Sun v. Smith et al
Filing
153
ORDER granting 140 Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff's Amended COmplaint is dismissed with prejudice. Signed by Honorable Richard M Gergel on 10/31/11.(hhil, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
CHARLESTON DIVISION
Joseph C. Sun,
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Plaintiff,
v.
Joseph L. Loadholt,
Defendant.
Civil Action No.: 9:08-cv-4021-RMG
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ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on Defendant's motion to dismiss and for summary
judgment. (Dkt. No. 140). For the reasons stated herein, the Court grants Defendant's motion.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed this pro se action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff alleges that
Defendant, a police officer, violated his constitutional rights when he arrested Plaintiff on March
28,2007. (See generally Dkt. No. 59). Plaintiff alleges that, when he went to the Department of
Motor Vehicles ("DMV") to get a South Carolina drivers license, he was asked for his birth date
and "gave his correct birth date which was different from the birth date used on some other
documents in the past because the old documents were copied from an erroneous old court record
based on the Chinese calendar." (Id. at 2). Plaintiff alleges that Stacy Smith, a DMV employee,
"devised a scheme to cause [Plaintiff] to be falsely arrested and charged" and called Defendant
Loadholt to arrest Plaintiff. (Id. at 3). Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Loadholt arrested him,
handcuffed him in the back, made him stay in a patrol car for an hour, had his car towed, refused
to let him call his wife, and took him to the Jasper County Detention Center where he remained
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until he was released on bail the next day. (Id. at 3-4). Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant
confiscated a notebook from Plaintiff when he arrested him, and that certain data was missing
from the notebook when Plaintiff picked it up from the police station. (Id. at 6).
In his motion for summary judgment, Defendant argues that he was exercising his
discretion as a police officer when he responded to the DMV's request and arrested Plaintiff for
alteration or falsification of a license pursuant to South Carolina Code § 56-1-515. (Dkt. No.
140-1 at 2).
Thus, Defendant argues that he is protected by qualified immunity and that
Plaintiffs suit should be dismissed. (ld. at 2-4).
DISCUSSION
Pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment shall be
granted "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). "Facts are 'material'
when they might affect the outcome of the case, and a 'genuine issue' exists when the evidence
would allow a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party." The News &
Observer Publ'g Co. v. Raleigh-Durham Airport Auth., 597 F.3d 570,576 (4th Cir. 2010) (citing
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). In ruling on a motion for summary
judgment, the nonmoving party's evidence is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to
be drawn in that party's favor. Id. Further, while the Court is charged with liberally construing a
complaint filed by a pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case, the
requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the Court can ignore a clear failure in the
pleadings to allege facts which set forth a federal claim, nor can the Court assume the existence
of a genuine issue of material fact where none exists. See Weller v. Dep't 0/ Social Services, 901
F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990).
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Here, Defendant is a government official who argues that qualified immunity bars this
suit.
Government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from
liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457
U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
"Ruling on a defense of qualified immunity therefore requires (1)
identification of the specific right allegedly violated; (2) determining whether at the time of the
alleged violation the right was clearly established; and (3) if so, then determining whether a
reasonable person in the officer's position would have known that doing what he did would
violate that right."
Pritchett v. Alford, 973 F.2d 307,312 (4th Cir. 1992).
In determining
whether the plaintiff has established the second element, "the proper focus is not upon the right
at its most general or abstract level but at the level of its application to the specific conduct being
challenged." Id. In determining whether the plaintiff has established the third element, the Court
must consider the information actually possessed or that was reasonably available to the officer at
the critical time, and in light of any exigencies of time and circumstance that reasonably may
have affected the officer's perceptions. Id.
"The tolerance thus accorded by the qualified
immunity defense to 'good faith' mistakes of judgment traceable to unsettled law, or faulty
information, or contextual exigencies, is deliberately designed to give protection to 'all but the
plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law,' ... in order to avoid undue
inhibitions in the performance of official duties." Id. at 313 (internal citation omitted). If there is
a "legitimate question" as to whether an official's conduct constitutes a constitutional violation,
the official is entitled to qualified immunity. Wiley v. Doory, 14 F.3d 993, 995 (4th Cir. 1994).
