Battersby v. Ashley et al

Filing 76

ORDER RULING ON REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION adopting 72 Report and Recommendation. Defendants' 53 motion for summary judgment is GRANTED and Plaintiff's claims are DISMISSED with prejudice. Plaintiffs 59 motion in limine is DENIED as moot. Signed by Honorable Bruce Howe Hendricks on 6/2/2016. (gpre, )

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
ANDERSON/GREENWOOD DIVISION
) Civil Action No.: 8:15-00066-BHH
)
Plaintiff, )
)
)
vs.
ORDER AND OPINION
)
)
Stanley Ashley, Michelle Hendrix,
)
Greg Williamson, and John Does 1)
20,1
)
Defendants. )
______________________________ )
Dr. Gregg Battersby,

On January 6, 2015, Plaintiff filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging that
Defendants violated his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by arresting Plaintiff
without probable cause and withholding exculpatory evidence. In accordance with 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule 73.02 D.S.C., this matter was referred to United
States Magistrate Jacquelyn D. Austin, for consideration of pretrial matters. The
Magistrate Judge prepared a thorough Report and Recommendation (“Report”) which
recommends that Defendants’ motion for summary judgment be granted and Plaintiff’s
motion in limine be found as moot. (ECF No. 72.) Plaintiff filed timely objections to the
Report. (ECF No. 74.) For the reasons set forth herein, the Court adopts the Report.
BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The Report sets forth in detail the relevant facts and standards of law, and the
Court incorporates them and summarizes below only in relevant part. Plaintiff filed this

1
Because Plaintiff has not served “John Does 1-20,” the Court dismisses these defendants from this
action. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m) (requiring defendants to be served within ninety days after a complaint is
filed).

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matter on January 6, 2015, alleging violations of his constitutional rights. (ECF No. 1.)
Liberally construing the complaint,2 the Court finds that Plaintiff has brought suit against
Defendants under § 1983 for malicious prosecution, false arrest, and false imprisonment
under the Fourth Amendment, alleging that Defendants caused Plaintiff to be arrested
without probable cause. (ECF No. 27 at 2–4.) Plaintiff also brings a § 1983 claim against
Defendants under the Fourteenth Amendment for violation of his due process rights by
withholding exculpatory audio statements from the Solicitor. (Id. at 4–5.)
On September 10, 2015, Defendants moved for summary judgment pursuant to
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (ECF No. 53.) Plaintiff filed a motion in
limine on October 15, 2015. (ECF No. 59.) After consideration of Plaintiff’s response filed
in opposition to the motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 57) and Defendant’s
response filed in opposition to the motion in limine (ECF No. 64), the Magistrate Judge
issued a Report recommending that the motion for summary judgment be granted and
the motion in limine be found as moot. (ECF No. 72.) The Court has reviewed the
objections to the Report, but finds them to be without merit. Therefore, it will enter
judgment accordingly.3
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Magistrate Judge makes only a recommendation to this Court. The
recommendation has no presumptive weight. The responsibility for making a final
determination remains with this Court. Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 270 (1976).

2
The Court draws the allegations from Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint, filed on April 7, 2015. (ECF
No. 27.)
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  As always, the Court says only what is necessary to address Plaintiff’s objections against the already
meaningful backdrop of a thorough Report of the Magistrate Judge, incorporated entirely by specific
reference, herein, to the degree not inconsistent. Exhaustive recitation of law and fact exists there. 

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The Court is charged with making a de novo determination of any portions of the Report
to which a specific objection is made. The Court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole
or in part, the recommendation made by the Magistrate Judge or may recommit the
matter to the Magistrate Judge with instructions. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The Court
need not conduct a de novo review when a party makes only “general and conclusory
objections that do not direct the court to a specific error in the magistrate’s proposed
findings and recommendations.” Orpiano v. Johnson, 687 F.2d 44, 47 (4th Cir. 1982). In
the absence of a timely filed, specific objection, the Magistrate Judge’s conclusions are
reviewed only for clear error. See Diamond v. Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co., 416 F.3d
310, 315 (4th Cir. 2005).
In reviewing these pleadings, the Court is mindful of Plaintiff’s pro se status. When
dealing with a pro se litigant, the Court is charged with liberal construction of the
pleadings. See, e.g., De’Lonta v. Angelone, 330 F.3d 630, 633 (4th Cir. 2003). The
requirement of a liberal construction does not mean, however, that the Court can ignore
a plaintiff’s clear failure to allege facts that set forth a cognizable claim, or that the Court
must assume the existence of a genuine issue of material fact where none exists. See
United States v. Wilson, 699 F.3d 789, 797 (4th Cir. 2012).
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff objects that the Magistrate Judge erred in finding “that probable cause
existed and that Defendants had qualified immunity.” (ECF No. 74 at 1.) Because these
are the only specific objections raised by Plaintiff, the Court invokes de novo review of
these claims and reviews the rest of the Magistrate Judge’s conclusions for clear error.

