Crawford v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration

Filing 21

ORDER RULING ON REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION accepting 16 Report and Recommendation. Signed by Honorable J Michelle Childs on 3/29/19. (alew, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
ANDERSON/GREENWOOD DIVISION
Debra Crawford,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
)
Commissioner of Social Security
)
Administration,
)
)
Defendant.
)
____________________________________)

Civil Action No.: 8:17-cv-02799-JMC
ORDER AND OPINION

This matter is before the court for review of the Magistrate Judge’s Report and
Recommendation (“Report”) filed on November 7, 2018. (ECF No. 16.) The Report recommends
that the court affirm the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security Administration (“the
Commissioner”), which denies Plaintiff Debra Crawford’s (“Plaintiff”) claim for disability
insurance benefits (“DIB”) and supplemental security income (“SSI”). (Id. at 1.) For the reasons
set forth below, the court ACCEPTS the Magistrate Judge’s Report, incorporating it herein, and
AFFIRMS the decision of the Commissioner.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The Report sets forth the relevant facts and legal standards, which this court incorporates
herein without a full recitation. (ECF No. 16 at 1–3.) As brief background, Plaintiff filed an
application for DIB and SSI on May 21, 2014, alleging the onset of a disability on April 4, 2011.
(ECF No. 10-5 at 2.) Plaintiff’s application was denied initially and upon reconsideration by the
Social Security Administration. (ECF No. 10-3 at 2–27, 30–59.) After an administrative hearing
was first held on July 19, 2016, an administrative law judge (“ALJ”) issued a decision regarding
Plaintiff’s disability status on December 7, 2016. (ECF No. 12 at 21–36.) Using a five-step

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sequential process established by the Commissioner, the ALJ first found that Plaintiff met the
Social Security Act’s insured status requirements and was not engaged in a substantial gainful
activity since April 4, 2011. (ECF No. 10-2 at 25–26.) Next, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff
possessed the following severe impairments under the applicable regulations: degenerative disc
disease, status post right rotator cuff repair, asthma, and obesity. (Id. at 27 (citing 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520(c), 416.920(c)).) Afterwards, the ALJ reasoned that Plaintiff “does not have an
impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of
the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 . . . .” (Id. at 29–30.) The ALJ
then considered the “entire record” and found that Plaintiff possessed the residual functional
capacity (“RFC”) “to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b) except
the claimant [could] occasionally climb ramps or stairs[,] but never ladders ropes or scaffolds.”
(Id. at 30.) Further, the ALJ opined, as it relates to Plaintiff’s RFC, that “[s]he can occasionally
kneel or crouch, but never crawl, and she cannot perform any overhead reaching.” (Id.) He further
stated that Plaintiff “must avoid concentrated exposure to fumes, dusts, odors, or other pulmonary
irritants. Finally, she must avoid exposure to workplace hazards such as unprotected heights or
dangerous moving machinery.” (Id.) Lastly, after considering Plaintiff’s age, education, past work,
and RFC, the ALJ reasoned that “there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national
economy that the claimant can perform.” (Id. at 35–36.) The ALJ ultimately concluded that
Plaintiff was not disabled under the Social Security Act. (Id.)
On December 12, 2016, Plaintiff submitted a request to the Appeals Council (“the
Council”), which sought review of the ALJ’s decision. (Id. at 20.) Plaintiff’s request for the
Council to review the ALJ’s decision was denied on September 21, 2017. (Id. at 2.) Thus, the
ALJ’s decision became the final decision of the Commissioner. (Id. at 2.) See also Meyer v. Astrue,

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662 F.3d 700, 704 (4th Cir. 2011) (stating that an ALJ’s decision was the final decision of the
Commissioner when the Council denied a request for review); Higginbotham v. Barnhart, 405
F.3d 332, 336 (5th Cir. 2005) (holding that the Commissioner’s “final decision” includes when the
Council denies a request for review). Plaintiff filed the instant action on October 17, 2017. (ECF
No. 1.)
The Magistrate Judge entered her Report on November 7, 2018. (ECF No. 16.) In the
Report, the Magistrate Judge first reasoned, as it relates to the testimony of Plaintiff’s physicians,
that “[w]hile an ALJ is charged with weighing the opinions of treating physicians, he is not
obligated to give weight to a physician’s opinion on the issue of disability.” (Id. at 28.) She further
found that “the ALJ proceeded exactly as the rules require” and concluded the Grid Rules were
not conclusive in this case because they were used “as a framework” by the ALJ. (Id. at 29-30.)
For example, she reasoned that “the ALJ consulted a [vocational expert] and presented a
hypothetical that incorporated the limitations found in the record.” (Id.) Lastly, the Magistrate
Judge found that Plaintiff provided new evidence to the Council, which “does not relate back to
the relevant time period,” which forecloses the remand of her case. (Id. at 31–32.) For these
reasons, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the court affirm the decision of the Commissioner.
(Id. at 32.)
The parties were apprised of their opportunity to file written, specific objections to the
Report. (ECF No. 16.) On November 21, 2018, Plaintiff timely filed her Objection to the
Magistrate Judge’s Report. (ECF No. 18.) Within her Objection, Plaintiff begins by stating the
following:
“We explained in our briefs that the ALJ failed to properly evaluate the opinion
evidence that consistently supported a limitation to sedentary work and that the
Appeals Council failed to consider new and material evidence that related to the
relevant time period. . . . Respectfully, the Magistrate Judge is mistaken.”
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(Id. at 1.) Next, Plaintiff provides numerous pieces of evidence that the Magistrate Judge should
have considered and stated that the ALJ “did not provide [] reasons for rejecting the [opinions of
her] treating physicians . . . .” (Id. at 3.) The Commissioner replied to Plaintiff’s Objection on
December 4, 2018, arguing that Plaintiff “did not . . . identify any errors” within the Magistrate
Judge’s Report, and Plaintiff raised issues that have already been addressed in the case. (ECF No.
19 at 1–2.) Because this matter has been fully briefed, it is now ripe for the court’s review. See
generally Sauls v. Wyeth Pharm., Inc., 846 F. Supp. 2d 499, 501 (D.S.C. 2012) (“The parties have
fully briefed the issues, and this matter is ripe for consideration.”).
II. LEGAL STANDARD
The Magistrate Judge’s Report is made in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local
Civil Rule 73.02 for the District of South Carolina. The Magistrate Judge only makes a
recommendation to this court, and the recommendation has no presumptive weight. See Mathews
v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 270–71 (1976). The responsibility to make a final determination remains
with the court. Id. at 271. As such, the court is charged with making de novo determinations of
those portions of the Report to which specific objections are made. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). See
also FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b)(3). Thus, the court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part,
the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation or recommit the matter with instructions. 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1).
The Act provides that “[t]he findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact,
if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). While the court
is free to conduct a de novo review of the Report, the court’s review of the Commissioner’s final
decision is “limited to determining whether the findings are supported by substantial evidence and
whether the correct law was applied.” Walls v. Barnhart, 296 F.3d 287, 290 (4th Cir. 2002) (citing

