the existence of potential defects in the Ryobi
Saw and of Defendants’ negligence and breaches of warranty.
Moreover, the mere circumstances of his accident - an injury due to contact
between his hand and the spinning blade of a table saw - did not alert Plaintiff to
the potential existence of a defect in the Ryobi Saw.
(ECF No. 1 at 11 ¶ 36-12 ¶ 37.) Accepting as true these well-pleaded allegations and viewing
the complaint in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, the court finds that Plaintiff had knowledge
or constructive notice of the allegedly defective nature of the Ryobi Saw in 2012. Therefore, the
complaint was timely filed on April 1, 2013 within the applicable three (3) year statute of
limitations. Accordingly, Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion based on the statute of limitations
must be denied because the allegations in the complaint do not support dismissal based on the
applicable three (3) year statute of limitations. Richmond, Fredricksburg & Potomac R. Co. v.
Forst, 4 F.3d 244, 250 (4th Cir. 1993) (A statute of limitations defense must “clearly appear[] on
the face of the complaint.”).

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III.

CONCLUSION

Upon careful consideration of the complaint and the arguments of the parties, the court
hereby DENIES without prejudice the motion to dismiss of Defendants Techtronic Industries
North America, Inc., One World Technologies, Inc., and Ryobi Technologies, Inc. (ECF No. 5.)
IT IS SO ORDERED.

United States District Judge
March 10, 2014
Greenville, South Carolina

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