Cahill v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration

Filing 23

ORDER RULING ON 16 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION The Court concurs in the recommendation of the magistrate judge and thus adopts the Report and Recommendation and incorporates it herein by reference to the extent it is consistent with this order. The decision of the Commissioner is affirmed. Signed by Honorable Bruce Howe Hendricks on 09/28/2015. (egra, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
BEAUFORT DIVISION
Stan K. Cahill,

) Civil Action No.: 9:14-2936-BHH
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v.
)
OPINION AND ORDER
)
Carolyn W. Colvin,
)
Acting Commissioner of Social
)
Security,
)
)
Defendant. )
______________________________ )
The plaintiff, Stan K. Cahill (“the plaintiff”), brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 405(g) to obtain judicial review of a final decision of the defendant, Acting Commissioner
of Social Security (“Commissioner”), denying his claim for Disability Insurance Benefits
(“DIB”) under the Social Security Act. In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and
Local Rules 73.02(B)(2)(a) and 83.VII.02, D.S.C., this matter was referred to United States
Magistrate Judge Bristow Marchant for pretrial handling. On April 30, 2015, the magistrate
judge issued a Report and Recommendation in which he determined that the conclusion
of the Commissioner that the Plaintiff was not disabled was based on substantial evidence.
Accordingly, the magistrate judge recommended affirming the Commissioner’s decision.
(ECF No. 16 at 18-19.) The plaintiff filed Objections on June 1, 2015 (ECF No. 19), and
on June 16, 2015, the Commissioner filed a Reply (ECF No. 21). For the reasons stated
below, the Court adopts the Report and Recommendation and affirms the Commissioner’s
decision.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The Report and Recommendation sets forth in detail the relevant facts and
standards of law, and the Court incorporates them and summarizes below in relevant part.
The plaintiff was 38 years old on the date of his amended alleged disability onset date, due
to L-5-5 disc degeneration and bulge, 15-S1 disc protrusion, and root compression, he has
a high school education with past relevant work experience as a truck customizer, cemetery
worker, rental equipment deliverer, construction worker, meat cutter, and retail sales clerk.
(R. at 21, 29, 84-85, 170, 179, 209-10.) The plaintiff’s application was denied initially and
on reconsideration. (R. at 120-23, 130-36.) A hearing was held before an Administrative
Law Judge (“ALJ”) who issued an unfavorable decision on December 6, 2012, finding that
the plaintiff was not disabled.1 (R. at 21-30, 36-90.) The Appeals Council denied the
plaintiff’s request for review (R. at 1-6), making the ALJ’s decision the final decision of the
Commissioner. The plaintiff subsequently filed an action in this Court on July 23, 2014.
(ECF No. 1.)
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
The magistrate judge recommends affirming the ALJ’s decision. (ECF No. 16 at
19.)

The magistrate judge makes only a recommendation to this Court.

The

recommendation has no presumptive weight, and the responsibility to make a final
determination remains with the Court. See Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261 (1976). The
Court is charged with making a de novo determination of those portions of the Report and
Recommendation to which specific objection is made, and the Court may accept, reject,

1

Shortly before the hearing, Plaintiff amended his disability onset date to November 4, 2010.
(R. at 40, 207).

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or modify, in whole or in part, the recommendation of the magistrate judge, or recommit the
matter to her with instructions. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). “However, the Court is not required
to review, under a de novo or any other standard, the factual or legal conclusions of the
magistrate judge as to those portions of the report and recommendation to which no
objections are addressed. While the level of scrutiny entailed by the Court’s review of the
Report thus depends on whether or not objections have been filed, in either case the Court
is free, after review, to accept, reject, or modify any of the magistrate judge’s findings or
recommendations.” Wallace v. Housing Auth. of the City of Columbia, 791 F. Supp. 137,
138 (D.S.C. 1992) (internal citations omitted).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The role of the federal judiciary in the administrative scheme established by the
Social Security Act is a limited one. Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), the court may only review
whether the Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial evidence and whether the
correct law was applied. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (“The findings of the Commissioner of
Social Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive .
. . .”); Myers v. Califano, 611 F.2d 980, 982 (4th Cir. 1980). “Substantial evidence has
been defined innumerable times as more than a scintilla, but less than preponderance.”
Thomas v. Celebrezze, 331 F.2d 541, 543 (4th Cir. 1964); see, e.g., Daniel v. Gardner, 404
F.2d 889 (4th Cir. 1968); Laws v. Celebrezze, 368 F.2d 640 (4th Cir. 1966); Tyler v.
Weinberger, 409 F. Supp. 776 (E.D. Va. 1976). In order for a reviewing court to determine
whether the Commissioner based a decision on substantial evidence, “the decision must
include the reasons for the determination . . . .” Green v. Chater, 64 F.3d 657, 1995 WL
478032, *2 (4th Cir.1995) (citing Cook v. Heckler, 783 F.2d 1168, 1172 (4th Cir.1986)).

