Rumsey v. Brady Corporation

Filing 92

ORDER granting $4,403.28 in costs re 90 Bill of Costs, filed by Brady Corporation. Signed by Honorable David C Norton on July 18, 2019. (kwhe, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
BEAUFORT DIVISION
KIMBERLY RUMSEY,

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Plaintiff,
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vs.
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BRADY CORPORATION,
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Defendant.
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____________________________________)

No. 9:17-cv-02026-DCN
ORDER

This matter is before the court on defendant Brady Corporation’s (“Brady”)
submission of a bill of costs for $4,403.28. Plaintiff Kimberly Rumsey (“Rumsey”)
objects to the costs. For the reasons set forth below, the court overrules Rumsey’s
objections and grants Brady $4,403.28 in costs.
“Unless a federal statute, these rules, or a court order provides otherwise, costs—
other than attorney’s fees—should be allowed to the prevailing party.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
54(d)(1). Rule 54(d)(1) creates a presumption “that costs are awarded to the prevailing
party.” Keeshan v. Eau Claire Coop. Health Centers, Inc., 394 F. App’x 987, 997 (4th
Cir. 2010). However, “while Rule 54(d)(1) intends the award of costs to the prevailing
party as a matter of course, the district court is given discretion to deny the award.”
Cherry v. Champion Int’l Corp., 186 F.3d 442, 446 (4th Cir. 1999). “To overcome the
presumption [of awarding costs], a district court must justify its decision [to deny costs]
by articulating some good reason for doing so.” Id. The following factors may justify
denying an award of costs: (1) the prevailing party’s engagement in misconduct worthy
of a penalty; (2) “the losing party’s inability to pay”; (3) excessive claimed costs; (4) the
limited value of the prevailing party’s victory; and (5) “the closeness or difficulty of the
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issues decided.” Id. A district court’s decision to award or deny costs is reviewed for
abuse of discretion. Id.
Brady prevailed in this action, having judgment entered in its favor pursuant to
the court’s order granting Brady’s renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law.
While Rumsey does not dispute that Brady is the prevailing party, she argues that an
award of costs to Brady should be denied based on several of the factors articulated in
Cherry. Rumsey first argues that Brady should not be awarded costs because Rumsey
will have trouble paying the costs. A court may deny costs when the losing party is “of
such modest means that it would be unjust or inequitable to enforce Rule 54(d)(1) against
her.” Cherry, 186 F.3d at 447. Indeed, courts have denied costs when the losing party
convincingly demonstrates its inability to pay. See Jeter v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2017 WL
5593296, at *2 (D.S.C. Mar. 28, 2017) (denying prevailing party’s bill of costs in part
because the losing party was over sixty years old, ran a small business, was the sole
provider for his family, and stated that paying the costs would be a substantial hardship);
Merritt v. Old Dominion Freight Line, Inc., 2009 WL 1362378, at *1 (W.D. Va. May 15,
2009) (finding that plaintiff did not have ability to pay costs because she was unable to
find a job after actively looking for one, had few assets, and had significant credit card
debt).
Here, Rumsey contends that she would have difficulty paying costs because she
makes less money at her current job than she did while working for Brady and because
she is a caretaker for her mother, who suffers from Alzheimer’s. While the court is
sympathetic to Rumsey’s caregiving responsibilities, she has not shown that she suffers
from the severe financial hardship that courts have found to result in an inability to pay

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costs. Therefore, the court is unconvinced that Rumsey is “of such modest means that it
would be unjust or inequitable” for her to pay costs. See Cherry, 186 F.3d at 447.
Rumsey also argues that she brought the case in good faith. “Most circuits,
including this one, have rejected the argument that an unsuccessful Title VII plaintiff’s
good faith in bringing the suit will likewise shield her from being taxed with her
opponent’s costs.” Keeshan, 394 F. App’x at 998. Therefore, Rumsey’s representation
that she brought her case in good faith does not weigh in favor of denying costs.
Finally, Rumsey argues that this case was close and decided on “the narrowest of
issues.” A case is “close and difficult” when it is “hotly contested at trial” or when the
legal issues are not “clear cut.” Ellis v. Grant Thornton LLP, 434 F. App’x 232, 235 (4th
Cir. 2011). While Rumsey is correct in pointing out that the jury trial did not result in a
unanimous verdict for either side, the court’s decision granting judgment in favor of
Brady was not decided on “the narrowest of issues.” The court held that Rumsey failed
to prove an essential element of her prima facie case, namely, that Rumsey was engaged
in activity protected by Title VII because her belief of discrimination was not objectively
reasonable. Circuit courts have not, as Rumsey suggests, decided this issue “on both
sides of the fence.” Instead, courts are clear that a plaintiff must show that her belief that
she was a victim of discrimination was objectively reasonable, and Rumsey presented no
evidence of gender discrimination to support an objectively reasonable belief other than
her own speculation. Courts have consistently held that a plaintiff’s speculation alone is
not sufficient to meet her burden on this element.

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In sum, after considering the Cherry factors, 1 the court finds that Rumsey’s
arguments do not overcome the presumption of awarding costs to the prevailing party.
For the foregoing reasons the court OVERRULES Rumsey’s objections and GRANTS
Brady $4,403.28 in costs
AND IT IS SO ORDERED.

July 18, 2019
Charleston, South Carolina

DAVID C. NORTON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Rumsey does not argue that Brady engaged in misconduct or that Brady’s costs
are excessive.
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