Roberts v. Case Pro Incorporated et al
Filing
76
ORDER granting 55 Motion for Summary Judgment Signed by Honorable David C Norton on 7/23/2015.(cahe, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
BEAUFORT DIVISION
LATTANNISHA ROBERTS,
Plaintiff,
v.
CASE PRO INCORPORATED, THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, and
THE UNITED STATES NAVAL
HOSPITAL,
Defendants.
CHRISTOPHER D. MILLER,
Plaintiff,
v.
CASEPRO INCORPORATED, THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, and
THE UNITED STATES NAVAL
HOSPITAL,
Defendants.
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No. 9:13-cv-3394-DCN
No. 9:13-cv-3395-DCN
ORDER
This matter is before the court on identical motions for summary judgment filed
by defendant CasePro, Inc. (“CasePro”). For the reasons set forth below, the court grants
CasePro’s motions for summary judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
On February 24, 2012, Kalvin Hunt (“Hunt”), a Marine on involuntary leave
while appealing his dishonorable discharge, was accompanied to the Beaufort Naval
Hospital (“the naval hospital”) by Edward Ray (“Ray”), an employee of the Beaufort
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County Office of Veteran’s Affairs.1 When Hunt and Ray arrived at the naval hospital,
Nurse Saundra Smith (“Smith”) came to offer assistance and meet with Hunt. While
Smith was in the process of interviewing Hunt and scheduling an appointment for him to
see a doctor the following Monday, Hunt began to rock back and forth in his chair and let
out an exasperated kind of moan. When Smith asked Hunt if he wanted to hurt himself,
he said that he did. At that time, Smith took Hunt and Ray to the emergency department.
Once in the emergency department, Hunt first saw triage nurse Janice McDonald
(“Janice”). When Janice asked Hunt whether he had thoughts about hurting himself, he
responded that he did, although he had no plan to hurt himself at that time. Janice
informed Hunt that he would be evaluated by a psychiatrist and, depending on her
judgment, a decision would be made whether to admit him. Janice turned Hunt over to
her husband Joe McDonald (“Joe”), who is also a registered nurse in the emergency
department. Joe accompanied Hunt to be evaluated by Dr. Christian Jansen (“Dr.
Jansen”). Dr. Jansen noted that Hunt had suicidal thoughts and thoughts of hurting
others, but no specific plans. At that time, Dr. Jansen called for a psychiatric technician
from the naval hospital’s mental health unit to evaluate Hunt.
Arthur Manning (“Manning”), a psychiatric technician, evaluated Hunt and
recommended that Hunt be admitted. The on-duty psychiatrist, Dr. Beverly Hendelman
(“Dr. Hendelman”), accepted the recommendation and made the decision to hospitalize
Hunt. Dr. Hendelman then relayed her decision to Dr. Jansen. The plan was to admit
Hunt to nearby Beaufort Memorial Hospital because the naval hospital did not provide
in-patient mental health treatment.
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Ray is now deceased.
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About the time that Dr. Jansen was in the process of determining bed availability
at Beaufort Memorial, Ray asked Joe if he and Hunt could go outside for some fresh air,
and Joe said that they could. Once outside, Hunt removed some items of clothing and ran
towards the front gate. Ray attempted to pursue Hunt, but was unable to catch him. At
the same time, the Town of Port Royal Fire Department was responding to an emergency
call at a nearby apartment complex. Hunt got into the still-running and unattended fire
truck and began driving the fire truck down Ribaut Road at a high speed. Hunt collided
with many cars, including one driven by plaintiff Lattannisha Roberts (“Roberts”). Hunt
also struck and killed pedestrian Justin Miller, whose brother plaintiff Christopher Miller
(“Miller”) was nearby.
On December 4, 2013, Miller and Roberts filed the present actions, alleging
causes of action against CasePro for negligence and negligent undertaking of duty. On
January 6, 2015, CasePro moved for summary judgment in both cases. On May 5, 2015,
CasePro filed a supplemental motion for summary judgment. Miller and Roberts each
responded on May 12, 2015, and CasePro filed a reply on May 22, 2015. These motions
have been fully briefed and are ripe for the court’s review.
II. STANDARD
Summary judgment is proper “if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “By its very terms, this standard provides that the mere
existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise
properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no
genuine issue of material fact.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247–48
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(1986). “Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the
governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Id. at 248.
“[S]ummary judgment will not lie if the dispute about a material fact is ‘genuine,’ that is,
if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving
party.” Id. “[A]t the summary judgment stage the judge’s function is not himself to
weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there
is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. at 249. The court should view the evidence in the light
most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all inferences in its favor. Id. at 255.
III. DISCUSSION
CasePro argues that Miller and Robert’s claims against it should be dismissed
because the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply. As an initial matter, CasePro
does not dispute that it hired Dr. Jansen, Joe, and Janice to work at the naval hospital and
that it paid their wages. Def.’s Mot. 2. Rather, CasePro argues that because the
government—and not it—had the right to control them, respondeat superior liability does
not apply. Def.’s Mot. 6.
“The doctrine of respondeat superior provides that the employer, as the
employee’s master, is called to answer for the tortious acts of his servant, the employee,
when those acts occur in the course and scope of the employee’s employment.” James v.