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The statutorily mandated standard precludes a de novo review of the factual circumstances
that substitutes the Court’s findings for those of the Commissioner. See, e.g., Vitek v.
Finch, 438 F.2d 1157 (4th Cir. 1971); Hicks v. Gardner, 393 F.2d 299 (4th Cir. 1968).
Accordingly, “the court [must] uphold the [Commissioner’s] decision even should the court
disagree with such decision as long as it is supported by ‘substantial evidence.’” Blalock
v. Richardson, 483 F.2d 773, 775 (4th Cir. 1972). As noted by Judge Sobeloff in Flack v.
Cohen, 413 F.2d 278 (4th Cir. 1969), “[f]rom this it does not follow, however, that the
findings of the administrative agency are to be mechanically accepted. The statutorily
granted right of review contemplates more than an uncritical rubber stamping of the
administrative action.” Id. at 279. “[T]he courts must not abdicate their responsibility to
give careful scrutiny to the whole record to assure that there is a sound foundation for the
[Commissioner’s] findings, and that his conclusion is rational.” Vitek, 438 F.2d at 1157-58.
DISCUSSION
The plaintiff filed objections to the Report and Recommendation (“Objections”) on
June 1, 2015 (ECF No. 19), and the Commissioner filed a reply on June 16, 2015 (ECF No.
21). The plaintiff objects to the magistrate judge’s recommendation concerning the ALJ’s
alleged (1) failure to consider the specialization of the plaintiff’s treating physician, Dr.
Michael Reing; (2) belief that Dr. Reing was biased in favor of the plaintiff; and (3) error in
crediting the opinions of non-examining, non-specialist medical sources over the opinion
of a treating source specialist.2

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As always, the Court says only what is necessary to address such objections against the
already meaningful backdrop of a thorough Report of the magistrate judge, incorporated entirely
by specific reference, herein, to the degree not inconsistent. Exhaustive recitation of law and fact
exists there.

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As is typical, Plaintiff’s Counsel has done an exceedingly thorough job in responding
to the recommendation of the magistrate judge. But, the point-by-point methodology,
employed, amounts mostly to a renewal of arguments already raised and rejected.
Between any particular decision of the ALJ and recommendation of the magistrate judge,
from case to case, there are innumerable opportunities for points of disagreement and
colorable criticism. But, the Court need not consider, as a specific objection, numerous
things that have been essentially and appropriately considered but rejected by the
magistrate judge; it is duplicative to do otherwise and inconsistent with the intended
process. See Hendrix v. Colvin, 2013 WL 2407126, at *4 (D.S.C. June 3, 2013); see also
Jackson v. Astrue, 2011 WL 1883026 (W.D.N.C. May 17, 2011); Aldrich v. Bock, 327 F.
Supp.2d 743, 747 (E.D. Mich. 2004). Accordingly, the district court must “‘only satisfy itself
that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the
recommendation.’” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 316 (4th Cir.
2005) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 Advisory Committee's Note).
And, so, the Court would make the following brief observations in affirmation. At
length, the magistrate judge recognized that Dr. Reing’s opinion was inconsistent with his
own records. (R. at 14-16.) So any objections of the plaintiff concerning Dr. Reing’s
specialization as an orthopedic surgeon or whether, as a result, that opinion should have
been favored over the opinions of non-examining, non-specialist sources begins to fall
away because there are significant independent and internal bases for the ALJ’s decision
to reduce the weight afforded, as a specialist or not. That is not to say that the undersigned
disagrees with the well reasoned conclusion that Dr. Reing’s opinion was also properly
considered inconsistent with other substantial evidence of record. (R&R at 14-16.) For

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instance, the ALJ and magistrate judge found substantial evidence in the form of the
plaintiff’s own testimony, apparently inconsistent with Dr. Reing’s opinion. See id. The
Court does not mean to treat each of the ALJ’s cited grounds with any real specificity
(because the magistrate judge has already done so) but simply to emphasize that, in
addition to being reassertions of arguments already made, the sum of the plaintiff’s many
reasonable objections does not have the effect of undermining the main point of the
magistrate judge – that numerous grounds, supported by substantial evidence, were
provided for giving Dr. Reing’s opinion little weight. (R. at 26-28.) And, the magistrate
judge has rightly not disturbed it. Lastly, the undersigned agrees with the magistrate
judge’s consideration of the objective evidence related to Dr. Reing’s opinion and the
magistrate judge’s consideration of any view the ALJ may have entertained concerning
doctor bias. (R&R 16-17; R at 28.) Neither justify remand.
CONCLUSION
The Court has carefully reviewed the record, including the findings of the ALJ, the
plaintiff’s objections to the Report and Recommendation, and the defendant’s reply. The
Court concurs in the recommendation of the magistrate judge and thus adopts the Report
and Recommendation and incorporates it herein by reference to the extent it is consistent
with this order. The decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/Bruce Howe Hendricks
United States District Judge
September 28, 2015
Greenville, South Carolina

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