Anderson v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration

Filing 19

ORDER RULING ON 14 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION The court affirms the final decision of the Commissioner denying Plaintiff's claim for Disability Insurance Benefits. The court accepts the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation (ECF No. 14) and incorporates it herein by reference. Signed by Honorable J Michelle Childs on 09/24/2015. (egra, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
BEAUFORT DIVISION
Rita Williams Anderson,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
)
Carolyn W. Colvin, Acting Commissioner )
of Social Security Administration,
)
)
Defendant.
)
___________________________________ )

Civil Action No. 9:14-cv-00832-JMC

ORDER AND OPINION

Plaintiff Rita Williams Anderson (“Plaintiff”) filed this action seeking judicial review of
the final decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (the
“Commissioner”) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3). (ECF No. 1.)
This matter is before the court for review of the Report and Recommendation (the
“Report”) of United States Magistrate Judge Bristow Marchant, issued in accordance with 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 73.02(B)(2)(a) D.S.C. (ECF No. 14.) On March 25,
2015, the Magistrate Judge recommended affirming the Commissioner’s final decision denying
Plaintiff’s claim for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”). (Id. at 17.) Plaintiff timely filed
objections to the Report, which objections are currently before the court. (ECF No. 16.) For the
reasons set forth below, the court ACCEPTS the Report and AFFIRMS the final decision of the
Commissioner denying Plaintiff’s claim for DIB.
I.

RELEVANT FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The Magistrate Judge’s Report contains a thorough recitation of the relevant factual and
procedural background of this matter. (See ECF No. 14 at 3–8.) The court concludes, upon its
own careful review of the record, that the Report’s factual and procedural summation is accurate,
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and the court adopts this summary as its own. The court will only reference herein background
pertinent to the analysis of Plaintiff’s claims.
Plaintiff was born on September 20, 1962, and is presently 53 years old. (ECF No. 7-5 at
2.) She filed an application for DIB on January 26, 2011, alleging disability since May 1, 20101,
due to lower back surgery complications, knee surgery complications, depression, anxiety,
diabetes,

high

blood

pressure,

diverticulitis,

high

cholesterol,

recurrent

headaches,

gastroesophageal reflux disease, diabetic neuropathy, muscle spasms, degenerative spine disease,
rheumatoid arthritis, and nerve damage. (Id.; see also ECF No. 7-6 at 3.) Plaintiff’s application
was denied initially on May 27, 2011, and upon reconsideration on August 1, 2011. (ECF No. 74 at 2 & 7.) As a result, Plaintiff requested an administrative hearing on September 1, 2011. (Id.
at 11.) On June 22, 2012, Plaintiff had a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”),
Ronald Sweeda, who found on June 28, 2012, that Plaintiff was not under a disability as defined
by the Social Security Act (“SSA”) because she had the residual functional capacity “for a full
range of sedentary work.” (ECF No. 7-2 at 35 & 42.) Thereafter, the Appeals Council granted
Plaintiff’s request for review (id. at 13) on January 6, 2013, and found on June 11, 2014, that
Plaintiff was not under a “‘disability’ from May 1, 2010 through June 30, 2011.” (Id. at 6.) The
Appeals Council decision served as the final decision of the Commissioner for purposes of
judicial review. (Id. at 2.)
Subsequently, on March 11, 2014, Plaintiff commenced an action in the United

1 The

Magistrate Judge observed that “Plaintiff previously filed for DIB on June 8, 2007,
alleging disability beginning May 25, 2006.” (ECF No. 14 at 1 n.1.) Moreover, “[i]n a decision
dated April 30, 2010, Administrative Law Judge Richard L. Vogel found that Plaintiff had the
RFC to perform the full range of sedentary work and that, pursuant to the Medical-Vocational
Guidelines, Plaintiff was not disabled.” (Id. (citing ECF No. 7-3 at 5–12).) The Magistrate
Judge further observed that Judge Vogel’s “decision is binding on this Court, and therefore
Plaintiff may not be considered for disability prior to the disability date she now claims, May 1,
2010.” (Id. (citations omitted).)
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States District Court for the District of South Carolina pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and
1383(c)(3) to obtain judicial review of the Commissioner’s final decision denying Plaintiff’s
claim for DIB.

(ECF No. 1.)

