Wilcox v. South Carolina Department of Corr et al

Filing 62

ORDER adopting Report and Recommendations of Magistrate Judge Bristow Marchant; granting 50 Motion for Summary Judgment; granting 53 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Honorable Richard M Gergel on 11/20/2015.(cwhi, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
BEAUFORT DIVISION
Vernon Wilcox,

)

Plaintiff,

)
)

vs.

)
)

South Carolina Department of
Corrections, Nurse Brooks, Cynthia
Connell, S. Page, D. Copeland, Captain
Siebles, Major Washington, Sharonda
Sutton, and Robert M. Stevenson, III,
Defendants.

Civil Action No. 9:14-3747-RMG

ORDER

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

-----------------------------)
This matter is before the Court on the Report and Recommendation (R & R) of the
Magistrate Judge, (Dkt. No. 59), recommending this Court grant Defendants' motions for
summary judgment for failure of the Plaintiff to exhaust his administrative remedies. (Dkt. Nos.
50; 53) Plaintiff filed a timely objection. (Dkt. No. 61.) As explained herein, the Court
ADOPTS portions of the R&R as modified and GRANTS Defendants' motions for summary
judgment.

I.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, a former inmate of Broad River Correctional Institution ("BRCI"), filed this
civil action pro se on September 23, 2014. (Dkt. No. I.) Plaintiff alleges claims for deliberate
indifference and violations of due process under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 arising out of events that
occurred during his incarceration at BRCI. (Id at 12-13.) Plaintiff alleges that because of his
HIV status, he was housed in the Wateree dorm, which was one of the two dorms used to house
HIV positive inmates at that time. (Id. at 8.) Subsequently, in February 2013, the Wateree dorm
inmates, including Plaintiff, were relocated to the Monticello dorm. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that
1

on January 3, 2014, all of the Monticello dorm inmates were placed on lockdown "due to a
number of the inmates being infected with a sexually transmitted infection ("STI")." (Id.)
According to Plaintiff, on January 13,2014, Defendant Copeland, a lieutenant, announced that
every inmate in the dorm would have to be treated for this SIl, and that any inmate who refused
treatment would be placed in quarantine. (ld.)
Defendant Washington explains in his affidavit that this treatment arose after "an
outbreak of gonorrhea in the Monticello Unit." (Dkt. No. 50-7 at 2.) Defendant Sutton avers
that the employees and staff at BRCI "attempted to narrow down the potential source of the
infection; however, despite treatment of the gonorrhea-positive inmates in the unit, more cases of
gonorrhea continued to be diagnosed in other inmates." (Dkt. No. 50-9 at 2.) The South
Carolina Department of Corrections ("SCDC") then made the administrative decision "that the
most prudent way to control and eliminate the further spread of the gonorrhea infection was to
treat all ofthe inmates within the HIV unit with antibiotics to avoid an imminent threat of
infection to these already immune-compromised inmates." (ld.)
Plaintiff alleges that the treatment was "forced" upon him, with Defendant Brooks
"forcefully us[ing] a hypodermic needle to inject medication into Plaintiffs body against his
will." (ld.) Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant Connell "forcefully administered [] four pills
to Plaintiff against his will." (ld. at 8-9.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Page, Copeland,
Seibles, Washington, Sutton and Stevenson witnessed this conduct and did not intervene. (ld. at
9.)
According to Plaintiff, he has never engaged in sexual behavior during his incarceration,
and none of the inmates who tested positive for the STI named Plaintiff as a sexual partner. (ld.)
Plaintiff alleges that he was not tested for this STI prior to receiving the treatment, and that

2

Defendants "had no valid reason to forcefully medicate Plaintiff against his will." (ld) Plaintiff
alleges that he has suffered "emotional injuries"-specifically, he "feels humiliated and
embarrassed" and "does not feel safe, physically, in his person." (ld. at 10-12.) He seeks
injunctive! and monetary relief.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(e) DSC, this matter was
automatically referred to a United States Magistrate Judge. Defendants Copeland, Page, Siebles,
SCDC, Stevenson, Sutton, and Washington filed a motion for summary judgment on August 25,
2015 (Dkt. No. 50), and Defendant Connell filed a motion for summary judgment on September
1,2015 (Dkt. No. 53). Plaintiff filed a memorandum in opposition on October 7, 2015. (Dkt.
No. 56.) Defendant Connell filed a reply memorandum on October 19,2015. (Dkt. No. 57.) On
October 27,2015, the Magistrate Judge issued the present R & R recommending the Court grant
Defendants' motions for summary judgment for the failure of Plaintiff to exhaust his
administrative remedies. (Dkt. No. 59.) Plaintiff then filed timely objections to the R & R.
(Dkt. No. 61.)

II.

