Latten-Reinhardt v. Commissioner of the Social Security Administration

Filing 25

ORDER RULING ON 19 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION. The Court hereby adopts as modified and incorporates by reference the R&R of Magistrate Judge Marchant. The Commissioner's decision is affirmed. Signed by Honorable R Bryan Harwell on 09/13/2012. (egra, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
BEAUFORT DIVISION
Roberta Latten-Reinhardt,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
)
Michael J. Astrue, Commissioner of )
the Social Security Administration, )
)
Defendant.
)
)

Civil Action No.: 9:11-cv-00881-RBH

ORDER

This matter is before the Court after the issuance of the Report and Recommendation
(“R&R”) of United States Magistrate Bristow Marchant.1

Plaintiff Roberta Latten-Reinhardt

brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3), seeking judicial review of a
final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (“the Commissioner”) denying Plaintiff’s
claims for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income benefits under Titles II
and XVI of the Social Security Act (“the Act”). In his R&R, the Magistrate Judge recommends
affirming the decision of the Commissioner.
FACTUAL FINDINGS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff applied for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income benefits
on January 10, 2007, alleging that she became unable to work on January 2, 2006.

The

applications were denied initially and on reconsideration. Plaintiff requested a hearing before the
Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). That hearing was held on July 8, 2009, and Plaintiff appeared
and testified. At the hearing, Plaintiff amended her alleged disability onset date to January 5, 2007.

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In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.), this
matter was referred to the Magistrate Judge.

A vocational expert also testified. The ALJ issued a decision dated August 18, 2009, finding that
Plaintiff was not disabled. The ALJ’s overall findings were as follows:
1. The claimant meets the insured status requirements of the Social
Security Act through December 31, 2011.
2. The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since
January 5, 2007, the alleged onset date.
...
3. The claimant has the following severe impairments: interstitial lung
disease and memory deficits.
...
4. The claimant does not have an impairment or combinations of
impairments that meets or medically equals one of the listed
impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.
...
5. After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned
finds that the claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform
light exertional work, which is defined as the ability to lift/carry 10
pounds frequently and 20 pounds occasionally, stand 6 hours in an 8
hour workday, walk 6 hours in an 8 hour workday and sit 6 hours in
an 8 hour workday. The claimant should avoid the use of foot
controls and climbing ropes, ladders and scaffolds. She is able to
occasionally climb stairs and ramps. The claimant is able to
frequently balance, stoop, kneel, crouch and crawl. She should avoid
concentrated exposure to extreme heat, cold, fumes, dust, odor, gases
and poor ventilation. She has a mild limit on social interaction and a
mild limit on maintaining attention and concentration.
...
6. The claimant is unable to perform any past relevant work.
...
7. The claimant was born [in] 1966 and was 40 years old, which is
defined as a younger individual age 18-49, on the allege disability
onset date.
8. The claimant has at least a high school education and is able to
communicate in English.
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9. Transferability of job skills is not material to the determination of
disability because using the Medical-Vocational Rules as a
framework supports a finding that the claimant is “not disabled,”
whether or not the claimant has transferable job skills.
10. Considering the claimant’s age, education, work experience, and
residual functional capacity, there are jobs that exist in significant
numbers in the national economy that the claimant can perform.
...
11. The claimant has not been under a disability, as defined in the
Social Security Act, from January 5, 2007 through the date of this
decision.
Tr. 17-23 (citations omitted).
The ALJ’s finding became the final decision of the Commissioner when the Appeals
Council denied Plaintiff’s request for further review. On April 13, 2011, Plaintiff filed this action
seeking judicial review of the Commissioner’s decision. Compl., ECF No. 1. Both Plaintiff and the
Commissioner filed briefs, ECF Nos. 15, 16, 17, and the Magistrate Judge issued his Report and
Recommendation (“R&R”) on June 5, 2012, recommending that the Commissioner’s decision be
affirmed, R&R, ECF No. 19. Plaintiff filed timely objections to the R&R on June 22, 2012, Pl.’s
Objs., ECF No. 20, and the Commissioner replied on July 9, 2012, Def.’s Reply, ECF No. 22.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The role of the federal judiciary in the administrative scheme established by the Act is a
limited one. The Act provides that “[t]he findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as to any
fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
“Substantial evidence has been defined innumerable times as more than a scintilla, but less than
preponderance.” Thomas v. Celebrezze, 331 F.2d 541, 543 (4th Cir. 1964). “Substantial evidence”