On March 25, 2015, the Magistrate Judge issued his

recommendation that the Commissioner’s final decision denying Plaintiff’s claim for DIB be
affirmed. (ECF No. 14.) Plaintiff filed timely Objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report on
April 13, 2015. (ECF No. 16.) The Commissioner filed a Response to Plaintiff’s Objections to
the Report and Recommendation of Magistrate Judge Marchant on April 17, 2015. (ECF No.
17.)
II.
A.

LEGAL STANDARD

The Magistrate Judge’s Report
The magistrate judge makes only a recommendation to this court. The recommendation

has no presumptive weight. The responsibility to make a final determination remains with this
court. See Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 270–71 (1976). The court reviews de novo only
those portions of a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation to which specific objections
are filed, and reviews those portions which are not objected to – including those portions to
which only “general and conclusory” objections have been made – for clear error. Diamond v.
Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 315 (4th Cir. 2005); Camby v. Davis, 718 F.2d 198,
200 (4th Cir. 1983); Orpiano v. Johnson, 687 F.2d 44, 47 (4th Cir. 1982). The court may accept,
reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the recommendation of the magistrate judge or recommit
the matter with instructions. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
B.

Judicial Review of the Commissioner
The role of the federal judiciary in the administrative scheme established by the Social

Security Act is a limited one.

Section 405(g) of the Act provides, “the findings of the

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Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be
conclusive . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). “Substantial evidence has been defined innumerable times
as more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance.” Thomas v. Celebrezze, 331 F.2d 541,
543 (4th Cir. 1964). This standard precludes a de novo review of the factual circumstances that
substitutes the court’s findings for those of the Commissioner. See Vitek v. Finch, 438 F.2d
1157 (4th Cir. 1971). The court must uphold the Commissioner’s decision as long as it is
supported by substantial evidence. See Blalock v. Richardson, 483 F.2d 773, 775 (4th Cir.
1972). “From this it does not follow, however, that the findings of the administrative agency are
to be mechanically accepted.” Flack v. Cohen, 413 F.2d 278, 279 (4th Cir. 1969). “The
statutorily granted right of review contemplates more than an uncritical rubber stamping of the
administrative agency.” Id. “[T]he courts must not abdicate their responsibility to give careful
scrutiny to the whole record to assure that there is a sound foundation for the [Commissioner’s]
findings, and that this conclusion is rational.” Vitek, 438 F.2d at 1157–58.
III.
A.

ANALYSIS

The Magistrate Judge’s Review
Upon his review, the Magistrate Judge observed that the ALJ supported his finding that

Plaintiff was able to perform sedentary work by giving proper consideration to “Plaintiff’s
testimony at the hearing, the medical record, and Plaintiff’s activities of daily living” (Id. at 9
(citing ECF No. 7-2 at 30–33).) In this regard, the Magistrate Judge found persuasive the ALJ’s
conclusions that “Plaintiff’s subjective complaints and limitations appeared to be exaggerated in
regard to her condition . . . [and] physical examinations through Plaintiff’s date last insured were
essentially unremarkable and did not show any significant worsening of Plaintiff’s condition.”
(ECF No. 14 at 10–11.) Moreover, the Magistrate Judge found support for the ALJ’s decision in

