Gaskins v. State of South Carolina et al

Filing 27

ORDER adopts 23 Report and Recommendation and DISMISSES Plaintiff's 1 Complaint without prejudice. Signed by Honorable J Michelle Childs on 6/10/16. (kmca)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
ANDERSON/GREENWOOD DIVISION
Jerald Denton Gaskins Jr., #362923,

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Plaintiff,
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v.
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State of South Carolina; Perry Correctional, )
Institution; Warden Larry Cartledge;
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Associate Warden Claytor,
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Defendants.
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____________________________________)

Civil Action No. 8:15-cv-04456-JMC
ORDER AND OPINION

Plaintiff Jerald Denton Gaskins, Jr. (“Plaintiff”), filed this pro se action in forma pauperis

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This matter is before the court for review of the Magistrate
Judge’s Report and Recommendation (“Report”) (ECF No. 23), filed on January 8, 2016,
recommending Plaintiff’s action (ECF No. 1) be dismissed without prejudice and without
issuance and service of process. For the reasons below, the court ADOPTS the findings of the
Magistrate Judge’s Report (ECF No. 23) and DISMISSES Plaintiff’s Complaint (ECF No. 1)
without prejudice.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On November 2, 2015, Plaintiff filed a Complaint claiming that a sheet of metal on the
premises of Perry Correctional Institution (“PCI”) created a dangerous condition when wet,
which caused Plaintiff’s injuries after a slip and fall. (ECF No. 23 at 1-2.) Plaintiff sought
damages for pain and suffering and asked the court to order PCI to fix the metal. (Id. at 2.) After
the Magistrate Judge filed the Report recommending this court dismiss the action without
prejudice and without issuance and service of process (ECF No. 23), Plaintiff timely filed
Objections on January 25, 2016. (ECF No. 25.)

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II. LEGAL STANDARD
The Magistrate Judge’s Report is made in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and
Local Civil Rule 73.02 for the District of South Carolina. The Magistrate Judge makes only a
recommendation to this court, and the recommendation has no presumptive weight—the
responsibility to make a final determination remains with this court. See Mathews v. Weber, 423
U.S. 261, 270–71 (1976). The court is charged with making a de novo determination of those
portions of the Report and Recommendation to which specific objections are made, and the court
may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation or
recommit the matter with instructions. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
III. ANALYSIS
A. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
The Magistrate Judge recommends the Complaint be dismissed because Plaintiff has not
exhausted the required administrative remedies prior to filing a lawsuit. (ECF No. 23 at 5 (citing
42 U.S.C. § 1997(e)(a)).)
In his first Objection, Plaintiff asserts that a request to staff (“Request”) was filed in lieu
of a Step 1 grievance or Step 2 appeal because the proper paperwork was not supplied to him.
(ECF No. 25.) As a result, Plaintiff claims every available action was exhausted. (Id.)
To exhaust the administrative remedies requires “using all steps that the agency holds
out, and doing so properly.” Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93-94 (2006) (quoting Pozo v.
McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022, 1024 (7th Cir. 2002)). Additionally, the Supreme Court held that
“the [Prison Litigation Rights Act] exhaustion requirement applies to all inmate suits about
prison life, whether they involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they

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allege excessive force or some other wrong.” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 516 (2002); Booth
v. Churner, 532 U.S 731, 731-32(2001).
This court agrees with the Magistrate Judge’s assessment that prison administrators were
denied an opportunity to resolve the matter when Plaintiff filed the Complaint before receiving
an answer to the Request. (ECF No. 23 at 7.) Therefore, Plaintiff’s claims are subject to
summary dismissal because he failed to exhaust the administrative remedies available at PCI. See
e.g., Anderson v. XYZ Corr. Health Serv., 407 F.3d 674, 683 (4th Cir. 2005).
B. Cruel and Unusual Punishment
The Magistrate Judge also recommends the Complaint be dismissed because the Eleventh
Amendment grants the State of South Carolina immunity from a state law tort claim in federal
court unless a State expressly consents. (ECF No. 23 at 7 (citing S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-20(e)
(1976); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984)).) In this regard, the
Magistrate Judge observes that the State of South Carolina has not consented to the suit. (ECF
No. 23 at 7.) This court agrees with the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation to dismiss based
upon Eleventh Amendment immunity. (Id.)
Plaintiff’s Objection (ECF No. 25) states verbatim:
The courts also stated that my slip and fall was due to my neglect. I object to
that. I was being lead by Sgt. Wal-drop on a dog chain with belley [sic] and
short leg chains. There is no way an inmate can control were [sic] he is led to.
I hope the courts can reconsider the claim under the 8th Amendment Act of
crul [sic] punishment.
The use of excessive force upon an inmate by correctional officers violates the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S.
1, 5 (1992). To state an excessive force claim, an inmate must show: (1) that the correctional
officers acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind and (2) that the harm inflicted on the

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inmate was sufficiently serious. Williams v. Benjamin, 77 F.3d 756, 761 (4th Cir. 1996).
The subjective component requires an inmate to demonstrate the officer used force not
“in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline,” but rather applied force “maliciously
and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 6–7. “It is obduracy
and wantonness, not inadvertence or error in good faith, that characterize the conduct prohibited
by the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause.” Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 299 (1991).
The objective component of an excessive force claim is not nearly as demanding to
establish because “[w]hen prison officials maliciously and sadistically use force to cause harm,
contemporary standards of decency always are violated . . . whether or not significant injury is
evident.” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9. However, not every malevolent touch by a prison guard gives
rise to a federal cause of action. The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual
punishments necessarily excludes from constitutional recognition de minimis uses of physical
force, provided that the use of force is not of a sort repugnant to the conscience of mankind. An
inmate who complains of a push or shove that causes no discernible injury almost certainly fails
to state a valid excessive force claim. Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 37–38 (2010).
Plaintiff offers no evidence regarding the state of mind of the correctional officer.
Plaintiff’s Objection that an inmate cannot control his movement is insufficient evidence to
establish that a correctional officer intended to maliciously and sadistically cause him harm.
Additionally, while Plaintiff suffered injuries to his left knee and back, the only evidence of the
severity of the injuries is a scheduled appointment for an x-ray. (ECF No. 1.) Upon review of the
Record, Plaintiff does not satisfy the necessary requirements to bring an action of cruel and
unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment.

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IV. CONCLUSION
Based on the aforementioned reasons and a thorough review of the Magistrate Judge’s
Report (ECF No. 23), this court ADOPTS the findings of the Report and DISMISSES
Plaintiff’s Complaint (ECF No. 1) without prejudice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

United States District Judge
June 10, 2016
Columbia, South Carolina

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