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is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
This statutorily mandated standard precludes a de novo review of the factual circumstances
that substitutes the Court’s findings for those of the Commissioner. See Vitek v. Finch, 438 F.2d
1157, 1157-58 (4th Cir. 1971); Hicks v. Gardner, 393 F.2d 299, 302 (4th Cir. 1968). The Court
“must uphold the factual findings of the [Commissioner] if they are supported by substantial
evidence and were reached through application of the correct legal standard.” Hancock v. Astrue,
667 F.3d 470, 472 (4th Cir. 2012); see also Blalock v. Richardson, 483 F.2d 773, 775 (4th Cir.
1973) (holding that the Court must uphold the decision supported by substantial evidence “even
should [it] disagree”).

“From this it does not follow, however, that the findings of the

administrative agency are to be mechanically accepted.” Flack v. Cohen, 413 F.2d 278, 279 (4th
Cir. 1969). “[T]he courts must not abdicate their responsibility to give careful scrutiny to the whole
record to assume that there is a sound foundation for the [Commissioner’s] findings, and that his
conclusion is rational.” Vitek, 438 F.2d at 1157-58.
Furthermore, a de novo review is conducted of the Magistrate Judge’s R&R. 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1). The R&R is only a recommendation to the Court and has no presumptive weight;
indeed, the responsibility to make a final determination remains with the district court. Mathews v.
Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 270-71 (1976). The Court is charged with making a de novo determination of
those portions of the R&R to which specific objection is made, and the Court may accept, reject, or
modify, in whole or in part, the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, or recommit the matter to
him with instructions. § 636(b)(1).
The right to de novo review, however, may be waived by the failure to file timely objections.
Orpiano v. Johnson, 687 F.2d 44, 47 (4th Cir. 1982). The Court need not conduct a de novo review

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when a party makes only “general and conclusory objections that do not direct the [C]ourt to a
specific error in the [M]agistrate’s proposed findings and recommendations.” Id. Moreover, in the
absence of objections to the R&R, the Court is not required to give any explanation for adopting the
recommendation. Camby v. Davis, 718 F.2d 198, 199 (4th Cir. 1983). In that event, however, the
Court must “ ‘satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the
recommendation.’ ” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 315 (4th Cir.
2005) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee’s note).
DETERMINATION OF DISABILITY
Under the Act, Plaintiff’s eligibility for the benefits she is seeking hinges on whether she is
under a “disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(a). The term “disability” is defined as the “inability to engage
in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental
impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last
for a continuous period of not less than 12 months . . . .” Id. § 423(d)(1)(A). “The ultimate burden
to prove disability lies on the claimant.” Preston v. Heckler, 769 F.2d 988, 991 n.* (4th Cir. 1985).
A claimant may establish a prima facie case of disability based solely upon medical evidence by
demonstrating that her impairments meet or equal the medical criteria set forth in Appendix 1 of
Subpart P. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d) & 416.920(d).
If such a showing is not possible, a claimant may also establish a prima facie case of
disability by proving that she could not perform her customary occupation as the result of physical
or mental impairments. See Taylor v. Weinberger, 512 F.2d 664 (4th Cir. 1975). Because this
approach is premised on the claimant’s inability to resolve the question solely on medical
considerations, it then becomes necessary to consider the medical evidence in conjunction with
certain vocational factors. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1560(a) & § 416.960(a). These factors include the

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claimant’s (1) “residual functional capacity,” id. §§ 404.1560(a) & 416.960(a); (2) age, id. §§
404.1563 & 416.963; (3) education, id. §§ 404.1564 & 416.964; (4) work experience, id. §§
404.1565 & 416.965; and (5) the existence of work “in significant numbers in the national
economy” that the individual can perform, id. §§ 404.1566 & 416.966. If the assessment of the
claimant’s residual functional capacity leads to the conclusion that she can no longer perform her
previous work, it must be determined whether the claimant can do some other type of work, taking
into account remaining vocational factors. Id. §§ 404.1560(c)(1) & 416.960(c)(1). The interrelation
between these vocational factors is governed by Appendix 2 of Subpart P. Thus, according to the
sequence of evaluation suggested by 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520 & 416.920, it must be determined: (1)
whether the claimant is currently gainfully employed, (2) whether she suffers from some physical or
mental impairment, (3) whether that impairment meets or equals the criteria of Appendix 1, (4)
whether, if those criteria are not met, the impairment prevents her from returning to her previous
work, and (5) whether the impairment prevents her from performing some other available work.
ANALYSIS
The Magistrate Judge recommends affirming the decision of the Commissioner. First, the
Magistrate Judge concludes the ALJ committed no reversible error in assessing Plaintiff’s residual
functional capacity. Second, the Magistrate Judge concludes the ALJ’s listings analysis was proper.
Finally, the he discerns no reversible error in the ALJ’s decision regarding Plaintiff’s credibility.
R&R 8-15. The Court addresses these recommendations in reverse order in light of Plaintiff’s
objections.
I. Combined Effect Analysis
Plaintiff does not challenge the Magistrate Judge’s “specific Listing analyses.” Instead, she
contends he ignored her “contention that the ALJ failed to analyze the combined effect of multiple