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Hays v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d 1453, 1456 (4th Cir. 1990); Preston v. Heckler, 769 F.2d 988, 990 (4th
Cir. 1985)). “Substantial evidence has been defined innumerable times as more than a scintilla, but
less than a preponderance.” Thomas v. Celebrezze, 331 F.2d 541, 543 (4th Cir. 1964). When
assessing whether the ALJ possessed substantial evidence, the court may not “re-weigh conflicting
evidence, make credibility determinations, or substitute [its] judgment for that of the
[Commissioner].” Mastro v. Apfel, 270 F.3d 171, 176 (4th Cir. 2001) (quoting Craig v. Chater, 76
F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 1996)). As such, the court is tasked with a “specific and narrow” review
under the Act. Blalock v. Richardson, 483 F.2d 773, 775 (4th Cir. 1972).
III. DISCUSSION
“The purpose of magistrate review is to conserve judicial resources.” Nichols v. Colvin,
100 F. Supp. 3d 487, 497 (E.D. Va. 2015). Generally, a party’s objection to a magistrate judge’s
report must be “specific and particularized” in order to facilitate review by a district court. United
States v. Midgette, 478 F.3d 616, 621 (4th Cir. 2007). “An ‘objection’ that does nothing more than
state a disagreement with a magistrate’s suggested resolution, or simply summarizes what has been
presented before, is not an ‘objection’ as that term is used in this context.” Aldrich v. Bock, 327 F.
Supp. 2d 743, 747 (E.D. Mich. 2004). Thus, a de novo review is wholly unnecessary for a district
court to undertake when a party seeks to rehash general arguments that were already addressed in
a magistrate judge’s report. See Orpiano v. Johnson, 687 F.2d 44, 47 (4th Cir. 1982); Jones v.
Hamidullah, No. 2:05–2736–PMD–RSC, 2005 WL 3298966, at *3 (D.S.C. Dec. 5, 2005).
In the instant case, the court has reviewed Plaintiff’s Brief (ECF No. 12), Plaintiff’s
Objection (ECF No. 18), and the Report (ECF No. 16). After examining all of the pleadings, the
court concludes that Plaintiff’s Objection restates arguments that are adequately addressed by the
Report. (Compare ECF No. 18 at 1–8, with ECF No. 16 at 16–32.) Moreover, Plaintiff’s Objection

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largely mirrors his Brief, almost verbatim, which was explicitly before the Magistrate Judge and
considered by the Report. (Compare ECF No. 18, with ECF No. 12.) As such, a de novo review is
unnecessary because Plaintiff has “failed to guide the [c]ourt towards specific issues needing
resolution . . . .” Nichols, 100 F. Supp. 3d at 498 (holding that a claimant failed to raise specific
objections when he repeated arguments raised in his initial brief). This court declines to hear
rehashed arguments from Plaintiff. Orpiano, 687 F.2d at 47. The court finds that the Report
adequately addresses Plaintiff’s Objection, is well-reasoned, and properly analyzes the rehashed
issues from Plaintiff. 1 See Fray v. Berryhill, No. 6:16-2916-TMC, 2018 WL 1224687, at *5
(D.S.C. Mar. 9, 2018) (adopting a magistrate’s report in which the court concurred “with both the
reasoning and the result”). Therefore, the Report is adopted herein, and all of Plaintiff’s objections
are overruled.
IV. CONCLUSION
After a thorough review of Plaintiff’s Objection (ECF No. 18) and the Magistrate Judge’s
Report (ECF No. 16), the court ACCEPTS the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation
(ECF No. 16) and AFFIRMS the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security Administration.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

United States District Judge

March 29, 2019
Columbia, South Carolina
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To the extent that Plaintiff believes that the ALJ failed to provide reasons for rejecting the
testimony of her treating physicians, Plaintiff’s argument is without legal merit. (ECF No. 18 at
3.) The ALJ did not reject the testimony of her treating physicians, but rather accorded the
testimony of “little weight.” (ECF No. 10-2 at 33.) The ALJ’s decision is clearly in accordance
with precedent from the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. See Craig v. Chater,
76 F.3d 585, 590 (4th Cir. 1996) (“[I]f a physician’s opinion is not supported by clinical evidence
or if it is inconsistent with other substantial evidence, it should be accorded significantly less
weight.” (emphasis added)).
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