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Plaintiff’s testimony regarding her “activities of daily living,” which evidence failed “to show
that Plaintiff was incapable of sedentary work activity.” (Id. at 12 (citing ECF Nos. 7-2 at 46,
55–56 & 7-6 at 38–42).)
In evaluating the ALJ’s decision to assign less than controlling weight to the opinion of
Plaintiff’s primary care physician (see ECF No. 7-2 at 33), Dr. Brian N. Anderson, M.D. (“Dr.
Anderson”), the Magistrate Judge concluded that “the ALJ considered Dr. Anderson’s opinion
and properly discounted it” for several reasons. (ECF No. 14 at 14.) First, the Magistrate Judge
observed that when Dr. Anderson opined that Plaintiff was “totally disabled” (see ECF No. 7-7
at 134) on June 21, 2012, his opinion was not dispositive because the “determination whether an
individual is ‘disabled’ or ‘unable to work’ is reserved to the Commissioner, and statements that
a claimant is disabled are therefore not given any special significance as to the issue of
disability.” (ECF No. 14 at 14 (citing Castellano v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 26 F.3d
1027, 1029 (10th Cir. 1994) (physician opinion that a claimant is totally disabled “is not
dispositive because final responsibility for determining the ultimate issue of disability is reserved
to the [Commissioner]”); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(1) (“a statement by a medical source that you
are ‘disabled’ or ‘unable to work’ does not mean that we will determine that you are disabled”)).)
Next, the Magistrate Judge agreed with the ALJ’s weighing of Dr. Anderson’s opinion because
of the examples in the record wherein Plaintiff’s own reporting of the extent of her limitations
contradicted Dr. Anderson’s limitations. (Id. at 14–15 (citing ECF Nos. 7-2 at 33, 50–51 & 7-6
at 42).) Finally, the Magistrate Judge asserted that the “ALJ properly discounted Dr. Anderson’s
opinion because it was inconsistent with his own treatment notes, ‘which reveal few objective
findings on examination along with relatively infrequent, routine, and conservative treatment.’”
(Id. at 15 (citing ECF Nos. 7-2 at 33 & 7-7 at 11, 14–15, 17–18, 57, 59, 61, 64, 107, 111, 116–

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17).)
Based upon the foregoing, the Magistrate Judge concluded that “the medical record and
other evidence provide[] substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s findings as to the extent of
Plaintiff’s limitations, and . . . [the Magistrate Judge did not find] reversible error in the ALJ’s
treatment of this evidence.” (Id. at 16.) Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge recommended that
the court find that substantial evidence supported “the conclusion of the Commissioner that the
Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act during the relevant time
period.” (Id. at 17.)
B.

Plaintiff’s Objections and the Commissioner’s Response
Objections to the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation must be specific. See

U.S. v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91, 94 & n.4 (4th Cir. 1984) (failure to file specific objections
constitutes a waiver of a party’s right to further judicial review, including appellate review, if the
recommendation is accepted by the district judge); see also Camby, 718 F.2d at 199 (in the
absence of specific objections to the report of the magistrate judge, this court is not required to
give any explanation for adopting the recommendation).
As to her first objection, Plaintiff asserts that “[t]he ALJ’s decision grossly overestimates
. . . [Plaintiff’s] level of functioning and is quite selective in choosing those medical records to
which significant weight was afforded.” (ECF No. 16 at 2.) As a result, Plaintiff argues that
“the ALJ’s findings regarding the medical source opinions, impairment severity, and medical
equivalency” are not entitled to affirmation. (Id. at 3.)
Plaintiff’s second objection is to the ALJ’s assessment of weight accorded the opinion of
Plaintiff’s treating physician, Dr. Anderson. (Id.) In this regard, Plaintiff argues that “there does
not exist persuasive contradictory evidence to rebut the opinion of Dr. Brian Anderson that . . .

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[Plaintiff] is disabled.” (Id.)
In response to Plaintiff’s objections, the Commissioner asserts that Plaintiff’s arguments
are meritless and “rehash the exact same arguments that she raised in her opening brief and the
Magistrate Judge correctly rejected.” (ECF No. 17 at 1.) Accordingly, the Commissioner prays
that the court adopt the Report in its entirety and affirm the Commissioner’s final decision that
Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the SSA. (Id. at 1–2.)
C.

The Court’s Ruling
In her Objections, Plaintiff merely rehashes arguments that have been properly

considered and rejected by the Magistrate Judge. (See ECF Nos. 10 at 4–5 & 12 at 4.) In the
absence of specific objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report, this court is not required to
provide an explanation for adopting the recommendation. See Camby v. Davis, 718 F.2d 198,
199 (4th Cir. 1983). Rather, “in the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not
conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the
face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.’” Diamond, 416 F.3d at 315. Upon
review, the court does not find clear error in the Report and agrees with the Magistrate Judge that
substantial evidence supports the decision of the Commissioner that Plaintiff was not disabled
within the meaning of the SSA during the relevant time period.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Upon careful consideration of the entire record, the court AFFIRMS the final decision of
the Commissioner denying Plaintiff’s claim for Disability Insurance Benefits.

The court

ACCEPTS the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation (ECF No. 14) and incorporates
it herein by reference.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

United States District Judge

September 24, 2015
Columbia, South Carolina

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