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impairments.” Pl.’s Objs. 1. The Court agrees that the Magistrate Judge failed to address her
argument regarding the combined effect of her impairments. Accordingly, the Court must review
her contention.
In her brief, Plaintiff, relying on Walker v. Bowen, 889 F.2d 47 (4th Cir. 1989), argues “the
ALJ did not make any meaningful evaluation of the combined impact of [Plaintiff’s] impairments.”
She contends, as an example, that Plaintiff’s ability to walk “would be compromised by both her
skin and pulmonary conditions.” Pl.’s Br. 13, ECF No. 15.
In Walker, the Fourth Circuit emphasized that the Act required consideration of the effect of
a claimant’s impairments in combination when determining disability. The ALJ, there, conducted a
fragmented analysis of the claimant’s impairments. 889 F.2d at 50. “He simply noted the effect or
noneffect of each [impairment] and found that the claimant could perform light and sedentary
work.” Id. at 49-50. Ultimately, the claimant was found not disabled based on a residual functional
capacity to perform “sedentary and light work limited only by his inability to work around
unprotected heights because of his seizure disorder.” Id. at 48. The Fourth Circuit, in order to
ensure that the ALJ conducted a combined effect analysis, held that “the ALJ must adequately
explain his or her evaluation of the combined effects of the impairments.” Id. at 50. The case was
remanded for proper consideration of the combined effect of claimant’s impairments. Id.
In the decades since the Walker decision, the Fourth Circuit has provided very little
elaboration about the meaning of “adequate.”2 In an unpublished opinion, the court found that a

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Other circuit courts have shown great deference to the Commissioner in addressing the same issue.
See, e.g., Gooch v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 833 F.2d 589, 592 (6th Cir. 1987) (“[T]he fact
that each element of the record was discussed individually hardly suggests that the totality of the
record was not considered, particularly in view of the fact that the ALJ specifically referred to ‘a
combination of impairments’ in deciding that [the plaintiff] did not meet the ‘listings.’ ”); Browning
v. Sullivan, 958 F.2d 817, 821 (8th Cir. 1992) (“After separately discussing [the plaintiff’s] physical
impairments, affective disorder, and complaints of pain, as well as her daily level of activities, the
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district court had “correctly determined that the ALJ had adequately explained his evaluation of the
combined effect of [a claimant’s] impairments.” Green v. Chater, 64 F.3d 657, 1995 WL 478032, at
*3 (4th Cir. 1995). Although the issue there regarded medical equivalence—a factor in determining
whether impairments meet listing level severity—the opinion sheds light on the Fourth Circuit’s
threshold for analyzing the combined effect of a claimant’s symptoms on his ability to engage in
substantial gainful activity, suggesting Walker was not meant to be used as a trap for the
Commissioner. The court focused on the ALJ’s conclusions that he considered the combination of
the claimant’s impairments in determining disability and noted findings consistent with that
conclusion. Id. Accordingly, the adequacy requirement of Walker is met if it is clear from the
decision as a whole that the ALJ considered the combined effect of a claimant’s impairments. Most
importantly, when multiple impairments are present, this Court must be satisfied that the ALJ’s
decision regarding disability is not founded on a fragmentized analysis of those impairments.
Walker, 889 F.2d at 50. If the ALJ’s analysis is fragmentized, it is, of course, the Plaintiff’s task to
adequately show the Court that the ALJ’s decision could have been different had she done an
adequate combined effect analysis of Plaintiff’s multiple impairments.3 See Mickles v. Shalala, 29