Plaintiffs allegations do not raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether
Defendant is protected by qualified immunity. In his amended complaint, Plaintiff alleges that
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Defendant's actions violated his constitutional rights under the Equal Protection Clause and the
Fourth Amendment prohibition on illegal searches and seizures. (Dkt. No. 59 at 5-7). In his
response in opposition to Defendant's motion, Plaintiff makes the additional argument that
Defendant violated his constitutional rights by arresting him without a warrant. (Dkt. No. 151 at
6). However, Plaintiff has not alleged any facts which, if true, would support a finding that
Defendant violated a clearly established right.
First, Defendant's decision to arrest Plaintiff based on the information allegedly made
available to Defendant does not constitute a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. See City of
Cuyahoga Falls, Ohio v. Buckeye Community Hope Foundation, 538 U.S. 188, 194 (2003)
(holding that plaintiffs must prove a racially discriminatory intent or purpose to establish a
violation of the Equal Protection Clause).
According to the allegations, Plaintiff provided
inconsistent information regarding his birthday to the DMV, and DMV supervisor Stacy Smith
then encouraged Defendant to arrest Plaintiff. (Dkt. No. 59 at 2-3). Plaintiff cannot survive a
summary judgment motion by simply asserting that his arrest was racially motivated.
See
Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986) (holding that courts need not assume the truth of
legal conclusions couched as factual allegations).
Second, Plaintiff has cited no authority to support his argument that Defendant's
confiscation of Plaintiffs notebook from his car constitutes a violation of the Fourth
Amendment's prohibition of illegal searches and seizures. See State v. Brown, 698 S.E.2d 811,
815 (S.C. ct. App. 2010) (holding that a law enforcement officer may conduct a warrantless
search of an arrestee's automobile if the officer reasonably believes that the vehicle contains
evidence of the offense of the arrest). To survive summary judgment based on Defendant's
confiscation of the notebook, Plaintiffhas the burden of creating a genuine issue of material fact
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as to whether Defendant's confiscation of the notebook was "plainly incompetent" or a knowing
violation of the law. See Pritchett, 973 F.2d at 313. Plaintiffhas failed to carry this burden.!
Finally, in his response to Defendant's motion, Plaintiff argues that Defendant is not
protected by qualified immunity because Defendant "fabricat[ ed] a criminal charge against
Plaintiff Sun and had Plaintiff arrested without an arrest warrant in violation of the Fourth
Amendment." (Dkt. No. 151 at 5). However, Plaintiff concedes that he provided conflicting
information regarding his birthday to the DMV and alleges that a DMV employee contacted
Defendant to arrest plaintiff. (Dkt. No. 59 at 2-3). Defendant was not required to get a warrant
before arresting Plaintiff if the facts and circumstances observed by Defendant gave him probable
cause to believe that a crime has been freshly committed. See State v. Martin, 268 S.E.2d 105,
107 (S.C. 1980). Here, because there is, at a minimum, a legitimate question as to whether
Defendant violated Plaintiffs constitutional rights, Defendant is entitled to qualified immunity.
See WileY,14 F.3d at 995.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff has not alleged facts which, if true, create a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether Defendant violated a clearly established right of Plaintiff. Thus, Defendant is entitled to
qualified immunity from suit on Plaintiffs claims.
Accordingly, Defendant's motion for
summary judgment is GRANTED, and Plaintiffs Amended Complaint is DISMISSED with
prejudice.
! Plaintiff also alleges that when he received his notebook back "several items containing
important and private data were missing and lost." (Dkt. No. 59 at 6). Even accepting this
allegation as true, Plaintiff has not established that Defendant violated a clearly established right.
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7;:'~--O
ORDERED.
Richard Mark Gergel
United States District Court Judge
October ~, 2011
Charleston, South Carolina
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