Legal Standard

The Magistrate Judge makes only a recommendation to this Court. The recommendation
has no presumptive weight, and the responsibility to make a final determination remains with the
Court. Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 270-71, 96 S. Ct. 549,46 L.Ed.2d 483 (1976). Thus,
this Court may "accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations
made by the magistrate judge." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(I). The Court may also "receive further
evidence or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions." Id
! The Court notes that, because Plaintiff is no longer incarcerated at BRCI [See Dkt. No.
61-1 indicating Plaintiff is an inmate at MacDougall Correctional Institution], his claim for
injunctive relief is moot. See Slade v. Hampton Roads Reg 'I Jail, 407 F.3d 243, 248-49 (4th Cir.
2005) (holding former detainee's request for injunctive relief was moot).
3

Defendants move for summary judgment. Summary judgment is appropriate if a party
"shows there is no genuine dispute as to any issue of material fact" and that the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Under the framework established
in Celotex Corporation v. Catrett, the party seeking summary judgment shoulders the initial
burden of demonstrating to the Court that there is no genuine issue of material 'fact. 477 U.S.
317, 323, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). If the moving party makes this threshold
demonstration, then the non-moving party must, in order to survive summary judgment,
demonstrate that specific, material facts exist that give rise to a genuine issue. Id. Notably, "(i]n
this Circuit, verified complaints by pro se prisoners are to be considered as affidavits and may,
standing alone, defeat a motion for summary judgment when the allegations contained therein
are based on personal knowledge." Pendergrass v. United States, No. 0:II-cv-2706, 2013 WL
518842, at *1 n.3 (D.S.C. Feb.l2, 2013) (citing Williams v. Griffin, 952 F.2d 820, 823 (4th Cir.
1991 )).
In reviewing these pleadings, the Court is mindful of Plaintiff s pro se status. This Court
is charged with liberally construing the pleadings of a pro se litigant. See, e.g., De'Lonta v.

Angelone, 330 F.3d 630, 633 (4th Cir. 2003). The requirement of a liberal construction does not
mean, however, that the Court can ignore a pro se plaintiffs clear failure to allege facts that set
forth a cognizable claim, or that a court must assume the existence of a genuine issue of material
fact where none exists. See United States v. Wilson, 699 F.3d 789, 797 (4th Cir. 2012).

III.
A.

Discussion

Fourteenth Amendment Claim

Plaintiff first alleges that Defendants violated his substantive due process rights under
the Fourteenth Amendment. (Dkt. No.1 at 11.) "The right to be free of unwanted physical

4

invasions has been recognized as an integral part of the individual's constitutional freedoms ...."

United States v. Charters, 829 F.2d 479, 491 (4th Cir. 1987), vacated on other grounds, 863 F.2d
302 (4th Cir. 1988). Moreover, "[t]he right to refuse medical treatment has been specifically
recognized as a subject of constitutional protection," id., that survives criminal conviction and
incarceration, cf Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 316, 102 S.Ct. 2452, 73 L.Ed.2d 28 (1982)
(recognizing liberty from bodily restraint, as protected by the Due Process Clause from arbitrary
governmental action, survives criminal conviction and incarceration). Thus, "[i]f an individual is
competent to make medical decisions, the individual's informed decision presumptively is the
best decision for that individual ...." Charters, 829 F.2d at 494-95; see also Washington v.

Harper, 494 U.S. 210,221-22, 110 S.Ct. 1028, 108 L.Ed.2d 178 (1990) (recognizing an
individual's "significant liberty interest in avoiding the unwanted administration" of a specific
form of medical treatment).
Although the right of a prisoner to be free from unwanted medical treatment is protected
under the Fourteenth Amendment, there are instances where a state's interest in providing a safe
and secure prison environment outweigh the liberty interests of an individual. See Harper, 494
U.S. at 223. Courts have balanced these interests in favor of the government in instances where
the inmate's refusal oftreatment could impact the health of other inmates and prison personnel.

See Harper, 494 U.S. at 220 (inmate forced to take antipsychotic drugs for the safety of himself
and those around him); Davis v. Anibal, 89 Fed. App'x. 523 (6th Cir. 2004) (bleeding prisoner
forced to have his head stitched shut to preserve his own life and to protect those around him);

McCormick v. Stalder, 105 F.3d 1059 (5th Cir. 1997) (inmate forced to undergo treatment for
tuberculosis); Russell v. Richards, 384 F.3d 444, 449 (7th Cir. 2004) (prisoners forced to use
delousing shampoo to prevent infestation among all inmates). Indeed, the Tenth Circuit has

5

noted that a "prison's interest in responding to the threat of ... any contagious disease occurring
in prison, is obviously strong." Dunn v. White, 880 F .2d 1188, 1195 (10th Cir. 1989).
"[T]he proper standard for determining the validity of a prison regulation claimed to
infringe on an inmate's constitutional rights is to ask whether the regulation is 'reasonably
related to legitimate penological interests.'" Harper, 494 U.S. at 223 (quoting Turner v. Safley,
482 U.S. 78, 89, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987). The fit between the jail's legitimate
interests and its policy need not be perfect in order to survive scrutiny, it need only be rational.