ALJ found that her impairments do not prevent her from performing her past relevant work. To
require a more elaborate articulation of the ALJ's thought processes would not be reasonable.”
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Eggleston v. Bowen, 851 F.2d 1244, 1247 (10th Cir. 1988)
(“Finally [the plaintiff] argues that the ALJ did not consider the combined effects of his
impairments. The ALJ's opinion addresses [the plaintiff’s] various impairments, and we find
nothing to suggest they were not properly considered.”).
3
This holding is consistent with other recent rulings from this district. See, e.g., Wright v. Astrue,
2:10-cv-02449-DCN, 2011 WL 5403070 (D.S.C. Nov. 8, 2011) (adopting the Magistrate Judge’s
R&R, 2:10-cv-02449-DCN-BHH, 2011 WL 5403104 (Oct. 18, 2011) (“The plaintiff’s objection
stops largely at the accusation that the ALJ’s consideration is too thin, which, as the plaintiff
contends, is the appropriate legal point, considering the applicable standard of review, but fails to
take the additional step of suggesting how the outcome could have been different. In other words,
there is a failure to demonstrate anything more than the harmlessness of the error.”)); Robinson v.
Astrue, 2:10-cv-00185-DCN, 2011 WL 4368396, at *5 (D.S.C. Sept. 19, 2011) (“The structure of
the ALJ’s analysis of plaintiff's conditions indicates that the ALJ did, in fact, consider the
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F.3d 918, 921 (4th Cir. 1994) (finding the Commissioner “would have reached the same result
notwithstanding his initial error”); Morgan v. Barnhart, 142 F. App’x 716, 724 (4th Cir. 2005).
Here, the decision as a whole indicates that the ALJ performed an adequate combined effect
analysis of Plaintiff’s multiple impairments. Specifically, the ALJ found, “[b]ased on the record as
a whole, [that] a limitation to light exertional work with the additional postural, environmental and
mental limitations provide[d] an adequate accommodation for the combination of [Plaintiff’s]
severe and nonsevere impairments.” Tr. 21 (emphasis added). This finding clearly indicates that the
ALJ considered Plaintiff’s impairments in combination, which is consistent with Walker, and the
ALJ’s assessment of Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity, in which she considered Plaintiff’s
symptoms and limitations, supports her conclusion. A finding by this Court that her analysis was
fragmentized would impose a standard too strict to remain within the scope of this Court’s mission
under § 405(g), which mandates great deference to the ALJ. Indeed, “[t]o require a more elaborate
articulation of the ALJ’s thought processes would not be reasonable.” Gooch v. Sec’y of Health &
Human Servs., 833 F.2d 589, 592 (6th Cir. 1987). The Court therefore finds that the combined
effect of Plaintiff’s impairments was properly evaluated under Walker.