Kelly Trucking Co., 661 S.E.2d 329, 330 (S.C. 2008) (citing Sams v. Arthur, 133 S.E.
205, 207–08 (S.C. 1926)). “Such liability is not predicated on the negligence of the
employer, but upon the acts of the employee, whether those acts occurred while the
employee was going about the employer’s business, and the agency principles that
characterize the employer-employee relationship.” Id.
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An employer can only be held responsible for the actions of its employee if the
relationship of master and servant, or employer and employee, existed at the time of the
accident. Parker v. Williams & Madjanik, Inc., 239 S.E.2d 487, 489 (S.C. 1977). In
Parker, the South Carolina Supreme Court noted that
[w]hile it is clear that an employer may lend his employee to another so as
to be relieved from liability for an injury caused by the negligence of the
employee in performing work for the other . . . , it is equally true that an
employer may direct his employee to go upon the premises of another and
perform work there under the general supervision of the other person
without severing the employment relation between the employer and the
employee.
Id. The South Carolina Supreme Court has articulated that resolving that distinction
depends on who controls the employee:
The test generally used in determining whether an employee furnished by
one person to another becomes the employee of the person to whom he is
loaned is whether the employee passes under the latter’s right of control
with regard not only to the work to be done but also to the manner of
performing it.
Id. (emphasis added); see also Foreman v. Atl. Land Corp., 245 S.E.2d 609, 611 (S.C.
1978) (holding that “[t]he critical issue” was “who had control of [the employee] at the
time of the accident” and that the defendant would not be liable if another company
controlled the employee); Allen v. Greenville Hotel Partners, Inc., No. 6:04-cv-1260,
2006 WL 1817804, at *4 (D.S.C. June 30, 2006) (citing Foreman and noting that the “key
question” is which company had control over the employee); 74 Am. Jur. 2d Torts § 60
(“The law imposes vicarious liability on a party for the acts of another when
circumstances show that the liable party controlled the conduct of the acting party.”); 27
Am. Jur. 2d Employment Relationship § 357 (“As a general rule, the doctrine of
respondeat superior applies only where the principal retains the right to control the time,
manner, and method of employment of the agent. An employer is only vicariously liable
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for the acts of an employee when the employee remains under the employer’s direction
and control.”).
Here, the government clearly had the right of control with regard to both the work
Dr. Jansen, Joe, and Janice had to do as well as the manner of performing it. The contract
between CasePro and the government states that workers “providing services under this
contract shall be rendering personal services to the Government and shall be subject to
day-to-day supervision and control by Government personnel.” CasePro’s Mot. Ex. B at
21 (emphasis added). Similar language appears in other sections of the contract. See id.
at 204 (“The Government supervisory personnel specified in the Task Order are
responsible for providing day-to-day supervision and control of contract personnel. This
includes provision of technical guidance, direction, and approval of tasks performed to
satisfy requirements of the contract/task order.”). Moreover, the contract grants the
government the ability to evaluate the performance of contract workers: “The
supervisor’s responsibility for supervision of contractor personnel extends to the normal
feedback that should be provided to any employee regarding the quality of their
performance.” Id. at 108. Contract workers all go through government orientation, id. at
29, and perform a range of mandated duties, id. at 40–41.
The contract indicates that it is entered into under the authority of 10 U.S.C.
§ 1091 and that any personal injury lawsuit filed “based on negligent or wrongful acts or
omissions incident to performance within the scope of this contract” are subject to 10
U.S.C. § 1089. Id. at 21. Section 1089 provides that claims against the government
under the Federal Torts Claims Act are the exclusive means of recovery for personal
injury actions against healthcare workers working under a personal services contract
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entered into under § 1091. Additionally, an instruction from the Department of the Navy
characterizes personal services contract as follows:
In a PSC, an employer/employee relationship is created between the
Government and the contract health care worker, and Government
personnel exercise relatively continuous direct supervision and control
over the contract health workers. PSC health care workers are usually
integrated into the facility, working alongside Government personnel
performing the same tasks.
BUMED Instruction 4200.2D, CasePro’s Reply Ex. A.
In response to this overwhelming evidence that the government exhibited nearly
exclusive control over Dr. Jansen, Joe, and Janice, plaintiffs point only to a provision in
Joe and Janice’s offers of employment that provides that “[b]y accepting employment
with CasePro, Inc. you will be subject to the Company’s policies as set out in its
Employee Manual and the requirements of the subject contract.” Pls.’ Resp. Exs. O, P.
However, plaintiffs do not attach the handbook or indicate what any of the policies in the
handbook entail. Moreover, the employment offers specifically provide that to the extent
that provisions of the employee manual conflict with CasePro’s contract with the
government, “the provisions of the contract will prevail.” Id.
Quite simply, there is no indication in the record that CasePro can control any
aspect of Dr. Jansen, Joe, or Janice’s work. Therefore, CasePro is not liable under the
doctrine of respondeat superior and the court grants its motion for summary judgment.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the court GRANTS CasePro’s motions for summary
judgment.
AND IT IS SO ORDERED.
DAVID C. NORTON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
July 23, 2015
Charleston, South Carolina
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