Waterman v. Farmer, 183 F.3d 208,215 (3d Cir.1999); see also Turner, 482 U.S. 78,89-90
("[A] regulation cannot be sustained where the logical connection between the regulation and the
asserted goal is so remote as to render the policy arbitrary or irrational.").
Here, the SCDC made the decision to administer treatment for gonorrhea in an effort to
prevent the spread of this contagious disease after an outbreak occurred. According to
Defendant Sutton's affidavit, the prison officials first limited treatment to those who had tested
positive for the disease. (Dkt. No. 50-9 at 2.) However, as more cases of gonorrhea continued to
be diagnosed, the prison decided "the most prudent way to control and eliminate the further
spread" of this disease was to treat all of the inmates in the Monticello dorm. (ld) The prisoners
who did not want to receive treatment were given the option of being quarantined instead. (/d)
In light of the prison officials' legitimate concerns about the "imminent threat of infection to
these already immune-compromised inmates," (id.), the Court fmds that requiring the inmates be
treated for gonorrhea was reasonably related to the prison's legitimate medical and penological

6

objectives. Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to establish a violation under the Fourteenth
Amendment. 2

B.

Eighth Amendment Claim

Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants' conduct amounts to deliberate indifference to
serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. (Dkt. No.1 at 11.) Deliberate
indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the "unnecessary and wanton
infliction of pain," proscribed by the Eighth Amendment. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104,
97 S. Ct. 285, 291, 50 L. Ed. 2d 251 (1976). To establish deliberate indifference, an inmate must
allege both that he experienced a deprivation that was "objectively sufficiently serious" and "that
subjectively the officials acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind." De 'Lonta v. Angelone,
330 F.3d 630, 634 (4th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks, alteration, and emphasis omitted).
Negligence or medical malpractice will not establish a sufficiently culpable state of mind.

Id.; Grayson v. Peed, 195 F.3d 692, 695 (4th Cir. 1999). Instead, a constitutional violation does
not occur unless the medical provider's actions were "so grossly incompetent, inadequate, or
excessive as to shock the conscience or to be intolerable to fundamental fairness." MUtier v.

Beorn, 896 F.2d 848, 851 (4th Cir. 1990). An inmate's mere disagreement with the course of
treatment provided by medical officers will not support a valid Eighth Amendment claim.

Russell v. Sheffer, 528 F.2d 318, 319 (4th Cir. 1975).

The Court also liberally construes the Complaint to allege an equal protection violation
under the Fourteenth Amendment. (Dkt. No. 1 at 13.) However, for the above reasons, the
Court finds that the prison's decision to treat HIV-positive inmates for gonorrhea was rational
based on its legitimate concerns about the "imminent threat of infection to these already
immune-compromised inmates." (Dkt. No. 50-9 at 2.) Accordingly, this claim also fails as a
matter oflaw. See Verderamo v. Mayor & City Council o/Baltimore, 4 F. Supp. 3d 722,733-34
(D. Md. 2014) ("Under rational-basis review, a governmental classification 'must be upheld
against equal protection challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could
provide a rational basis for the classification.'" (quoting F.c.c. v. Beach Comm., Inc., 508 U.S.
307,313,113 S.Ct. 2096,124 L.E.2d 211 (1993)).
2

7

In the Complaint, Plaintiff acknowledges that he had the option to be quarantined as an
alternative to receiving the gonorrhea treatment. (Dkt. No.1 at 8.) Apparently, Plaintiff elected
not to be quarantined and was "forcefully" treated for gonorrhea. (Id) Plaintiff asserts that
"Defendants Stevenson, Sutton, Washington, Seibles, Copeland, and Page were indifferent for
failing to stop th[e] unwarranted [gonorrhea] treatment," and "Defendants Connell and Brooks
were indifferent for administering this unwarranted and unwanted medication." (Dkt. No. 56 at
16.) Notably, Plaintiff does not allege that he suffered any physical harm as a result of
Defendants' conduct. Rather, he asserts that he has been "humiliated and embarrassed due to the
actions of the Defendants." (Dkt. No.1 at 10.)
Even if Plaintiff's allegations are true, he has failed to show that he had a serious medical
need of which Defendants knew about and consciously ignored. Additionally, he has not shown
that any conduct by the Defendants "shocks the conscience" as required by Milter v. Bearn.
Accordingly, even when viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the record creates no
genuine issue of material fact to support his deliberate indifference claim.

Conclusion
The Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to establish any genuine issues of material fact as
to his constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Having disposed of the motions for
summary judgment on this ground, the Court does not reach the issue of whether Plaintiff failed
to exhaust his administrative remedies. Accordingly, the Court ADOPTS the portions of the
R&R granting Defendants' motions and GRANTS Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment
(Dkt. Nos. 50; 53).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

8

Richard M. Gergel
United States District Judge
November to ,2015
Charleston, South Carolina

9