conditions in combination. This analysis places the facts of this case outside of the circumstances in
Walker v. Bowen. While plaintiff states each alleged ailment again in her objection, she does not
point to any medical evidence which could demonstrate that the ALJ’s analysis was not supported
by substantial evidence. Though a more thorough analysis may be required in some cases, plaintiff
fails to demonstrate how any additional discussion would have produced a different result. Thus, it
appears that the ALJ did not err, and if he did, the error was harmless.”); Thornsberry v. Astrue,
4:08-cv-04075-HMH, 2010 WL 146483, at *5 (D.S.C. Jan. 12, 2010) (“Accordingly, the court finds
that while the ALJ could have been more explicit in stating that his discussion dealt with the
combination of Thornsberry’s impairments, his overall findings adequately evaluate the combined
effect of Thornsberry’s impairments. Any error on the part of the ALJ in failing to use explicit
language is harmless.”); Ingram v. Astrue, 3:07-cv-00823-GRA, 2008 WL 3823859, at *2 (D.S.C.
Aug. 12, 2008) (“[T]he ALJ's separate discussion of each of Plaintiff's impairments indicates that he
considered them ‘in combination.’ This Court finds that such an explanation is adequate.”
(emphasis added)).
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II. Plaintiff’s Credibility
Plaintiff contends the Magistrate Judge merely parroted the ALJ’s erroneous credibility
analysis. Pl.’s Objs. 1. Specifically, Plaintiff maintains that the ALJ (1) did not explain which
symptoms she found Plaintiff was exaggerating (2) did not explain—or was qualified to explain—
the discrepancy between two different lung function tests, or (3) drew “almost exclusively on the
medical evidence prior to [Plaintiff’s] onset date.” Finally, Plaintiff argues the Magistrate Judge (1)
did not even address her “assertion that the ALJ had improperly discounted her credibility based on
her inability to afford more aggressive treatment” and (2) accepted the Commissioner’s post hoc
rationale that the ALJ made “observations of [Plaintiff] at the hearing.” Id. at 2-3.
Under 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(b) and 416.929(b), “the determination of whether a person is
disabled by pain or other symptoms is a two-step process.” Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 594 (4th
Cir. 1996). The threshold requirement is that there be “a showing by objective [medical] evidence
of the existence of a medical impairment which could reasonably be expected to produce the actual
pain, in the amount and degree, alleged by [Plaintiff].” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Once
the ALJ concludes that this threshold requirement has been met, the ALJ must evaluate “the
intensity and persistence of [Plaintiff’s] pain, and the extent to which it affects her ability to work.”4
Id. at 595. “[T]his evaluation must take into account not only [Plaintiff’s] statements about her
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Specifically, the following factors relevant to one’s pain and symptoms will be considered by the
Commissioner: (1) the individual’s daily activities; (2) the location, duration, frequency, and
intensity of the individual’s pain or other symptoms; (3) factors that precipitate and aggravate the
symptoms; (4) the type, dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of any medication the individual
takes or has taken to alleviate the pain or other symptoms; (5) treatment, other than medication, the
individual receives or has received for relief of pain or other symptoms; (6) any measures other than
treatment that the individual uses or has used to relieve pain or other symptoms (such as lying flat
on one’s back, standing for 15 to 20 minutes each hour, etc.); and (7) any other factors concerning
the individual’s functional limitations and restrictions due to pain or other symptoms. 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1529(c)(3) & 416.929(c)(3).
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pain, but also ‘all the available evidence,’ including [Plaintiff’s] medical history, medical signs, and
laboratory findings; any objective medical evidence of pain . . . ; and any other evidence relevant to
the severity of the impairment, such as evidence of [Plaintiff’s] daily activities, specific descriptions
of the pain, and any medical treatment taken to alleviate it.” Id. (citations omitted). The ALJ may
not disregard or discredit the Plaintiff’s statements about pain “solely because they are not
substantiated by objective medical evidence.” SSR 96-7p; see also Craig, 76 F.3d at 595. The
Fourth Circuit has held that once a plaintiff meets the “threshold obligation of showing by objective
medical evidence a condition reasonably likely to cause the pain claimed, [Plaintiff is] entitled to
rely exclusively on subjective evidence to prove the second part of the test, i.e., that [the] pain is so
continuous and/or severe that it prevents [Plaintiff] from working a full . . . day.” Hines v. Barnhart,
453 F.3d 559, 565 (4th Cir. 2006).
However,
[t]his is not say . . . that objective medical evidence and other
objective evidence are not crucial to evaluating the intensity and
persistence of a claimant’s pain and the extent to which it impairs her
ability to work. They most certainly are. Although a claimant’s
allegations about her pain may not be discredited solely because they
are not substantiated by objective evidence of the pain itself or its
severity, they need not be accepted to the extent they are inconsistent
with the available evidence, including objective evidence of the
underlying impairment, and the extent to which that impairment can
reasonably be expected to cause the pain the claimant alleges she
suffers.
Craig, 76 F.3d at 595. Finally, the ALJ’s “determination or decision must contain specific reasons
for the finding on credibility, supported by the evidence in the case record, and must be sufficiently
specific to make clear to the individual and to any subsequent reviewers the weight the adjudicator
gave to the individual’s statements and the reasons for that weight.” SSR 96-7p.