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In her thorough Report, the Magistrate Judge detailed the events leading to
Plaintiff’s arrest for “willfully and maliciously expos[ing] his private parts” on two separate
occasions. (ECF No. 72 at 9–12.) She noted that the Anderson Sherriff’s Office
documented incident reports based on the statements of both alleged victims and that
Defendant Stanley Ashley (“Ashley”) completed affidavits from these reports in support
of the arrest warrants. Although Plaintiff was arrested and the grand jury returned true bill
indictments on both charges, the Tenth Circuit Solicitor’s Office declined to pursue the
case and it was nolle prossed. The Magistrate Judge concluded that “in light of the
totality of the circumstances, Ashley possessed sufficient evidence to believe,
reasonably, that Plaintiff had committed crimes.” (Id. at 12.)
The Magistrate Judge recognized Plaintiff’s argument that one of the alleged
victims gave contradictory statements. (Id. at 13.) Jane Morton (“Morton”), a patient of
Plaintiff who claimed that he exposed himself to her during a chiropractic treatment
session at Plaintiff’s home, initially reported Plaintiff was wearing a towel and later stated
Plaintiff was wearing a men’s robe. (Id.) The Magistrate Judge found that this apparent
inconsistency was not enough to indicate a lack of probable cause in light of the other
evidence. (Id.)
Plaintiff relies on the deposition testimony of Deputy Patrick Marter (“Marter”) to
argue that the Magistrate Judge erred in finding probable cause existed. Marter
completed an incident report based on Morton’s statements regarding Plaintiff’s alleged
indecent exposure. In Marter’s deposition, when asked “If the only evidence . . . is the

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statement of the victim [and] if a victim has two contradictory statements, do you have
probable cause?[,]” Marter responded no. (ECF No. 57-14 at 2.)
The Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that Morton’s inconsistent statements
regarding Plaintiff’s attire do not indicate a lack of probable cause—Marter’s deposition
testimony does not persuade the Court otherwise. As the Magistrate Judge noted,
Morton consistently identified Plaintiff as the perpetrator who exposed himself to her
while she was receiving chiropractic treatment. See, e.g., Torchinsky v. Siwinski, 942
F.2d 257, 262 (4th Cir. 1991) (“It is surely reasonable for a police officer to base his
belief in probable cause on a victim’s reliable identification of his attacker. . . . Indeed, it
is difficult to imagine how a police officer could obtain better evidence of probable cause
than an identification by name of assailants provided by a victim, unless, perchance, the
officer were to witness the crime himself.” (internal citations omitted)); see also United
States v. Beckham, 325 F. Supp. 2d 678, 687 & n.16 (E.D. Va. 2004) (collecting cases).
Further, the grand jury issued true bills of indictment on each of the charges, indicating
prima facie evidence of probable cause. See United States v. Soriano-Jarquin, 492 F.3d
495, 502 (4th Cir. 2007) (noting probable cause may be satisfied by a grand jury
indictment); United States ex rel. Haim v. Mathues, 19 F.2d 22, 23 (3d Cir. 1927) (“The
indictment is itself evidence that there was probable cause . . . ”); White v. Coleman, 277
F.Supp. 292, 297 (D.S.C. 1967) (“[W]here the grand jury have returned a true bill upon
the charge made, such finding amounts to a judicial recognition that probable cause
does exist . . . and infers prima facie probable cause for the prosecution.” (citation
omitted)). Accordingly, the Court overrules this objection.

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The Magistrate Judge also found that Plaintiff failed to establish a claim under the
Fourteenth Amendment and the Court agrees. The Magistrate Judge found that
Defendants did not violate Plaintiff’s due process rights because Defendants in fact
produced the alleged exculpatory audio recording and the charges against Plaintiff were
dropped. See Taylor v. Waters, 81 F.3d 429, 436 n.5 (4th Cir. 1996); Hockett v. Acosta,
2004 WL 1242757, at *3 (W .D. Va. June 3, 2004) (finding no Fourteenth Amendment
violation when plaintiffs did not allege that any favorable evidence was unavailable at
their criminal trial); Windham v. Graham, 9:08-cv-1935, 2008 WL 3833789, at *7–*9
(D.S.C. Aug. 14, 2008) (pretrial detainee who alleged that police withheld favorable
evidence had no cause of action under the Fourteenth Amendment because he had not
yet been tried).
The Magistrate Judge further found that Defendants are entitled to qualified
immunity and the Court agrees. For the reasons discussed above, Plaintiff has failed to
establish that Defendants violated his constitutional rights—the qualified immunity
doctrine therefore applies. See, e.g., Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 243 (2009)
(finding defendants entitled to qualified immunity where their conduct “did not violate
clearly established law”). Accordingly, the Court overrules this objection.
CONCLUSION
After careful consideration of the relevant motions, responses, and objections, the
Court finds that Plaintiff’s objections are without merit and the Magistrate Judge’s
conclusions evince no clear error. Accordingly, for the reasons stated above and by the
Magistrate Judge, the Court overrules Plaintiff’s objections, adopts the Report, and

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incorporates it herein. It is therefore ORDERED that Defendants’ motion for summary
judgment (ECF No. 53) is GRANTED and Plaintiff’s claims are DISMISSED with
prejudice. Plaintiff’s motion in limine (ECF No. 59) is DENIED as moot.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/Bruce Howe Hendricks
United States District Judge
Greenville, South Carolina
June 2, 2016

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