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The Court finds no error in the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. Plaintiff does not
object to the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that “Plaintiff’s medically determinable impairments
could reasonably be expected to cause some of the alleged symptoms.” R&R 14. Instead, Plaintiff’s
objection concerns the second step of the two-step analysis—specifically, the Magistrate Judge’s
acceptance of the manner in which the ALJ weighed Plaintiff’s subjective complaints against the
objective evidence. The Court is mindful of the boilerplate language used by the ALJ, but the
deference this Court must give to the Commissioner requires that it take the ALJ’s findings, as long
as they are supported by substantial evidence, at face value. The ALJ found Plaintiff’s “statements
concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of [her] symptoms are not credible to the
extent they are inconsistent with the . . . residual functional capacity.” Tr. 21. The ALJ’s reason to
discount Plaintiff’s credibility could have been more thorough and better organized; however,
reading the decision as a whole, the Court finds that the inference required to understand which
statements the ALJ did not find entirely credible is satisfactory and that the ALJ’s credibility
findings are supported by substantial evidence.
In her objections, Plaintiff highlights several facets of the ALJ’s analysis of her credibility
that she asserts were erroneous. First, she argues the ALJ relied only on objective evidence. The
argument, however, ignores the fact the ALJ specifically considered Plaintiff’s subjective
complaints in her testimony. See Tr. 20. Second, Plaintiff points to the ALJ’s attempt to reconcile
the results of two separate lung function tests, a spirometry test and an oxygen saturation test. But
this argument mischaracterizes the ALJ’s analysis, where the ALJ was merely considering the
“suboptimal” results of one with the better results of the other. Importantly, the ALJ never found
the results were conflicting. Indeed, it is entirely appropriate to consider all the medical evidence
against Plaintiff’s subjective complaints, including the “[t]reatment records generally indicat[ing]

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[Plaintiff] reported symptom improvement, including significant improvement in breathing.” Tr. 21.
Despite these arguments of Plaintiff, the Court’s duty is determine whether substantial evidence
supports the ALJ’s findings, and, given the medical evidence discussed by the ALJ, the Court finds
no error in the ALJ’s decision concerning Plaintiff’s credibility.
Furthermore, no evidence even suggests that the ALJ discounted Plaintiff’s credibility based
a failure to pay for treatment. Rather, the ALJ found Plaintiff “declined [the] treatment because she
did not like the present side effects,” a finding that is supported by substantial evidence. See Tr. 41.
The ALJ explained her reason to discount Plaintiff’s credibility was based on this finding, noting
that “[i]f [Plaintiff’s] condition was as disabling as alleged, and a treating specialist’s opinion was
that the treatment would result in improvement, it is not reasonable to believe that the treatment
would be rejected.” Tr. 21. The ALJ supported her decision with the finding that the “treatment
records do not contain evidence of complaint[s] of unacceptable side effects.” Id. The Magistrate
Judge was correct then to conclude the ALJ committed no reversible error in weighing the evidence
in order to determine Plaintiff’s credibility.

Plaintiff’s argument, thus, lacks merit, and her

objection is overruled.
III. Plaintiff’s Residual Functional Capacity
Plaintiff contends the Magistrate Judge erred in accepting the ALJ’s residual functional
capacity assessment. Specifically, she maintains that “[c]ontrary to the [Magistrate Judge’s]
assertion, a proper [residual functional capacity] should indeed by discussed on a function-byfunction basis especially when, in order to demonstrate the soundness of this determination, factual
discrepancies and inconsistencies must be resolved.” She argues an example is the ALJ’s failure to
account for Plaintiff’s “complaints of shortness of breath” and how it would affect her “ability to
perform postural exertions and of course, to walk or climb stairs.” Pl.’s Objs. 3.

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Contrary to Plaintiff’s assertion, the ALJ noted Plaintiff’s testimony of shortness of breath.
Tr. 20. The ALJ expressly weighed her complaints against the objective medical evidence, as well
as Plaintiff’s own reports of “continual improvement, with waxing and waning, of symptoms such
as pain, sores on her feet, shortness of breath, rashes, fatigue and mood.” Tr. 21. The ALJ
concluded, however, that the limitations Plaintiff testified about “are not supported by the medical
evidence, including complaints to treating sources.” Id. The residual functional capacity finding
revealed the extent to which the ALJ determined Plaintiff’s shortness of breath was a limitation.
Indeed, the ALJ found Plaintiff could perform only light exertional work and climb stairs and ramps
only occasionally. These functions, therefore, are supported by substantial evidence, and the Court
is satisfied the same can be said for the ALJ’s remaining findings regarding Plaintiff’s residual
functional capacity. Accordingly, the Court finds no error in the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that
the ALJ’s committed no reversible error under the regulations. See SSR 96-8p.
CONCLUSION
The Court has thoroughly reviewed the entire record, including the transcript, the briefs, the
Magistrate Judge’s R&R, Plaintiff’s objections to the R&R, and applicable law. For the reasons set
forth above and by the Magistrate Judge, the Court hereby adopts as modified and incorporates by
reference the R&R of the Magistrate Judge. The Commissioner’s decision is AFFIRMED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/ R. Bryan Harwell
R. Bryan Harwell
United States District Judge
September 13, 2012
Florence, South Carolina

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